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Abstract 
This thesis studies internationalisation strategies for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). For most SMEs internationalisation means, predominantly, 
exporting. Only a few SMEs are involved in foreign direct investment. However, 
growing pressure from globalisation increasingly means that SMEs must extend their 
business activities beyond sole export strategies. 
Internationaiisation imposes an above-the-average financial and managerial resource 
burden upon SMEs. This is particularly true in the case of foreign direct investment 
which requires the highest resource commitment of all market entry strategies. 
Frequently, thus, SMEs cannot commit the resources necessary for success in 
international markets. Not without reason internationalisation, in the form of foreign 
direct investment, is often considered the domain of large multinational enterprises. 
This thesis regards the joint venture strategy as a means to overcome the resource 
scarcity of SMEs and so make foreign market entry in the form of a direct investment 
commitment feasible for these firms. Joint ventures can open doors to markets that 
otherwise would not be open to SMEs. The joint venture strategy can be a vehicle for 
SMEs to penetrate a foreign market with only a reduced financial and managerial 
resource commitment. 
The results of this investigation suggest that joint ventures are a feasible strategy for 
UK and German SMEs to enter the vast market of the People's Republic of China. The 
joint venture strategy permits SMEs to establish a market presence in the Chinese 
market and so better reap the benefits of the impressive economic development of the 
country. 
The UK and German joint venture entrepreneurs studied expressed overall satisfaction 
with their joint investment projects in China. However, the study has also detected 
various size-related resource scarcities which restrict the SMEs in their joint venturing 
efforts. Short cut planning procedures and partner selection processes are resultant 
from that, as well as a weak bargaining position in negotiations and less influence in 
the control and management of the investment project. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 introduction 
1.1.1 Global is ing b u s i n e s s e s 
Globalisation has been a major trend of the 1990s. The world is shrinking at a speed 
that was unthinkable only ten years ago (Teltschik, 1998). Companies, which a decade 
ago felt secure inside national borders, are now facing ever-increasing international 
competition. In fact, a recent survey of European businesses (Jackson, 1997) has 
shown that global competition is the major challenge for Europe's business leaders. 
These companies now recognise the need to pursue global strategies in line with the 
argument of Porter (1980) and Harrigan (1984) that competition can no longer be 
confined to national boundaries. Although globalisation has frequently been declared a 
threat to national businesses, it equally holds plenty of opportunities for them 
(Gundlach and Nunnenkamp, 1998). 
New international horizons - including the creation of the single European market, 
NAFTA, the opening up of the former eastern bloc, the creation of ASEAN and now the 
emergence of the countries of East Asia - offer endless opportunities for globalisation. 
In the words of the German ministry for economic co-operation (BMZ, 1995), fresh 
momentum to new economic areas has been emerging. Developments in information 
technology and telecommunications that have reduced the costs of communication 
and transportation, interacting governments, and the move towards freer trade under 
the auspices of the world trade organisation (WTO), have fuelled this move towards 
globalisation (Gibb, 1995). 
Whereas in the earty 19th century only about 1 per cent of all goods manufactured in 
the world were traded internationally, in the 1990s this share has grown to about 15 
per cent. Worldwide production in the 1990s is 44 times higher than in 1820 and 
wortdwide trade, 600 times higher. In recent decades, growth in world trade has been 
consistently higher than growth in production (EOSME, 1993). According to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, in the mid-1990s world economic output grew 
at an average annual rate of 3.7 per cent and worldwide trade at more than 8 per 
cent.' Trade between industrialised and less developed countries (LDCs) grew even 
faster - at more than 11 per cent (FT, 27.9.96, p.xv). 
Trade barriers across much of the world have declined sharply and estimations 
suggest that the average tariff by 1990 stood at about 7 per cent, less than 20 per cent 
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of the level four decades earlier (Tait, 1997).^ Worldwide production and worldwide 
trade are closely interconnected: the freer international trade, the more the production 
of specific products shifts to countries specialising in the manufacture of those 
products. Similarly, the more intense is international job sharing, the faster the growth 
of worldwide production. 
The markets of many western companies are saturated and no longer demand outputs 
of sufficient size to secure growth and competitiveness. Western economies are 
growing only moderately. In 1996, the UK economy was growing at 1.1 per cent (Office 
for National Statistics, 1998) and the German economy grew-at 1.4 per cent in 1996 
and 2.2 per cent in 1997 (FAZ, 28.2.98, p. 13). As a consequence, companies are 
making great efforts to globalise their operations. As many companies now recognise 
the need to establish market presence to ensure efficient servicing of customers, 
globalisation has become particularly important for traditional export economies, 
including the UK and Germany. In 1997, the UK was the fifth biggest exporter in the 
world and Germany the second largest, with export volumes of US$280bn (£179.5bn) 
and US$51 Ibn (£327.6bn), respectively (FAZ, 24.3.98, p. 17). 
The term globalisation has become synonymous with internationalisation. However, 
Buckley (1997) draws a clear demarcation line between these two concepts: 
globalisation suggests that firms can reach similar foreign markets simultaneously; 
internationalisation implies a gradual approach to entering also dissimilar markets. 
When authors suggest that enterprises are becoming increasingly committed to global 
markets (Barkema et al., 1996), this applies in the main to large companies rather than 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Large firms have long been regarded as 
global players, whereas SMEs reportedly have been reluctant to engage in global 
business activities. However, the necessity for them to engage in global business 
activities is becoming more and more important as increasingly they are experiencing 
saturated home markets, global competition, high labour costs, punitive taxes and 
bureaucracy (Lloyds Bank, 1996; FT, 10.10.97, p.3).^ This is substantiated by some 
authors (Gibb, 1995 for the UK; BMZ, 1995 for Germany) who argue that as SMEs 
make up a large proportion of the total number of companies in an economy, they will 
be affected by globalisation and internationalisation. According to Reynolds (1997), as 
much as 80 per cent of all SMEs will be affected by, or involved in, international trade 
by the year 2005. 
In fact, SMEs not only constitute the bulk of firms in all economies in the world," but 
they also contribute considerably to private sector output,^ exporting^ and employment^ 
(Storey, 1994; Dawson, 1995; Buckley, 1997; Reynolds, 1997).' 
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As a norm this study adopts the definition of SME as proposed by EUROSTAT:^ 
accordingly, an SME has a workforce not exceeding 500 employees (see DTI, 1995; 
BMWi, 1995; Buckley, 1997). An extensive evaluation of UK, German and European 
academic literature as well as the UK, German and European official opinions of what 
constitutes an SME indicates a variety of approaches towards defining an SME (see 
Appendix I). The EUROSTAT definition is the most appropriate for the purpose of this 
study. It ignores the turnover criterion distorted by factors, such as exchange rates and 
inflation. Critics could argue that, to refer to "an SME" is linguistically incorrect since a 
company is either small or medium-sized, but not small and medium-sized. 
Internationalisation by SMEs helps reinforce economies at home by securing existing 
jobs, creating new ones and establishing new, more efficient organisational models 
(VobaRaiba, 1996). As has been pointed out (SBFD, 1995), diversity is one rationale 
for the existence of SMEs. As a consequence they are able to play an increasingly 
important international role as providers of solutions to diverse needs since they are 
able to adjust more quickly to differences in standards and statutory regulations than 
their larger counterparts. Foreign markets offer SMEs opportunities for long-term 
growth and profitability (Calof, 1993). Simon (1996), for instance, insists that his 
'hidden champions' (German world class SMEs) have to cross borders if they are to 
grow since their markets in any one country are too small. In fact, many SMEs have 
turned to foreign markets because their home markets have turned sour (Economist, 
3.7.93, p.59). However, SMEs frequently lack the necessary resources to 
internationalise effectively and participate in globalisation. 
Conversely, other sources document an unexpectedly large international presence of 
SMEs (eg VobaRaiba, 1996). Evidence of the increasing recognition of SME 
participation in international business has been found in Germany.'" This was 
evidenced by the adoption by the Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken (public banks) of 
'SME internationalisation' for their Award Innovative SMEs 7996." The accolade was 
awarded to SMEs that had successfully entered international markets and in so doing 
had contributed to the protection and development of their domestic operations. 
Businesses of different size display different degrees of globalisation (and 
internationalisation), as do businesses in different industries. According to the German 
Association of Chambers of Commerce (DIHT) (1995), SMEs understand 
internationalisation predominantly as exporting and importing. This finds support from 
an examination of business literature databases (Kaiser and Griffen, 1996), which 
established that exporting is the most frequently used internationalisation strategy of 
SMEs (chapter two, section 2.3.1). Market servicing strategies which demand higher 
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resource commitment, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), tend to be neglected. 
SMEs only rarely invest abroad (Berger and Uhlmann, 1984) and investment activity 
correlates positively with company size (Kayser and Hauser, 1990). 
FDI has long been seen as the domain of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) which 
manufacture in locations offering low costs and vast markets. This is due to the long-
term financial and managerial resource commitment and the consequent need for risk 
taking which is too often a barrier to SME FDI (Laughton, 1995). However, increasingly 
SMEs are recognising the necessity to extend their thinking on internationalisation 
beyond exporting and importing. This has been observed by OECD (1981), Rennie 
(1993) and Mulhern (1994), though SME direct investments are still only small in 
volume (Berger and Uhlmann, 1984; DIHT, 1996). The German research institute 
HWWA^^ (1996) found that 7 per cent of all German SMEs are internationally active 
whereas only 1 per cent of SMEs undertake FDI projects. 
Various sources have suggested that SMEs follow their corporate clients abroad 
(Schuller, 1994; Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995; 
DIHT, 1996) in an effort to maintain existing business relationships. For instance, 
Technoplast GmbH of Germany, an SME supplying Siemens AG of Germany, set up 
operations in Malacca, Malaysia, when its multinational customer shifted 
semiconductor production from Regensburg, Germany, to the Malaysian location. The 
fact that Siemens could not find a qualified supplier was both the challenge and the 
opportunity for the German SME (Handelsblatt, 14.6.95, p.18). The resource 
attractions of foreign markets - low cost production and advantageous legal and 
administrative environments (DIHT, 1995; DIHT, 1995b) - are also suggested as 
motivations for SMEs to engage in FDI. 
1.1.2 Participation in the 'Chinese miracle' 
Three decades ago, Myrdal (1968) painted a bleak picture of 'massive misery' and 
'insuperable underdevelopment' in the Asian economies'. Yet 25 years later, the World 
Bank (1993) pointed out that all 23 countries within that area" had enjoyed a faster 
growrth rate than all other world economies and as a result almost all of them had 
experienced a reduction in poverty. 
In Asia, the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) enjoys an outstanding 
position as a target for foreign businesses. Since its opening up to the outside world in 
late 1978, China has been the focus of international business activities. Since 1978, it 
has increased its economy by an average 9 per cent a year and its foreign trade 
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volume has grown from US$20.6bn (£13.2bn) to US$325bn (£208.3bn) in 1997, 
making the country the tenth largest trader worldwide (World Bank, 1997).''' 
China's increasing importance for the economies of Europe has been recognised both 
on the supra-national level of the EU'^ and at a national level within the UK and 
Germany (Wilson, 1990). Following the 1996 UK trade mission to China, it was noted 
that the country was "very important for Britain" (Heseltine'^), "the greatest challenge in 
the next century" (Campbell") and "a country nobody can afford to ignore" (Leitch'^). 
The growing bilateral importance of business between the UK and China and Germany 
and China, respectively, is evidenced by the number of reciprocal senior government 
ministerial visits. These included the then UK deputy prime minister Heseltine's visits to 
China in 1995'^ and 1996,^° German chancellor Kohl's four visits to China since 1982 
and the visits of Chinese president Jiang and then premier Li to the UK and Germany, 
as well as Qian's and Wu's visits to Germany in 1993 and to the UK in 1994 and 1996, 
respectively. China's new premier Zhu was expected in Germany in spring 1998 and in 
June 1998 Kohl was to pay a return visit to China. Whereas China's relationship with 
Germany has been successfully maintained on an even footing for many years,^' 
China's relations with the UK were soured by the question of democratic reforms in the 
former British crown colony, Hong Kong (DTI, 1995).^^ However, friction between 
China and the US over intellectual property and human rights has seen a gradual tilting 
in favour of the UK and Germany. 
China's importance to the UK and German economies is further illustrated by a 
considerable expansion of both nations' support networks in the PRC, including 
chambers of commerce and, on UK side, the China-Britain Trade Group (CBTG). 
Germany by the end of April 1998 had opened two further delegation offices, one in 
Beijing and the other in Guangzhou. The first, in Shanghai, had been operational since 
autumn 1994 and had spawned a German Centre in the city's Pudong district, 
providing enhanced support to German companies, predominantly SMEs (FAZ, 
28.4.98, p.19). A final step will be the establishment of a chamber of commerce similar 
to the 1920s when several German chambers of commerce existed in China. 
The necessity to establish a local presence in order to improve market access as 
opposed to cutting production costs has been suggested on an Asia-wide basis (Arthur 
Andersen, in FT, 6.2.96, p.5; Federation of Swedish Industries, in FT, 25.6.96, p.3)^^ 
as well as specifically for China (Klenner, 1986; Schiiller, 1994; Grimm, 1997b). An FDI 
presence facilitates closer company-to-market proximity than exporting. This improves 
competitiveness. Unilever's China chairman has already warned that UK companies 
which do not move into China now "will miss the boat, because competition is already 
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there" (Sunday Times, 15.1.95, p.2.6). Similarly, the Siemens chief executive officer 
and chairman of the German Asia-Pacific Committee (APA) has called upon German 
companies to engage in FDI in China to capture the benefits of China's dynamically 
developing economy (Welt, 16.9.95, p.22). 
UK and German companies are to a large extent already aware of this and are looking 
to China as a feasible location for overseas investment (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 1.6.95, p.46; Delegation of German Industry and 
Commerce Hong Kong, 1995). The two nations' enterprises are eyeing China's vast 
domestic market as a supplement to saturated home markets and, in the case of 
Germany, the slowly emerging markets in Eastern Europe (Schuller, 1994). UK and 
German companies enjoy special investment opportunities in China due to Chinese 
efforts to resist dependency on Japanese investment and China's high regard for UK 
and German products. 
Within Europe, the UK is the biggest direct investor in China, ahead of Germany which 
ranks second. On a worldwide scale the UK ranks sixth as a direct investor in China 
and Germany ninth. 
1.1.3 Weak S M E FDI presence in China 
International sections of daily business papers, such as the UK's Financial Times or 
Germany's Handelsblatt, comprehensively cover the FDI moves by large MNEs. It is 
difficult, however, to detect investment companies outside the top 100-plus private 
enterprises (Cahill, 1997). One possible reason is that projects undertaken by SMEs 
are usually only small in size and individually unimportant to China's economic 
development. For this reason they escape coverage by the media. Another reason is 
that many SMEs prefer details to remain confidential (Simon, 1996). This was 
confirmed in an interview with the Consul Commercial at the British Consulate General 
in Shanghai who suggests that the bulk of all UK FDI in China comes from industrial 
giants, though smaller, specialist UK companies have also invested in China (Steve 
Smith interview, 17.8.95). A similar explanation is also offered for the relatively low 
commitment of German S^ylEs in China (MTC, December 1994, p.6; Manfred Holthus 
interview, 9.5.95). However, this is not the case for Japanese, Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese FDI. Evidence indicates their SMEs entered China initially as direct 
investors (Shenkar, 1990; Fujita, 1993; Kelly, 1994; Duffy, 1995). 
The SME interest in the Chinese market in the UK and in Germany is considerable. Of 
82 SMEs in Northeast England that targeted the Asia-Pacific region, as many as 34 
targeted also, or exclusively, the Chinese market (Kaiser and Kirby, 1996). The 1996 
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Heseltine trade mission to China confirmed this interest on a nationwide basis, 
suggesting that "many SMEs attended" [the trade mission] (Heseitine, 6.6.96). 
Elsewhere (Keenlyside, 1996) 'many' was defined as 40 per cent of all firms 
participating in the trade mission. Evidence is also available from Germany where in 
excess of 500 SMEs expressed interest in the acquisition of an FDI guide for China, 
There is no definite figure indicating the number of SME projects in China. According to 
the Shanghai-based British Commercial Consul, "there are only very few"^^ (Paul 
Davies interview, 11.11.96). It has been suggested that SMEs are under-represented 
in China (CHINA-INFO, July 1995; Handelsblatt, 29.5.95, p.14). However, there is no 
evidence given to support such statements. Although in 1996, the Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Shanghai estimated the number of German SMEs 
involved in FDI at 180 to 200,^^ this figure seems to be rather speculative: there was 
neither a methodology provided nor a basis given for this estimation. 
The reasons for the weak presence of UK and German SMEs in China are: 
• SMEs face fundamental problems when it comes to internationalisation and, in 
particular, FDI. These include a weak financial standing, insufficient managerial 
capacity, a lack of relevant information for decision-making and a relatively risk-
averse attitude towards internationalisation. The German economic ministry 
suggests another impediment to SME FDI; while large MNEs have sufficient 
bargaining power to create special contractual frameworks for the treatment of 
their direct investments, SMEs do not (HWWA, 1996). Even though an SME 
investment - such as the application of a new technology with spill-over effects 
for the domestic economy - should qualify for the kind of preferential treatment 
awarded to large MNEs, the reality is they do not; 
• there are various obstacles to FDI in China that large companies are confronted 
by and struggle with, including a foreign language, cultural differences, logistical 
difficulties, lack of qualified employees, lack of managerial staying power and 
renunciation of a long-term strategy (Thiess, 1994). It is further suggested 
(Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995) that many 
companies are insufficiently accustomed to the procedures of establishing co-
operation projects with local companies. In the case of SMEs, however, these 
barriers to FDI are even harder to surmount. In a recent study, Wilpert and 
Scharpf (1990) highlighted the psychic distance between Germany and China 
and Geissbauer (1994) suggested that German companies are reluctant to 
invest due to the political risk and lack of reliable market data; 
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• further reasons for the weak presence of German SMEs in China are the 
country's weak legal system, bureaucracy, the economic situation, inefficient 
infrastructure and personnel/management difficulties (Wu, 1993; Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995); 
• reasons put forward by the British Consul Commercial in Shanghai include the 
cost of doing business in China, insufficient knowledge about the China market, 
a certain reluctance of SMEs to go to China, a negative (or problem-rich) 
perception within SMEs of Chinese market entry and the absence of a pro-
active attitude towards the Chinese market (Paul Davies interview, 11.11.96); 
• according to CBTG, the majority of SMEs are not strong enough to support such 
a remote market, CBTG suggests companies need at least 50 to 100 employees 
and experience of business with Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. if they are to enter 
the Chinese market successfully (Raymond Yang interview, 21.10.96). 
That SMEs face considerable difficulties when setting up an FDI project in China was 
gleaned from the de-briefing of the 1996 Heseltine trade mission to China (Dougan, 
6.6.96),^'' although SMEs were able to identify market niches (Michael Heseltine 
interview, June 1996). Many SMEs have dropped plans to engage in FDI projects in 
China due to the long duration of negotiations. Lengthy absences of owner-managers, 
or other important decision-makers, plus the high cost of travel and accommodation in 
China were simply not palatable to them. Also, the successful development of the 
Chinese market demands patience (Kraus, 1989) - a condition that the majority of 
SMEs is simply unable to afford. 
A team of experts from the Economic Research Institute of China's State Planning 
Commission recently demanded increased government support for FDI by foreign 
SMEs (Business News, 3.3.97, in German Centre China Newsletter, 14.3.97, p.3). 
However, despite the Chinese central government having recognised the importance 
of a healthy SME sector, concrete signals from Beijing, in the form of additional tax 
concessions, preferential financing opportunities and non-bureaucratic establishment 
procedures have not been forthcoming (Grimm, 1997b). Eartier, Professor Wang 
(1996) of the Research Institute for International Economic Cooperation with the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) demanded 
support for SMEs entering the Chinese market. 
Overall, the FDI climate in China is too difficult and alien for many SMEs. Thus, UK 
and German SMEs invest in locations which seem familiar to them, less troublesome 
and secure. According to the German Federal Bank, more German investment is 
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directed to Eastern Europe than to Southeast Asia (FT, 27.7.95, p. 19; FT, 19.7.96, 
p.2)^^ and Schmidt et al. (1995) found nearty 90 per cent of all German FDI directed 
towards Europe and NAFTA countries. 
1.2 Problem and aims of the thesis 
As has been outlined above, establishing a permanent market presence becomes 
increasingly important for western companies wishing to develop the Chinese market 
efficiently. However, FDI appears to be widely neglected by SMEs as a market 
servicing strategy for reasons of resource limitations and an unwillingness to take 
risks. When adopting a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) as its FDI strategy, 
the SME is exposed to severe limitations, including lack of finance, managerial 
capacity and adequate information. The argument advanced in this thesis is that 
another FDI strategy, the joint venture (JV), serves as an alternative means for SMEs 
to service the Chinese market, ie meeting the strategic requirement of maintaining a 
local presence and utilising the resources of a local partner. The JV strategy allows the 
SME to benefit from the contributions that a partner can make, such as the investment 
of additional capital, local managerial expertise and knowledge of procedures peculiar 
to the Chinese market and business conventions. With the establishment of a JV, 
SMEs side-step many of the limitations associated with WFOEs. In other words, 
servicing the Chinese market via a JV reduces the sum of producfion and transaction 
costs that would be incurred by going it alone. 
In fact, Wu (1993) argues that the JV is the best mode for SMEs to invest in China 
since, compared with large firms, they are in a weaker position to cope with any 
unforeseen eventualities. This is due to the fact that SMEs do not have the same ready 
access to natural resources, finance and information as large MNEs, nor are they able 
to enjoy the same favourable terms. Wu's (1993) assertion is supported by an Arthur 
Andersen survey (in FT, 6.2.96, p.5), stating that JVs are expected to become the 
most popular vehicle for international expansion. 
This thesis investigates whether, and to what extent, JVs are a viable strategy for 
SMEs as a means of engaging in FDI in China. In particular, the issues to be 
addressed include: 
• the characteristics of UK and German SME JVs in China, using and extending 
Beamish and Wang's (1989) and Beamish's (1993) frameworks; 
• UK and German SME JV experiences. This uses a framework based on the 
works of Harrigan (1984), Datta (1988) and Fan (1996). In detail, the thesis 
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addresses both the establishment and operation phases of UK and German 
SME JVs in China; 
• the extent to which JV strategies ease the resource burden on SMEs engaged 
in internationalisation; 
• the extent to which the JV strategy has been successful as a market servicing 
strategy for UK and German SMEs. 
The study investigates UK and German SME JVs. As a consequence the experiences 
are differentiated in order that similarities and differences between UK and German 
SME practice in China can be established. This follows a notion by Ritchie (1994) that 
there are intra-European differences in the approach to the Chinese market. 
1.3 Methodology 
To meet its objectives this study takes both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. 
A total of 21 UK and German SMEs with a JV in China participated in a questionnaire 
survey carried out in the summer of 1996. In addition, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with a limited number of SMEs that participated in the postal questionnaire 
survey. Overall, the examination of the experiences and strategies of UK and German 
SMEs with JVs in China is based on both the quantitative findings and the results of 
four case studies. 
The body of knowledge in this thesis is supplemented by findings from various 
interviews carried out with representatives from the British Embassy in Beijing and the 
British Consulate General in Shanghai, European financial institutions in China and 
various Chinese organisations, mainly in Shanghai. In addition, first hand information 
was acquired by the researcher during two placements with the Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce Shanghai in 1995 and 1997. These involved the researcher in 
strategic issues revolving around FDI in China and day-to-day problems experienced 
by foreign companies. These insights not only support the argument forwarded in this 
thesis, but also contributed to the production of a guide to FDI in China (Kaiser and 
Grimm et al., 1997). 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains ten chapters. After this introduction, chapter two reviews the 
literature on SME internationalisation, establishes the limitations faced by SMEs when 
engaging in FDI, and develops a rationale for SMEs engaging in FDI, specifically JVs. 
Chapter three reviews the literature on international JVs and develops a framework for 
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analysis that is complemented and modified in chapter six. Chapter four introduces the 
methodology employed for gathering the essential data for this thesis and discusses 
the data as well as the methodological problems encountered in the course of this 
study. The Chinese environment for FDI is presented in chapter five. Chapter seven 
presents and analyses the findings of the survey that was carried out amongst UK and 
German SMEs and chapter eight cross-analyses four cases of UK and German SME 
JVs in China. In chapter nine, both the quantitative and qualitative findings are 
discussed using the modified JV framework established in chapter six. Chapter ten 
summarises the key findings, concludes the thesis and offers proposals for policy-
making and further research. Figure 1-1 presents the structure of the thesis. 
Figure 1-1: Structure of the thesis. 
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Notes 
^ In 1997, worldwide trade grew at 9.5% over 1996, despite the Asia crisis (FAZ, 24.3.98, p. 17). 
^ This would suggest that markets that previously demanded local production facilities because 
of prohibitive tariff levels can now be supplied from non-domestic sources (Tait, 1997). 
^ The German manufacturing-hostile welfare state was criticised by BDI president Henkel, 
demanding that Germany cut taxes and social spending" (FT, 24.6,96, p,8). He repeatedly 
criticised the quality of Germany as an investment location (Economist, 13.9.97, p.99), 
" In 1992, the EU accounted for approx. 15.7m enterprises in the non-primary private sector. Of 
these, 13,000 have over 500 employees and 13,5m have less than ten employees (Stanworth 
and Gray, 1991; EOSME, 1993; Lloyd, 1994; Storey, 1994; Gibb, 1996), The breakdown for the 
UK and Germany is similar (Kayser and Hauser, 1993; Storey, 1994; BMWi, 1995), 
^ European SMEs provide 66% of all sales of the non-primary sector, 50% of all manufacturing 
sales, 67% of services and even 90% of the construction and trade sectors (EOSME, 1993). 
Stanworth and Gray (1991) suggest that, in 1986, large enterprises with over 500 employees 
were responsible for 29.4% of the turnover of all enterprises, and enterprises with 100 or more 
employees were credited with 53.7% of the aggregate turnover. Bearing in mind that SMEs 
constitute the biggest share of enterprises and employment, this clearly demonstrates their 
disproportionate role in the UK economy. In 1991, the UK SME sector's contribution to GDP was 
only 32% (Mulhern, 1994), The loD (1992, in Dawson, 1995, p.7) suggests that the UK SME 
sector accounts for 56% of the UK economy output Germany's SMEs constituted 40% of 
investment and 46% of GDP (Lauder et al., 1993), Kayser and Hauser (1993) found that 
German SMEs, in 1990, contributed some 45.8% of all liable sales tax turnovers and 52,4% to 
the gross value added of all companies. Equally, they contributed 41 .1% of all gross investments 
in the same year. 
The importance of SMEs as exporters has been emphasised by Simon (1996), Ali and Swiercz 
(1991), Economist (3.7.93, p.59) and Walker (1994). 
^ Authors are also in agreement with regard to the importance of SMEs as job creators (Lauder 
etal . , 1993; Kayser and Hauser, 1993; GSFB, 1994; BMWi, 1995), According to EOSME (1993), 
in 1992, European SMEs employed 62m people or 70% of the European workforce in the non-
primary private sector. Between 1990 and 1995, Germany's SMEs had a net growth in jobs of 
around 1m, while the big firms showed a decline (BMWi, 1995; FT, 16,9.96, p.2), 
^ The literature agrees that the SME sectors of virtually all economies in the worid are important 
economic contributors. It is also agreed that the German 'Mittelstand' is a complex network of 
values shared by thousands of German firms (Simon, 1996), A recent report by Lloyds Bank 
(8,5,96) stressed the non-existence of a UK equivalent of the German 'Mittelstand' due to 
differences in culture, motivation of owner-managers and capital markets. However, Smith 
(1997) recently challenged this year-long belief in the strengths and power of the German 
'Mittelstand'. Instead, the 'Mittelstand' would be "labouring through a period of weakness and 
retrenchment" (p,128) and its UK equivalent the so-called 'middle market' (firms with an annual 
turnover of between US$7,8m (£5m) and US$312m (£200m) has been consistently achieving 
annual sales growth of more than 10% and annual profits growth of more than 20%, alongside 
strongly rising employment and capital investment 
^ EUROSTAT is the statistics department of the Commission of the European Communities, 
°^ In the German states of Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Thuringia and Saariand, 
" 'Forderpreis Innovativer Mittelstand 1996', 
HWWA - institute for Economic Research, Hamburg, 
" The Commission of the European Communities defines the region Asia (26 countries) as: East 
Asia: China, Japan, North/South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, (Hong Kong), Macao, Southeast 
Asia: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
Burma, South Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, 
Afghanistan, 
" As an exporter, China ranked tenth in 1997, with exports worth some ,USS182bn (£116,7bn) 
(FAZ, 24,3,98, p.17), 
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'^ In 1995, the Commission of the European Communities released its China strategy stretching 
beyond traditional trade relationships, after emphasising, in 1994, the need for Europe to adopt 
more pro-active policies towards the whole of Asia in order to protect its economic interests 
against competition from the US, Japan and others (FT, 6.7.95, p.2; FT, 13.7.95, p.4). 
'^ Michael Heseltine was deputy prime minister of the UK from 1995 to 1997. 
Ken Campbell was a council member of CBTG. 
'® Sandy Leitch is chairman of Eagle Star Holdings. 
'^ The 1995 visit of UK trade and industry secretary Michael Heseltine to China was considered 
the largest ever British trade mission and a very good start to a new chapter in Sino-British 
relations (FT, 17.5.95, p.7). 
^° Heseltine's 1996 trade mission to China is said to be the largest British trade mission ever, 
attracting some 270 entrepreneurs (Keenlyside, 1996). Although fewer deals were concluded 
during that mission, CBTG suggests that "the trend is still broadly on the increase" (ibid). 
^' Apart from temporary setbacks in the Sino-German relations due to Tiananmen Square or 
Tibet, the Himalayan region that was invaded by China in 1950. 
^2 For a review of the Sino-UK and Sino-German relations see Kampffmeyer (1990), Winckler 
(1991) and Schuller (1994). 
The survey is based on responses of 260 managers and business experts in the US, Europe 
and Asia. 
In terms of trade, Germany is China's most important partner within the EU. However, 
according to EUR-OP News (1997) Germany's 1996 exports to China decreased by 0 .1% to 
Ecu5.96bn compared with the previous year. The UK's export volume to China shrinked by 7.6% 
even to Ecu0.9bn in 1996. 
Explicitly, the Consul could name three SMEs. 
®^ This figure was also suggested in International Business Daily (3.9.96, in German Centre 
China Newsletter, 6.9.96, p.3). It can be assumed that the source for this statement was the 
Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai. 
Sir Alan Cockshaw, chairman of AMEC, led the 'mission business team' and emphasised the 
difficulties of SMEs with a presence in China. Patrick Dougan, chief executive of Mackie 
International, stressed that SMEs do not get credibility, unlike large companies and that finance 
is a problem. 
2^ This is approx. 10% of the country's total FDI, DM4.2bn (£1.8bn) in 1995 against DM2,4bn 
(£1.0bn) in 1993. 
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SMEs - The New Global Players 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the internationalisation strategies available to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), classifies them into a framework of market entry 
strategies and reviews the internationalisation experiences of multinational SMEs. In 
addition it addresses the question of where the foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy 
is positioned within the SME internationalisation literature and identifies the difficulties 
faced by SMEs when internationalising their activities, in particular in relation to FDI. 
The chapter also establishes the theoretical underpinning for the decisions taken by 
SMEs to engage in FDI and, in particular, in a joint venture (JV) strategy. 
2.2 Internationalisation strategies^ 
Internationalisation is a comprehensive plan taking into account the objectives, 
resources and policies that guide a firm's international marketing operations (Root, 
1987).^ The selection of a market servicing strategy is an institutional agreement that is 
necessary for the entry of a company's products, its technology, as well as human and 
financial capital into a foreign market (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995). A firm's 
international competitiveness depends upon the adoption of an appropriate set of 
strategies and their effective management (Davidson, 1982; Killing, 1982; Root, 1987; 
Terpstra, 1987; Naumann and Lincoln, 1991). Various authors have highlighted the 
importance of selecting a servicing mode with the utmost care (Rugman, 1985; 
Contractor, 1985; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Young et al., 1989; Lopez-
Gonzalez et al., 1995), albeit the choice is limited by the constraints imposed by a 
firm's products, financial and managerial limitations and host market conditions 
(Buckley et al., 1991). The various entry modes differ greatly in their mix of advantages 
and drawbacks (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).^ 
Each market servicing strategy is characterised by a set of dimensions. Commonly, 
authors (Hill et al., 1990) feature three determinants for servicing strategy: resource 
commitment, control and risk of know-how dissemination. Young et al. (1989) have 
added time and space limitations as a further dimension while Laughton (1995) takes 
into consideration the degree of learning required by the particular type of market 
servicing. These attributes constitute the dimensions of a market servicing decision-
making framework. A firm chooses the strategy which best satisfies the factors that 
influence its decision-making. However, this decision is frequently a compromise since 
securing long-term goals often impacts on short-term decision-making." 
SMEs - the new global players 
Foreign market entry has become a frontier issue in international research. 
Researchers have elaborated extensively on international market servicing (Pavitt, 
1969; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Carstairs and Welch, 1982; Rugman, 1985; Rugman 
et al., 1985; Parry, 1985; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brockmeyer, 1987; Root, 
1987; Young et al., 1989; Robock and Simmonds, 1989; Hill et al., 1990; Kaufmann et 
ai., 1990; Wu, 1993; Laughton, 1995; Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995). Comprehensive 
continuums of market servicing strategies can be found in the works of Carstairs and 
Welch (1982), Root (1987), Young et al. (1989), Erramilli and Rao (1990), Laughton 
(1995) and Lopez-Gonzalez et al. (1995). 
To establish a hierarchy for market servicing modes, writers (Pavitt, 1969; Root, 1987; 
Brockmeyer, 1987; Young et al., 1989; Robock and Simmonds, 1989; Shenkar, 1990; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1990; Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995; Laughton, 1995; Schmidt et al., 
1995) use various patterns including the application of dimensions such as risk, control 
or resource commitment or combinations thereof. Accordingly, they arrive at differing 
enumerations (see Appendix II). 
The literature on foreign market servicing displays additional divergences: first, some 
authors suggest that a JV is one form of FDI (Parry, 1985; Brockmeyer, 1987; Young 
et al., 1989; Dutta and Merva, 1990; Wu, 1993; Erramilli and D'Souza, 1993; Braun, 
1996) . This is also the view taken in this thesis. It is, however, in sharp contrast to the 
ideas of authors, including Rugman et al. (1985), Anderson and Gatignon (1986), 
Endres (1987),* Robock and Simmonds (1989), Hill et al. (1990), Williamson (1991), 
UNCTAD (1993), Laughton (1995), Lopez-Gonzalez et al. (1995) and Schmidt et al. 
(1995), who, implicitly or explicitly, exclude JVs from FDI. This can have far-reaching 
implications since it suggests, as is the case with Rugman et al. (1985), that the 
(original) theory of internalisation would not apply to JVs. As section 2.4.3 of this 
chapter will show in detail, the internalisation theory was subject to criticism for failing 
to explain the reasoning for JV formation. 
Secondly, whereas a variety of authors (Rugman, 1985; Rugman et al., 1985; Robock 
and Simmonds, 1989; Young et al., 1989; Laughton, 1995) include exporting as one 
principle option for companies to service markets, some (Hill et al., 1990) do not 
consider exporting from the home country to be such an option due to tariff barriers, 
transportation costs or variants thereof. Thirdly, market entry modes, including 
licensing, franchising and contract manufacturing do not require the physical presence 
of a company in a foreign country. Thus, to refer to multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
when discussing companies that apply such entry modes (eg Tan, 1993) is misleading. 
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This suggests the basic definition of the MNE as an enterprise with assets in at least 
one foreign country (Vernon, 1971; Caves, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hood 
and Young, 1979; Teece, 1985; Rugman, 1985; Young et al., 1989; Dunning, 1993). 
Finally, SMEs are not just smaller versions of large companies, but deal with unique 
size-related issues and behave differently in their analysis of, and interaction with, their 
environment (Welsh and White, 1981; Wu, 1993; Baird et al., 1994). However, the 
majority of authors (Rugman, 1985; Rugman et al., 1985; Root, 1987; Robock and 
Simmonds, 1989) discuss the market servicing framework from the perspective of 
large companies, excluding SMEs. At first glance, Young et al.'s (1989) contribution is 
an exception. However, the study does not prove to be of specific value for SMEs 
embarked on internationalisation since it is still too general - unlike Wu's (1993) study 
of 75 European firms entering the Chinese market. He makes it clear that SMEs are 
different from large MNEs in terms of, for instance, financial standing. 
The literature on market entry has produced various strands of interest, including 
market servicing theorising (Rugman, 1985; Parry, 1985; Hennart, 1982; Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Hill et al., 1990; Buckley et al., 1991), choice of market servicing 
(Contractor, 1985, 1990; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986; Beamish and Banks, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hill et al., 1990; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1990; Wu, 1993; Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995) and managerial 
decision-making (Tan, 1993; Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995).® An examination of the 
literature suggests that a number of scholars (Teece, 1977, 1981, 1985; Hennart, 
1982; Hill and Kim, 1988) have linked the choice of strategy to transaction cost theory, 
whereas others (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1985; Casson, 1982) have 
based their discussions on internalisation theory. Others (Stopford and Wells, 1972) 
make reference to bargaining power, focusing on behavioural constructs rather than 
economic and strategic dimensions. A growing body of literature takes a holistic 
approach towards market entry explanation (Buckley and Mathew, 1979; Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1988; Hill et al., 1990; Contractor, 1990; Buckley et al., 
1991) since transaction cost logic does not take into account strategic considerations. 
This is addressed in the strategy literature (Killing, 1983; Contractor, 1985; Harrigan, 
1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
2.3 SME internationalisation 
International business has long been the domain of large companies (Delacroix, 1984; 
Kaufmann, 1995; Berra et al., 1995). A United Nations study (UNCTAD, 1993, p.38) 
has criticised this, pointing out that internationalisation is "by no means the exclusive 
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province of large firms". Also Simon (1996, p.1), investigating German SMEs, insists 
that "many of the mid-sized champions were global long before the term 'globalisation' 
was coined". 
2.3.1 Predominance in S M E market servicing 
According to Acs and Preston (1997), very little is known about the processes by which 
SMEs participate in the global economy, although there is overwhelming evidence in 
the literature that points to exporting as the pre-dominant internafional activity of SMEs 
(Cavusgil, 1980; OECD, 1981; Brockmeyer, 1987; Stratos, 1990; Walker, 1994; 
Mulhern, 1994; Schmidt et al., 1995; Vatne, 1995). There is also a large degree of 
agreement that SME commitment to FDI is rather limited (Buckley, 1983; Kaufmann et 
al., 1990; Dunning, 1993; Acs and Preston, 1997; Acs et al., 1997) both in comparison 
with large firm FDI and relative to the export activities of SMEs (Albaum et al., 1992). 
Acs et al. (1997) speculate that the SMEs' disproportionately low share of FDI might be 
exaggerated. However, there is supportive evidence that relatively fewer SMEs engage 
in FDI than large MNEs as the likelihood of firms engaging in FDI grows with firm size 
(Braun, 1982; Berger and Uhlmann, 1984; Oman, 1984). This is due to the fact that 
there is a strong correlation between firm size and the possession of monopolistic 
advantages, the sine qua non of FDI (Oman, 1984).^ 
Between 1986 and 1993, worldwide FDI grew at 14.6 per cent (Schmidt et al., 1995) 
and FDI continues to be a driving force of the globalisation process (UNCTAD, 1997).^ 
However, it seems that large firms, as opposed to SMEs, have gained in importance in 
FDI (Fujita, 1995). This corresponds with later findings by Buckley (1997) and Eden et 
al. (1997). Summarising the key issues involved in the international transfer of 
technology by SMEs, these authors found that SMEs are not the major players in the 
transfer of technology in the wortd economy. Moreover, Buckley (1997) discovered that 
SMEs show a strong preference for non-equity forms of technology transfer, such as 
licensing. This is the tenor also of Kumar and Neyer's (1992) research examining 13 
German firms with technology transfers to less developed countries (LDCs). 
Although the limited participation of SMEs in FDI is well documented in the literature 
(Buckley, 1979, 1993: UK FDI; Braun, 1982: German FDI; Menke et al., 1995: German 
FDI; Acs et al., 1997: US FDI), there is also evidence to suggest increased FDI activity 
by SMEs (UNCTAD, 1993; Mulhern, 1994; Fujita, 1995; Kohn, 1997; Reynolds, 1997). 
In their earty study of 3,153 large and small and medium-sized manufacturing German 
firms, Berger and Uhlmann (1984) discovered that 95 per cent were involved in export 
activities, whereas only 21 per cent were engaged in activities abroad on top of their 
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export commitment. On the other hand, Fujita (1995) points out that SMEs account for 
a large proportion of the number of investment projects. From data obtained from 443 
firms in developed countries, he found that the make-up of SMEs^ is becoming 
increasingly multinational and, when compared with large MNEs, represents an 
alternative and additional source of FDI and non-equity resource transfer to LDCs 
(UNCTAD, 1993). However, in subsequent research, surveying 735 multinational 
SMEs from 18 developed countries, with investment projects in LDCs, Fujita (1995) 
discovered they do not play a role in FDI to the same extent as in their home 
economies. He also found they are still minor players in the introduction of capital, 
technology and management into LDCs. Exceptions are SME investors from Japan 
and Australia,^° the former accounting for the largest number of active multinational 
SMEs worldwide (Fujita, 1995)." This supports earlier findings by Ozawa (1985) who 
investigated the international transfer of technology by Japan's SMEs to LDCs. 
However, if measured in terms of value, large investors still account for the bulk of FDI. 
Fujita's (1995) confident statement contradicts Buckley (1997) who argues that global 
figures for SME FDI are not available. Conversely, UNCTAD (1997) supports Fujita's 
large firm-FDI concentration statement, suggesting that for six out of nine developed 
countries, 25 MNEs account for more than half of their countries' outward stocks. 
Equally interesting is occasional evidence that challenges the perceived importance of 
SMEs as exporters. Although Simon (1996) praises the export contribution of the 
German 'hidden champions' which generate more than 50 per cent of their sales 
outside their home markets,'^ others, including Acs et al. (1997), argue that the SME 
export share is disproportionately lower than its share of home economy sales: 
Samuels et al. (1992) in their study of 70 UK SME exporters found more than 60 per 
cent of the exporters generated less than 25 per cent of their annual turnover from 
exports. Reynolds (1997) points out that 10 to 20 per cent of manufacturing SMEs 
acquire 10 to 40 per cent of their sales from exports. Within OECD countries, for 
instance, 26 per cent of direct exports were provided by SMEs, whereas this figure 
was 35 per cent among the Asian countries (Reynolds, 1997). Berger and Uhlmann 
(1984) have shown that, although 95 per cent of their German sample firms were 
involved in exporting, only one third had an export ratio'^ exceeding 20 per cent. 
Further, Smallbone et al. (1995) studying European SMEs in the food processing and 
clothing industries in the UK and Portugal found that only 8 per cent of the food 
processing firms exported more than 10 per cent of their turnover. The high-number-
low-volume phenomenon of SME exporters has also been observed by Kean (1989), 
AN and Swiercz (1991), Naumann and Lincoln (1991) and Moskowitz and Menzies 
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(1995) who suggest that between 80 and 90 per cent of US exporting activity is 
performed by 1 per cent of the firms, mostly large companies.^" 
Other studies not only question the high-number argument of the SME export 
phenomenon: Cavusgil (1980) observed that nearly 90 per cent of the manufacturing 
firms in the US are non-exporters and Edmunds and Khoury (1986) studying 32 small, 
California-based firms, found SMEs were greatly under-represented in export markets. 
The weak presence of SMEs in FDI, relative to large companies, is reflected in the 
literature (Buckley, 1979; Buckley et al., 1983; Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Parnell, 
1993; Vatne, 1995).'^ Wright and Ricks (1994), who reviewed the business literature of 
the past 25 years, observed that the internationalisation of SMEs is a new thrust of 
research activity. Samuels et al, (1992) also discovered a substantial volume of 
literature on SME exporting activities. For instance, Laughton (1995) in a compendium 
on international business, devoted a whole chapter to the international business of 
SMEs, shedding light on the problems they experienced and offering a strategic 
framework to facilitate international success for SMEs. However, he did not specifically 
discuss strategies to enable SMEs to overcome resource shortages or the market 
entry modes available to them. SME licensing and SME FDI were not considered at all. 
Instead, the author devotes more than 50 per cent of the volume of his compendium to 
SME exporting. Equally, Young et al. (1989) claimed to be SME-specific and 
considered their work a 'study must' for the student of SME internationalisation, as well 
as the international SME itself. However, the compendium is no more than a 
generalised piece of work on internationalisation, addressing large MNEs equally. 
A quantitative investigation of international business literature carried out by Kaiser and 
Griffen (1996) covering the 15 year period 1981 to 1995^^ found the vast majority 
(98%) of research studies on the concept of internationalisation do not deal explicitly 
with SMEs. The study further revealed that, although the absolute volume of literature 
on SME internationalisation has steadily increased during the past 15 years, the 
relative interest in SME internationalisation has decreased at a rate of 14 per cent. The 
study also shows that of the total contributions on SME internationalisation issues 
(international business, internationalisation, exporting, licensing, FDI), exporting 
accounted for 62 per cent of research interest.'' 
2.3.2 S M E foreign direct investment* 
Compared with the literature on SME exporting, contributions on SME FDI are rather 
limited (section 2.3.1). Little research has discussed the FDI activities of SMEs 
(Buckley, 1979, 1989, 1997; Braun, 1982, 1996; Buckley et al., 1988; Kaufmann et al., 
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1990; Simon, 1992, 1996; Kaufmann, 1995). Scholars from the UK, Buckley, Mathew 
and colleagues, and from Germany, Braun, Berger and Uhlmann, Kaufmann and 
colleagues, Simon, Schmidt and colleagues, have advanced the understanding of SME 
FDI considerably. Work on SME FDI has also been carried out by Japanese 
(Yoshihara, 1978; Ozawa, 1985), Italian (Onida et al., 1985; Berra et al. 1995) and 
French (Bertin, 1986) researchers. In a number of volumes, UNCTAD'' has 
investigated FDI patterns of SMEs on a worldwide scale (UNCTAD, 1984, 1993, 1995). 
Most notably, at a conference in October 1995, experts on 'SMEs and the global 
economy' - including Kogut, Gomes-Casseres, Kohn, Buckley and Reynolds -
presented their ideas on SME FDI. Though these authors elaborated on vanous 
aspects of SME FDI, no ground-breaking wisdom was voiced by the contributors. 
Moreover, most of the data presented at the conference originated from the 1993 
UNCTAD study on multinational SMEs. 
According to Gomes-Casseres (1997), students of international business traditionally 
believe that success in foreign markets is dependent on size. Campbell (24.10.97, 
p. 16) argues that, at first glance, the global small company appears an inherent 
contradiction since many of the traditional drivers of globalisation (notably economies 
of scale) simply would not apply to SMEs which are faced, instead, with a constant 
battle for scarce resources. The reason for this appears to be deep-rooted: 
organisational industrialists, including Williamson (1975), Hymer (1976), Buckley and 
Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), Teece (1981) and Rugman (1985), have long insisted 
that commitment to FDI has resulted in the emergence of the MNE. It has also been 
suggested that an MNE is different from an SME (Rugman et al., 1985; Robock and 
Simmonds, 1989; Young et al., 1989). Implicitly, it has been argued that: 
• an MNE is a large-size company and 
• vice versa, an SME can never be a multinational. 
SMEs are not just smaller versions of big businesses, but they deal with unique size-
related issues and behave differently in their analysis of, and interaction with, their 
environment (Baird et al., 1994). As a consequence, the implications cited provide 
cause for criticism. Frequently, research on firm internationalisation too readily 
separates the concepts of SME and MNE, as can be seen in the works of Caves 
(1971), Rugman et al. (1985), Robock and Simmonds (1989), Young et al. (1989), 
Tsang (1994), Leung and Yeung (1995), Smallbone et al. (1995) and Cafferata and 
Mensi (1995). Buckley (1979, p.12) is the exception. While arguing that "the vast 
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majority of writing on FDI has concerned the behaviour of large MNEs", he implicitly 
admits the existence of small MNEs. 
Contradicting the views of other scholars on SME and MNE (Rugman et al., 1985; 
Robock and Simmonds, 1989; Young et al., 1989), this thesis argues that SMEs can 
be MNEs, as long as they meet the definition of MNEs as outlined below. On the other 
hand, it is recognised that the concepts of multinationality and large size have more in 
common than multinationality and being an SME.^" 
According to Robock and Simmonds (1989), there is no universally accepted definition 
of MNE. Early approaches focus on performance characteristics such as the absolute 
amount - or relative share - of earnings, sales, assets, or employees derived from, or 
committed to, foreign operat ions.Def in i t ions further focus on the concept of 
ownership, looking at whether a foreign business is owned by nationals from many 
countries.Addit ionally, definitions consider structural criteria such as the composition 
and behavioural characteristics of top management, eg 'thinking globally'.^^ 
Most of the definitions of MNE stress the possession and control of assets and 
operation in foreign countries without further specification (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Teece, 1981) or with a specified number of foreign countries, ranging from 'at least 
one' (Rugman, 1985; Robock and Simmonds, 1989; Dunning, 1993) to 'at least two' 
(Teece, 1985) and even 'more than six' (Vernon, 1971; Rugman et al., 1985).^'' 
Definitions characterise an MNE by the fact that it produces abroad, rather than by 
company size criteria (Caves, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hood and Young, 
1979; Teece, 1981, 1985; Rugman et al.. 1985; Robock and Simmonds, 1989; 
Dunning, 1993). The above authors all require the establishment of foreign 
manufacturing facilities for a firm to qualify as an MNE.^^ Dunning (1993) adds to this 
enumeration of distinctive criteria the extent to which a company's higher value 
activities, for instance research and development, are internationalised - a measure 
which is intended to capture the quality or depth of foreign production. 
The conclusion from this is that an SME can be an MNE, as long as it owns or controls 
income-generating assets in production and/or marketing operations in more than one 
country. Thus, the concept of the MNE and that of the SME are in fact consistent. 
Interestingly, the UK and German SME FDI research reveals a distinctively similar 
pattern. Both strands of research into the FDI commitment of SMEs have focused on 
those geographic investment areas that were culturally close to the home countries of 
21 
SMEs - the new global players 
the SMEs under investigation. This was a consequence of the influence of psychic 
distance on FDI by SMEs. 
The concept of psychic distance was introduced into the context of a firm's 
internationalisation by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975). It is a function of the 
differences between any two countries in terms of their level of development and 
education, culture, business and everyday languages, political systems and the extent 
of commercial connections which prevent or disturb the flows of information between 
firms and target nations. The concept suggests that firms not familiar with foreign 
countries, and whose limited information does not contribute to reducing the perceived 
risk in doing business with, or in, a particular country, do business with, or invest in, 
first neighbouring countries or those countries, that are as similar as possible to their 
home countries. This is seen as a way of minimising the risks arising from 'foreignness' 
(Buckley, 1989). 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) point out that psychic distance is correlated 
with geographic distance, ie the further a market is from the home market 
geographically, the greater is the psychic distance between this market and the home 
market. However, Buckley (1989) argues that often, psychic and physical distance are 
negatively correlated, ie countries that are physically distant are psychically closer (UK 
vs. Australia) than physically close countries (USA vs. Cuba).^ ® However, to 
underestimate psychic distance between two ostensibly 'close' countries would be 
unwise as is shown by the studies about UK FDI (Buckley et al., 1988) and UK FDI in 
Australia (Mathew 1979; Buckley and Mathew, 1979, 1980). More recently, Lau (1992) 
analysing the development process of Hong Kong garment manufacturing companies, 
found that ethnic bond and geographical proximity seem to be the most salient 
location-specific factors. 
According to Carlson (1975) and Buckley and Mathew (1979), for smaller firms 
political, cultural, and language barners are more formidable than physical distance. 
This corresponds with findings by Schmidt et al. (1995) who emphasise that perceived 
psychic distance to the home country correlates positively with firm size. Based on 
findings from a study of 43 UK first-time investors, Buckley (1979) suggests that the 
rate of success of UK SMEs is higher in the 'white dominions'. Further, Cavusgil (1984) 
in his study of 70 US SMEs found that Western Europe was the primary export market 
for all firms, followed by Canada and Mexico. This contrasts with initial expectations 
that the experimental and active exporters would concentrate on psychically close 
countries such as Canada. The applicability of Cavusgil's (1984) argument is limited 
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since he does not provide information on the markets in diversified Europe to which the 
companies began exporting. In their study of 141 US service firms, Erramilli and 
D'Souza (1993) found that, with increasing experience, firms chose countries that are 
increasingly dissimilar to their home country. 
This confirms findings by Caughey and Chetty (1994), who investigated the pre-export 
behaviour of manufacturing SMEs from New Zealand. They discovered that the firms 
chose initially to start exporting to countries that were psychically close, such as the 
UK and the US. Only when they gained confidence and experience in exporting did 
they begin exporting to other markets, ie in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
Buckley and his colleagues concentrated their early interest in UK SME FDI in 
Australia (Buckley and Mathew, 1979; Buckley et al., 1988) and only later moved on to 
research European FDI in the UK (Buckley et al., 1983). Here Buckley et al. examined 
the success and problems of European SMEs^^ in establishing 51 subsidiaries in the 
UK. From their examination of the FDI of 52 UK firms in Australia Buckley and Mathew 
(1979) found that the companies moved to FDI in order to exploit present and 
anticipated market opportunities more effectively than would have been possible 
through exports or other market servicing modes. Whereas the manufacturing firms in 
their study had attempted to avoid traditional defensive measures, such as tariffs and 
quotas, and responded to local competition, the service firms followed on behind their 
UK clients. From the fact that the subsidiaries of the UK first-time investors were 
"generally small"^^ and "larger UK enterprises were excluded" (p.59), the authors 
indicated that the size of the UK parent companies is small or medium-sized. This is 
not necessarily accurate and for this reason the empirical findings of Buckley and 
Mathew (1979) might not be comparable with other findings on SME FDI. 
In their later investigation of 43 UK SMEs with FDI in Australia, Buckley et al. (1988) 
looked more closely into the investment motivations of these companies. In detail the 
authors observed that, where there were pull factors, such as market prospects, the 
firms were more successful than where firms were pushed to go abroad by home 
country legislation or high labour costs, etc. (= push factors). Such 'pull factors' as 
investment motivations were also found by Braun (1982) who investigated the FDI of 
German SMEs in LDCs. There, it was predominantly the desire to secure access to an 
existing market, or to create a new one, as well as to utilise the low production costs of 
the host country and bypass restrictive import policies. 
These main motivations for an FDI project were also observed by Berger and Uhlmann 
(1984). In their research of 3,153 German large, small and medium-sized companies 
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with FDI projects in developed countries, as well as LDCs, the authors revealed 
remarkable differences between the investments of large firms and SMEs. They also 
highlighted the economic state of the host countries. According to their research the 
single most important motivation of German SMEs for choosing an investment location 
within an industrialised country was market proximity. However, the market motive is 
less important to SMEs than to large firms when the host country is an LDC and SMEs 
intend to develop additional markets to a lesser extent than large firms. Berger and 
Uhlmann's two groups of firms correspond with regard to import restrictions and 
production and transportation cost advantages. These are more important when 
entering LDCs. Perceived as important by both groups of firms (in developed countries 
and LDCs) were security of raw materials supply and investment support by the home 
and host countries, hlowever, SMEs attached greater importance to them than large 
firms. This suggests that SMEs more frequently look for means to compensate for their 
weak resource position when engaging in FDI. 
The company size-related differences observed by Berger and Uhlmann (1984) 
substantially contradict later findings by Schmidt et al. (1995). In their study of the 
market entry modes open to German SMEs, they could not find any such differences 
with regard to investment motivations. Although Berger and Uhlmann's (1984) early 
research was of considerable value in its time, it is now obsolete. The Berger and 
Uhlmann study was published more than 14 years ago and consequently was unable 
to track new trends and increased globalisation forces. Instead, included in Schmidt et 
al.'s (1995) motivations are marketing and market, production and cost, and sourcing. 
The interesting finding in this research is that motivations to engage in FDI were stable 
over time and generally more than one motive was necessary for the decision to 
engage in FDI. 
Interestingly also, in contrast to the market motivation that dominates the FDI process 
of western SMEs (Buckley and Mathew, 1979; Braun, 1982; Buckley et al., 1983; 
1988; Berger and Uhlmann, 1984; Onida et al., 1985; Bertin, 1986; Schmidt et al., 
1995), Japanese SMEs were investing in LDCs (of Southeast Asia) to make use of 
offshore production advantages and export production back to Japan (Ozawa, 1985). 
Another theme authors focused on was the distribution of ownership in subsidiaries of 
SMEs. Scholars, including Buckley et al. (1988) from their research on UK SMEs in 
Australia, Kaufmann et al. (1990) from their examination of cross-border co-operation^^ 
strategies applied by 79 German SMEs co-operating in the EU, Simon (1992, 1996) 
discussing the strategies of German SMEs for expanding abroad,^ and Schmidt et al. 
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(1995), all found that SMEs prefer the establishment of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs) to JVs or majority equity positions to arrangements where they 
would have a minority position. Buckley et al. (1988) derived a distinct relationship 
between control and success: firms with absolute control were more successful than 
their counterparts. 
In contrast, Berger and Uhlmann's (1984) research and the UNCTAD (1993) study 
observed an SME tendency towards the establishment of JVs. UNCTAD (1993) 
discovered that multinational SMEs are more likely to jointly own affiliates than large 
firms, although this does not apply to those SMEs with proprietary technologies. This 
corresponds with the later findings of Acs et al. (1997) from a study of US SMEs. They 
argue that SMEs tend to have partially-owned foreign affiliates, whereas large firms 
have WFOEs. Also Kohn (1997), exploring the FDI strategies of US SMEs highlighted 
a tendency for SMEs to form minority-owned affiliates, as opposed to large MNEs. In a 
survey of seven US SMEs, Kohn and Gomes-Casseres {forthcoming) reveal a much 
lower share of JVs and licensing than expected. Of the 36 FDI projects undertaken by 
these firms, only five were JVs. However, to what extent Kohn's (1997) and Kohn and 
Gomes-Casseres's {forthcoming) findings are applicable is questionable as the upper 
margin of the size criterion 'number of employees' is pitched at 1,000 employees, as 
opposed to 500 staff in other studies. For example, Berra et al. (1995) defined an SME 
as a firm with a workforce up to 200 employees and found amongst Italian clothing 
firms a high propensity for contractual ventures and FDI in the period 1987 to 1991. 
2.3.3 S M E FDI barriers 
SMEs face considerable barriers in their efforts to internationalise and even more 
stringent ones when engaging in FDI (Braun, 1982, 1996; Berger and Uhlmann, 1984; 
Brockmeyer, 1987). Authors (Buckley et al., 1988; Acs et al., 1997; Eden et al., 1997) 
have found that SMEs are more likely to fail in their international expansion and 
transfer of technology than large firms. Frequently stated constraints are the high 
costs, management requirements, market intelligence needs, risks and uncertainties 
associated with identifying foreign market opportunities and subsequently executing 
them. In short: finding a location for manufacture (in case of an FDI project) or the right 
partner (when the FDI project is a JV), adapting to a foreign culture, with a different 
administrative and legal system, foreign language difficulties etc. (Oman, 1984; Acs et 
al., 1997). Also, and this is an aspect which is regularly overlooked in the literature, 
host government investment policies often focus on the strategic or high-profile sectors 
of their economies rather than on SME industries (Braun, 1982; Oman, 1984). This 
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affects SMEs' bargaining power with regard to factors such as a minimum local stake, 
financing problems, location regulations and local content. According to Acs et al. 
(1997) these are regarded as the highest, economically most damaging and most 
difficult to overcome entry barriers for SME FDI. 
An interesting insight from Braun's (1982) investigation of German FDI in LDCs is that 
internal as well as external problems were regarded as more taxing by smaller (up to 
200 employees) than by larger (200 to 1,000 employees) firms. Braun's (1982) 
research provides considerable insight into the different perceptions companies of 
different sizes have of barriers to FDI. However, since Braun (1982) includes firms of 
sizes up to 1,000 staff and distinguishes them only by applying a 200-employee 
workforce margin, the applicability of his findings is limited. In accordance with Braun 
(1982), Berger and Uhlmann (1984) contend that the perception of difficulties 
correlates with firm size and that they are regarded as more severe by SMEs than by 
large companies. Interestingly, non-investors perceived nearly all difficulties to be more 
important than investors, reflecting the higher risk-aversion of non-investors. 
Brockmeyer (1987), from his research on selected cases of German SMEs with 
business operations in Japan, highlighted the problem of recruiting sufficiently qualified 
personnel for-an FDI operation as one of the most important reasons for German 
SMEs not entering the Japanese market on their own. 
The international marketing literature suggests a broad range of areas where SMEs 
are at a disadvantage compared with large firms when engaging in internationalisation. 
This is because it requires resources which SMEs often do not have (Penrose, 1956; 
Buckley, 1979; Oman, 1984; Cavusgil, 1984; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Edmunds 
and Khoury, 1986; Buckley et al., 1988; Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Peridis, 1992; 
Bonaccorsi, 1992; UNCTAD, 1993; Erramilli and D'Souza, 1993; Walker, 1994; 
Donckels and Lambrecht, 1995; Schmidt et al., 1995; Laughton, 1995; Kaufmann, 
1995; Gibb, 1995; Braun, 1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Acs et al., 1997; Eden et al., 
1997). Especially higher forms of market servicing are a priori excluded from the 
portfolio of many SMEs. Various scholars have argued that SMEs must execute 
internationalisation strategies that are consistent with their capabilities and that they 
should avoid market servicing strategies that require large financial and managerial 
resources (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kean, 1989; Calof, 1993; Wu, 1993; Tsang, 
1994; Baird et al., 1994). 
The four areas where SMEs are at a disadvantage when it comes to FDI, compared 
with large MNEs, are: 
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• financial resources, 
• managerial resources, 
• information shortages, and 
• attitude to risk. 
In addition, SMEs display a high degree of naivety and lack the public relations skills 
and lobbying power of larger MNEs (UNCTAD, 1993; Gomes-Casseres, 1997; 
Buckley, 1997). Also, according to Kohn (1997), in foreign environments only large 
firms can afford the product customisation and marketing modifications required. 
However, it must also be noted that problems can be overcome. Buckley (1979) insists 
that difficulties facing SMEs in FDI are most acute for first-time investors. The risks are 
perceived to be great and the firms have no international experience on which to draw. 
Many firms in the study by Buckley et al. (1988) had unsuccessful first foreign ventures 
but subsequently went on to undertake successful foreign investments. By engaging in 
an FDI project for the first time and making mistakes, the firms learned and could avoid 
many pitfalls in subsequent investment projects. 
Limited financial resources 
The high financial burden of foreign market servicing for SMEs has frequently been 
referred to in the literature (Edmunds and Khoury, 1986; Peridis, 1992; Hall, 1992; 
UNCTAD, 1993; Caughey and Chetty, 1994; Schmidt et al., 1995; Berra et al., 1995). 
Some (eg UNCTAD, 1993) consider financial constraints as the largest problem for 
SME FDI. The limited access to financial resources plays a crucial role in the 
internationalisation process of SMEs since, as Buckley (1979) and Buckley et al. 
(1988) suggest, failure often puts the enterprises' home bases at risk. Multinational 
corporations raise capital from a variety of sources at home and abroad. These include 
commercial banks, local and international equity markets and their own corporate 
systems in the form of internally generated profits for reinvestment (UNCTAD, 1997). 
SMEs are considerably disadvantaged in this respect as they are less able to raise risk 
capital from the public. Buckley (1997) also cites the problem faced by SMEs of 
'selling' investment opportunities to potential investors. This is compounded by a 
tendency to hang on to (family) control. From the SME financing literature it is known 
that SMEs face a so-called "Catch 22" situation when trying to raise funding for 
projects (Buckley, 1979). 
Limited managerial capacity 
International activities and, in particular, FDI are highly management-intensive because 
of the high risks involved in moving abroad and the necessity to collect and crucially 
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channel information (Buckley et al., 1988; Buckley, 1993). The shortage of managerial 
capacity is an equally important barrier to SME internationalisation, although according 
to UNCTAD (1993) it ranks second after financial restrictions. However, Buckley (1979, 
1997) and Buckley et ai. (1988) insist that in most cases, managerial constraints 
leapfrog financial constraints since, due to management shortages, SMEs are forced 
to take short cuts in decision-making, often with disastrous results. Often, however, 
management and financial constraints are correlated since a lack of funds often results 
in a lack of investment in human capital. Managing at a distance was found by Buckley 
(1979) as the most frequent difficulty with the operation of an SME FDI project. 
When the literature discusses the problem of limited managerial resources, it 
frequently ignores that this comprises numerous strands. Elements such as 
management time, management expertise, ambition and motivation, and contacts are 
all part and parcel of the problem. This is supported by VobaRaiba (1997) suggesting 
that the managements of SMEs have, predominantly, to combat two bottlenecks: 
scarcity of time and problems with information gathering. Whereas Cavusgil (1984) 
argues that management time is the single most influential constraint on the capacity 
of SMEs to grow internationally. Walker (1994) considers the ability and willingness of 
management teams to adapt to changes and environmental developments as the 
major limitation. 
Management expertise 
Internationalisation requires a range of skills (Moini, 1995). For instance, Simon (1992, 
1996) revealed that the skills of general managers were important assets for 
Germany's 'hidden champions'. Frequently SMEs do not have specialist executives to 
manage their international operations, nor a hierarchy of managers for complex 
decision-making. Instead, decision-making is much more likely to be personalised 
involving ad hoc short-term reckoning based on individual perceptions, prejudice and 
ignorance (Buckley, 1979; Stratos, 1990; UNCTAD, 1993). This is considered as a 
major problem for SME internationalisation (Cavusgil, 1980; Peridis, 1992; Hall, 1992; 
Smallbone et al., 1995) and explains, for instance, a firm's ignorance of government 
assistance towards exporting or FDI activities, as found by Edmunds and Khoury 
(1986) in their examination of Californian SMEs which had targeted a greater role in 
exporting. Further, a lack of management expertise manifests itself in insufficient 
internationalisation know-how (Gibb, 1995), though various authors (eg Schmidt et al., 
1995) list this aspect separately. Buckley (1997) points out that SMEs with 
inexperienced managers can behave in a naive fashion. 
Donckels and Aerts (1992) in their research on the internationalisation of Belgian 
SMEs have shown that internationally active business managers speak significantly 
more languages than internationally non-active managers. Equally, from the research 
of Belgian small businessmen, Lambrecht (1992) has established that the number of 
business dealings with LDCs increases in accordance with the managers' level of 
education and knowledge of languages. Accordingly, Caughey and Chetty (1994) who 
investigated the pre-export behaviour of small New Zealand manufacturing firms, 
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discovered that exporters had more management education than non-exporters. 
Overall, the characteristics of the decision-maker within a company may determine 
how internal and external stimuli are perceived and interpreted. For example stimuli 
such as: the goals of the firm and the expected fulfilment of those goals, fortuitous 
orders from foreign customers, market opportunities, competition, economic integration 
and government stimulation measures (Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1978). 
In a subsequent study investigating 480 Belgian SMEs with business connections with 
LDCs, Donckels and Lambrecht (1995) found that JV entrepreneurs are significantly 
older than non-JV entrepreneurs and that they are more frequently university 
graduates than non-JV entrepreneurs. However, these results contradict earlier 
findings by Caughey and Chetty (1994) which suggested that younger (and better 
educated) decision-makers were more likely to respond positively to export stimuli than 
older ones. 
Restricted management time 
Management time becomes more important the deeper the international involvement 
of the SME: large amounts of management time are needed to collect, collate, sift and 
evaluate relevant information. Not only is management expertise as a qualitative 
component a scarce resource, but so also is the management time made available to 
their international undertakings within SMEs (Gibb, 1995). VobaRaiba (1997) points 
out that SMEs do not have expensive experts with the corresponding expertise. 
Frequently, this leads to short cuts with limited global scanning of opportunities 
(Buckley, 1979, 1997; Schmidt et al., 1995). Managerial talent is often pre-occupied 
with day-to-day problems, leaving insufficient time for long-term planning (Cavusgil, 
1980; UNCTAD, 1993). Understandably, the actual time spent on the exploration of 
additional business abroad and FDI opportunities is negligible. This "fire-fighting" mode 
of operation was detected by Peridis (1992) in 30 per cent of the senior managers 
surveyed in a study of various forms of strategic alliance involving 16 Canadian 
technology-based SMEs. Eden et al. (1997), in their comparison of large firms and 
SMEs as producers of technology, suggest the latter are likely to lack the managerial 
resources available to large firms and are therefore less likely to use formalised 
methods to send technical experts abroad, or to provide formal training. 
The limited global scanning of opportunities within SMEs is verified in the data of 
Buckley et al. (1988). From their study of 43 UK investors in Australia, the authors 
discovered that only 15 firms at any stage considered an alternative country for their 
investment. When searching for alternatives, the companies spent, on average, two to 
six months, with 12 months being the longest period. However, Buckley et al.'s (1988) 
comparison of search periods is misleading since some firms are more sophisticated in 
country scanning than others. A clearer statement on this aspect would have been 
possible if Buckley et al. (1988) had provided details on the search processes applied 
by the firms. 
Lack of contact networks 
Limited management time exacerbates the problem of restricted contact networks. 
Given constant quality of management staff, the size of a contact network is likely to be 
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more extensive in a company with greater management resources. Having extended 
global networks is vital for the establishment of international business. However, 
building international networks requires a positive attitude towards different cultures 
and at least a basic understanding of international languages. Thus, the management 
criterion 'networks of contacts' is correlated with the issues, expertise, ambition and 
management motivation. 
Management ambition and motivation 
The values and attitudes of (top) managers influence the behaviour and development 
of firms. In other words, a manager's values in respect of change, risk, innovation, 
growth etc. determine - directly or indirectly - the choice of objectives (Stratos, 1990). 
According to Gibb (1995), ambition and motivation of a firm's management is an 
important determinant of internationalisation success. 
This includes, for instance, the mobility of managers (Braun, 1982). If the key individual 
within an organisation cannot be convinced of the need to devote resources to develop 
an international orientation, the internationalisation of a company can be affected 
seriously (Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1978). Samuels et al. (1992) point out that 
there are small firms that have been in existence for a long time and have remained 
small due to the owners not seeking growth. Both personality and the objectives of the 
decision-maker are of basic importance for internationalisation behaviour (Schmidt et 
al., 1995). Simon (1996), for instance, considers the determination of the 'hidden 
champions' to become number one in their markets as being crucial to their success. It 
is frequently overlooked in the literature that critical issues such as the ambition and 
motivation of a manager are correlated with education and expertise. 
In their study of German SMEs with cross-border co-operations in Europe, Kaufmann 
et al. (1990) found that in nearly 90 per cent of all cases, the idea of co-operating with 
another enterprise in Europe was initiated from inside the company. Had this not been 
the case, many of the 122 companies out of 474 German SMEs in this study, would 
still be operating on their own. 
Information scarcities 
Becoming 'international' implies entering complex terrain (UNCTAD, 1993). Accessible 
information about foreign cultures and markets is essential to success (Kean, 1989; 
McDowell and Rowlands, 1995; Belich and Dubinsky, 1995). It plays a crucial role in 
risk reduction (Buckley, 1979). The importance of the availability of information cannot 
be over-emphasised (Buckley et al., 1988) since lack of knowledge of a host country, 
for instance, can frequently lead SMEs to make inappropriate decisions (UNCTAD, 
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1993). Whereas some authors (Deloitte Touche, 1992) argue that information 
problems are a major obstacle to SMEs, others (Berger and Uhlmann, 1984) have 
suggested that insufficient know-how of operating abroad is the least of a firm's 
worries. The need for high quality information to support decision-making becomes 
even more crucial for the switch from exporting to FDI. This is demonstrated in various 
models (Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1976; Buckley and Casson, 1981) based on the 
different costs involved in these methods of market servicing and - in the case of the 
Buckley and Casson (1981) model - the demand and conditions in the market and 
host market grov\rth. This is confirmed by Cafferata and Mensi (1995) who argue that 
the need for information, communication and other support services increases as 
SMEs shift from simple to more complex internationalisation paths. 
However, SMEs are often at a disadvantage, because of the fixed costs involved vis-a-
vis larger firms in collecting and analysing information about the environment, the legal, 
economic and political aspects of operations and methods of doing business abroad, 
market opportunities, sources of finance, government regulations etc. (Buckley, 1979; 
Delacroix, 1984; Kean, 1989; Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Smallbone et al., 1995; 
Schmidt et al., 1995). Delacroix (1984) argues that obtaining information about little 
known environments, and interpreting and acting upon that information is more costly 
than doing the same at home. SMEs are not usually able to send their personnel to 
foreign countries for a lengthy period (UNCTAD, 1993). This results often in less than 
perfect information for SMEs (Acs et al., 1997). Buckley (1993) argues that shortage of 
information reinforces the impact of uncertainty on decision-making. 
In their study of UK firms in Australia, Buckley et al. (1988) found that, often, 
information is both readily available and free with most countries providing a service to 
prospective investors and giving large amounts of free information on their economy, 
laws, aids to industry, labour conditions and costs, etc. In most cases, however, this 
type of information is rather general in nature and needs to be tailored first before it 
can be used for decision-making. The limited availability of adequate information within 
SMEs embarked upon internationalisation, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is 
confirmed by findings of a Stratos (1990) study that looked into the internationalisation 
pattern of European SMEs. 
SMEs' attitude to risk 
Due to their financial resource restrictions, a commitment to FDi means SMEs put 
more at stake than large firms. SMEs are highly vulnerable (Buckley, 1979). Their risks 
are highly concentrated due to poor diversification, changes in supply and demand, 
technological improvements and governmental policy decisions that can easily leave 
them in an unenviable position. The risk is perceived to be greatest when the firm has 
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no international experience to draw on (ibid). Since SMEs normally do not have ready 
access to long-term credit, the desire for a quick recovery of the investment outlay is 
higher for SMEs. This restricts the goals of SMEs to the short term (UNCTAD, 1993). 
SMEs are more risk-aware and cautious with their investment, though usually they do 
not carry out risk assessments, etc. As a consequence, they are often greater risk 
takers than more 'managerially-minded' entrepreneurs (Buckley, 1997). 
2.4 The need for SME FDI 
The initial decision to engage in FDI is critical for the MNE (Rugman, 1985). 
Consequently, the explanation of why MNEs undertake FDI has concerned 
researchers for some 60 years, commencing with Cease's (1937) contribution on the 
'nature of the firm'. Since then, scholars have been trying to explain FDI against the 
background of international trade theory (Mundell, 1957; Heckscher & Ohiin; see 
Mookerjee, 1958; Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1976), theory of location (Calvet, 1981), 
investment theory (Barlow and Wender, 1955; Aliber, 1970, 1983), theory of the firm 
(Penrose, 1956; Kindleberger, 1979), and industrial organisation theory (Hymer, 
1976;^' Williamson, 1975; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977; Rugman, 1985). 
The vast majority of FDI theorising has been carried out on large rather than small 
MNEs (Vatne, 1995). However, as SMEs face size-related constraints on 
internationalisation (Baird et al., 1994), theorising on SME FDI requires particular 
attention. It has taken scholars another forty years to consider the specific case of 
SME FDI following Cease's first FDI theory. Ten years after establishing the criteria for 
success for SME investors in the late 1970s (Buckley, 1979), Buckley (1989) proposed 
theories for SME engagement in FDI, including the 'evolutionary approach', the 
'economics of the firm's growth approach', the 'gambler's earnings hypothesis' and the 
'corporate decision-making approach'. Subsequently, Buckley (1997) has restated his 
ideas drawn from a wide range of theoretical concepts, including the ideas of 
incremental international involvement (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), the economic theory of the firm (Penrose, 1956) and the 
investment decision-making process (Aharoni, 1966). All strands, he suggests, adopt 
different perspectives, although they have a common theme: the importance of 
management and the constraints on SMEs, including lack of finance, shortage of 
managerial capacity and non-availability of essential information. 
2.4.1 B u c k l e y ' s SME FDI t heo r i s i ng 
Internationalisation is the process of an organisation's increasing involvement in 
international business (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988; Young et al., 1989) or simply a 
process by which firms adopt international business activities (Cavusgil, 1980).^^ 
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Elsewhere (Albaum et al., 1992, p.33), internationalisation is considered to be "the 
successive development in a firm's export management in terms of the geographical 
spreading in markets, products and operation forms, and the changes in export 
management philosophies and organisational behaviour from the beginning of the 
process to the actual situation." This latter attempt to clarify the terminology 
demonstrates the hefty influence of the export literature in the discussion of firm 
internationalisation (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Pavord and Bogart, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980, 
1984; Czinkota, 1982; Edmunds and Khoury, 1986). 
According to the evolutionary model of international involvement, the 
internationalisation of the firm proceeds in stages, representing a process of 
incremental involvement with regard to managerial and financial resources (Young et 
al., 1989; Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995). FDI is perceived to be the ultimate stage of 
international commitment, following exporting which launches the process (Buckley, 
1989). With FDI, the company has reached a stage where, in contrast to exporting, the 
value-adding part of the manufacturing process is carried out in a host country. 
Buckley (1989) breaks down the internationalisation process into a series of stages, 
termed the 'routes of investment' in production facilities overseas.These start with 
domestic activities before moving to direct exporting, use of a foreign agent, 
establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary and, subsequently, establishment of an 
overseas production subsidiary. Throughout the process, the choice of strategy is 
influenced by a complex mix of both internal and external factors (Baird et al., 1994). 
During the evolutionary process, perceived risks decline, market opportunities are 
identified and managerial skills are developed. 
Buckley (1989) highlights the existence of crucial interactions between internal and 
external pressures in the firm's development. Since all forms of international activity, 
and in particular FDI, are management-intensive, he stresses the critical role of 
management activity and awareness in the internationalisation process. Buckley 
(1989) equally holds that information is a crucial part of the feedback process and, 
thus, a critical factor impacting on progression from one stage to the next. Success in 
the initial stages of the process will dictate the speed of progression towards additional 
levels of commitment, whereas lack of success will lead to withdrawal and de-
internationalisation (Cavusgil, 1980; Young et al., 1989). 
The idea of incremental learning in the evolutionary model was developed at the 
Nordic Uppsala school of thought (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) and 
formalised by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) as the model of the firm's 
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internationalisation process. It is an early attempt at classification, using the market 
entry form as a criterion drawing on extensive experience with Swedish firms.^ Various 
studies provide evidence for the practical relevance of the evolutionary process of 
internationalisation (Gruber et al., 1967; Hornell et al., 1973; Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
Luostarinen, 1979; Edmunds and Khoury, 1986; Buckley et al., 1988). Nevertheless, 
the majority of studies stem from the vast body of export literature (Bilkey and Tesar, 
1977; Pavord and Bogart, 1977; Edmunds and Khoury, 1986) where authors identified 
four (Pavord and Bogart, 1977),'' five (Cavusgil, 1980),^ or six (Bilkey and Tesar, 
1977;^'') distinct stages throughout the internationalisation process. 
The Uppsala school extended the idea of incremental international development to the 
entire process of a firm's internationalisation from exporting to FDI. Hornell et al. 
(1973), with their case study of a Swedish pharmaceutical firm established in nine 
foreign countries, provide confirmation for the internationalisation process. Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) found support for a step-wise process in the 
internationalisation of four Swedish firms.'^ Further empirical confirmation of the 
incremental internationalisation process has been discovered in US firms (Gruber et 
al., 1967), Australian firms (Wiedersheim-Paul et al., 1978), Japanese firms in 
Southeast Asia (Yoshihara, 1978), Finnish firms (Luostarinen, 1979), UK SMEs 
(Buckley et al., 1988), German SMEs in Europe (Kaufmann et al., 1990) and in China 
(Schuller, 1994; Commerzbank, 1995), Belgian firms (Donckels and Lambrecht, 1995) 
and Dutch firms (Barkema et al., 1996). 
Despite Buckley et al.'s (1988) findings that companies which pursue the evolutionary 
model perform better than companies preferring an aggressive growth strategy, 
various authors (Young and Hood, 1976; Czinkota, 1982; Hedlund and Kverneland, 
1983; Reid, 1983, b, 1984; Cavusgil, 1984; Edmunds and Khoury, 1986; Turnbull, 
1987) have criticised the wide acceptance and popularity of the staged approach. They 
argue it is not consistent with the empirical evidence and is based on two significant 
studies only, namely the original research by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) 
and the research into Australian firms by Wiedersheim-Paul et al. (1978). This criticism 
is based on the argument that entry modes are more direct and rapid than those 
implied by the evolutionary model. The pace and pattern of a firm's internationalisation 
is strongly influenced by stability of market conditions, size and growth, a company's 
market experience, international experience in transferring technology and product 
lines, the present stage of internationalisation, a company's resources and its 
organisational structure (Hedlund and Kverneland, 1983). Turnbull (1987), reporting on 
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the reversal of stages, cites one case of the closure of a sales office which resulted in 
a company returning to direct exporting. This emerged from research into 72 UK-
spawned organisational structures in France, Germany and Sweden. 
Davidson and McFetridge (1985) report that their sample companies did not follow the 
classic pattern of 'exporting-licensing-FDI' due to the difficulty of developing export 
sales under Chinese state trading procedures and the reluctance of firms to license for 
fear of technological loss. This applies also to the Hong Kong garment manufacturers 
cited by Lau (1992). Unlike North American and West European MNEs, the Hong Kong 
firms did not use licensing as a market servicing tool prior to establishing their manu-
facturing subsidiaries. 
Despite the general legitimacy of the arguments, the above criticism of the 
internationalisation process is based on large firm thinking (eg Young and Hood, 1976; 
Hedlund and Kverneland, 1983; Cavusgil, 1984). Large firms have the resources and 
managerial philosophy needed to plan expansion strategies that do not necessarily 
follow any strategy developed from previous experiences (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 
1995). Further, the evolutionary approach does not require adherence to a strict order 
of stages, but accepts leapfrogging of some intermediate steps to suit a firm's 
experiences or market size considerations. Companies with experience in culturally 
similar countries have a ready understanding of cultural characteristics which, coupled 
with experience of market entry strategies, streamlines the market entry process 
(Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). However, as Strandskov 
(1986) acknowledges, the literature offers only few alternative paths to 
internationalisation, despite the firms coming from different-sized countries, facing 
different technological, managerial, and environmental conditions. Critics of the model 
view the stages process too narrowly, solely on a one-country basis instead of 
adopting a multi-country perspective. Explicitly, Hedlund and Kverneland (1983) stick 
too rigidly to the terminology and fail to expose a wider perspective. For instance, 
Carstairs and Welch (1982) revealed that in all but eight of 43 cases, licensing was not 
the first form of international involvement by Australian firms in their study. It was 
preceded generally, if not by exporting to particular foreign markets, at least by 
exporting to of/7er foreign markets. 
On the other hand, Rennie (1993) in his study of the export behaviour of 300 
Australian firms, highlights the growing existence of 'born global' enterprises. This 
contradicts the long-standing assumption that SMEs need to establish a successful 
domestic base before embarking on export strategies and subsequently FDI. 
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Elsewhere, though, it is suggested that 'born global' exporters seem to be the smaller 
group (Economist, 3.7.93, p.59). Nevertheless, criticism of citing Rennie (1993) to 
contradict the applicability of the incremental internationalisation model might be 
justified since this author does not question explicitly the incremental move from 
exporting to FDI. Implicitly, however, Rennie's (1993) reasoning could be extended to 
suggest that these 'born global' companies are able to establish an FDI presence 
without having previously exported or licensed extensively to a specific country. 
Some of these critical notes (Hedlund and Kverneland, 1983; Cavusgil, 1984) give 
grounds for criticism themselves. For instance, Cavusgil's (1984) suggested 
methodology for classifying the exporting firms into three categories (experimental, 
active, and committed exporters) along a range of four measurable criteria was 
primarily judgmental and highly subjective. His entire approach promotes the belief that 
he measured a concept that he had already pre-determined. The purpose of this 
exercise and the conceptual and empirical value of Cavusgil's (1984) note is not clear. 
Buckley (1989) further includes, in his discourse of SME FDI theories, the 'economics 
of the firm's growth approach', the 'gambler's earnings hypothesis' and the 'corporate 
decision-making approach'. These are promoted by Buckley as distinct approaches. In 
fact, both the 'economics of the firm's growth approach' and the 'gambler's earnings 
hypothesis' revolve around the shortage of financial resources which restrict an SME's 
FDI. Equally, both approaches emphasise the fact that companies, due to their inability 
to raise external funding in the form of loans, use retained earnings for the financing of 
their direct investment projects. This merely reiterates Penrose's (1956) original 
economic theory of the firm which suggests that firms starting with only a small 
investment can eventually operate on a sufficiently large basis in the foreign country to 
capitalise on market opportunities and to defend their position against both indigenous 
and foreign competitors. 
Some aspects may raise concern about the applicability of the growth of the firm's 
approach as a rationale for SME FDI. Penrose (1956) argues that it is one of the 
notable characteristics of the growth of large corporations, to the extent they change 
the range and nature of the product as they grow. However, the difficulties of 
diversification and expansion out of a given sector and product are well known (Teece, 
1985). So, by the same token, are the entry barriers to new areas of growth (Bain, 
1956). Consequently, SMEs that are frequently one-product firms (Buckley, 1989) may 
find it difficult to diversify into a new product area in case competition causes profits 
and profitability, and future success prospects, to decline. Moreover, although the 
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rationales provide reasoning as to liow firms grow, Penrose's (1956) theory of the 
growth of the firm does not offer an explanation as to why firms engage in FDI in the 
first place. According to the theory of the growth of the firm, a firm's expansion drive is 
determined by its internal resources, but fails to take environmental factors into the 
equation. Whereas the evolutionary approach, the economics of the firm's growrth 
approach and the gambler's earnings hypothesis clearly emphasise the resource 
starvation suffered by many SMEs, Buckley's (1989) suggested corporate decision-
making approach fails to capture their situation. It focuses on organisational behaviour 
in general. Further, the economics of the firm's growth approach, the gambler's 
earnings hypothesis and the corporate decision-making approach revolve around the 
issue of management being a major variable in the decision to invest abroad. However, 
it has been established above (section 2.3.3) that SMEs frequently lack the managerial 
resources that are essential for FDI. Thus, Buckley's (1989) SME FDI theories are 
constructed on a vital element which is frequently absent from the SME armoury. 
This thesis also challenges the applicability of the evolutionary model. Regardless of all 
the empirical support and the doubt that the model has attracted, it has descriptive 
power - but only to suggest why firms gradually build up their international market 
servicing strategies and do not engage in FDI activities without prior international 
experience. What it fails to offer is a rationale for why firms finally make the decision to 
engage in FDI: what makes an SME take the final step to FDI? Why does an SME not 
continue exporting or licensing its technology to a customer abroad? The evolutionary 
model cannot answer these questions. The fact that an SME has gained experience in 
international business and markets is not a sufficient condition for it to engage in FDI, 
although it is necessary. The evolutionary model has no explanatory value. Neulinger 
and Rossi (1991) consider the evolutionary approach as classification only with no 
empirical relevance at all. Neulinger and Rossi's (1991) criticism sits comfortably with 
that of Reid (1983, b, 1984), Cavusgil (1984) and Turnbull (1987). However, as has 
been established, much of this criticism is in fact not well grounded. 
2.4.2 An appropriate S M E FDI theory 
This thesis argues the application of Dunning's (1977) eclectic approach to FDP^ 
offering a holistic framework with which it is possible to identify and evaluate the 
significance of the factors influencing both the initial act of foreign production by 
enterprises and the growth of such production. The eclectic theory draws on industrial 
organisation theory that stresses oligopolistic behaviour and imperfect factor markets 
as well as location theory. 
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The need for an eclectic theory for FDI was first recognised by Baumann in 1975. 
Subsequently, Dunning (1977) put forward the idea of the eclectic paradigm which 
states that the extent, form, and pattern of international production is determined by 
the configuration of three sets of advantages as perceived by enterprises: firm-specific, 
internalisation and location-specific advantages. The theory includes both home-
country and host-country characteristics as additional explanatory factors. It further 
argues that these advantages must be sufficient to compensate for the costs of setting 
up and operating a foreign value-adding operation, in addition to those faced by 
indigenous producers. Subsequently, Dunning (1980) tested the eclectic paradigm 
empirically in order to evaluate the significance of ownership and location-specific 
variables in explaining the industrial pattern and geographical distribution of the sales 
of US affiliates in 14 manufacturing industries in seven countries in 1970. 
The eclectic paradigm refers to firm-specific advantages (FSAs) as ownership 
advantages (O) and to country-specific advantages as locational advantages (L). The 
third set are internalisation advantages (I). Analysing the eclectic theory reveals that it 
has split the FSAs identified by internalisation theory into separate ownership and 
internalisation advantages."" 
Dunning (1977, 1980) stresses the separation of the country of origin-specific inputs 
from those that are location-specific, because the firm possessing country of origin-
specific inputs can exploit them wherever it wishes, usually at a minimal transfer cost. 
Moreover, unless it chooses to sell its country of origin-specific inputs, or the right to 
their use to other enterprises, the endowments are - for some time at least - its 
exclusive property (Dunning, 1977, 1980). The eclectic theory is based on adherence 
to a stage-by-stage procedure: a firm being able to proceed to the next stage only 
when the conditions of the previous stage have been fully satisfied. When FSAs exist 
and the first condition is satisfied, the firm must have an incentive to internalise its 
FSAs, such as the incentive to secure property rights over its FSAs in knowledge. This 
is realised through an extension of its own activities rather than by externalising them 
through arm's-length contracts with independent firms. Dunning's (1977, 1980) eclectic 
theory states further that, if the internalisation advantage condition is satisfied, it must 
be profitable for the firm to move its operations abroad. This, he argues, is due to at 
least some factor inputs, including natural and labour resources outside the home 
country. Otherwise, foreign markets would be served entirely by exports and domestic 
markets by domestic production. In accordance with Caves (1971), Dunning (1977, 
1980) further argues that the more ownership advantages an enterprise possesses, 
the greater the inducement to internalise them. Also the wider the attractions of a 
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foreign, rather than a home country production base, the more likely it is that an 
enterprise will try to engage in international production. 
However, Dunning's (1977, 1980) eclectic paradigm has been criticised by various 
authors (Kojima, 1978; Aliber, 1983; Robock and Simmonds, 1989). According to 
these critics, the eclectic theory does not take into account variations in the strategies 
of specific firms. Moreover, the theory pre-supposes that different firms have broadly 
similar objectives and respond to economic stimuli both consistently and in the same 
direction. Further, the eclectic theory has only a restricted applicability for analysing 
public policy issues. This is based on the way in which it separates the largely policy-
determined characteristics of the country environments from those location-specific 
characteristics that are less amenable to change brought about by policy choices. 
Another limitation of the eclectic theory is the omission of inter-nation variables, such 
as foreign exchange rates (Robock and Simmonds, 1989). 
As a consequence. Dunning (1988) restated the eclectic theory's main tenets and 
presented a number of possible extensions of the paradigm. The purpose was to 
ensure that the eclectic theory remained "a useful and robust general framework for 
explaining and analysing not only the economic rationale of international production but 
many organisational and impact issues in relation to MNE activity as well" (Dunning, 
1988, p.24). Dunning (1988) restated that, without international market failure, there is 
no raison d'etre for international production. Without the advantages of internalisation, 
much of the FDI would be replaced by the international contractual transaction of 
resources. The higher the transaction costs of using the market and the greater the 
efficiency of MNEs as co-ordinators of geographically dispersed activities, ceteris 
paribus, the more international production is likely to take place (ibid). Dunning (1988) 
finally extended the eclectic paradigm with the incorporation of more formal modelling. 
This included dynamic and development aspects of international production, the 
explanation of different forms of international economic involvement (eg arm's-length 
trade, JVs, non-equity contractual agreements), locus of decision-taking, divestment by 
MNEs (see Boddewyn, 1979, 1983, 1985) and consequences of MNE activity. 
2.4.3 Joint venture"^ ra t iona le 
As a next logical step in theorising about the motivations of firms to engage in foreign 
production in the form of a JV, Dunning's (1977, 1980) eclectic paradigm is extended 
to encompass this aspect. Whereas the ownership-specific as well as the location-
specific advantages in Dunning's (1977, 1980) paradigm need no further consideration 
(since they are not affected by a firm's choice of establishing a JV instead of a WFOE), 
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the internalisation aspect in the Dunning (1977, 1980) model needs separate 
examination. 
Organisational industrialists such as Hymer (1976), Williamson (1975), Buckley and 
Casson (1976), Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988), Casson (1979), Rugman (1979, 1983), 
Teece (1981) and Hennart (1982) have significantly advanced the understanding of 
FDI and the MNE as a response to imperfect markets. However, the majority of 
authors (Wells, 1973; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Teece, 1985; Thorelli, 1986) 
have restricted their theorising to the formation of WFOEs. This may be because, by 
value of assets, or employment, WFOEs have been far more important than JVs, 
outvaluing them by a ratio of 2.5:1 (Contractor, 1990). On the other hand, contractual 
and co-operative forms of FDI are so numerous that they require an integrated theory 
(ibid). Of those, most were JVs and more were announced after 1981 than in all prior 
years combined (Anderson, 1990). 
The literature has long excluded JVs from the arguments about the creation of 
hierarchies to bypass the inefficient institution of the market. JVs could not be 
structured in such a way as to maintain both the bargaining and maladaption costs 
inherent in such arrangements. With the establishment of a WFOE, an MNE could 
reduce dissemination risk and in so doing economise on the transaction costs of 
licensing or a JV. Williamson (1975) originally suggested two modes of organising 
economic activity, markets (exporting) and hierarchies (WFOE). Only later did he 
extend this logic to encompass inter-firm relationships falling between markets and 
hierarchies (hybrid modes, including licensing and JVs) (Williamson, 1985, 1991). 
According to authors, such as Kindleberger (1979), Caves (1982), Rugman (1983), 
Killing (1983), Poynter (1985), Harrigan (1985) and Rugman et al. (1985) firms have a 
strong economic incentive to avoid the formation of a JV since it has long been seen 
as inferior to the WFOE in maximising the firm's returns on its FSAs. Other frequently 
cited obstacles to the JV strategy include the difficulty of appreciating each other's 
contribution (Kindleberger, 1979) and the potential collision of the partners' interests. In 
many cases, the barriers are of an internal attitudinal nature which, as Harrigan (1984) 
notes, are more difficult to overcome than external ones. Co-operative arrangements 
were long seen as only the second or third best option for supplying foreign markets. 
They were used only under external mandates when government regulations 
precluded exporting or licensing or the establishment of WFOEs (Wells, 1973; 
Beamish, 1985; Root, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hamill and Hunt, 1993). 
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This myopic view has been criticised on various occasions (Stuckey, 1983; Beamish 
and Banks, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Contractor, 1990). Beamish and 
Banks (1987) extended the internalisation thinking to include the JV. They established 
the reasons why the JV may be the preferred strategy and presented empirical 
conditions when this is the case. Beamish and Banks suggested the existence of two 
necessary conditions to justify the utilisation of the JV, namely the possession of an 
FSA and the superiority of the JV over other means of appropriating rents from the 
sale of this asset in the foreign market. Earlier, Stuckey (1983) examined the 
conditions necessary to establish the superiority of JVs for firms pursuing vertical FDI 
with the application of the transaction cost paradigm. A similar consideration of JVs in 
the context of horizontal FDI, however, had long been lacking. 
According to Beamish and Banks (1987) the JV can provide an even better solution 
than the WFOE to the problems of opportunism, the small numbers dilemma and 
uncertainty in the face of bounded rationality. The authors suggest that when MNEs 
are faced with higher adaptation and information requirements than they are 
traditionally accustomed to, particularly in culturally dissimilar countries, the JV may be 
more appropriate. Kogut and Shingh (1988) found that cultural distance increased the 
probability of choosing a JV over an acquisition or a WFOE. Further, Davidson's (1982) 
early findings that JVs are more strongly associated with firms inexperienced in a 
particular foreign market, were later confirmed by Buckley et al. (1988) and Wu (1993). 
The former examined the FDI of UK first time investors in Australia. The latter 
investigated the entry of European firms into the Chinese market. 
Eventually, the literature has brought forward substantial lists of advantages for JVs as 
market entry strategies. Issues raised were the ability to facilitate the partner's local 
knowledge of the market and politics, and to access the partner's technology and 
distribution network, to embark on economies of scale, to reduce venture capital costs 
and overheads, and to get grants and cheaper loans in foreign countries (Engelhardt 
and Seibert, 1981; Killing, 1983; Herzfeld, 1983; Datta, 1988; Buckley et al., 1988; 
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Contractor, 1990; Schuler et 
al., 1992; Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993; Zahra and Elhagrasey, 1994; Laughton, 
1995). JVs were also praised for providing better ways of coping with competitive 
challenges than WFOEs. They were singled out for increasing interdependencies 
between industries and global competition (Harrigan, 1985; Perlmutter and Heenan, 
1986) since they provide enterprises with a wider range of strategic flexibility (Harrigan, 
1985, 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e JV is widely acknowledged as a strategic option when factors, such 
as quotas or high duties, offer only limited choices of foreign market servicing 
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(Harrigan, 1985, 1987; Zahra and Elhagrasey, 1994). JVs may result in greater long-
term market penetration through the promotion of a local image and market proximity 
(Engelhardt and Seibert, 1981; Buckley et al., 1988; Hamill and Hunt, 1993). 
In their statistical analysis of the foreign market entry decision of 155 US MNEs, 
Stopford and Wells (1972) found that the choice of JVs relative to WFOEs declined 
with the increasing importance of technology and marketing and product 
standardisation. Later, Wells (1973), while researching the determinants of 187 US 
investors' attitudes towards JVs, discovered that firms that did not diversify and 
allowed their product lines to age, did not tolerate JVs. 
This is confirmed by Gomes-Casseres (1989) who discovered that the main reasons 
for the formation of JVs were government attempts to restrict foreign ownership, local 
partner assistance with the acquisition of management expertise and local 
connections, to facilitate fast entry into new markets, the emergence of intensified 
competition in the world markets and the emergence of technological capabilities and 
market presence. From an analysis of statistical data from the 1970s and interviews 
with more than 40 international executives from five major MNEs, Gomes-Casseres 
(1989) discovered JVs are more appropriate for, and much more common in, cases 
where companies are following multi-domestic, rather than global strategies. Using a 
sample of Japanese investments in the US, Hennart and Reddy (1997) found that the 
JV is primarily a device to get access to resources embedded in other organisations 
and is, thus, preferable to mergers/acquisitions. From 20 interviews. Berg and 
Friedman (1980) found that executives perceive JVs as a way to link the specialised 
expertise of the parent firms and, therefore, reject merger, licensing, or internal 
development. Similarly, Harrison (1987), examining the JV as an alternative to 
merger/acquisition, notes that the JV is more attractive since it costs less, requires less 
risk-taking and causes less organisational upheaval. On the other hand, Finnerty et al. 
(1986), from their research on 208 US JVs, could not observe any abnormal wealth 
effect for stockholders participating in a JV than for stockholders of merging or 
acquiring businesses. 
Conversely, McConnell and Nantell (1985) have shown that the share values of over 
200 firms listed at the New York stock exchange increased for those companies that 
had undertaken JVs. Koh and Venkatraman (1991), examining the impact of JV 
formation on market value, found that JVs have significant, positive effects on the 
market values of the parent firms. This is in cases where JVs strengthen existing 
product-market segments or place new products in existing markets without creating 
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any appreciable increase in market values in instances where they develop new 
customers or enter new, unrelated product-market segments. Koh and Venkatraman 
(1991) further discovered that only the shareholders of the smaller partners earned 
significantly abnormal positive returns. 
Scholars, including Janger (1980), Gomes-Casseres (1987, 1989) and Chowdhury 
(1992) have further detected better performance in JVs compared with WFOEs. 
Various arguments against the use of JVs have been developed by authors, such as 
Caves (1982), Herzfeld (1983), Harrigan (1984, 1985), Contractor and Lorange (1988) 
and Gomes-Casseres (1989). These include: anti-trust problems, sovereignty conflicts, 
loss of autonomy, control and competitive advantage through strategic inflexibility, the 
risk of dissemination of intangible assets or expertise, the free-rider problem, 
inadequacy, when adopted by firms pursuing global strategies, problems with transfer 
pricing, host government regulations, creation of new competition and damaging 
implications for the firm's reputation. 
2.4.4 Additional joint venture theorising 
The need for JVs has been reasoned also by the application of transactional value, as 
opposed to transaction cost thinking. Proponents of this strand of thought, including 
Zajac and Olsen (1993) criticised the transaction cost thinking for neglecting 
interdependence between exchange partners in the pursuit of a JV, as well as 
important process issues. These authors are in favour of transactional value thinking 
as it addresses both joint value maximisation (rather than.single firm cost minimisation) 
and processes by which exchange partners create and claim value. Explicitly, Zajac 
and Olsen (1993) showed that transaction costs and transactional value may often be 
correlated so that the pursuit of greater joint value requires the use of governance 
structures that are less efficient from a transaction cost perspective. Strategic and 
learning gains often increase transaction value while simultaneously increasing 
transaction costs. However, expected joint gains often outweigh transaction cost 
considerations in inter-organisational strategies (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Madhok, 
1997). On the other hand, the shortcomings of the transactional value framework for 
inter-organisational strategies are its inherent abstract nature and its requirement for 
additional development. 
Apart from transaction cost and internalisation approaches, scholars have introduced a 
vanety of additional schools of thought when theorising on the establishment of JVs. 
For instance, Baran et al. (1996) consider: (1) resource dependence, (2) strategic 
choice, (3) transaction cost theory and (4) the eclectic paradigm of foreign investment. 
On the other hand, Albrecht et al. (1996) suggest three approaches towards JV 
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formation: (1) internalisation approach, (2) strategic behaviour approach and (3) co-
operative benefits and learning approach. The latter is comparable with Kogut's (1988) 
organisational learning amalgam derived from a review of transaction cost theory, 
strategic behaviour and organisational theory. Interestingly, Albrecht et al. (1996) 
published their arguments on JV formation in a compendium edited by Baran et al. 
(1996) who proposed, as outlined, four somewhat different approaches. This suggests 
that JV theories are neither right nor wrong. They are simply more applicable in certain 
circumstances than they are in others and they share commonalities. 
For instance, the strategic behaviour approach - which has attracted much research 
(Harrigan, 1984, 1987; Harrison, 1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Lyons, 1991) - and 
transaction cost theorising share several of these. However, they differ fundamentally 
in the objectives attributed to firms (Kogut, 1988). Whereas transaction cost theory 
argues that firms transact by the mode which minimises the sum of production and 
transaction costs, the strategic behaviour approach emphasises that firms transact by 
the mode which maximises profits through improving their competitive position vis-a-vis 
rivals. Kogut (1988) points out that a common failing is the treatment of the two 
theories as substitutes rather than as being complementary. Schuchardt (1994) argues 
that the corporate goals can be better met by employing co-operative rather than 
competitive strategies. This occurs under certain pre-requisites such as market and 
environmental conditions. Schuchardt's (1994) argument is sound in part only. Co-
operative strategies, such as JVs, do provide the ability to overcome political, legal and 
economic market entry barriers and the unfamiliarity with the foreign environment. 
However, they do not contribute more than WFOEs to corporate goals such as 
reducing industry-specific uncertainty and risk factors. 
Additional JV formation theorising has been put forward with Axelrod's (1987) 'theory 
of game approach'. Explicitly, the theory suggests that co-operative behaviour that is 
based on a few, simple and transparent rules, is the best long-term strategy of survival. 
Axelrod (1987) formulated several essentials for successful co-operative strategies 
and transferred them into socio-economic systems. These include an undertaking not 
to covet partner advantages, not to be the first to defect, to mirror both co-operation 
and defection and to utilise simple, transparent rules of behaviour. The game theory 
crops up in various approaches, including those of Beamish and Banks (1987) and 
Weder (1989) who integrated the idea of game theory into business management 
theory. The 'theory of game' shows JV specificity although the conditions of an 
approach that is suitable for analysis of internal interactions and individual problems, 
are only partly transferable into the international context. 
2.5 SME joint venture research 
Although there are various proponents of the JV strategy who recognised that JVs 
open doors into international markets for SMEs that have fewer productive resources 
and/or market knowledge (Connolly, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 
1988; Wilson, 1990; UNCTAD, 1993; Kaufmann, 1995; Donckels and Lambrecht, 
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1995; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996; Buckley, 1997; Gomes-Casseres, 1997), only a few 
have dedicated their interest to a close investigation of the joint venturing of SMEs 
(Connolly, 1984; Kaufmann, 1995; Donckels and Lambrecht, 1995). 
For instance, Connolly (1984) examined market situations where third world MNEs and 
US enterprises (especially SMEs) can form JVs to combine the distinctive advantages 
of each for mutual benefit. The third world MNE can support US SMEs that do not 
have the resources, experience or personnel to "go it alone". Though Connolly's (1984) 
study points out the areas of synergy for both sides in the JV, it does not examine the 
operational difficulties of the JV itself. These involve three national systems with 
different legal, tax and business practices and two headquarters' managements the 
interests of which may conflict. Moreover, Connolly's (1984) study overwhelmingly 
adopts the point of view of the third world corporation rather than that of the US SME. 
As a result it focuses more on what the SME can provide to the third world MNE rather 
than vice versa. Also Connolly (1984) emphasises situations where an SME joins 
forces with an LDC MNE to enter a third market but not the market of the MNE (eg a 
US SME forming a JV with a Chinese MNE to enter the Kuwait market). The attributes 
of host country enterprises most frequently sought by foreign SMEs (and large firms) -
such as cultural links and contacts within authorities - could not be utilised in situations 
as laid out by Connolly (1984). 
Later, Kaufmann (1995) examined whether, and to what extent, aggressive forms of 
internationalisation, such as JVs are appropriate to SMEs. Eventually, he expressed 
concern over whether pursuing a strategy of survival through foreign expansion, as 
large MNEs do, is adequate for SMEs. Kaufmann (1995) who builds his construct on 
the concept of trust, points out that SMEs tend to avoid JVs where problems of control 
and governance in areas of information and research and development are 
observable. As an example, the author suggests a JV in disthbution where loss of 
market share for one partner often means a gain for the other. Consequently, 
Kaufmann (1995) discovered that the creation of cross-border co-operation among 
firms already known to each other is the preferred way for SMEs to engage in FDI. 
Risky co-operation with unknown partners is the exception rather than the rule. Hence, 
the promotion of co-operation for SMEs in the form of JVs has to include the mediation 
of information and contacts in order to improve transparency and reduce transaction 
costs. Only then can the co-operation with foreign partners abroad be a basis to realise 
synergies and to benefit from the advantages of a location in a foreign market (ibid). 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the market servicing strategies open to SMEs. The review 
of the literature on SME internationalisation has shown that the bulk of studies on 
international SMEs revolve around exporting. Less is known about SME FDI. The 
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common theme that was discovered in the majority of studies is that SMEs are at a 
disadvantage compared with large firms when it comes to internationalisation and, in 
particular, FDI. Financial and managerial resource limitations, a paucity of market 
information and the SME's 'at risk' position have been established as the main barriers 
to SME FDI. 
Chapter two did not discuss support mechanisms available on the national and supra-
national levels (eg DTI, 1995 and Samuels et al., 1992 for UK; Mulhern, 1994 for EU; 
Berger and Uhlmann, 1984 for Germany; O'Sullivan, 1985 for foreign investors in 
Ireland;"^ Born, 1996 on trade missions). Support mechanisms are another means of 
enabling SMEs to enter foreign markets, apart from the application of the JV strategy. 
This chapter has rejected Buckley's (1989, 1997) reasoning to explain the FDI of SMEs 
since it fails to provide any rationale for SMEs engaging in FDI. Whereas the 
evolutionary approach is only a descriptive model, the 'economics of the firm's growth 
approach', the 'gambler's earnings hypothesis' and the 'corporate decision-making 
approach' are centred on the importance of the SME's management capacity - an 
asset which many SMEs do not have. Dunning's (1977, 1980) eclectic theory of foreign 
production is thus applied in this study. It extended industrial organisation thinking that 
is, according to Rugman et al. (1985), applicable to both large and small and medium-
sized MNEs. SMEs have FSAs that they wish to exploit in international markets. By 
doing so, they use the internal structure of the firm, rather than the market mechanism. 
Dunning's eclectic theory has been extended to encompass also the rationale of why 
SMEs engage in a JV. 
The predictive power of the internalisation theory which deals with Dunning's (1977, 
1980) internalisation advantage, is supported by the explanatory power of the 
internationalisation approach. The evolutionary approach of internationalisation 
provides the reasoning as to why firms enter a JV instead of a WFOE, if it is assumed 
that both forms are strategies of FDI. Especially in markets which are geographically or 
culturally distant, a JV can be an advantageous entry and servicing strategy as it is 
less resource-intensive than a WFOE (Schuchardt, 1994; Laughton, 1995). For many 
SMEs, the JV is the finite strategy for servicing a foreign market. For others it is the 
stepping stone to a form of higher commitment - the WFOE. 
This approach of combining elements from both internalisation and internationalisation 
thinking, coincides with the ideas of Lau (1992). He argues that internationalisation and 
internalisation of a firm's FSAs do not necessarily conflict, but rather complement each 
other. This contradicts Rugman et al. (1985) who insist that a firm involved in 
internationalisation is typically more concerned about avoiding exposure to an 
uncertain foreign environment than about losing its FSA. 
The subsequent chapter builds a model framework for JV analysis. 
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Notes 
A catalogue of market entry strategies is contained in Appendix II. 
^ The literature has also addressed the measurement of the degree of internationalisation (Bilkey 
and Tesar, 1977; Luostarinen, 1979; Czinkota, 1982; Cavusgil, 1984; Strandskov, 1986; Welch 
and Luostarinen, 1988; Albaum et al., 1992; Gibb, 1995; O'Farrell et al., 1996; Simon, 1996). 
^ Lopez-Gonzalez et al. (1995), along with other authors, include strategic alliances (SAs) in the 
range of servicing strategies. A SA exists when two or more firms combine parts of their 
operations, either formally or informally, in order to achieve the goal of internationalisation. 
However, as Lopez-Gonzalez et al. (1995) establish, and as can be found in the contributions of 
Welch (1992), Axelsson (1993), Hara and Kanai (1994) and Gomes-Casseres (1997), a SA can 
comprise any of the market entry modes, "but especially licensing and (contractual) equity JVs" 
(Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995, p.219). What Lopez-Gonzalez et al. Understand as contractual 
equity JV is not clear the literature on JVs distinguishes between equity JVs and contractual 
JVs. This excludes the SA from a separate discussion in the market entry strategy framework. 
" Establishing a long-term market position through a JV or a WFOE affects the short-term profit 
prospects of a firm since substantial funds are required which often cannot be recouped shortly. 
^ Endres (1987, p.374) considers the JV not as a form of FDI: "JVs as opposed to direct 
investments." However he states also that "within the group of FDI ]...[ there is a trend to JVs." 
® For a discussion of contributions in the entry mode literature see Tan (1993, pp. 12-31). 
Various studies have detected a positive correlation between firm size and export behaviour 
(Calof, 1993; Wagner 1995; Vatne, 1995), though others reject such a relationship (Bilkey, 
1978; Ali and Swiercz, 1991; Bonaccorsi, 1992; Walker, 1994). 
^ While the share of trade in GDP has remained constant since 1980, that of FDI flows has risen 
from 1% to 2.3% in 1996 and that of FDI stock from 10% to 21% (FT, 4.9.98, p.4). 
^ UNCTAD (1993) defines multinational SMEs as having up to 500 employees in the home 
country, possessing at least one foreign affiliate and originating from developed countries. 
Noteworthy is the confusing use of terminology in the study: on the one hand, it is referred to 
"affiliates of SME TNCs" and elsewhere to "parent firms of SME TNCs" (p.205). 3,315 
questionnaires were sent to multinational SMEs in 18 developed countries and 1,257 were 
mailed to their foreign affiliates in LDGs. Additional 862 foreign affiliates of large MNEs and 460 
indigenous firms received questionnaires. 132 parent SMEs, 97 SME affiliates, 147 affiliates of 
large MNEs and 67 indigenous firms in LDCs returned the questionnaires. 
°^ Also most Western European countries have more foreign affiliates than the average. Many 
US SMEs have not become internationalised due to their large home market (Fujita, 1995). 
" In the mid-1980s, their share in total FDI by value was under 20% and if measured in numbers 
of investments, more than 50% of new equity FDI by Japanese MNEs was accounted for by 
SMEs in the late 1980s. In contrast, in the US, the share in FDI by value was only 3% in 1988. 
Although Simon's work provides insight into the relevant issues of SME internationalisation, 
including servicing strategies, attitudes and the characteristics of owner-managers, the results 
have to be applied with care: the world-class SMEs in Simon's (1996) 122 firm sample have, on 
average, 735 employees and, thus, do not correspond with the definition applied in this study. 
Turnover abroad/total turnover. 
The reason for the discrepancy is that Moskowitz and Menzies (1995) draw the upper size 
margin at 99 employees. It is not clear, however, where Kean (1989) draws the margin. 
Naumann and Lincoln (1991) suggest that only 10% of total US exports are conducted by SMEs. 
For the entire firm internationalisation scholars (Buckley et al., 1983; Albaum et al., 1992; 
Axelsson, 1993; Erramilli and D'Souza, 1993; Calof, 1993; Storey, 1994) discovered similar 
ABI-INFORM (Proquest), ANBAR, BUSINESS DISC EBA, INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT 
INTERNATIONAL DATABASE, INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCE, SOCIAL SCIENCE CITATION INDEX. 
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'''' The interpretation of Kaiser and Griffen's (1997) results warrants consideration: first, SMEs 
were defined as businesses with up to 500 employees. However, since scholars apply a variety 
of definitions to the term SME, it can be assumed that other authors have defined the term SME 
differently, eg by applying different criteria (turnover or number of employees) and/or different 
margins. Secondly, due to the nature of the search strategy, double counting could not be 
completely avoided. Thirdly, terms such as 'JVs' were not searched for. In the study, JVs were 
considered as one form of FDI. This suggests that the inclusion of the search term 'JVs' would 
have produced different results. On the other hand, within the concept of the category of 
'internationalisation', 'licensing', as opposed to 'exporting', 'FDI', 'internationalisation' and 
'international business' can also be dealt with on a purely domestic basis. This could possibly 
have reduced the number of research items found, though it would have then reduced the figure 
within both categories. 
The literature on SME exporting has addressed various aspects, including 'firm size and export 
intensity' (All and Swiercz, 1991; BonaccorsI, 1992; Calof, 1993; Walker, 1994; Wagner, 1995; 
Vatne, 1995), 'exporters and non-exporters' (Vatne, 1995; Crick and Chaudhry, 1995; Calof and 
Vivlers, 1995), 'SME management characteristics' (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Edmunds and 
Khoury, 1986; Butler, 1993; Caughey and Chetty, 1994; Moini, 1995), 'export barriers' (Sharkey 
et al., 1989; Naumann and Lincoln, 1991; Kumcu et al., 1995; Crick and Chaudhry, 1995; 
Campbell, 1996) and 'export Information' (McDowell and Rowlands, 1995; Belich and Dubinsky, 
1995). However, ideas were also put forward on the strategies for successfully pursuing SME 
exporting: Delacroix (1984) reports on cases of US SME exporters and Kerr (1989) and 
Kirkconnell (1989) present guidelines for successful SME exporters. 
See Appendix V for a definition of FDI. 
®^ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
°^ Robock and Simmonds (1989, p.3) In their discourse upon the emergence of international 
business, suggest that "some business firms have had FDI and foreign operations for many 
years ]...[ predominantly in the fields of mining, petroleum and agriculture." All these are product 
categories that have, traditionally, been In the hands of large corporations. 
One such approach to defining an MNE Is the use of the ratio of foreign (F) to total (T) 
operations (Bruck and Lees, 1968; Rugman, 1979). According to Rugman et al. (1985), firms 
with F/T ratios greater than 25 or 30% can be classified as MNEs. The problem with the F/T ratio 
is that available data do not always permit to distinguish between exports and sales by overseas 
branches. 
Hood and Young (1979) allow the income-generating assets to be owned also partly by the 
foreign enterprise. 
2^ The work of Perlmutter (1969) points out three types of management view: ethnocentric, 
polycentric and geocentric. A true MNE is geocentric. 
Why these authors advanced these figures is not clear. 
This contradicts Young et ai.'s (1989) understanding of the MNE which requires the 
establishment of income-generating assets in the form of either production or marketing. 
This is more a matter of historical consequence. 
The parent firm should have worldwide sales of less than £50m per year and the UK 
subsidiary should have sales no larger than £10m per year. Size limits were chosen in order to 
eliminate the larger European MNEs but to leave a population from which a viable sample could 
be selected. The relevance of the size of the investment project is not clear. 
^ M 8 of the distributor companies had up to 50 employees, 17 of the service firms had up to 50 
employees and 12 of the manufacturing firms had up to 50 employees. In addition, three 
manufacturers had between 51 and 100 and two had more than 100 employees. 
As forms of co-operation the authors regard anything between co-ordination and equity JVs. 
°^ These results with regard to Simon's 'hidden champions' can be transferred to the SME 
context in this thesis only to a limited degree since the 'hidden champions' have workforces in 
excess of 500 - the upper limit for an SME In this thesis. 
The theory was originally propounded in Hymer's thesis in 1960. 
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Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) refer to it as the 'establishment chain' and Cavusgil 
(1984) discusses the phenomenon under the 'stages internationalisation framework', whereas 
Strandskov (1986) knows the concept as 'phase process' and Turnbull (1987) as 
'internationalisation process'. Similar was pointed out by Lopez-Gonzalez et al. (1995). 
Rugman et al. (1985) suggest four stages in the model dominated by the management's 
attitude towards expansion into foreign markets (re-active exporting, pro-exporting, assembling 
and packaging stage, foreign production stage. 
The Johanson and Vahlne (1977) model is based on the premise that a lack of knowledge 
about foreign markets and operations is a crucial obstacle to the development of international 
operations and that the necessary knowledge can be acquired through operations abroad. 
Johanson and Vahlne borrowed from Aharoni's (1966) behavioural theory of the firm which 
suggests that market commitment and market knowledge affect both commitment decisions and 
the way activities are performed. These, in turn, change knowledge and commitment The 
internationalisation variables 'market commitment' and 'market knowledge' develop during the 
internationalisation process. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) assume that the firm strives to 
increase its long-term profit and to keep risk-taking at a low level, and that these objectives 
characterise decision-making at all levels of the firm." The model finally assumes that the state 
of internationalisation affects perceived opportunities and risks. These, in turn, influence 
commitment decisions and current activities. The role of management is crucial in the model 
since success in subsequent stages depends on the ability of the management team to adapt to 
changes and developments in both the internal and external environments. 
No activity in the export market, passive activity, minor activity and aggressive activity. 
However, the authors' empirical study of 138 US firms did not confirm these suggested stages. 
®^ Domestic marketing, pre-export stage, experimental involvement, active involvement and 
committed involvement. Later, Cavusgil (1984) merged the first three stages of the 1980 model 
into one single stage, the active exporting stage. The new, three tier categorisation comprises 
stages such as 'experimental exporters', 'active exporters' and 'committed exporters'. 
Management is not interested in exporting; management would fill an unsolicited^export order; 
management actively explores the feasibility of exporting; firm exports on an experimental basis 
to some psychologically close countries; firm is an experienced exporter to that country and 
adjusts exports optimally to changing exchange rates, tariffs, etc.; management explores the 
feasibility of exporting to additional countries that are psychologically further away. The 
classification of companies in the individual stages was based on criteria such as length of 
export experience, volume of exports as a percentage of sales and export target countries. The 
authors tested their model on 423 US SMEs and found clear confirmation for the stages model. 
Sandvik, Atlas Copco, Facit and Volvo. The authors suggest four stages of development: no 
regular export activities; export via independent representatives (agents); establishment of sales 
subsidiary; establishment of production/manufacturing subsidiary. Of 63 sales subsidiaries of the 
four companies, 56 were preceded by agents and in no case had a firm started production 
without having first sold to the country via an agent/sales subsidiary. 
Defined as production financed by FDI and undertaken by MNEs. 
''° Rugman (1985) argues that any ownership advantage has to be internalised in order to be 
effective. This supports Rugman's (1983) earlier argument that there is no substantial difference 
between the eclectic paradigm and the internalisation theory, once the assumption is made that 
market imperfections are exogenous. 
For a definition of the JV see Appendix V. 
Harrigan (1987) highlighted the advantages of the JV using the example of the pharmaceutical 
industry, where JVs are inevitable ilue to the involvement of technologies such as robotics and 
industry automation. 
From his research of foreign investors in Ireland, O'Sullivan (1985) found that market size, 
costs of production, and exchange rates were important for investors, whereas grants and 
subsidies were not found statistically significant as explanatory variables for the locational choice 
of FDI. This contradicts findings by Donaldson (1966). 
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Chapter Three 
International Joint Ventures 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two has hypothesised that the joint venture (JV) is an adequate strategy for 
SMEs servicing a foreign market in cases where exporting is exposed to too-high 
transaction costs and which cannot be serviced by a wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
(WFOE), because of limited firm resources. This chapter moves the JV strategy into 
the centre of attention. It attempts to develop a framework that allows the investigation 
of this strategy. This framework will be modified and developed further in chapter six 
with the findings from the literature on Sino-foreign JVs. 
3.2 The model framework 
JVs have become a very popular tool for foreign market servicing and have been the 
dominant foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy compared with WFOEs (Herzfeld, 
1983; Endres, 1987). Research on JVs has been popular for the past three decades 
(Herzfeld, 1983), the literature suggesting the 1960s and 1970s as the cornerstones of 
research activity (Reynolds, 1984). Import substitution policies and quota restrictions, 
restrictions on royalty payments and the problems of negotiating with agents and 
licensees prevented exporting, licensing and the establishment of WFOEs (Datta, 
1988; Young et al., 1989; Laughton, 1995). 
However, as several scholars (Friedman and Beguin, 1971; Raveed and Renforth, 
1983; Lasserre, 1984; Beamish, 1987) argue, MNEs have not resisted entering into 
JVs since they have recognised their desirability. In the future, JVs may become even 
more attractive to MNEs (Killing, 1983; Herzfeld, 1983; Harrigan, 1987; Lichtenberger 
and Naulleau, 1993) since, as Raveed and Renforth (1983) conclude, WFOEs are no 
longer a viable form of foreign equity investments in most LDCs. In the east-west 
context, JVs have long been the exception, and only after enduring unsatisfactory and 
disappointing experiences with technology transfer through licensing in the 1960s and 
1970s, have socialist countries widened the opportunities for establishing JVs (Erhardt, 
1977). 
An analytical JV model needs to address the question of whether, and to what extent, 
joint venturing is an adequate FDI strategy for SMEs. It needs to address the issue of 
success and the various factors that determine the success of a JV, ie its interaction 
with parents and environments, etc. The model that is developed here takes on the 
perspective of the multinational, rather than the local partner. 
International joint ventures 
Harrigan (1985)^ presented an early framework for JV research. In her model, she 
examines the relationship between the partners in a JV, between the parents and the 
'child', and between the 'child' and its competitive environment. She allocates a variety 
of factors to the individual elements of her model determining the bargaining power of 
the parent firms and including benefits, costs, resources, alternatives, needs and 
barriers. Harrigan's (1985) model further suggests that the JV, as the bargaining 
agreement, covers outputs, inputs, control mechanisms and duration or stability of the 
agreement. It incorporates a dynamic element, so-called change stimuli that influence 
the stability of the JV and the timing of changes. These stimuli include changes in the 
parents' strategic mission, in the importance of the JV to parents, in parent firm 
bargaining power, in the industry (and success requirements therein), effectiveness of 
JVs as a competitive strategy, in the JV's need for autonomous activities and changes 
in patterns of parent-'child' co-ordination. 
For the application in this thesis, Harrigan's (1985) model is not appropriate, for 
various reasons: first, although the model addresses the questions of the relationship 
between the different parties involved in the establishment of a JV, ie parents and JV, 
it does not emphasise the relevance of success. Secondly, the model in this thesis 
needs to apply a time aspect, commencing with the preparation of a JV and 
culminating in its operation, in order to identify in the later analysis chapters (seven, 
eight and nine) where SMEs face resource-induced joint venturing difficulties. 
Dissolution issues are not addressed as a component of the model, though 
emphasised in the literature (Fan, 1996). Harrigan's (1985) model cannot capture this 
aspect. Its main limitation is that it confines itself to competing in mature markets - the 
US market in her case. The model does not consider, and explicitly excludes, its 
application to situations where emerging markets are being serviced. However, 
motivations vary considerably depending on whether the JV is to be established in a 
mature market setting with a developed country partner or whether it is to be 
established in a less developed country (LDC) environment with a local partner. 
Harrigan (1985, p.1) points out that "... surprisingly ]...[ JVs are now being used 
voluntarily as a strategy option within mature economies assuming that any 
motivations other than government mandate would not be relevant if a foreign firm sets 
up a JV in an LDC. 
Killing (1983) addressed the different issues that make a JV succeed or fail, based on 
a review of existing JV studies and a first hand examination of 37 JVs in North 
America, Western Europe and in LDCs. His resultant model revolves around the issue 
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of control, incorporating elements such as performance, techniques of JV control, 
partner selection, staffing, reward systems, product flows and management. In it 
success is the dependent variable and control is the independent. Although this 
framework provides a basis for the development of an analytical model for this thesis, it 
needs substantial extensions: for instance, it does not address the issues of partner 
motivations, partner contributions and the negotiation process, although these issues 
are considered essential for the success or failure of a JV. Further, as was the case 
with Harhgan's (1985) model. Killing (1983) deals exclusively with JVs in mature 
market settings. 
However, to be applicable to the investigation in this thesis, an international JV model 
must also consider those cases where MNEs form JVs with local firms from foreign 
counthes and, in particular, LDCs since the approach to JVs in developed counthes is 
different from that in LDCs (Beamish, 1985; Lane and Beamish, 1990). This has been 
shown in vahous studies of JVs in LDCs, including Wells (1973), Raveed and Renforth 
(1983), Schaan (1983, 1988), Lasserre (1984), Reynolds (1984), Stoever (1985), 
Beamish (1985, 1987), Franko (1987) and Lane and Beamish (1990). 
From an original sample of 66 JVs in LDCs^ and the results from 12 empirical JV 
studies from both developed countries and LDCs, Beamish (1985) demonstrated that 
developed countries and LDCs represent different external environments, with the 
latter being a more complex and difficult one in which to establish and manage a JV. 
Beamish (1985) examined characteristics, including reasons for JV formation, 
autonomy, stability, performance, frequency of government partners and ownership, 
while placing particular emphasis on ownership and control and their relationship to 
performance. He discovered that JVs in developed countries and LDCs differ in eight 
charactenstics. Whereas 64 per cent of developed country JVs were created because 
each partner needed the other's skills (Killing, 1983), only 38 per cent of the JVs in 
Beamish's (1984) LDC sample were created for this reason with the phmary skill 
required by the MNE being the local partner's knowledge of the local economy, politics 
and culture. 19 per cent of the JVs in the developed country sample were created 
because one partner needed the other's attributes or assets. However, only 5 per cent 
of the LDC sample were created for this reason. 
Further, whereas 17 per cent of the JVs in the developed country sample were created 
as the result of government mandate, 57 per cent of JVs in LDCs were created for this 
reason. Many LDCs seek to maintain their national identities by protecting and 
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controlling economic activities within their borders (Reynolds, 1984).^ Nearly half of the 
JVs in the LDC samples of authors, such as Tomlinson (1970), Janger (1980), 
Reynolds (1984), Datta (1988) and Contractor (1990) were created due to government 
requirement. Wells (1973) and Franko (1987) have found this earlier from their studies 
of 187 US firms in LDCs and 65 minority and equal equity food JVs, respectively. 
Datta (1988) extended the rather narrow use of JVs to situations where they provide 
MNEs with an attractive strategic option where demand for local participation offers 
only few alternatives. His analytical framework is based on a critical examination and 
synthesis of the various tasks, activities and factors associated with, and influencing 
JVs and their performance. His model incorporates such elements as environmental 
forces, JV objectives and motives, JV strategies - the equivalent of Killing's (1983) 
control aspect - , potential JV benefits (unique opportunity of combining the distinctive 
competences and the complementary resources of participating firms, including 
economic benefits in the form of factor cost, transportation cost, overhead and tax 
reductions, and increased economies of scale in areas such as manufacturing, 
research and development, sales and marketing), and JV management and 
implementation. However, important JV issues, including JV negotiation, are not 
discussed in Datta's (1988) model. He also fails to evaluate the achieved performance, 
though indicated in the overview figure of his model framework. 
The analytical framework needed in this thesis must be a model comprising two 
elements, with one tier being the formation and the second being the operation of JVs. 
Both tiers examine the independent variables of the model in this thesis that determine 
the success of the JV strategy and thus its applicability as a strategy for 
internationalising SMEs. The JV formation phase comprises sub-elements, including 
JV planning, motivations for JV formation, partner search and selection, JV negotiation 
and contributions towards the JV. The JV operation element of the model comprises 
the ownership, control and management issues of the JV process. The model in this 
thesis shows various links to Harrigan's (1985) dynamic JV model. For instance, the JV 
formation element in the model developed here reflects Harrigan's (1985) JV parent 
relationship and the JV operation element reflects her parent-'child' relationship. 
3.2.1 Joint venture formation 
Research has shown that only JVs that have been carefully planned and negotiated, 
that have symmetric sets of motivations, complementary contributions and matching 
partners succeed (Engelhardt and Seibert, 1981; Harrigan, 1984; Reynolds, 1984). 
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First and foremost, it is important for a company to understand why it wants a JV (Lane 
and Beamish, 1990; Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993; Zahra and Elhagrasey, 1994; 
Albrecht et a!., 1996). Subsequently, firms must develop an appreciation of industry 
structures, consider all options, clarify the appropriate potential partner, consider the 
motives of potential partners, develop a SWOT analysis for parents and the JV itself, 
eternal vigilance and attention to detail (Lyons, 1991). 
Joint venture planning 
Planning the JV process is key to the prevention of failure (Killing, 1982). Hamill and 
Hunt (1993), in their research of three UK JVs in Hungary discovered that potential JV 
partners need to pay great attention to the effective planning of JVs, ie clarifying the 
objectives, analysing the advantages of JVs, compared with other entry strategies, 
screening potential partners and constantly evaluating the individual planning steps. 
However, methods of strategic planning are applied only to a limited extent (Harrigan, 
1985; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Young et al., 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990), 
and especially within SMEs strategic planning, if used, is characterised by a number of 
short cuts (Bilkey, 1978; Robinson and Pearce, 1984; Laughton, 1995). Harrigan 
(1985, p.12) is critical of firms that "jump without thinking through their motivations or 
how the 'child' will fit into their scheme for strategy implementation." Killing (1983) 
discovered that some firms, excited by the prospect of entering a JV, put in a lot of 
effort into designing its internal operation and relationship with its parents, but are less 
scrupulous about examining the market, competition and the venture's strengths, 
weaknesses and prospects. 
Despite the existence of a large volume of literature on the planning of JVs, according 
to Reynolds (1984), Young et al. (1989) and Hamill and Hunt (1993), the literature has 
not examined empirically the relationship between planning and success of a JV. What 
does the efficient planning of a JV look like and what kind of firms should employ what 
kind of planning? Is there a greater need for planning of JVs in LDCs? So far, research 
has not addressed these questions. 
Motivations for joint venture formation 
Motivations are the directions and persistence of action. They are the goals or 
objectives of each partner (Kim, 1996). The examination of the JV formation literature 
suggests it is important to distinguish among three sets of motivations, including those 
of the foreign and the local partners'' as well as the host government^ (Datta, 1988). 
These sets of motivations are often not congruent. Harrigan (1985) found that local 
partners frequently want to import sophisticated technologies and brand names, 
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whereas host governments and foreign firms might want to establish JVs in order to 
use technologies that exploit the country's low-cost labour. Harrigan (1985, p.37) 
established also that "many host governments want the most modern technologies, but 
not those that would make the most sense from the parents' viewpoints". However, this 
contradicts her earlier argument that host nations desire labour-intensive technologies: 
sophisticated technologies (her second argument) are commonly not labour-intensive. 
Foreign partner motivations 
Harrigan (1985) categorises the motivations for JV formation into internal, competitive 
and strategic uses. Since her dynamic JV model is developed in the mature, domestic 
market context, motivations such as the entry of a new and potentially profitable 
market appear only relatively late in her enumeration of motivations for JV formation. In 
Datta's (1988) international JV model, on the other hand, 'new market entry' enjoys 
high importance. Also, other motivations as stressed by Datta (1988), receive little or 
no priority consideration in the Harrigan (1985) model. These motivations include the 
sharing of heightened economic risks in new JVs, satisfying nationalistic demands and 
reducing risks of expropriation, maintaining good relations with host governments and 
pooling organisational know-how to realise synergistic benefits. This suggests that 
partners in domestic JVs attempt to consolidate existing positions whereas foreign 
partners in international JVs attempt to establish and extend their existence in a 
foreign market. There, foreign partner motivations are rather aggressive. 
Too often, authors in the field of international JVs (eg Shenkar, 1990) consider 
necessary motivations for JV formation as sufficient motivations. 'Entry of a potentially 
profitable new market' and 'gaining raw materials', for instance, are frequently 
suggested as sufficient for establishing a JV (eg Janger, 1980), though they are only 
necessary. In fact, there are various other ways of developing new markets (see 
chapter two) and getting raw materials. Eventually, these motivations can lead to the 
formation of a JV upon a host government's insistence, or when a project is financially 
too large for one firm, or when neither firm has all the skills required to make a success 
of the business on its own, or when a venture can only achieve satisfactory economies 
of scale in research and development, production or marketing when forces are 
combined (Killing, 1983). Thus, conditions do not necessarily have to be substitutional, 
but can also be complementary. 
This argument partly pre-empts Sukijasovic's (1970) four-point enumeration that 
motivations for entering a JV are 'doing business in common', 'sharing of profits', 
'sharing of business risks and losses' and 'longevity of co-operation'. Whereas in this 
thesis 'sharing of business risks and losses' as well as 'longevity of co-operation' are 
accepted as motivations for JV formation, 'doing business in common' and 'sharing of 
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profits' are rejected: why should a firm wish, a priori, to share its profits with another 
firm? Also, access to technology (Harrigan, 1985; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991) requires 
special consideration: while JVs, as a means of gaining skills and technologies, are 
relevant for the industrialised partner in a mature market context, they are of less or 
even of no importance to foreign, advanced partners in the LDC context (Kim, 1996). 
There, skills and technologies are desired by the local partner. 
According to Endres (1987) and Contractor and Lorange (1988), in the international JV 
context, foreign firms join forces with local partners for their knowledge of business 
practices, consumer behaviour, distribution networks and legislation. They join forces 
to generate economies of scale, exchange technology, co-opt or block competition, 
overcome government-mandated trade or investment barriers, facilitate initial 
international expansion of inexperienced firms, and vertical quasi-integration 
advantages of linking the complementary contributions of the parties in a value chain. 
The partner in an international JV further facilitates better access to product, resource, 
labour and financial markets of the host country. The local partner is expected to bring 
in financial, technical and human resources that eventually reduce the foreign firm's 
resource commitment, its business and political risks and strengthen the impact of the 
JV. Foreign firms also desire the partner's ability in dealing with authorities. Endres 
notes the foreign firms' desire to reduce foreignness and the 'colonial character' a 
WFOE creates: considering the JV as a national business provides access to tax and 
investment incentives, to government orders and to projects of international credit and 
supra-national developmental aid organisations. However, analysing the international 
JV literature has not suggested any study that has examined whether, and to what 
extent, this aspect influences a foreign firm to establish a JV, instead of a WFOE. 
The US MNE executives in Raveed and Renforth's (1983) study of US JVs in Costa 
Rica rated five motivations as "most important" for JV activity. These included (1) to 
obtain country-related knowledge and local management, (2) to reduce the risk of 
expropriation, (3) to obtain favourable government treatment in areas of taxes, 
protective tariffs, foreign exchange, and input permits, and (4) to keep operational 
control of the JV. Thereby the US managers exhibited a substantially different opinion 
to the local elite who considered the most important motivations for the foreign firm to 
be the maintaining of good relations with the national government, reduction of the risk 
of expropriation, nurturing the best attitude by the general public, keeping operational 
control of the venture and avoiding labour problems. Overall, however, the differences, 
although statistically significant, tend to be more of a degree and of emphasis, rather 
than a total failure to understand each other's point of view. 
Conqruity of motivations 
For the success of a JV, congruity of the partners' motivations is essential (Killing, 
1983; Connolly, 1984; Reynolds, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Schaan, 1988; Datta, 1988; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1989). However, the partners' (and host governments') motivations 
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are not always so (Killing, 1983; Ruggles, 1983; Connolly, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Datta, 
1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Anderson, 1990). Frequently, one partner pursues its 
objectives with little regard for the needs or values of the other (Reynolds, 1984). 
Reynolds (1984), in his study of 52 Indian-US JVs, discovered that the Indian partner 
hoped to export in order to generate foreign exchange for the import of equipment, 
whereas the US partner aimed at entering the market with a broad product line that 
would have competed against products already offered by the Indian partner's sister 
companies. Subsequently, Habib (1987) developed and tested a research instrument 
for measuring manifest conflict within international JVs. Investigating 258 JVs in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries, he found that the greater the disparity in the 
partners' goals, the higher the level of conflict in a JV. Bieszki and Rath (1989) 
demonstrated that in socialist economies the central planning unit wished to obtain a 
different technology than the western partner was prepared to transfer. For instance, 
Hamill and Hunt (1993) examining the experiences of three UK companies that were to 
establish JVs in Hungary (United Biscuits, Thorn-EMI, APV), found that Thorn-EMI's 
proposal to establish a 50:50 equity JV was aborted due to a mismatch of the partners' 
objectives: the Hungarian Ministry of Education and Culture viewed the potential JV 
primarily as a vehicle for promoting Hungarian musicians and culture rather than as a 
viable business entity in its own right. This proved unacceptable to Thorn-EMI. 
Partner selection 
The decision for or against a JV rests also upon the availability of a suitable partner in 
the host country (Endres, 1987). Research has shown that the choice of a JV partner 
(or partners) is an important variable influencing performance because it affects the 
mix of skills and resources that will be available to the JV and thus its ability to achieve 
its strategic objectives (Tomlinson, 1970; Berg et al., 1982; Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 
1984, 1985; Rugman et al., 1985; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Geringer, 1991; Schuler et 
al., 1992; Hamill and Hunt, 1993). The central challenge of JV formation is to identify a 
qualified, reliable, co-operative and resourceful partner (Brockmeyer, 1987; Lane and 
Beamish, 1990). 
Before a JV is formed, it is important that the potential partners recognise any 
differences in objectives that may exist and take appropriate action to reconcile them 
(Datta, 1988). Otherwise there will be inevitable conflict and misunderstanding, erosion 
of potential benefits and ultimately the demise of the venture (Datta, 1988). Research 
has further established a variety of dimensions that are related with partner selection, 
including cultural background, number of partners, firm size and industry, and a 
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company's past association with a potential partner. Firms that are to engage in a JV 
need to assess their potential partners according to these dimensions. However, 
Lasserre (1984) and Lane and Beamish (1990) suggest that partner selection is 
usually not given the time or the attention it deserves, though Harrigan (1987) has 
observed that managers are rather choosy about whom they take as their partner. This 
is empirically supported in the works of Tomlinson and Thompson (1977), Geringer 
(1991), Schuleret al. (1992) and Hamill and Hunt (1993). 
From an investigation of the JV experiences of Canadian firms in Mexico, Tomlinson 
and Thompson (1977) found that the firms sought traits, including: the local partners' 
financial status, business compatibility, common goals, ability to negotiate with the 
government, compatible ethics, resources, technology and experience in its 
application, international visibility and reputation, commitment to the JV, international 
experience, management depth and the ability to communicate with Mexicans. The 
authors failed, however, to indicate the relative frequency or intensity with which the 
specific traits were sought, or any contextual variables which might influence the 
criteria employed. 
Later, Geringer (1991) aimed at emphasising the identification of variables that help 
determine the selection criteria which firms employ when seeking JV partners. 
Studying 81 US firms,® he found a positive correlation between perceived importance 
of potential critical success factor categories and the relative weighting of their 
associated selection criteria categories. There was only mixed support for a negative 
correlation between perceived relative competitive position on a particular variable 
category and the weighting applied to the associated selection criteria category. 
Geringer (1991) found a'positive correlation also between the perceived difficulty of 
internal development categories and the weighting of their associated selection criteria 
categories. Geringer's (1991) study is a potentially valuable contribution towards an 
improved understanding of the partner selection process and how firms proceed in 
selecting partners. However, it was restricted to US-based firms and limited to JVs with 
only two parents where partners may have held a maximum equity of 75 per cent. 
Hamill and Hunt (1993) showed that United Biscuits (UB), when selecting a partner for 
its JV in Hungary, used a number of cleariy defined criteria. These included the 
stipulation that the target company had to operate in UB's core business, that UB 
would bring something to the JV, that the target had good products and management, 
and that the target had a large market share. 
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While symmetry in the partners' objectives and its commitment to, and vision for, the 
JV is considered stabilising, symmetry in resource contribution is a destabilising force 
(Harrigan, 1985; Rugman et al., 1985; Ohmae, 1989). Various authors (Berg and 
Friedman, 1980; Killing, 1982) warn that a lack of erosion of complementariness is the 
most important factor undermining JV effectiveness. The potential for joint gains is 
greater the more dissimilar the partners (Gomes-Casseres, 1989). On the other hand, 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) and Bleeke and Ernst (1991) point out that alliances between 
strong and weak companies rarely work: they do not provide the missing skills needed 
for growth and they lead to mediocre performance. Gomes-Casseres (1989) 
discovered that all of 'his' US firms chose a partner that could complement their 
capabilities. 
Eartier, from a study of 895 strategic alliances competing in 23 industries, Harrigan 
(1988) analysed the influence of parent firm asymmetries on venture performance, 
including national origins of parent firms, firms' levels of venturing experience and 
firms' relative asset sizes. Her results suggest that ventures are more successful 
where partners are related (in products, markets, and/ or technologies) to their 
ventures or horizontally-related to them than when they are vertically-related or 
unrelated. Harrigan (1988) also found that ventures last longer if the partners are of 
similar cultures, asset sizes and venturing experience levels and when the partners' 
activities are related. Harrigan's (1988) findings could have advanced the 
understanding of partner asymmetries. However, the author does not distinguish 
between different types of strategic alliances, but refers to the range of market 
servicing strategies as one entity, which they are not. Harrigan could have categorised 
the various market servicing strategies in separate clusters and, for each strategy type, 
separately analysed the relationships between partner asymmetries and performance. 
The applicability of Harrigan's (1988) results is difficult and, as a result, generalised. 
Cultural background 
Killing (1983), in his study of JVs between firms in developed countries and LDCs 
showed that the greater the cultural gap between the partners, the more difficult it is to 
create cohesion. This is in line with findings by Pertmutter and Heenan (1986) and 
Lane and Beamish (1990) who argue that differences between national cultures, if not 
understood, can lead to poor communication, mutual distrust and JV termination. 
Often, according to Killing (1983), the difference in language can be a hindrance to the 
creation of a core skill. 
Number of partners 
Endres (1987) suggests that normally the foreign company has only one local partner 
and that with an increasing number of partners the risk of conflict increases. In a JV 
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with several partners decision-making might be lengthy, making the business sluggish 
and possibly performing worse than with one partner only. However, Beamish (1985) 
did not find any difference in the performance of JVs with two or more partners. 
Though there is fragmented knowledge on the appropriate number of partners in a JV, 
there is a lack of studies on this topic in either a developed country or an LDC setting. 
Firm size 
Size mismatches between parents can contribute to differences in corporate culture 
which may affect a venture's performance (Rugman et al., 1985). Lane and Beamish 
(1990) showed that large foreign parents tend to be systematic and slow in their 
decision-making. They have a long-term investment orientation and a willingness to 
reap rewards in the future. In contrast, their local partners are often entrepreneurs who 
manage intuitively and make decisions very quickly (ibid). On the other hand, Kogut's 
(1988) data suggest the reverse. However, his findings were not statistically significant. 
Industry 
Killing (1983) predicts that JVs between firms in the same industry are easier to 
manage than those between parents from different industries and would therefore 
perform better than others. In line with this. Lane and Beamish (1990) advise that 
industrialists of some stature are used in the same or a similar business. On the other 
hand, JVs between firms with similar skills and knowledge also tend to cause 
difficulties. 
What was suggested above with regard to number of partners applies also to firm size 
and industry: so far, no study has been carried out to investigate closely the issue of 
ideal firm size and industry of partners. The issues that need to be addressed for 
instance include: what is to be chosen and what is to be avoided, when and why. Are 
there any differences when considering firm size and industry, between JVs in 
developed country and in LDC settings? 
Firm type 
As partners, foreign firms prefer private rather than government companies since the 
interests of an MNE usually correspond to a higher degree with those of local firms 
than those of state owned enterprises (SOEs). This has been shown by Endres (1987). 
SOEs are commonly criticised for being less decisive and that both the slowness and 
the confusion of the decision-making process at the board level can place a JV with an 
SOE partner at a distinct competitive disadvantage (Killing, 1982; Endres, 1987). In 
fact, the most common partner for MNEs in LDCs is a local private firm (Beamish, 
1987), though Beamish (1985) eariier detected a higher use of SOEs in JVs with a 
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particularly high scale of investment, or in JVs in an industrial sector that was important 
to the local economy. 
Raveed and Renforth (1983) from their study of various forms of US equity 
investments in Costa Rica revealed that both groups of respondents (39 US 
executives, 68 local business leaders and government officials) agreed on the 
usefulness, both for the MNE and the host country, of incorporating a local partner. 
The respondents also agreed that foreign equity investment forms excluding local 
participation were not very attractive to either the MNE or the host country. The two 
groups agreed further on the relative usefulness of JVs to the local general public and 
that, in most cases, the JV between an MNE and a private local firm was the optimum 
form both for the MNE and the host country. However, the groups of respondents 
disagreed strongly on the usefulness of SOEs: whereas MNE executives would avoid 
JVs with SOEs, host country executives proposed that a JV with an SOE perfectly 
meets the MNE's needs. US MNE executives believed that an SOE partner is 
incompetent, inefficient, slow in decision-making, and often has different objectives. 
Further, host government control would be much greater than their own. Raveed and 
Renforth's (1983) research was confined to US MNEs. Thus, the study minimises the 
possible cultural differences among foreign investors which is likely to reduce the 
differences in the attitudes of the MNE executives. This limits its scope and general 
applicability. Equally, the study increases the homogeneity of the more restricted 
sample which, in turn, should increase the validity and reliability of its findings. 
The desirability of local private partners in JVs has been expressed also in 
performance measures. Stuckey (1983) found that JVs with government partners had 
an overall instability rate of 56 to 58 per cent whereas instability rates of JVs with local 
private partners in Beamish's (1985) study were 43 per cent. In Beamish's (1984) LDC 
sample only two out of 23 JVs were deemed satisfactory where the foreign firm had 
government partners, public shareholders or other foreign partners. In none of the 12 
JVs with government partners was the foreign firm satisfied with the venture's 
performance. Firms with a local private partner were satisfied with performance more 
often than firms with other types of partners (Beamish, 1985). 
Favourable past association with the partner 
It has been suggested that selecting a partner with whom a basis of trust has been 
established during earlier business relations is advantageous (Endres, 1987; Lane and 
Beamish, 1990). 
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As eariy as 1970, Tomlinson studied the JV process of 49 UK firms in India and 
Pakistan and identified distinct categories of partner selection criteria. Of the six 
general categories examined, 'favourable past association' was found to be the single 
most important criterion, though it was not sufficient to ensure effective performance. 
Categories, including 'facilities', 'resources', 'partner status' and 'forced choice' were 
about equally important and 'local identity' only rarely represented a primary criterion 
for partner selection. Generalisation of Tomlinson's (1970) results might be 
constrained by several factors, including a sole focus on a convenience sample of 49 
UK firms involved in 71 JVs. Further, the selection criteria categories developed were 
not mutually exclusive and his data's validity may also be compromised by the 
likelihood that some interviewees had not been involved in partner selection. Since 
several JVs were formed 20 years or more prior to the interviews, reliability of 
information regarding selection criteria might have diminished even if the executives 
had participated in the selection process. 
Later, Lasserre (1984), studying a French-Thai and a German-Indonesian JV, 
suggested two pre-JV establishment phases. Phase one: the partners' attempts to 
assess whether the strategies of the partners are compatible with their own. Phase 
two: whether the resources of the partners are complementary to jointly carry out the 
project. According to Lasserre (1984), the get-to-know period takes one or two years 
before a JV is established. Most of the US firms in Reynolds's (1984) study had 
selected as partners Indian firms that had previously marketed their products. In the 
case of Mariey of the UK and Davidson of the US forming the Davidson-Mariey JV in 
Belgium (Schuler et al., 1992), the partners' long-term arrangement had given them 
time to get acquainted and learn about each other's management styles and 
philosophies. 
Negotiation process 
The relationship between the potential partners in a JV is one of the three elements in 
Harrigan's (1985) JV model. It is the confrontation of the bargaining powers of the firms 
involved, including the JV benefits, costs, resources, alternatives, needs and barriers. 
Each potential partner tries to get the most out of a deal. The more a firm has to offer, 
quantitatively and qualitatively (eg uniqueness of a technology) to a JV, the more it 
demands of the other firm or firms involved and the more equity and control it is likely 
to demand in the proposed business. 
Blodgett (1991) examined just this relationship between contribution and ownership. 
Studying US JVs in OECD countries (110), Japan (81), LDCs (81), and (former) 
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Eastern bloc countries (7), Blodgett discovered that when technology and government 
requirement are combined in an international JV, the majority share of equity is more 
likely to go to the government partner. On the other hand, when technology and local 
knowledge/marketing skill are combined, the majority share is more likely to go to the 
technology partner. In conclusion, Blodgett (1991) argued that government 
requirement dominates technology more strongly than technology dominates local 
knowledge/marketing skill. 
Equally, the more alternatives a firm has to engage in other business deals, or the less 
a company needs to enter a JV with a particular firm, the stronger is its bargaining 
position. The more successful a firm is in communicating to its potential partner and 
the host government how indispensable it is for the success of the JV, the stronger is 
its bargaining position (Endres, 1987). Often, foreign firms only agree to establish a JV 
if their previous export volumes are secured through supply contracts for raw 
materials, semi-finished goods, parts or certain finished goods (Engelhardt and 
Seibert, 1981). As strong bargaining positions, Hamill and Hunt (1993) propose the 
control over technological know-how and the operation in industries identified by host 
governments as priority sectors of economic development. 
Contractor (1984) established a methodology for conducting negotiations between US 
firms with local JV partners over the nature of the arrangements, the value of 
technology transferred, the equity shares of both parties, and other forms of 
compensation to be derived by the US firm, such as licensing fees and sales of 
components or products. He proposed a three step quantifiable approach to planning 
negotiations, including the determination of the total income derivable from that 
country's market for the product in question, the determination of the fractions of 
income that ought to accrue to each partner, and the determination of the mix of 
ownership and contractual arrangements used to compensate the foreign firm. 
Contractor's (1984) underlying assumption might be misleading: when discussing the 
strategic purposes of auxiliary agreements, such as the licensing or trading 
arrangements, he bases his ideas on a positive correlation between ownership and 
control. However, majority ownership and dominance of a JV do not necessarily 
correspond as has been suggested in the literature on JV control (Killing, 1982, 1983). 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) suggests that the bargaining power of the US MNEs in his 
study increased with the size of their planned investment. Hamill and Hunt (1993) 
discovered that the key to negotiating JVs is the ability to cultivate good relationships 
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with the authorities and the venture partners. Matching the requirements of the country 
for foreign currency, modernisation, technology transfer and exports, for instance, is 
one way of achieving this. However, attempting to meet all the host country's 
requirements, as suggested by Hamill and Hunt (1993), has not very much in common 
with bargaining. It is particulariy the export requirement of host governments that 
foreign partners are not always willing to meet since they are, themselves, seeking a 
possibility to develop the domestic market (Bieszki and Rath, 1989). 
Partner contributions 
Firms forming JVs make contributions in the hope of adding the partner's competence 
and assets to their own (Beamish, 1987; Blodgett, 1991). Organisational know-how 
and skills or intangible assets, including patents, trademarks and reputation cannot be 
readily acquired through arm's-length transactions. Thus, companies seek these 
contributions through a JV with another firm (Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Killing (1983) 
distinguishes between assets, such as capital, trademarks and patents and attributes, 
including nationality, source of raw material or component supply: In other words. 
Killing's (1983) attributes are 'soft contributions' and assets are 'hard contributions'. 
The foreign partner in a JV contributes its firm-specific knowledge in, and access to, 
technology, product know-how and patents, management expertise, technical training 
and management development, finance, access to international distribution channels, 
increased exports and improved competitiveness (Hamill and Hunt, 1993). On the 
other hand, the local partner contributes capital; location-specific knowledge on the 
political, economic and customs environments of the host country market; contacts 
with government officials; faster entry into the domestic market; marketing personnel; 
plants, facilities and land; local labour and trade union relationships; as well as access 
to local financial institutions (Contractor, 1984; Hamill and Hunt, 1993). Contractor 
(1984) also proposes risk reduction as a potential local partner contribution. 
The importance of JV contributions can, from time to time, differ substantially between 
mature economy settings and LDC environments. Berger and Uhlmann's (1984) work 
has shown this (chapter two). Thus, the findings of Killing (1983) and Harrigan (1985) 
have to be treated with care and cannot be generalised and transferred to JV 
scenarios in LDC seftings. For instance, Harrigan (1985) suggests access to 
distribution networks as the most important contribution of a partner, more important 
even than capital and technology, marketing experience, personnel, or physical assets, 
including production facilities, plants, etc. On the other hand. Beamish (1985) has 
found that the primary aftribute required of the local partner in LDCs by the MNE is its 
knowledge of the host country's economy, its politics and culture. So far, research on 
JVs has not produced any convincing comparison between contributions sought by 
MNEs in mature markets and in LDC seftings. 
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Studying 66 JVs in LDCs and 12 core ventures between US, UK or Canadian MNEs 
and local private firms,'' Beamish (1987) examined 16 partner contributions and their 
relationship to performance in terms of the degree of importance (ie on a scale of 
'important', 'neutral', 'unimportant'), the changes in importance (ie 'increasing', 
'decreasing', 'steady') and the various perspectives (of MNE executives, local 
partner/JV general managers). The partner need was assessed over a time span in 
terms of the relative importance of each partner's contribution to the JV in a number of 
aspects, such as capital, knowledge and staff. Beamish's (1987) performance measure 
was subjective, based on whether there was mutual agreement between the partners 
regarding their overall satisfaction. 
The MNE executives felt that speed of entry was an important partner contribution at 
the time of establishing the JV, whereas raw material supply, inexpensive labour 
supply, and technology and equipment were not important. The local managers felt 
that the foreign MNEs made important contributions in the areas of raw material 
supply, technology/equipment and export opportunities. Perceived as unimportant, 
were speed of entry into the local market, local political advantages, inexpensive 
labour supply, and general knowledge of the local economy, politics and customs. In 
summary, the executives in high-performing JVs looked at their local partners for 
greater contributions than did MNE executives in low-performing JVs. Interestingly, 
partner contributions that were considered unimportant tended to remain unimportant, 
while contributions considered important tended to vary in importance over time 
(Beamish, 1987). 
3.2.2 Joint venture operation 
Harrigan's (1985) JV model also suggests the analysis of the relationship between the 
'child' and the parents. This relationship covers the ownership, control and 
management aspects of the JV process. This is where the work of Killing (1983) finds 
its application since it includes just these elements. The model developed in this thesis 
covers this relationship in its second tier, the JV operation. The model framework also 
suggests that this relationship is linked with the sub-elements of the first tier, making 
the model dynamic. For instance, re-negotiation of certain issues that were negotiated 
in the formation phase, or the modification of resource contributions, or changes in the 
global strategy of the parent firms at a later stage, might change the entire 
constellation of the JV as it was in the formation and operation phases. Datta (1988) 
has established that the effective implementation of the JV plays a key role for JV 
success. However, only limited attention has been given to this dimension, with 
research addressing, instead, JV establishment issues (Lyles and Reger, 1993). 
Joint venture ownership 
In a JV foreign firms can take majority (at least 5 1 % of the equity), equal (50%) or 
minority (49% or less) positions. According to Young et al. (1989), the partners' relative 
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equity share holdings are commonly 50-50 or 51-49 per cent, though the authors do 
not specify which partner holds the majority. The partners' stakes determine where in 
the JV the management power lies: in functional areas such as production, marketing, 
research and development and finance (Young et al., 1989). 
As has been established above, differences between JVs in domestic, mature market 
settings and LDC seftings also apply to the ownership aspect. Berg and Friedman 
(1978) note that more than 80 per cent of two-partner, US chemical JVs formed 
between 1924 and 1969 had an equal equity split and Beamish (1985) discovered in 
developed country samples that half of the JVs were 50:50 ventures. On the other 
hand, in LDC samples both Reynolds (1979) and Beamish (1985) revealed that in 70 
per cent of cases the foreign firm was in a minority equity position with only a small 
proportion (10 to 20%) of the JVs being equally owned. On the other hand, Afriyie 
(1988) has observed that the most common type of JV in Ghana is the shared 
management equity JV, based on a sample of 46 JVs in three Ghanaian industries, 
food, beverages and textiles. According to Endres (1987), equal equity sharing in JVs 
in LDCs creates the impression the foreign firm accepts the partner on equal terms. 
Beamish (1985) discovered that the most common reasons of MNEs taking a minority 
position are existing regulations and/or local tax advantages. Often, JVs are the result 
of host government attempts to reduce foreign influence in their economy and to 
demand participation and the minimum equity holding of local partners. In some 
industries, LDCs demand a majority equity being held by local partners (Endres, 1987). 
Interestingly, MNEs that were minority or equal partners performed better than those 
where the MNE was the single, largest shareholder (Beamish, 1985; Lane and 
Beamish, 1990). This coincides with findings by Bleeke and Ernst (1991) who found, 
from a study of US, European and Japanese strategic alliances that 50:50 equity JVs 
had a higher success rate than others. 
Equity share holdings in JVs of MNEs differ from industry to industry. For instance, 
Franko (1987) surveying the use of new forms of investment^ in LDCs by the 70 
leading, internationally active US corporations, discovered that minority and equal 
equity JVs are more common among US vehicle component manufacturers than in the 
auto assembly companies. 25 of the 64 subsidiaries and affiliates in LDCs of the ten 
leading US component manufacturers are minority or equal equity JVs and accounted 
for slightly more than 10 per cent of all 243 foreign operations of these ten component 
producers. The typical food processor's overseas operation was either a WFOE or a 
majority JV. Franko (1987) points out that the more important foreign sales were to a 
US food processing MNE, the less likely it is to have minority or equal equity ventures. 
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For the pharmaceutical industry, Franko could not discover the majority equity pattern. 
There, only the smaller companies have used minority or 50:50 JVs. 
Franko's (1987) work highlights the US reluctance to enter into minority or equal equity 
JVs in LDCs. He further discovered minority shareholdings in firms that produce 
unrelated or distantly related diversified products. He shows, also, that companies 
producing low technology, comparatively undifferentiated products with low value-to-
weight ratios (or local tariff protection) isolate themselves from 'core' company 
activities elsewhere. The new forms of investment were avoided by companies that 
were industry leaders. However, they were accepted by second rank or outsider firms 
attempting to match the geographical spread of their larger brethren (ibid). 
Joint venture control 
Control is the authority over operational and strategic decision-making (Hill et al., 
1990). It is the ability to influence systems, methods and decisions (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986) and a continuing adjustment to given and changing conditions, not a 
one-time intervention (Ulrich, 1983; Miles and Snow, 1984). Control refers to the 
process by which one entity influences the behaviour and output of another through 
the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal 
mechanisms. Control plays an important role in the capacity of a firm to achieve its 
goals (Ulrich, 1983; Davidson, 1987; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Young et al., 1989). 
As the process of influencing actions, control includes setting goals, giving orders, 
setting up procedures, and monitoring results. It is determined by the number of parties 
involved in a venture (Hill et al., 1990). The actual level of control the foreign investor 
has, is dependent on whether or not the host country stake is held by a major 
company, the government or more local companies even, rather than equity traded on 
the stock market. 
Killing (1983) established three distinctive control constellations, including dominant 
parent ventures, shared management ventures and independent JVs. Schaan (1988) 
found that, of these, the shared management ventures are the most difficult to 
manage. This indicates that, although shared management ventures are not 
consistently used for riskier business tasks, they have a higher failure rate (Killing, 
1982). Shared management ventures frequently encourage deadlocks in decision-
making, unless one partner trusts the decisions of the other on minor issues (Killing, 
1982, 1983; Harrigan, 1985). Thus, asymmetric equity sharing has been touted as 
being more effective than 50:50 equity JVs (Harrigan, 1985). 
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Geringer and Hebert (1989) argue that domination of a JV may allow greater 
integration of it into the global strategy of the firm. As such it helps protect the firm from 
premature exposure of its strategy, technological core or other proprietary components 
to outside groups, A partner that exercises dominant control in a JV can reduce the 
risks associated with co-ordination and opportunistic behaviour and thus reduce 
transaction costs (ibid). From the MNE's viewpoint the dominant parent strategy is 
appropriate when it is forced to take on a partner solely in response to pressure from 
the host government or when the passive partner sees its involvement as a purely 
financial investment (Datta, 1988). If a partner is chosen for reasons other than 
managerial input, a dominant parent JV fits best (Killing, 1982). 
How can a foreign partner get into the position of exercising dominant control? First 
and foremost, control is linked with ownership and is certainly highest in cases where 
the foreign investor holds a majority stake in the venture and where the local partner 
adopts a management-passive role (Young et al., 1989; Blodgeft, 1991), though this 
occurs rather less frequently in LDCs, according to Beamish (1985). Killing (1983) 
discovered a high correlation between ownership and control of JVs in developed 
countries: 70 per cent of the dominant management JVs were majority owned and 76 
per cent of the shared management JVs were equally owned by the partners. 
However, control and ownership do not necessarily have to correspond (Friedmann 
and Beguin, 1971; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Beamish, 1985; Young et al., 1989; 
Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993). Killing (1983) proposed various strategies for 
controlling a JV in an equal equity or minority position even. In line with that, Harrigan 
(1985) notes that firms accept a minority ownership if they can obtain a majority 
position in managerial authority. Overall, control in a minority JV seems to require a 
shift from control through financial and legal structures to influence through creating 
relationships and through behavioural interaction (Lane and Beamish, 1990). 
When it comes to measures which a minority partner can employ to control a JV, 
Friedman and Beguin (1971) discovered a variety of mechanisms. These included right 
of veto, representation in management bodies and special agreements related to either 
technology (eg licensing) or management (eg management services). From interviews 
with 48 senior executives of 23 JVs operating in North America, Mexico and Europe, 
Schaan (1988) discovered a variety of means which allow a foreign firm to control a JV 
even as a minority equity partner, including board meetings, provision of parent 
company services (transfer of technology, sales to, and from, the JV, provision of staff 
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services), key personnel appointments, organisational and structural context, informal 
mechanisms, and integration of the parent organisations. Schaan's (1988) findings are 
flawed since, at the time of the interviews, 13 per cent of the JVs had been terminated, 
35 per cent were unsuccessful in the eyes of at least one parent and only 52 per cent 
were successful. 
On the other hand, JVs that are not equally owned by the partners can be controlled 
and managed evenly (Killing, 1983). Shared management ventures are most common 
in situations in which the skills of both parents are crucial to the success of the JV 
(Killing, 1982). 
Examining data on 74 licensing agreements and 28 JVs in North America and Western 
Europe, Killing (1980) considered the conditions under which a firm should try to 
acquire technology - via licensing or JVs. He discovered that a 50 or 55 per cent 
majority JV is best for a strong technology transfer relationship. 50 to 55 per cent JVs 
have high managerial costs and major decisions in such a JV have to be made via 
negotiation and compromise, and the managerial time demanded in a 50 to 55 per 
cent JV is very high. Thus, many firms will not enter JVs of this type (ibid). Only five 
ventures in Killing's (1980) sample were majority JVs. However, many firms with 
valuable technology will not supply to a JV in which they own less than 50 per cent. 
Killing's (1980) conclusion is that many managers, particularly in North America, will 
not enter 50:50 JVs since they view such ventures as too ambiguous, too inflexible, 
and all too likely to end in disaster. Killing warns against the use of a stronger link than 
necessary because the cost of the agreement to the technology-dependent firm 
generally goes up with increasing strength of the linkage. 
JV relationships where decisions are based only on the equity and control shares of 
partners are frequently prone to failure. Control cannot be more than that which 
companies fall back on when everything else fails and when they are willing to risk the 
moralisation of workers and managers. Good partnerships do not work on the basis of 
ownership or control. Instead, it takes effort and commitment and enthusiasm from 
both sides if either is to realise the hoped-for benefits (Ohmae, 1989). Ohmae (1989) 
argues that tradition has long taught managers the incorrect arithmetic that equates 51 
per cent with 100 per cent and 49 per cent with zero. Although 51 per cent buys a 
company full legal control, this is control of activities in a foreign market, about which it 
may know little (Ohmae, 1989). 
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The importance of creating consensus was prior to that stressed by Killing (1982) who 
points out that it is the manager's job in a 51:49 or up to a 60:40 JV to ensure that no 
decisions are forced by shareholders' vote, since this would lead to the loss of the 
minority partner's goodwill. However, both partners in the venture are essential to its 
success (Schaan, 1988). For instance, although United Biscuits had a controlling stake 
of 85 per cent in its Hungarian JV, which virtually would have allowed it to run the 
venture as a WFOE, the actual decision-making was as decentralised as possible 
(Hamill and Hunt, 1993). Equally, APV could have opted for 100 per cent ownership in 
its JV in Hungary, but preferred a 60:40 JV since it believed the long-term success of 
the venture required the active involvement of local partners In decision-making (ibid). 
There is a popular misconception that control means a better managed company and a 
better chance of success (Ohmae, 1989). Tomlinson (1970), examining the attitude of 
UK parents toward control of their 71 JVs in India and Pakistan, found that higher 
levels of profitability were obtained from JV investments with a more relaxed attitude 
towards control. Beamish (1985) observed that when the foreign firm owned less than 
50 per cent of the equity in a LDC JV, it was more likely to perform satisfactorily and 
even equal shareholding MNEs peri'ormed better than those MNEs that were the 
single, largest shareholders (Beamish, 1985). 
On the other hand, there are also voices that would suggest a better performance in 
dominant parent JVs, including Killing (1982, 1983). Half of the shared ventures in 
Killing's (1982) sample had to be liquidated or reorganised. Janger (1980) gathering 
data from 168 JVs in developed countries and LDCs, did not find that one type of JV 
(dominant parent venture, shared management venture) tended to be more successful 
than another. Also Kogut (1988) who attempted to support statistically the argument 
that dominant parent ventures are more stable than shared management ventures, 
could not extract significant data from a sample of 148 domestic and international JVs. 
Joint venture management 
JVs offer companies significant economic and non-economic benefits. However, the 
extent to which these benefits are realised depends largely on venture implementation 
and management (Datta, 1988; Lane and Beamish, 1990). Compared with WFOEs, 
JVs are much more difficult to manage (Rugman et al., 1985) since in a JV more than 
one firm is involved in decision-making (Killing, 1982, 1983). According to Datta (1988), 
behavioural, cultural and administrative impediments make JV management a 
demanding and difficult task. For instance, the MNE management team might have a 
different attitude towards risk than the local partner or a different decision-making style. 
The greater the interdependencies or linkages, the greater is the possibility of conflict 
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between the JV partners. Datta (1988) insists it is important to recognise these 
interdependencies early on in the JV process and to take appropriate actions to 
minimise their consequences. Overall, managing an international JV might have to be 
considered as a mutual responsibility evolving overtime (Albrecht et al., 1996). 
In his JV model, Killing (1983) identified the board of directors and the management 
staffing issue as the two areas where problems of multiple parents manifest 
themselves. The board of directors aspect covers the issue of control. This has been 
discussed above. However, this aspect Is of interest only in cases where management 
is shared, since in dominant parent ventures the board plays rather a ceremonial role 
as the dominant parent executives make all the venture's strategic and operating 
decisions (ibid). Management team staffing is a highly delicate issue: as some parent 
firms attempt to manoeuvre their own personnel into key managerial positions while 
others refrain from sending excess foreign personnel to the JV, owing to either their 
polycentric orientation or cost considerations. Lane and Beamish (1990) recommend 
committing a large proportion of local managers rather than expatriates in order to 
ensure that the foreign partner acquires the necessary knowledge of the local 
economy, its politics and culture. On the other hand, expatriate management 
personnel enhance and improve the communication between the venture and its 
parent company, because employees of the two firms know each other (Killing, 1983). 
Also, the more complete the information communicated by expatriates to the parent 
company, the better the control. 
Whether a large proportion of local managers is employed (ie Lane and Beamish's 
argument) depends upon the control position of the foreign partner. For instance. 
Killing (1983) found that dominant parent ventures do not employ managers from their 
passive parents, whereas, in order to enhance information flow and to capture the 
skills of parent companies, shared management ventures between firms from similar 
cultures employ managers from both parents. 
Often, managers in JVs are on loan and their seniority and pension rights are retained 
in the parent company. In his research of US JVs in Mexico, Schaan (1983) found that 
in two out of ten Mexican JVs, the general manager remained on the payroll of the 
parent, in four JVs the general manager's bonus was tied to one of the parent's results, 
in four ventures the general manager was required to attend the parent's worldwide 
management or technical meetings, and in five JVs the promotion and career plans of 
the general manager were clearly predicated upon his returning to the parent 
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company. Neither Schaan (1983) nor Killing (1983), however, established any 
relationship between these issues and JV success. Also Killing's (1982) earlier study 
did not reveal any better performance from JVs with managers drawn from either both 
partners or just one, respectively. 
As a result, these managers may pay more attention to events taking place in their 
parent and to signals coming from that parent, than to the venture's general manager 
(Killing, 1983). To this end. Killing (1983) found that eleven of 19 shared management 
ventures used executives from both parents. Those shared management JVs that did 
not use managers from both parents were either too small to justify a full-time 
employee or had previously used employees from both parents, but had learned 
enough to be able to dispense with the expensive foreigners. 
The appointment of JV general managers has seen most problems and conflicts 
between partners. Foreign companies display different behaviours with regard to 
general manager appointments. Whereas one type of company (ethnocentric), 
attempts to introduce one of its own employees in order to increase the company's 
influence on the JV operation, the other type (polycentric) opts for a general manager 
from the local parent company. A third type (geocentric) rejects both strategies and 
would appoint an independent general manager, in many cases from a third nation. 
The advantages and disadvantages of appointing foreign or local general managers 
have been discussed by Buckley et al. (1988). 
Schuler et al. (1992), studying the Davidson-Marley Automotive Components JV in 
Belgium, investigated issues such as the assignment of managers, transferability of 
human resources, allocation of start-up responsibilities and conflicts of loyalty which 
are typical for JVs. The authors found western managers displayed greater sensitivity 
to cultural diversity when dealing with Asian firms than was the case with other 
European or US firms. This was because differences were expected. Marley 
recognised the importance of adjusting to the employment practices of the host country 
rather than just imposing parent country practices on the local operations. In 
conclusion, Schuler et al. (1992) suggest that companies need to consider the degree 
of cultural homogeneity. After drawing the picture of the Davidson-Marley JV, van 
Sluijs and Schuler (1994) subsequently assessed the Belgium-based JV. The authors 
argue that, since in a JV the general manager reports to two individuals - one from 
each parent - conflicts, differences and discussions are bound to occur among the 
three individuals. This would be even more complex in the case of the human resource 
manager, who reports to the general manager of the JV itself and to the corresponding 
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functional managers of the two parents. Thus conflicts, differences and discussions 
take place among four individuals. 
Lyles and Reger (1993) explored the relationships between influence, autonomy and 
control in the US-European JV ElM. Autonomy and upward influence in JVs was found 
more complicated than previously believed and relationships were not simple, 
unidirectional or linear. The study revealed that JV managers have a variety of 
techniques that can be applied to influence decision-making about the JV's future. 
These include generating a self-sufficient resource base, cultivating a separate culture, 
developing multiple, distinctive products, and producing superior products. Lyles and 
Reger (1993) observed that JV managers utilised a variety of individually-applied 
techniques to influence the decisions made, including personal interactions with parent 
firm managers and gaining co-operation from outside the formal authority structure. 
Lichtenberger and Naulleau (1993) investigated French-German JVs to study cultural 
issues prevalent in JVs. The data from non-specified number of interviews with 
consultants and executives working in these JVs revealed conflicts in the three phases 
of the JV life cycle. In the start-up phase, the German approach to decision-making 
was characterised by a higher degree of systematisation in planning all the steps, 
eventually leading to the JV start-up: business plan, budgets and division of 
responsibilities (Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993). Lichtenberger and Naulleau 
(1993) propose that cultural synergy emphasises the need for managing the impacts of 
diversity, rather than attempting to eliminate the diversity itself. Synergistic problem-
solving is a systematic process for moving a JV from two-domestic to one-international 
perspective. It becomes an effective approach for making JVs successful 
(Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993). 
3.2.3 Joint venture s u c c e s s 
JV success is the dependent variable in this model. The most prevalent question at 
this stage, however, is: what is success? How is success measured? Lyles (1987), 
Anderson (1990) and Geringer and Hebert (1991) could not find consensus on the 
appropriate definition and measure of JV performance. A variety of subjective and 
objective measures have been employed with the latter including profitability, growth 
and cost position (Tomlinson, 1970; Lecraw, 1983), survival (Franko, 1971; Killing, 
1983; Harrigan, 1988; Geringer, 1991), JV duration (Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988) and 
instability (Franko, 1971; Gomes-Casseres, 1987, 1989). Most of the empirical studies 
examining the effectiveness of JVs concentrate on performance in absolute terms 
(Chowdhury, 1992). 
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Objective measures embody potential limitations that are critical to the evaluation of JV 
performance (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Financial measures especially fail to reflect 
the extent to which a JV has achieved its short- and long-term objectives (Killing, 
1983). Schaan (1988) accordingly argues that JVs can be deemed successful despite 
poor financial performance, and vice versa. For instance, JVs formed to develop new 
markets are often unlikely to generate a financial profit for many years. Anderson 
(1990) criticised the application of profitability indicators when businesses are in risky 
or uncertain situations. Earlier, Cartwright and Cooper (1989), in their study of 
Southeast England firms, found that financially successful companies were less 
successful in humanistic terms. 
Also, consider the case where the foreign partner learns during establishing and 
operating a JV in a host country: the JV itself might have been a financial disaster, 
whereas the parent firms could learn substantially and so save financial and 
managerial resources when forming another JV. Buckley et al. (1988) support this 
argument, suggesting that second-time investors are more successful than first-time 
investors. Further, the majority of the 52 US firms in Reynolds's (1984) study benefited 
from the experience of their Indian JVs, largely in terms of serving the Indian market 
itself Further, consider cases where a JV may be concerned solely with the supply of 
required material or with the production of goods, possibly separately labelled, to be 
sold independently by both parties. In such cases, a JV does not have to be profitable 
in itself (Herzfeld, 1983). Equally, JV parents generate income through mechanisms 
other than dividends, including supply contracts, management fees, technology 
licensing fees, royalties and transfer pricing (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Stability or instability as measures of performance provide ground for criticism, too. 
Instability refers to major changes in ownership shares of a JV (Geringer and Hebert, 
1991). These include foreign ownership crossing the 50 (downwards) and 95 per cent 
(upwards) lines, respectively, a partner selling out, liquidation of the JV, and major 
reorganisations (Franko, 1971; Killing, 1983; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Authors, such 
as Gomes-Casseres (1987), Bleeke and Ernst (1991) and Reuer and Miller (1997) 
argue that JV termination need not reflect parent failure, though theoretical and 
empirical research on JVs has often characterised JV ownership structure changes as 
failures (Hamel, 1991). To this end, Killing (1982) discovered that the number of firms 
in his 19-company sample which needed the help of the local partner, decreased from 
13 at the time of establishing the JV to six by the time the study was completed. 
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Scholars have also applied subjective JV performance measures, including the 
assessments of the JV and parent firms. However, as Osland and Cavusgil (1996) 
remark: using subjective performance measures reflects difficulties in obtaining 
objective evaluations, and the awareness that measures, such as profits, are not 
directly comparable across different industries and stages in JV life cycles. Geringer 
and Hebert (1991) in their study of 69 international JVs in the US and 82 in Canada, 
discovered positive and significant correlations between subjective and objective 
measures of JV performance. JV survival was the objective measure that evidenced 
the strongest and most significant correlations with subjective performance measures, 
followed by JV duration. Beamish (1988) and Geringer and Hebert (1991) discovered a 
significant positive correlation between the parents' and the JV general managers' 
assessments and between a parent's satisfaction with JV performance and 
perceptions by the other partner, and the JV general managers, of this parent's 
satisfaction. Geringer and Hebert's (1991) study was limited, however, to data on JVs 
that involved developed country parents. It also focused on recently formed JVs that 
still existed or had been terminated only recently. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter the JV models of Killing (1983) and Harrigan (1984, 1985) have been 
discussed and it has been suggested that both models reflect JV reality in a developed 
country rather than a LDC environment. Thus, both models exhibit shortcomings for 
use in this thesis. Equally, Datta's (1988) JV model, though covering the international 
dimension, ignores essential model components such as the negotiation of JVs. The 
model contributes to the consequent evaluation of the appropriateness of the JV 
strategy as a market entry strategy for SMEs. Thus, a framework needed to be 
established that would allow the subsequent investigation of the JV strategy, including 
the JV formation and operation phases. The proposed model forms a good, general 
basis for the subsequent amendment with the insights from the review of the Sino-
foreign JV literature in chapter six. JV dissolution aspects have not been covered in 
this chapter. 
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Notes 
^ Earlier, Harrigan (1984) presented a framework for predicting how parent firms might 
configure JVs to achieve competitiveness. Basically, the paper presents the contents of 
Harrigan's (1985) later comprehensive work on JVs in domestic, mature economies. 
^ Beamish's doctoral thesis of 1984. 
^ Wells (1973) suggests that host countries may be better off if the foreign firm has all the 
equity. Contractor (1985) showed that putting a ceiling on the foreign equity share is the 
worst regulatory intervention leading to sub-optimal solutions for the companies and 
increasing prices for buyers of the final product, lower tax collection and increase of the 
venture's costs of foreign exchange. Support for that argument has been found in Afriyie's 
(1988) study which highlights the greater industrial impact of JVs on the host economy than 
that of local firms. Focusing on the relative industrial performance of JVs and local firms on 
their factor choice behaviour patterns, the study found that JVs produced three times more 
than local firms. Further, it was found that a JV has larger plant capacities than local firms. 
JVs also tended to employ higher capital per worker and also employ more production 
workers than did local firms. The study discovered that inter-industry differences appear to be 
smaller for local firms than for JVs. 
The local partner's main motivations are access to finance and technology that would be 
othenwise very difficult or time-intensive to develop or to buy. Buckley (1983) and Datta 
(1988) point out that the transfer of technology is likely to be the single most important reason 
why LDC firms seek JVs. Foreign partners in LDCs also seek access to the use of well-
known brands and trademarks. Often JVs are seen as important mechanisms for achieving 
corporate growth and diversification objectives (Datta, 1988). In Reynolds's (1984) study of 
US JVs in India, the Indian firms expected equipment and foreign exchange. Raveed and 
Renforth (1983) also examined the host country motivations from two different perspectives -
MNE executives and local elite. The authors found agreement between the attitudes of the 
US MNE and host country executives as to which country-oriented objectives were the most 
important for the host country. The two groups rated four of the same factors, namely 'to 
maximise the net capital flow into the country', 'to maximise the foreign exchange earnings of 
the country', 'to enhance the opportunity for local business interests to share in highly 
profitable commercial opportunities', 'to maximise the transfer of technology to the country'. 
^ Increasing local employment, establishing a means of import substitution, conserving 
foreign exchange and the technological upgrade of the economy (Datta, 1988; Albaum et al., 
1992). Bieszki and Rath (1989) have challenged this, however. Studying JVs in Eastern 
European (former socialist) countries, they have questioned whether co-operation in the form 
of JVs leads to the aspired improvement in the countries' export position or whether it would 
result in more imports and currency outlays even. In fact, Afriyie's (1988) earlier study of 
foreign investment projects in Ghana found that JVs employ larger quantities of imported 
inputs per worker than local firms do. 
^ 34 of the sample firms had a US, 21 a Japanese, and 26 a Western European partner. 
^ Ten ventures were located in Carribean market economies, with half of these in a single 
country. Beamish executed 46 interviews and received 18 questionnaires. 
" Defined as either minority participations, 50-50 equity participations, licensing agreements 
between US and host-country firms. The investigation covered five industries, including 
automobiles, motor vehicle parts, food processing, pharmaceuticals and computers. 
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Objectives and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has developed the international JV framework to be used for 
analysis of joint venturing in China by UK and German small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). After setting the scene for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
Chinese market in chapter five, this framework will be amended and extended 
throughout chapter six based on findings from an examination of the literature on Sino-
foreign joint ventures (JVs). Chapter four introduces the research objectives, the 
sampling process and the methodology applied in this study. It also introduces the 
tools for analysis and discusses the problems encountered in the sampling and data 
collection processes. 
4.2 Research objectives 
In chapter two it has been established that, compared with large firms, SMEs are 
disadvantaged when it comes to internationalisation, particularly in the form of FDI. it 
has been proposed in chapter two that the JV strategy is a means of overcoming 
traditional SME internationalisation restrictions, making foreign market entry and 
servicing possible for many SMEs. The overall aim of this study is to investigate 
whether, and to what extent, the JV supports the internationalisation efforts of SMEs. 
In particular, the issues addressed in this thesis include: 
• the impact of resource limitations on the joint venturing in China of UK and 
German SMEs; 
• the UK and German SMEs' entry strategy development towards the Chinese 
market; 
• the characteristics of UK and German SME JVs in China, applying and 
extending the frameworks of Beamish and Wang (1989) and Beamish (1993);' 
• the experiences of UK and German SMEs with their JVs in China. This 
proceeds along a framework based on the works of Harrigan (1984), Datta 
(1988) and Fan (1996). In detail, the thesis addresses both the establishment 
and operation phases of SME JVs in China; 
• the extent to which the JV strategy relieves the resources burden that rests on 
SMEs in the process of internationalisation; 
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• the extent to which the JV has been successful as a market servicing strategy 
for UK and German SMEs in the Chinese market. 
4.3 Preparatory study and piloting field work 
During a first visit to the People's Republic of China in 1995,^ UK and German 
business support organisations were contacted that could be sources for the 
subsequent data collection. One of the outcomes of the four-month exercise was 
agreement from the managing director of a Greater Shanghai-based subsidiary of a 
German small electronic appliances manufacturer to let the candidate investigate the 
company's procurement situation. It was known from various sources, including 
Trommsdortf et al. (1994) and Schuchardt (1994) that the sourcing of domestically-
produced matenals and components has been a great problem for many foreign 
manufacturers in China. 
The subsequent research visit to this company in January 1996 had three objectives: 
first, to discover the problems with, and the strategies for, local sourcing in China.^ 
Secondly, to gain expenence in carrying out field research in China. Since the research 
with the appliance manufacturer would involve interviewing expatriate and local 
managers, it was considered a preparation for the subsequent execution of field 
research in China. Thirdly, the hope that investigation of that particular case would lead 
to western, possibly German, SMEs that had established JVs with local companies and 
were, as a result, supplying components to subsidiaries of German MNEs. Several 
studies have previously suggested such relationships (Schuller, 1994; Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995). However, analysing the supply 
chain of the company did not detect such relationships. 
However, by accident the research visit led to a German SME in East China that 
produces mechanical components jointly with a Chinese partner. Both its German 
expatriate manager and the director for international affairs at the German 
headquarters agreed to grant access to the company. This involved studying published 
company literature, executing personal interviews with the expatriate production and 
quality assurance manager, the assistant production and quality assurance manager 
and the finance and marketing managers of the JV. The director for international affairs 
of the company in Germany was also interviewed. This formed the pilot for the study. 
As Yin (1994) and Jankowicz (1994) have suggested, a pilot case assists the 
investigator in the development of relevant lines of questioning and also helps to clarify 
the research design. From the literature (Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993; Leung and 
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Yeung, 1995) it is known that pilot studies can identify sensitive questions. The piloting 
case research in this thesis had one major objective: that the result of the exercise 
should help establish a framework for the data collection that commenced in the spring 
of 1996. 
4.4 Creating a sample for research 
The identification of a population of UK and German SMEs with a JV in China was 
difficult. In neither case was there a readily available database that could be used to 
extract a sample for research. The Association of German Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce (DIHT), in conjunction with its representative office in Shanghai, has begun 
only recently to target SMEs with an existing or a planned FDI project in China and to 
provide SME-specific investment information (Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). A 
similar, SME-specific approach on the part of a UK institution or individual has not yet 
been put forward. 
Data on UK and German SMEs with FDI projects in China was hoped to be available 
from a range of sources (UK, German, Chinese) which are detailed in Appendix i l l . 
The data from these sources is limited in its validity and usefulness for at least two 
reasons: first, it is not comprehensive and does not indicate the size of the companies 
that undertake the investment. This obsen/ation was made by Fujita (1993, 1995) in an 
international context. He suggests that there is no country for which consistent and 
systematic FDI data is available by firm size. UK companies are not required to 
register with the British Embassy in Beijing when setting up FDI projects in China. This 
suggests that official UK bodies only know fragments of the actual investment projects 
of UK companies. Thus, no comprehensive list exists (CBTR, August 1994, p.ll)."* 
This explains why, in mid-1994, for instance, the British Embassy in Beijing knew of the 
existence of only 120 or so Sino-UK JVs (CBTR, August 1994, p.11), whereas official 
Chinese figures at that time suggested a total of 616 UK investment projects (FT, 
7.11.94, p.vi). Secondly, both the 'JV list' and the 'British Chamber of Commerce 
Shanghai membership list' did not indicate whether the investors were large or SMEs. 
These limitations apply, principally, also to German data. Directories are not 
comprehensive and do not indicate the size of the investing company, although the 
Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai, in 1997, revealed an 
estimated 180 to 200 German SMEs with an FDI project in China (Grimm, 1997). On 
the other hand, it is equally difficult to support the argument that SME investment in 
China is under-represented (CHINA-INFO, No. 11, July 1995; Handelsblatt, 29.5.95, 
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p.14). This confirms Braun's (1982) experience when examining German SME FDI in 
LDCs. He complained that there is no distribution of German FDI in less developed 
countries (LDCs) with respect to firm size. Also Kaufmann et al. (1990), when carrying 
out their study of German SMEs in Europe, complained of the lack of comprehensive 
statistics and databases that would suggest the size of co-operating firms. 
Furthermore, some of the directories provide inaccurate information. Buckley et al. 
(1983) had a similar experience to the above. Studying continental European SME FDI 
in the UK, the authors detected that 23 firms claimed not to be owned by European 
continental firms, although databases had suggested so. Dong et al. (1993, p.204) 
stressed, when investigating Overseas Chinese, Japanese, US and European 
investments in China, that "no two sources provided exactly the same listings and the 
exact size of the target population is, therefore, unknown." 
Also German companies are not required to register with the German Embassy in 
Beijing when setting up FDI projects in China. This suggests that official German 
bodies only know a fraction of the actual German investment projects in China. For 
instance, by June 1994, the German Embassy in Beijing was aware of some 312 
German representative offices, 138 Sino-German JVs and 16 German WFOEs 
(Gnmm, 1994). However, the business press (FT, 7.11.94, p.vi) suggested 569 
German investment projects established by the end of 1993, 103 more than the 
German Embassy proposed six months later. 
Further, the database of the trade promotion department of the German Embassy had 
to be treated with caution. On its first page, the directory identified the company Agfa-
Gaevert (HK) Ltd. Shanghai Repr. Office as a JV, which seems rather odd. On its 
page 14, the directory classified the company Homag-Anderson Machinery (Shanghai) 
Co Ltd. as a JV. This company is a JV, but with a Taiwanese rather than a Chinese 
partner. It is treated legally therefore as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE).^ 
Another example of inaccurate data is the directory obtained from the German Asia-
Pacific Business Association. One putative Sino-German JV project whose address 
was found in the above directory responded that "our company is a wholly Swiss-
owned enterprise, instead of a (Sino-German) JV." 
As with the UK and German sources, the value of Chinese data was diminished by the 
fact that it fails to indicate whether the investing foreign companies are large 
enterprises or SMEs. During an interview with officials at the Foreign Investment 
Commission in Shanghai on 11. May 1995, it became evident that the Chinese 
authorities - although they knew the size of the foreign companies' investment projects 
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in China - did not know the size of the parent companies. If the foreign companies are 
on the 'Forbes 500' list, the officials can find out more about them, as one interviewee 
at the Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission indicated. However, lists such as the 
'Forbes 500' only include the world's top 500 companies, not SMEs. Support for this 
statement was found in the China-Britain Trade Review (October 1993, p.9) where it is 
pointed out that local officials in Shanghai had suggested that in autumn 1993 one 
sixth of the world's 500 top companies had established JVs or agencies in Shanghai. 
The fact that Chinese officials do not have normally available information on the 
investors' firm size, has been frequently ignored by researchers who,^ after talking to 
Chinese officials, stressed: "Whereas in the past more SMEs pursued investments, it is 
now the large and multinational companies that tend to invest." Equally, Au and 
Enderwick (1994) have suggested that the average size of JVs actually decreased 
between 1987 and 1988 and that smaller investors in China are thus growing in 
importance. This argument is hampered in two ways: first, it has been shown that JV 
investment has not decreased, but increased (FT, 7.11.94, p.vi; Kaiser and Grimm et 
al., 1997; de Bruijn and Jia, 1997). Secondly, to conclude from a decreasing average 
investment size to SME investment is superficial since decreasing investments can 
also be caused by cautious investment behaviour of large MNEs. 
In summary, no single directory with UK and German data on SME FDI in China could 
be made available from the sources outlined above. This suggested two alternative 
strategies. The first was to ask all UK and German companies with a JV in China which 
were identified in any of the available databases to participate in a survey and to use 
the data only from SME respondents. This would have by far exceeded the financial 
budget of the researcher and a low response rate would have been risked, too. The 
second was to create specific databases with populations of UK and German SMEs 
with JV projects in China. Whereas for the German SME database, the basis was 
largely the company directory of the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Shanghai, the UK SME database was - due to a lack of a single, comprehensive 
source of company addresses - an amalgam of various elements. 
4.4.1 S M E s in the UK 
SMEs in Northeast England 
The database that was obtained from the Government Office for the Northeast 
(GONE) was used for further analysis. It was assumed that the 452 enterprise contacts 
on the list were involved in business within the Asia-Pacific region. However, as 
suggested earlier, it was not clear which countries in the Asia-Pacific region these 
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companies were targeting and which market servicing strategies they employed. A 
survey was earned out that helped to clarify this aspect and to identify companies with 
JVs in China (Kaiser and Kirby, 1996). After removing those companies from the list 
that were known not to be SMEs or known to be subsidiaries of large firms, 
questionnaires were sent to the owner-managers or senior management personnel of 
444 companies in August 1996. The structured questionnaire covered areas such as 
information on the respondents' business, their internationalisation experience in 
general, their experience with the Asia-Pacific region, and with China in particular, and 
their attitudes to doing business in the Asia-Pacific region. By the end of August 1996, 
a total of 87 usable questionnaires were returned. 
Of these, 82 Northeast England businesses were reported to be active in the Asia-
Pacific region and 34 were also dealing with, or operating in, China. Seven of these 
indicated that they were involved in a JV in China. Question 33 of the questionnaire 
asked the respondents whether they were prepared to be interviewed about their JV 
business in China and, surprisingly, 13 respondents agreed. All 13 respondents were 
contacted. Brief telephone conversations revealed that not all of the companies were 
actually involved in a JV, but variously "were interested in establishing a JV", "wanted 
to establish a WFOE", "was American-owned and does not have a JV itself or "has 
only a business-relationship with a Chinese agent". 
Thus, the 13 Northeast SMEs originally thought to be involved in a JV in China, turned 
out to be six. To these, an additional Northeast England SME that operates a JV in 
China was added. The company that the researcher identified somewhat by chance^ 
was not contained in the GONE company directory. 
SMEs in the rest of the UK 
Subsequently, qualifying SMEs were sought UK-wide. This task was expected to be 
more comprehensive than the one described above since the carrying out of a survey 
on a nationwide basis was not possible for reasons of finance and manpower 
restrictions. Thus, an alternative, two-step approach was undertaken: first, addresses 
were collected from databases with contacts of direct investors in China, as the one 
discussed above, and from other sources, including publications. Secondly, company 
directories were used in order to identify whether the China direct investors were large 
firms or SMEs. Although this was a time-consuming task, it was the only way of 
creating an SME population for the survey. 
The most promising strategy to establish the UK SME database was to use the 
following sources of information: 'JV list' of the British Embassy in Beijing, 'British 
Chamber of Commerce Shanghai membership list', CBTG databases, China-Britain 
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Trade Review, business press, conference attendance lists, trade mission participation 
lists, and chambers of commerce in the UK. 
The monthly periodical 'China-Bhtain Trade Review' (CBTR), published by the CBTG, 
was thought to be a further valuable source. The publication contains a two-page 
section listing recent contracts between Chinese and foreign companies. The data on 
these two pages is organised using dimensions such as 'sector', 'country', 'foreign 
partner', 'Chinese partner', 'agreement', 'date', and 'project'. 55 issues of the CBTR, 
from January 1992 to August 1996,^ were analysed. Only if the country engaged in the 
project was the UK, and the project was a JV, and the foreign parent companies were 
known not to be large companies, were the firms examined further. This exercise 
produced a total of 216 agreements established between UK and Chinese companies. 
Analysing these agreements showed that 81 were JVs and 135 were other contracts. 
Company news in the CBTR (Jan. 192 to Aug. 1996), the UK business press, such as 
the Financial Times (Jan. 1994 to July 1996), were examined and, if the firm 
concerned was not known as large, it was added to the database for examination. 
Conference and trade fair attendance lists seemed to be of value, too. In 1994, the 
researcher attended an exhibition in Harrogate in the UK. Several exhibitors were 
approached and asked about their China commitment. Two of the exhibiting UK firms 
expressed their interest in entering the Chinese market through "a JV or so". The 
companies were contacted in the summer of 1996 to find out if they had realised their 
plans. However, neither company had, at that time, established a JV, though one was 
involved in discussions about forming one. A list with the names of companies that 
participated in the 1996 UK trade mission to China was obtained at the Confederation 
of the British Industry (CBI) de-briefing session in London on 6. June 1996. 
Evaluation 
In a second step, the company entries obtained in the process described above were 
sifted (ie companies with more than 500 employees were removed) by applying 
company directory data that was available either on CD-ROM (FAME)^ or on-line 
(DATASTREAM).'° DATASTREAM was applied whenever FAME did not produce 
sufficient results. Evaluating the above mentioned data sources was straightforward -
with one exception: the 'British Chamber of Commerce Shanghai membership list' 
created difficulties since the name that is contained in the list, is the name of the 
organisation established in the Chinese jurisdiction. Checking these names in 
company directories, such as FAME and DATASTREAM, did not produce results. 
However, usually the names of the UK companies' operations in China contain parts of 
the name also to be found in the parent company name. This made the identification of 
these firms in FAME and DATASTREAM possible. The lists also contained company 
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names that were not found in the directories. Although it could not be assumed that 
these companies were not SMEs, the enterprises were excluded from the list. 
Out of the original 30 UK companies in the database, 23 qualified for the next round of 
the evaluation process. 
Additional findings 
A survey undertaken by a 1996 University of Durham MBA student examined the 
China business commitment of Scottish SMEs that were members of CBTG. Question 
ten of this student's questionnaire asked what stage the respondents' company had 
reached in developing the Chinese market. Three of the 23 respondents indicated that 
they had JVs operating in China. All three companies were added to the database for 
further research. The database contained the names of the companies, contact 
persons, addresses, telephone numbers, industry affiliation and company size 
information, where known. 
4.4.2 S M E s in Germany 
Database of German SIVIEs 
The most promising strategy to obtain addresses for the subsequent establishment of 
the 'German SME with a JV in China' population was to use the company directory 
provided by the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai. This 
directory seemed to be the most comprehensive available and, thus, appropriate as 
the basis for further evaluation. Other sources were evaluated, including the database 
processed by the German Embassy in Beijing, the publications 'Ost-West Contact' and 
'China aktuell', the business press, CBTR, an HWWA proposal and information from 
selected chambers of commerce in Germany. However, none of these other sources 
proved very helpful with regard to improving the comprehensive database of the 
Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai. 
Evaluation 
The process of evaluating the content of the original database was similar to the case 
of the UK SMEs. However, instead of FAME and DATASTREAM, the German 
company directory Hoppenstedt was employed." 31 out of the original database of 38 
companies thought to be German SMEs with a JV in China were eventually 
approached. As with the UK SME database, the German SME database contained 
information about the companies including names, addresses, contact persons, 
telephone numbers and company size information. 
Results of the search 
The population-creating exercises produced at total of 26 UK and 31 German SMEs 
with an alleged JV project in China. Employing the company directories FAME and 
Hoppenstedt also provided, in most cases, the addresses and telephone numbers of 
the companies. Where the address and/or telephone number was missing, national 
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enquiry services were asked for the relevant information. Consequent ly, in the UK the 
individual enterpr ises (excluding those that had participated in the Northeast England 
S M E study) were phoned, and the names of the managing directors requested. Next, 
personal letters were sent to the managing directors or senior management personnel. 
The letter int roduced the candidate and the research project and indicated that the 
candidate wou ld te lephone to find out whether the addressee was prepared to 
part icipate in a quest ionnaire s u r v e y . A f t e r a fortnight of continuously contacting the 
companies, the researcher had spoken to all but two of the companies ' representatives 
and asked whether they would release information about their JV in China. 
This process showed that not all of the UK companies on the original list of 26 actually 
had a JV in China or were will ing to participate in the intended study. Eventually, 14 
companies agreed to participate in the research project. The remaining 12 f irms did not 
part icipate as: 
• "the Chinese partner insists that all technical and financial information 
regarding the operat ion of the JV would be kept confidential," 
the contact person was never available, 
the JV was a restaurant and not part of the core business of the UK company, 
the contact person did not respond, 
the company did not operate in China, 
the managing director refused to talk to the researcher, 
the company had a W F O E and not a JV in China, 
the company had pulled out from the JV, or 
the company did not even have a representative office in China. 
Addi t ional information was obtained during the researcher's field trip to China in 
October and November 1996 from CBTG and the British Chamber of Commerce 
Shanghai . Since the names of contact persons and telephone numbers were provided 
by the data source, four of the above listed companies that were assumed to be JV 
companies were contacted from Shanghai. One JV was not approached since its UK 
parent had already been asked in the UK and a reply was awaited. Eventually, one 
contact proved useful and the company could be added to the database raising the 
total number of companies to 15. 
The SMEs in Germany were also contacted by telephone to find out the names and 
posit ions of the persons to participate in the research. This was done in the summer of 
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1996. The information obtained was subsequently used to send personal letters to 
prospect ive respondents. The companies were not asked for an interview since 
te lephoning 31 companies, perhaps as many as ten t imes, was simply too resource-
hungry. The process of building the sample for research is presented in table 4 - 1 . 
Table 4 - 1 : Process of building the sample for research. 
Step Search strategy UK SMEs Search strategy German SMEs 
1 Northeast England study 
(Kaiser and Kirby, 1996) 
1 3 - 7 
I 6 
2 Additional entry + 1 
Z 7 
3 Embassy JV list, British 
Chamber of Commerce 
membership list, CBTG 
databases, CBTR, press, 
conference attendance 
lists, trade mission partici-
pation lists, Chambers of 
Commerce in UK 
+ 23 Delegation of German Indu-
stry and Commerce Shang-
hai database, German 
Embassy database, Ost-
West Contact, China aktuell, 
business press, CBTR, 
HWWA proposal. Chambers 
of Commerce in Germany 
38 
I 30 
4 MBA survey results + 3 
I 33 
5 Firm size review - 7 - 7 
Z 26 31 
6 Approaching enterprises - 12 
Z 14 
7 CBTG in China + 1 
z 15 31 
4.5 Data collection 
The tradit ion of research suggests basically two strategies o f collecting data. One 
fol lows the positivist or quantitative^^ route and the other the qualitative^" strand of 
thought. Positivist epistemology'^ has frequently been at tacked for assuming that 
social sc iences can be investigated in the same way as the natural sciences (Smith, 
1989). This implies reducing human action to the status of automatic responses 
exci ted by external stimuli (Gill and Johnson, 1991). By limiting its concept ion of valid 
knowledge to that which is considered to be clearly observable 'sense-data' , positivist 
epistemology has been criticised for missing out on important data when dealing with 
complex phenomena. Instead it establishes a causal relationship between variables 
that have little or no meaning to those individuals whose social worlds they are meant 
to represent (Hayek, 1978; Bryman, 1984; Smith, 1989; Gill and Johnson, 1991; 
Wr ight , 1996). Through an artificial distancing from the phenomenon under 
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investigation inherent in positivist epistemology, the researcher is not sufficiently close 
to the phenomenon to understand it (Smith, 1989). 
The tenor of this crit icism of quantitative research was the extoll ing of qualitative 
research in the psychology, economics and management branches of social sciences. 
Wr ight (1996) def ines qualitative research as any research where number counting 
and statistical techniques are not the central issues, but where an attempt is made to 
get close to the collection of data in its natural setting by applying, among other things, 
case studies and participant observat ion. Qualitative research methods give the 
researcher more flexibility in capturing the complexit ies of the social sciences, which 
detect how factors (ie 'what') are related and what underlying psychological, economic, 
or social dynamics justi fy the selection of those factors and their relationships (Smith, 
1989; Wright, 1996). 
This, on the other hand, brought proponents of the positivist strand of thought into the 
arena. The principal crit icism of qualitative research methods, such as case studies, is 
that they are unrepresentat ive and that they are suitable for exploratory studies at 
best, whereas quantif ication is necessary to establish the validity of any findings. 
Wr ight (1996) proposes to minimise this drawback by using more than one case, and 
matching cases as far as possible along some variables, including industry, similar size 
and entering a foreign market within the same time period. Though Wright 's (1996) 
argument may be able to minimise the drawback of qualitative research, it is not strong 
enough to el iminate it. Indeed, she suggests as much with her own choice of the word 
"minimise", which suggests that there remains a rest which neither she nor other 
wri ters could address. Prior to Wright (1996), Gummesson (1991) at tempted to justify 
the use of qualitative case research by challenging the importance of validity with 
which general isat ion is closely related. 
This d ichotomy - which arises as a result of the acceptance one strand of research (the 
qual i tat ive) and the rejection of the other (the quantitative) on the basis that one is a 
priori better than the other - loses out on a common benefit that is derived from the 
meri ts of both. The different methods have different inherent strengths and 
weaknesses that need to be taken into account (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Various 
authors have accepted such a position of tr iangulation, where methods are combined 
to st rengthen both, including Smith (1989), Rohner (1977), Bennett (1983), Snow and 
Thomas (1994), Yin (1994), and Wright (1996). A strategy of tr iangulation implies 
combin ing principal research methods, such as historical research, case study, survey, 
and f ield experiment. Snow and Thomas (1994) discovered that studies that employed 
a tr iangulated methodology have an impressive record in the strategy literature. 
87 
Objectives and methodology 
However, Bryman (1984) criticises the combinat ion of methods on the basis that this 
confuses technical and epistemological arguing: the argument for tr iangulated 
strategies is essential ly a technical one (ibid). Bryman (1984) also rejects the merit of a 
preparatory case study since this places qualitative and quantitative methodology 
within the same epistemological f ramework. 
The mult i -method approach also has its l imitations, however. For example, the use of 
more than one field method introduces analytic diversity, though such diversity is low 
relative to the entire range of research methods. Indeed, the use of multiple field 
methods may only be sufficient to create within-method tr iangulation (Denzin, 1978) 
which means that the researcher has examined a phenomenon or relationship from 
different angles. As a result the views share common flaws which prevent strong 
convergent validity f rom being establ ished. 
The methodology applied in this research was tr iangulated, extracting the merits of the 
methods of both strands of methodological thought. This research employed 
quanti tat ive methods (survey) as well as qualitative ones (case study). The exploratory 
nature of case study research was exploited in the process of piloting the field work 
(section 4.3) in order to explore factors ('what') that are meaningful to those whose 
social worids they are meant to represent. Subsequently, a causal relationship 
between these variables was establ ished by asking respondents and studying certain 
aspects in-depth. 
4.5.1 Questionnaire survey 
Techniques '^ in survey research include the structured interview, mail questionnaire 
and self-administered questionnaire (Harpaz, 1996). Snow and Thomas (1994) 
examining the variety of field research methods used in strategic management, 
propose that these can realistically examine strategic processes. 
The survey is particulariy useful when large numbers of people have to be contacted in 
order to obtain data on the same issue or issues. Also, conduct ing a survey permits 
conclusions to be general ised (Jankowicz, 1994). Some authors (Jobber and 
Saunders, 1988) consider the use of a questionnaire survey as an inexpensive method 
of gathering data, making the carrying out of surveys possible. Elsewhere (Snow and 
Thomas , 1994) it is suggested that the questionnaire survey is an efficient, though less 
f lexible, substitute for observat ion or interviewing and that it is cheaper to administer, 
whi le covering more respondents. 
Quest ionnaire surveys also have disadvantages and there are situations where 
alternative means of data collection are more promising. For instance, some authors 
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(Gaedeke and Tootel ian, 1976; Snow and Thomas, 1994) consider as a major 
l imitation of quest ionnaire surveys their typically low response rates. This is especially 
appl icable when surveys are mailed directly to respondents without prior contact or 
when the intended respondents are top managers (Snow and Thomas, 1994). This is 
problematic, as it reduces confidence about the extent to which the results generalise 
to the populat ion f rom which the survey is drawn. 
Distr ibuted quest ionnaires are frequently ignored by respondents. This particularly 
appl ies to quest ionnaires that are too comprehensive since respondents are likely to 
be careless, or indeed, refuse to participate in a survey at all (Jankowicz, 1994). As a 
useful rule of t humb for postal questionnaires, Howard and Sharp (1983) suggest an 
upper limit of ten pages or 15 minutes for completion. Management personnel have 
only a limited amount of t ime and filling in lengthy questionnaires is certainly not a 
priority. Empir ical f indings confirm this: Dii lman (1978) reports 52 per cent average 
response rates for surveys of top managers, whereas research using other managers 
as respondents achieved an average rate of 61 per cent. 
The examinat ion of studies on SME internationalisation (chapter two) suggests 
response rates between 7.5 and 92 per cent with 25 to 50 per cent as the most 
f requent. However, it is not known from these studies whether the authors applied 
sophist icated data collection methods, such as Dillman's (1978) 'total design' method. 
The export l i terature suggests response rates of approximately 30 per cent (Burton 
and Schlegelmi lch, 1987; Cavusgi l and Naor, 1987; Koh and Robicheaux, 1988; Keng 
and Tan, 1988; Ax inn, 1988; Sharkey et al., 1989; Czinkota and Ursic, 1991; Moini, 
1995), whereas the FDI literature exper ienced response rates of between 15 and 56 
per cent (Habib, 1987; Ei teman, 1990; Lau, 1992; Gledhill, 1994; Glaister and Wang, 
1993; Leung and Yeung, 1995). 
Respondents are increasingly getting tired of answering quest ionnaires. For instance, 
dur ing a session of the German J V round table in Shanghai, participants complained 
that too many researchers kept sending metre-long questionnaires through their fax 
machines. This was also pointed out by a researcher of the German Economics 
Research Institute H W W A considering this phenomenon dangerous for people with 
'proper' research projects. 
The identif ied populat ions of 26 UK and 31 German f irms with JVs in China seemed to 
be too small to risk the use of a conventional data collection approach, ie initial 
distr ibution of a quest ionnaire and the carrying out of interviews. Considering a 
response rate that was experienced in an earlier study of less than 20 per cent (Kaiser 
and Kirby, 1996), this approach would have produced only some five or six usable 
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responses, respectively. Thus, a data collection mechanism had to be designed that 
wou ld guarantee a max imum response rate. Dil lman (1978), for instance, recommends 
applying the "total design method" which identifies and copes with factors that can 
inf luence the number and quality of responses. The 48 questionnaire surveys that 
used this method and that were investigated by Dillman (1978) produced an average 
response rate of 74 per cent, with none of the surveys obtaining less than 50 per cent. 
The number of potential survey respondents was small enough to justify the application 
of Dil lman's (1978) 'total design method' . More generally, high response rates are 
more likely to be associated with features such as: contacting respondents in advance, 
administer ing surveys on site (especially during work hours), convincing top managers 
to distr ibute surveys, contacting non-respondents and/or sending them another mailing 
and carrying out the survey in conjunction with interviews (Snow and Thomas, 1994). 
A l though, in the present study, the sample for quantitative research was not very large 
(26 UK and 31 German SMEs) , financial constraints prevented the carrying out of 
structured te lephone interviews with every SME. Similariy, it was not possible to carry 
out face-to-face interviews with each owner-manager or senior management 
personnel . Thus, a postal questionnaire survey was regarded as the best alternative. It 
was hoped to achieve a response rate of some 50 per cent as a result of using the 
'total design method' , as outl ined above. 
Questionnaire design 
A quest ionnaire may be regarded as a written interview (Pareek and Rao, 1980; Dess 
and Davies, 1984). Thus, when designing the questionnaire, there has to be a f low that 
will keep potential respondents interested. Also the questionnaire must not to be too 
long while the questions should be arranged in a logical order. Structured 
quest ionnaires exist in a variety of forms, including fixed alternative and open-ended 
fo rms (Jankowicz, 1994). Fixed alternative forms are multiple choice (single 
alternat ive), free choice (one or more alternatives), ranking and rating variations. The 
structured questionnaire employed in this thesis contains both multiple and free choice 
and rating elements. 
Subject ive rating measures may best be captured in bipolar, f ive-point Likert scales. 
Likert scales allow the application of both nominal and ordinal data measurement 
(Dong et al., 1993). They also permit measurement of the importance of contributions, 
for example, subjective success (Geringer and Hebert, 1991) and changes over t ime 
(Beamish, 1993). Five-point Likert scales have been used by authors, including 
Ger inger and Hebert (1991) in their study of 69 and 82 international JVs in the US and 
Canada, Beamish (1993) and Dong et al. (1993) studying international JVs in China. 
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A seven-point Likert scale, as used by Stewart and Keown (1989) and Leung and 
Yeung (1995) in their study of the factors for successful negotiat ions, was not used 
since it was bel ieved that more numerous response categories would exceed the 
respondents ' ability to discriminate. The two poles of the Likert scales that were 
employed expressed a very high degree of agreement and a very high degree of 
d i sag reemen t . " The 'agreement ' pole was allocated one credit and the 'disagreement' 
pole f ive credits. The three answer categories between the two poles were given 
credits f rom two to four. The structured questionnaire also included some open-ended 
quest ions, making it more flexible (Jankowicz, 1994). This addressed a concern raised 
by Gill and Johnson (1991) that a respondent might be constrained by the rubric of a 
sel f-complet ion quest ionnaire and have little opportunity to articulate ways in which 
he/she personally conceptual ises and understands the matters of interest. 
The quest ions were organised in main topics, including basic information about the 
part icipating companies, JV establ ishment, operat ion, problems, performance, 
f inancing and JV contributions to relieve the SMEs' resource commitments. A copy of 
the quest ionnaire is contained in Appendix IV. 
The input for the questionnaire design was obtained from literature on 
internationalisation (chapter two of this thesis) and the analytical research framework 
on international JVs developed in chapters three and six. Addit ional sources included: 
• owner-managers of SMEs in Northeast England that were involved in 
international business. These practit ioners would know, f rom their own 
exper ience, the issues relevant to SMEs with a commitment overseas, 
• academics working in the field of international business. This group of people 
was thought to be able, f rom personal experience of international companies, to 
direct the researcher to relevant issues of research, ie to help revise the original 
version of the questionnaire, 
• the exper ience gained while carrying out a questionnaire survey in August 1996 
to research the internationalisation behaviour and the attitudes of SMEs in 
Northeast England towards doing business in the Asia-Pacif ic region (Kaiser and 
Kirby, 1996), 
Questionnaire pre-testing 
Six Durham MBA students pre-tested the quest ionnaire and the f indings were used to 
refine the initial concept of the questionnaire design. This included, for instance, 
extending the range of pre-defined answers where necessary or modify ing the order of 
quest ions and pre-def ined answers. MBA students as pre-testers were chosen due to 
reasons of convenience. Furthermore, prior to taking their MBA courses, the students 
were decis ion-makers in internationally active companies. 
Questionnaire distribution 
The quest ionnaires were distributed in September 1996^° to the owner-managers or 
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senior management personnel of the UK and German SMEs. The owner-managers, or 
h igh-ranking management personnel, were chosen in order to ensure quality 
responses. Habib (1987) distributed his questionnaires to the JVs' presidents and 
Ger inger (1991) approached respondents who had direct responsibil i ty for the JV's 
operat ions and had been closely involved with the JV during its format ion. 
The respondents received either English or German versions of the questionnaire. In 
order to ensure precise translation of not only the wording but also the meaning, the 
German quest ionnaire was back-translated into English. Shenkar (1994) suggests that 
the meaning at tached to a question may vary from one culture to another. Other 
t ranslat ion techniques, as suggested by Harpaz (1996), including the bilingual method, 
commi t tee procedure, and pre-testing were not applied since back-translating the 
quest ionnaire f rom German to English'® showed a sufficiently good result. 
To ensure a max imum response rate, a covering letter was produced. It was 
personal ly addressed to the respondent and signed by hand. Pre-paid, self-addressed 
enve lopes were at tached to the questionnaires and the respondents were promised an 
execut ive summary of the survey f indings. 
Eventual ly, nine UK and 12 German SMEs returned the quest ionnaires. This suggests 
a c leared response rate of 60 per cent in the case of the UK (9/15) and 39 per cent in 
the case of the German companies (12/31). The profiles of the participating firms are 
presented in table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Profile of the samples of UK and German SMEs. 
Characteristics UK SMEs German SMEs 
Ownership; limited liability company 8 9 
Ownership: other (eg limited partnership) 1 3 
Firm size: 1-200 employees 4 6 
Firm size: 201-500 employees 4 5 
Firm size: 500 plus employees 1 1 
Industry: mechanical engineering 7 6 
Industry: construction 1 0 
Industry: electronics 1 3 
Industry: services 0 2 
Industry: textiles 0 1 
JV establishment 1987-1996 1990-1996 
4.5.2 In-depth interviews 
In addi t ion to the questionnaire survey, telephone interviews were conducted with a 
selected number of UK SMEs to confirm responses and to explore information in 
greater detai l . Interviews with the respondents of the SMEs that agreed to participate 
in the case study research are discussed under the heading 'case studies'. The 
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appropr iateness of interviews was previously suggested by Daniels et al. (1985), 
Gummesson (1991), Dong et al. (1993), and Leung and Yeung (1995). Tang et al. 
(1992) even suggest that, in China, questionnaires should be replaced with interviews 
since most people in China are still unfamiliar with surveys. In-depth interviews were 
not carried out with German SMEs as the cost of telephoning the respondents (from 
the UK) or meeting them in Germany would have been too expensive. 
Authors, including McGrath (1964), Bennett (1983) and Healey and Rawlinson (1994) 
consider interviewing as one of the main tools of the social science field investigator, 
gathering data through discussions with informants rather than at first hand. 
Interviewing involves asking questions of those who have information about a 
phenomenon that the researcher has not been able to observe directly. Interviews may 
require respondents to speak about themselves, to inform on the attitudes and actions 
of others, to recall events that have occurred in the past and to speculate about future 
situations (Cannell and Kahn, 1968). Responses are most commonly elicited from 
single respondents through open-ended or structured interviews (Krcmar, 1987; Snow 
and Thomas, 1994). Snow and Thomas note that interviewing typically involves less 
interaction with the situation than direct or participant observat ion. 
Interviews, over the te lephone or face-to-face, are expensive methods of collecting 
data compared with questionnaire surveys. In addit ion, interviewing a respondent 
a lways gives the opportunity to influence the respondent and so manipulate the 
respondent 's answers. As Eisenhardt (1989) suggests, in many field studies, interview 
data needs to be combined with observational (and other) data to arrive at a valid 
characterisat ion of the research problem. 
The interviews for this study were carried out over the telephone with those 
respondents who agreed to be interviewed by filling in their names on the 
quest ionnaire that was returned to the candidate. The researcher contacted the 
respondents to agree a date and time for the interview. The interviews lasted between 
40 and 70 minutes. Three interviews were carried out in the UK. These do not include 
the face-to-face interviews completed for the preparation of the case studies. 
4.5.3 C a s e studies 
The purpose, strengths and weaknesses of case study research have been highlighted 
in the introduction to section 4.5.^° Case study research deals with operational links 
needing to be traced over t ime, rather than mere frequencies or incidence (Yin, 1994). 
Case study research allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characterist ics of real life events. The study of cases allows coverage of contextual 
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condit ions that are bel ieved to be highly pertinent to the phenomenon under study 
(ibid). If a number of variables have been identified, the importance of which to the 
organisat ions under study may be explored, it is possible to carry out a comparat ive 
case study in which the same questions are asked in several organisations 
(Jankowicz, 1994). According to the findings by Gummesson (1991), case study 
research is increasingly accepted as a scientific tool in business administrat ion. 
Case study research obtains its data largely through a review of written records and by 
means of interview technique (Jankowicz, 1994). Bennett (1983) suggests the 
fol lowing stages that need to be gone through in the process of case study research. 
These include the determinat ion of the present situation, the gathering of information 
about background to the present situation, the gathering of more specific data to test 
alternative hypotheses about the important factors in the present situation, and the 
presentat ion of recommendat ions for action. 
A wide range of information gathering can be used in case study research. 
(Gummesson , 1991) and explicitly Jankowicz (1994) suggest that evidence for case 
study research may come from six sources, including documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observat ion, participant-observation and physical artefacts. A 
knowledge of the company history is also deemed to be essential since a study of 
signif icant events in company history is expected to provide insights that might act as a 
basis for decisions about the future (Gummesson, 1991). 
From the pre-export l iterature (eg Caughey and Chetty, 1994) it is known that, for the 
aim of studying causality, the multiple case study method is the preferred approach. As 
the most appropriate number of cases studied, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests between 
four and ten. Eariier, Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggested that the actual number of 
cases needed in a specific study will be determined by saturat ion, that is, the 
diminishing marginal contribution of each individual case. 
Case study research has been confronted with a variety of crit icisms, including its lack 
of statistical validity, an inability to test hypotheses and of the fact that it is difficult to 
form general conclusions (Gummesson, 1991). Yin (1994) concedes that case studies 
wou ld take too long and result in massive, unreadable documents. Furthermore - and 
this naturally applies more to techniques that are applied within case study research -
the researcher cannot determine how much his presence is affecting the situation 
under study. Thus, according to Gummesson (1991), researchers in business-related 
subjects limit case studies to pilot studies as a basis for formulat ing more precise 
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quest ions or testable hypotheses. 
In this thesis - to complement the f indings from the questionnaire survey and the series 
of in-depth interviews - the cases of three Sino-UK and one Sino-German JVs in China 
were studied. The UK cases were selected by asking the senior management 
personnel at the UK SMEs for permission to investigate the JVs. Three agreed. The 
select ion of the German SME for case study research is outl ined in section 4.3 of this 
chapter (pilot case). 
In this thesis, studying the cases of selected SMEs involved the application of a range 
of data collection methods, including questionnaire surveying, observat ion, personal 
interviewing, the study of company literature, organisation charts, business plans etc. 
For the study of the four cases of UK and German SME JVs in China, a case study 
pattern was designed and refined during the first interview with Case Company One. 
Firms were studied between three and five days. All JVs were visited in China where 
key informant interviews were carried out. In addit ion, personal interviews with the 
owner -managers or senior managers were conducted at the SMEs ' headquarters in 
the UK and Germany. The individual interview sessions lasted approximately two 
hours each and were not taped. They were complemented by a tour through the 
company, off ice and production facilities. 
The language of interviewing in China was predominantly English. Where the Chinese 
interviewees did not speak English sufficiently well, the interview was translated by an 
Engl ish-speaking employee of the company. This was the case in two companies. 
Using an employee had the advantage that this employee knew the company and the 
subject the interview partners were talking about. In one case, the Chinese general 
manager of the JV tried to use the services of an employee who worked for the hotel 
where the company had rented its office space. Al though the interpreter's English was 
good, he did not understand what the researcher and the general manager tried to 
d iscuss. The conversat ion had to be postponed to the next day when the English-
speaking assistant of the general manager returned from a business trip. 
Table 4-3 presents the various sources that were consulted for the compilat ion of the 
case studies. 
4.5.4 Difficulties encountered 
Field research 
The fact that there was no readily available database from which to draw a sample, 
appl ies both to the investigation of UK and German SMEs with an FDI project in China. 
The sample f ramework had to be created first (section 4.4). Furthermore, since the 
objects of the research were SMEs and, within them, the respondents were the owner-
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managers or senior management personnel who were busy with day-to-day duties, 
contact ing and talking to respondents proved difficult. 
Another obstacle was the fact that SMEs are usually very cautious in terms of 
comment ing on their exper iences and strategies. According to Simon (1992, 1996), 
this appl ies to SMEs in Germany where it is not the style to parade success. Simon 
(1992, p.116) puts forward a statement of a German 'hidden champion ' that says "we 
are not interested in revealing our success strategies and helping those who have 
been inert during recent years." This totally contradicts the experiences of Killing 
(1983, preface) with US MNEs suggesting that "I was continually del ighted and 
amazed at the wi l l ingness with which executives discussed both their success and 
their fai lures." However, S imon (1992, 1996) eventually convinced 39 of Germany's 
'hidden champions ' to participate in a study looking at their strategies and tactics. 
Table 4-3: Data sources used for case study research. 
Case Questionnaire Interviews Printed material 
GER-O-JV • Production & quality assurance 
manager 
• Assistant production & quality 
assurance manager 
• Assistant sales manager 
• Director for overseas affairs of 
GER-0 
• Annual report 
• Product catalogue 
• Newsletter 
UK-3-JV Participation in survey • General manager of JV in PRC 
• Managing director of UK-3 
• Product catalogue 
• Business plan 
• Organisational 
structure 
UK-4-JV Participation in survey • General manager of JV in PRC 
• Manager of Chinese partner 
• Managing director of UK-4 
• Product leaflets of 
SME 
• Product leaflets of 
Chinese partner 
UK-8-JV Participation in survey • General manager of JV In PRC 
• Sales manager of JV In PRC 
• Managing director of UK-8 
• Technical director of UK-8 
• Product catalogue 
It was anticipated that carrying out field research in China would be difficult, since Fan 
(1996) suggests difficulties with finding 'hard' data and conduct ing field studies. The 
research sessions in China brought also a variety of difficulties and problems the 
candidate had to cope with. First, the organisations to be investigated had to be 
prepared to grant the researcher access. Gummesson (1991) considers access, the 
ability to get close to the object of study to find out what is happening, as the 
researcher 's number one problem. Thereby, access manifests itself as physical, initial 
and cont inued access, and mental access, which is the understanding what is actually 
happening in the sett ing. Surprisingly, however, Gummesson (1991) suggests that 
physical access would not pose any problem at all. 
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Here, physical access was facilitated by letters of recommendat ion f rom the UK SME 
headquarters and parallel correspondence from the headquarters to the subsidiary in 
China. Mental access had to be developed throughout the interviews. Access to the 
German S M E JV was relatively easily granted since both the production and quality 
assurance manager of the JV and the director for overseas affairs of the German 
parent company were open to the proposed undertaking. Furthermore, the researcher 
had a letter of recommendat ion from a German manager (of one of the German SME's 
major customers in China) to show to the aforement ioned production and quality 
assurance manager. 
Further, the prospect ive respondents had to have t ime for the interview. Usually, the 
general managers of the JVs were extremely busy with their day-to-day tasks. 
Meet ings were arranged weeks in advance in order to give the respondents adequate 
notice. Executing a research tour that would have started in North China and continued 
in East and South China was not possible. Flexibility was necessary as the researcher 
had to visit a f irm in Jiangsu Province (East China), first, then one in South China, 
fo l lowed by a venture in East China. 
Another problem was access to, and the release of, information. Where the interview 
partner was a Chinese manager, the release of relevant information was not as 
satisfactory as had been hoped for. Duscha (1987), in his research of 22 Sino-foreign 
JVs, concentrated on foreign managers as interviewees since Chinese managers were 
regarded as being highly cautious with regard to releasing information. One reason for 
this is that these managers have a vested interest in creating an optimistic attitude 
toward economic co-operat ion. On the other hand, foreign managers were more open. 
Shenkar (1994) f rom his study of Chinese managers, found that the Chinese have a 
tendency to answer a desired rather than an actual state. This had to be taken into 
considerat ion and the answers given had to be cross-checked with the UK and 
German managers. Furthermore, the interviewees were somet imes very cautious in 
what they told the candidate. Not surprisingly, many of the quest ions were answered 
vaguely or avoided on the basis that the facts were secret. Further, although the 
Chinese interviewees were willing to talk to the candidate, they would not have liked 
the idea of the candidate 'searching' around in their company. For instance, the 
candidate was not granted access to the workshop of one JV in East China. One of the 
Chinese directors had refused that as there had been an agreement between the 
Chinese company and the UK SME that "nobody was allowed to enter the workshop". 
Also, the answers to some questions had to be treated very cautiously and discussed 
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later wi th the UK and German managers. For instance, at the beginning of the study of 
one case, it was intended to tape the whole session since Jankowicz (1994) 
recommended the use of a tape recorder if interviews are longer than half an hour. 
However, this was not permit ted. Krcmar's (1987) observations were similar, which 
might suggest that Asian interviewees are not very happy about being taped. Thus, 
notes were taken during all interviews in an attempt to minimise the anxiety 
exper ienced by the managers. The problem of Chinese managers ' anxiety when asked 
about their exper iences and opinions has been observed also by Wascher and Schmitt 
(1994). Since the sample in these authors' research was relatively small, and the topic 
(foreign exchange) relatively sensit ive for the Chinese authorit ies, the authors detected 
"some fear that the respondents could be identified" (p.871). 
Desk research 
W h e n collecting and compar ing data on FDI in China, researchers frequently 
encounter various diff iculties. Figures provided by different sources rarely correspond. 
This can lead to serious difficulties if Chinese data is to be compared either with those 
of other countr ies, or over t ime, in order to avoid misleading conclusions, statistics on 
FDI in China must be treated with care, ie cross-checked with various sources, since: 
• there is no strong tradit ion of reporting economic statistics in China (Klenner, 
1986; Pomfret, 1991). For instance, at the opening of the National People's 
Congress (NPC) in March 1998, positive evidence of China's economic policy 
was presented, including a 1997 inflation rate of only 0.8 per cent. The 
internationally appl ied criterion for inflation is, however, not the retail price index, 
as used by the Chinese, but the consumer price index which was 2.8 per cent in 
China. Further, at the NPC an urban unemployment rate of only 3.1 per cent 
was presented - 12 million people, according to Chinese statistics. According to 
the same statistics, urban employment accounts for 147 mill ion people. This 
would suggest an unemployment rate of 8.2 per cent, and not 3.1 per cent. 
However, Chinese complaints about western reporting on China have also been 
heard (Zhu, 1996), including W u Yi questioning US trade f igures which show a 
yawning gap in Beijing's favour (FT, 11.4.95, p.6); 
• the data describing the pattern of FDI in China is f ragmented, with the resultant 
data not always being consistent (Shenkar, 1990). Another barrier to providing a 
comprehensive list of FDI f igures in China becomes manifest in the fact that 
even recent contributions in business journals are not providing updated figures. 
Woodward and Liu (1993), for instance, refer to f igures as current as 1988 
which lead them to the erroneous conclusion that W F O E s were "to date" (= 
1993) not significantly preferred. In contrast, different studies have shown that, 
after the law governing WFOEs was effected in 1986, the number of WFOEs 
increased, f rom 18 in 1986 to 2,795 in 1991 (Tsang, 1994); 
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• it has not yet been clarified how much of the invested money is 'round-trip' 
investment (Pomfret, 1991; Kelly, 1994). This is money which has been invested 
in foreign enterpr ises by Chinese companies and is being re-imported to China 
by the foreign company (ie an Overseas Chinese investor f rom Hong Kong or 
Taiwan) in order to make use of the preferential t reatment of FDI. De Bruijn and 
Jia (1997) suggest that in 1992 and 1993, one third of all JVs could be counted 
as fake, whi le in 1994 and 1995 less than 10 per cent had to be considered a 
fake construct ion. This is because many of the formerly granted preferences are 
no longer granted (partly in response to complaints from Chinese companies); 
• a natural t ime lag exists between the signing of a contract and the actual 
operat ion of the business, resulting in a more or less large gap between the 
vo lume of p ledged and utilised investment. A possible reason for this delay as 
suggested by Beamish and Wang (1989) and Woodward and Liu (1993) might 
be the complex bureaucratic procedures which have to be fol lowed when 
investments are set in motion. Other factors have a bearing too, including 
inflexibility, short- term orientation, management and foreign exchange problems. 
In a considerable number of cases, foreign-funded enterprises received the 
contracted investment after being in operation for two years or more; 
• also, western sources do not always report data on FDI in China consistently. 
For instance, the Financial Times of 3 1 . August 1994 (p.4) discussed the 
sources of FDI into China. It ranked the US (with pledged investment worth 
some US$78.5bn (£50.3bn) number two among the ten largest investor 
countr ies by the end of 1993, after Hong Kong (US$150.9bn; £96.7bn), but 
ahead of Taiwan (US$18.4bn; £11.8bn) and Japan (US$8.9bn; 5.7bn). France 
was considered the fifth largest investor (US$6.8bn; £4.4bn)! In its issue of 7. 
November 1994, the same source considered the US (now with investments of 
US$14.6bn; £9.4bn) as having been overtaken by Taiwan (by this t ime having 
invested some US$18.5bn; £11.8bn). France was not even on the top ten 
investors list. Further, as opposed to the figure of US$5.8bn (£3.7bn) of 
contractual UK investment by the end of 1994, a British Embassy paper^^ 
suggested some US$8.1bn (£5.2bn) of contracted investment. Compared with 
1993 f igures of US$3bn (£1.9bn) of cumulative contractual investment, as 
provided by MOFTEC, these figures do not add up. Has MOFTEC changed its 
methods of accounting investment by country and now, for the first t ime, 
ascribed to Britain money invested by overseas subsidiaries of British 
companies? This question remains open. 
4.6 Analysis 
Analys is is an activity to familiarise oneself with the recorded data until emerging 
patterns are revealed - either those that were in mind, or fresh patterns - and to 
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tabulate the data in such a way that these insights or perceptions are informative, 
obvious rather than hidden (Jankowicz, 1994). The statistical analyses that were 
appl ied to the quanti tat ive research data in this thesis were f requency analysis of the 
quest ionnaires ' content and content analysis of the interviews to review the rich, but 
d isorganised data/mater ial . Since cont ingency analysis and rank correlation analysis 
(Spearman) was also to be appl ied, the quantitative survey material was processed 
with the social sc iences analysis package SPSS. 
This contradicts the recommendat ions of, for instance, Jankowicz (1994) who suggests 
that wi th a sample of less than 100 people and a questionnaire of 15 items or so, the 
job can be f inished faster by hand than by using a computer. However, Jankowicz 
(1994) when making this statement, was referring to the application of f requency 
analysis solely, not to more complex forms of analysis as applied in this study. 
These types of analysis enabled the candidate not only to show how important 
individual factors were for the two groups of SMEs, but also whether significant 
di f ferences were apparent between each of the two groups of SMEs when the 
discr iminat ing criteria of nationality and firm size were applied. It was necessary to 
detect di f ferences between UK and German SMEs and also between small SMEs ( 1 -
200 employees) and larger SMEs (201-500 employees). The Spearman rank 
correlat ion coeff icient helped to highlight dif ferences of the perceived importance of 
factors between the two groups. 
Content analysis of the case studies was applied according to the research f ramework 
that was introduced in chapter three and subsequently fol lowed throughout this 
research. Information on each JV case was gathered with regard to the individual 
sect ion of the f ramework and subsequent ly cross-analysed. This enabled the 
researcher to identify similarities or dif ferences in the approaches towards joint 
ventur ing of the four SMEs investigated. Occasionally, the informants did not provide 
equal amounts of information on the individual sections. Thus, the depth of insight into 
the cases with regard to the individual sections of the f ramework varies. 
Ser ious problems with the analysis of the data - quantitative and qualitative - did not 
appear, the reason being that the tools of analysis were rather straightforward and the 
f indings easy to interpret. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the objectives of the study and the methodological 
approach developed to achieve them. It has been suggested that the sampling 
procedure was a comprehensive task, but had to be carried out since no readily 
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avai lable data on UK and German SME investment in China existed. This relates to the 
shor tcoming of this methodological approach. There is no known figure to define the 
actual size of the populat ion of UK and German SME JVs in China. A n estimation of 
the number of German SMEs in China exists. However, this estimation has been 
cri t ic ised. It gives no indication whatsoever of its reliability. The UK and German SME 
JVs in this study are spread over China: no pattern could be determined, nor 
establ ished. Nor does there exist an industry pattern. Earlier, Dong et al. (1993) 
sugges ted that, due to the geographical dispersion of JVs in China, it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to select a sample that covers all major sectors and locations. In other 
words , the sample in this study is a convenience sample. Consequent ly, there is no 
way to est imate how big it is relative to the entire population of UK and German SME 
JVs in China. S imon (1996, p.5) had a similar problem. He noted that "since there are 
no stat ist ics for a 'hidden champion ' category, my collection is not comprehensive". 
S o m e of the lessons learned f rom this study for conducting research in China include: 
• be patient, 
• do not al low your t ime and financial budgets to be too tight, 
• do not place yourself under pressure, 
• do not forget that the Chinese want to get to know you before they tell you 
about their business. 
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Notes 
^ Beamish and Wang's (1989) nine dimensions were: region of investment, source of 
investment, industry division, total investment, foreign partner equity contribution, foreign 
equity percentage, most frequently observed foreign equity percentage, foreign equity 
percentage by country, pre-determined duration of JVs. 
^ Working and research placement with the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Shanghai (a representative office of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce - DIHT) from May to August. 
^ For details see Kaiser (1997). 
" During a visit on 17. August 1995 to the Consulate General in Shanghai, the British Consul 
Commercial, Steve Smith, told the researcher that, at a recent diplomatic event in Shanghai, 
the Japanese Consul had revealed to him how many British companies were present in 
China. The Japanese Consul received this information from a Chinese official. 
^ This was discovered during a personal visit to the company in the summer of 1995. 
^ Internal report by one of the candidate's former colleagues. 
'' The managing director of this company phoned the candidate in order to talk about his JV in 
China. On 15. July 1996 this managing director was visited for an initial interview. 
® December 1993 and January 1994 are covered in one issue. 
® FAME is a financial database of major public and private UK companies. The database 
provides detailed data on 100,000 and outline data on another 60,000 UK companies. Since 
160,000 companies covered by the CD-ROM, is small, relative to the total number of 
companies in the UK of more than 2m, it is unlikely that the database contains data on the 
smallest of the companies in the UK. However, 160,000 is big enough to contain medium-
sized UK companies with up to 500 employees. 
°^ The on-line database DATASTREAM provides share price and accounts information for 
major British and international companies. 
The Hoppenstedt SME directory lists more than 50,000 enterprises of the German 
'Mittelstand' and provides details on address, telephone data, legal status, names of the 
management, industry, subsidiaries, import and export data, etc. 
The subsequent contacting of the addressees was rather difficult and time-consuming. 
Some companies had to be telephoned up to ten times since the potential addressee of the 
questionnaire was "just talking on the phone with somebody else", was "in a meeting", or "on 
a business trip abroad", "in the workshop", or "had just left the company five minutes ago." In 
another case, the managing director had left the company and his successor was not aware 
of the researcher's enquiry. 
" Or empiricist. 
Or naturalistic, ethnographic, interpretivist, constructivist. 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory/ies of knowledge. It is 
the study of nature and grounds of knowledge about phenomena (how a person comes to 
know what he or she knows). 
Harpaz (1996), for instance, uses the term methods, instead of techniques. This is 
considered inaccurate. Equally, Harpaz's distinction between structured interview and 
telephone interview is unsound: also a telephone interview can be structured. 
^' Expressed as degrees of importance, satisfaction, etc. 
An English version questionnaire was distributed in November 1996. 
®^ This was accomplished by a German friend of the candidate. 
2° For a review of case study research see Yin (1993, 1994). 
2^ Fax of 6.6.95 from the Bntish Embassy to the British Consulate General in Shanghai. 
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FDI Environment in China 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four has discussed the objectives of this thesis and the methodological 
approach taken. This chapter introduces the Chinese environment of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) projects. It is divided into two main themes. The first introduces the 
investment envi ronment foreign firms encounter when establishing a production facility 
in China. China's opening up to the outside world and, in particular, the economic 
reforms are d iscussed, as are the country's impressive growth record and the need for 
joint ventures (JVs). The contents of the first theme are the legislative f ramework that 
has been evolving over the past years to enable and attract FDI to the country, as well 
as cultural aspects and the country's infrastructure. Chinese national and international 
politics are not d iscussed separately but are addressed in cases where they affect 
foreign investors.^ The political future of FDI in China is contemplated in chapter ten. 
The second theme of chapter five reviews the characteristics of foreign and, in 
particular, UK and German direct investment in the country. For this task, a f ramework 
is appl ied that was proposed earlier by Kaiser, Kirby and Fan (1996) for an 
examinat ion of FDI in China. This f ramework investigated FDI dimensions, including 
the deve lopment of FDI in China, its importance to the Chinese economy, sources, 
regional distr ibution, and its distribution by industry. 
5.2 An economy opens up^ 
"Let China sleep, for when it awal<es, it will shake the world" 
(Napoleon Bonaparte, 1816) 
Since 1974, the Chinese Communist Party leaders have been directing the country 
towards its long-term national goal, the modernisation - to world class standards - of 
agriculture, industry, science and national defence by the year 2000. In 1975, and later 
under premier Zhou Enlai's leadership, the ambition of the 'Four Modernisat ions' first 
emerged.^ During the Fourth National Party Congress in 1975, Zhou initiated reforms 
"so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world" (Chen, 
1978, p. 176). At the 'Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Commit tee of the 
Communis t Party' in December 1978, the new leadership, headed by Deng Xiaoping, 
restated that China's primary objective was to achieve the 'Four Modernisat ions'. 
This was the starting signal for reforming the Chinese economy and re-opening its 
doors to the outside wor ld." After a period of political and economic isolation under 
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Mao Zedong,^ the country 's industrial structure was to be shaken up, its participation in 
international t rade to be increased and FDI into the country permitted. In fact, trade 
was the first area of economic activity exhibit ing an 'open door' (Brown, 1985).® China's 
economic development may be attr ibuted partly to the reforms that unleashed a 
repressed rural economy.^ In 1992, Deng, the most outspoken advocate of the new 
trade l iberalisation policy, announced the 'socialist market economy'.^ Though some of 
China's biggest remaining chal lenges are the modernisat ion of its state-owned 
enterpr ises (SOEs)^ and an end to growing disparities, particularly between urban and 
rural areas, where average incomes in the former exceed those in the latter by four to 
one. In fact, at the 15th Communis t Party Congress in 1997 Zhu Rongji^" identified the 
reforming of the state-owned sector as a priority and set a target of three years to 
revive most loss-making SOEs (FT, 23.9.97, p.1). However, the government 's fear of 
rising unemployment^^ has discouraged it f rom pursuing these much needed reforms. 
in 1975, the Chinese authorit ies recognised that the only way to pursue the ambit ious 
goal of the 'Four Modernisat ions' was to attract FDI which would provide the capital, 
the technology and the management skills that were lacking (Tai, 1988; Grub and Lin, 
1991). Authors, including Duscha (1987) and Woodward and Liu (1993), estimated the 
technological gap between China and the developed countr ies at between ten and 40 
years. To access western technologies, the Chinese government, in 1978, accepted 
compensat ion trade a r rangemen ts " and, in 1979, the establ ishment of JVs. In the 
1980s China was one of the largest importers of technology in the world (Tsang, 
1994), though its ability to assimilate and make effective use of technological 
knowledge has been poor, even amongst less developed countries (LDCs) (Roessner 
et al. , 1992; de Bruijn and Jia, 1993b). 
Chinese officials bel ieved that partnerships with foreign companies could facilitate 
access to international markets which would absorb the country's exports and 
generate the foreign exchange needed to f inance its imports (Child, 1994). China has 
v iewed foreign investment as a means of conserving funds for building and 
accelerat ing the pace of construct ion, learning about management and using foreign 
capital markets (Grub and Lin, 1991). Child (1994) points out that the new policy was 
both an immediate reaction to the shortcomings of the cultural revolution and a desire 
to exceed the l imitations of the Soviet-style, centralised system developed in the first 
half of the 1950s.^' 
Indeed, China's awakening has been shaking the world. The country's impressive 
economic growth, potential capital gains and vast opportunit ies are universally 
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recognised (Fortune, 1994; Owen, 1995). According to an IMF report (New York 
T imes, 20.5.93, p.1), China, with a per capita income of US$1,600 and a total 
economy of US$1,700bn, was, in 1993, the third biggest economy in the world. Only 
the USA and Japan, says Spar (1996), loomed larger in the international economic 
a r e n a . C h i n a is set to overtake these economies - Japan by 2000 and the USA by 
2030 - provided the economy continues to grow at an average of 6 per cent per annum 
(Kelly, 1994). Accord ing to Thiess (1994) this may happen earlier, in about 2015, if the 
growth exper ienced between 1989 and 1995 continues and Gledhill (1994) suggests 
the year 2005 as the date when China might be the world's largest economy. 
However, apart f rom these optimistic projections, the speed at which China has been 
catching up with other economies, such as the US and Japan, has been quest ioned. 
The Wor ld Bank (1997) recently argued that "continued success is possible, but 
uncertain," though China has been doubling its Income per head every ten years. 
A l though the Wor ld Bank (1997) believes that China's economy can grow at an 
average rate of 7.6 per cent until the year 2000, it questions whether China can 
cont inue its rapid growth until 2020. Also Lardy (1994) argues that China's output 
would not exceed that of the US'^ until the year 2040 (Economist, 30.4.94, p.97). In 
just i fy ing this est imate, he assumes a per capita income in 1990 of only US$1,000 and 
a rate of growth of about 5 per cent after the year 2000. 
Even Lardy's modif ied f igures represent China's per capita GDP at purchasing power 
parity (PPP), whereas the equivalent f igures at market prices are still very modest 
since GDP at market prices does not consider the consequent revaluation of China's 
low-quality, non-tradable services. For instance, the World Bank estimated China's per 
capita income at US$370 in 1990 and at US$470 in 1992 (ibid). It is kept to this low 
level to ensure China's eligibility for concessional lending. This conforms to Chinese 
interests that repeatedly demonstrated the country's LDC status which would entitle 
China to enter W T O on special terms . These include a five year extension - as 
opposed to one year for most countries - after W T O entry to bring patent and copyright 
laws into line with rules agreed in the Uruguay round. China would also have five 
years, instead of two, to remove some controls on FDI (Economist, 6.8.94, p .65 ) . " 
The fact is, however, that, for the past 18 years, the economy of the world's most 
populous'® and third largest country has maintained a high rate of growth. Apart from 
smal l , d iamond-r ich Botswana (FT, 28.6.96, p.4), China has been the fastest-growing 
economy in the wor ld since 1978. The World Bank (1997) in its recent study entitled 
'China 2020' praises China's GDP growth, both compared with other economies and 
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over t ime. Between 1978 and 1997, China's GDP averaged 9 per cent a year.'® This 
was the longest period of high and relatively stable expansion since 1949. The original 
target, to double the 1980 GDP by the year 2000, was reached five years early (Liu, 
1997).^° The peak of China's economic growth was reached in 1992, with a rate of 14.2 
per cent. Since then, there has been a steady decline^' to 8.8 per cent in 1997 (FAZ, 
6.3.98, p.8).^^ Later In 1997, Zhu forecast growth of 8 per cent per year until 2000 and 
7 per cent for the fol lowing decade (FT, 23.9.97, p.1). This corresponds with 
project ions by the Economist Intell igence Unit, proposing 7 to 8 per cent until the year 
2000 (Wilde, 1996 ) . ' ' 
China's decl ine in GDP growth has not been unintentional. The Chinese government 
recognised that the only way of reducing the high inflation which plagued the country in 
1988 (18.5%), 1989 (17.8%) and again in 1993 (13.2%) - and then peaked at 21.7 per 
cent in 1994, ' " - was to cool down the overheated economy. The strategy has worked: 
the rate of price increases has been controlled with the introduction of macro-economic 
policies (Liu, 1997). By 1995, inflation was reduced to 14.8 per cent and in 1996, the 
consumer price index showed an increase of 6.1 per cent. In 1997, inflation was only 
0.8 per cent, according to Chinese statistics (FAZ, 5.3.98, p. 18). 
5.3 Investment environments 
This sect ion discusses the legislative and cultural environments which foreign 
companies face when establishing FDI projects in China. Also, the different forms of 
FDI open to foreign companies are reviewed. 
5.3.1 Legislative framework 
With the establ ishment of an institutional and legislative f ramework, investment 
condit ions were improved and became more attractive for FDI . According to Yamada 
(1979), China was only the second Asian socialist country to introduce a foreign capital 
investment law, fol lowing the Vietnamese law announced in Apri l 1977. Fan (1996, 
p.78) notes that the "legal and policy environment for international JVs has been much 
improved throughout the past 15 years with the continuing addition of new regulations, 
the cutt ing off of red tape and easing of infrastructure problems." According to Brown 
(1993), since 1979 more than 300 laws dealing with economic matters, have been 
promulgated. In addit ion, the State Council has issued in excess of 400 regulations. 
Table 5-1 documents the development of the Chinese legislation structure for FDI. '^ 
In October 1986, the State Council issued, for the first t ime, 22 'Regulations 
Concern ing Encouragement of Foreign Investment'. '^ The regulations were designed 
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in order to provide addit ional investment incentives to foreign investors, including 
further reduct ions in the income tax rate, easier access to f inancial resources, better 
access to the domest ic labour market, more autonomy in hiring and firing, as well as 
other related decisions. Further, management was granted more autonomy in seeking 
raw materials f rom the domest ic market and in making product ion, f inancing, and 
market ing decisions. Also, controls over the remittance of profits in foreign currencies 
abroad were reduced (Grub and Lin, 1991). 
Tab le 5 - 1 : Development of the Chinese legislation structure for FDI. 
Date Law or regulation 
1. July 1979 Law of the People's Republic of China on JVs Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment (Equity JV Law)^'' 
20. September 1983 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic 
of China on JV Using Chinese and Foreign Investment 
(Implementation Regulations) 
15. January 1986 Amendment of the Implementation Regulations 
12. April 1986 Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprises Operated 
Exclusively with Foreign Capital 
13. April 1988 Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Contractual 
Cooperative Enterprises 
4. April 1990 Revision of the Equity JV Law 
12. December 1990 Detailed Rules for Implementing Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital 
29. December 1993 First general company law of the People's Republic of China^® 
Projects include those earning foreign exchange through exports and projects 
producing import substitutes. Priority would also be given to energy resources, 
t ransportat ion, the raw materials industry, the renovation of out-of-date enterprises and 
educat ion (Tai, 1988). Preferential t reatment to these industries was promised by the 
then premier Zhao (ibid) and restated by W u Yi, the then Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperat ion, during her visit to Germany in 1993 (OAV, 1994). 
Dur ing her more recent visit to the UK in February 1996, Ms. W u encouraged 
investments in the fol lowing priority sectors: power generat ion, telecommunicat ions, 
t ransport , envi ronmental protection, agriculture and electronics (CBTR, March 1996, 
p.3). It was reported that the Chinese government wished to divert FDI away from the 
labour- intensive and small-scale projects that dominated the early years of the 
country 's economic reforms to bott lenecks and high-tech areas (FT, 27.6.96, p.4). In 
1996 the then pr ime minister, Li Peng, conf irmed: "We want more investment in 
infrastructure ]...[ and welcome co-operation in the technical t ransformation of SMEs in 
light industr ies ]...[ and are ready to co-operate in services" (FT, 27.9.96, p.3). 
Ch inese laws and regulations make clear the industnes in which foreign companies 
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can establ ish JVs and wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) (and those where 
they cannot) . For instance, the establ ishment of W F O E s is not possible in industries, 
such as the press, publ ishing, broadcasting, TV, f i lm, wholesale and retail, foreign 
trade, insurance, tour ism, post and telecommunicat ions, as well as industries which 
are embargoed by the Chinese government. They include, in the manufacturing sector, 
for instance, the automobi le and engine building industries, selected petrochemical 
industries as wel l as important raw material extraction and production industries. 
Included also are public utilities, traffic and transportat ion; there, the respective 
ministries give approval on an individual basis (Kaiser and Gr imm et al., 1997). In 
some industries, the establ ishment of a JV is still required, with the local partner 
holding a majority stake. In other industries, such as defence and telecommunicat ions, 
FDI is prohibited. 
This contradicts earlier f indings by Grub and Lin (1991, p.38) who insist that "in 
contrast to FDI in some LDCs, the claim that unilateral FDI is discouraged and that 
some sort of local participation in investments is mandated does not hold true for 
China." However, China watchers suggest that the government in Beijing - provided 
neither the national security nor the political and social stability of the country are 
endangered - will gradually permit projects in industries that are yet not open to FDI. 
This would be down to a lack of know-how and financial resources for a successful 
development in those sectors (Kaiser and Gr imm et al., 1997). 
The Chinese central government has been aware that the provision of an adequate 
infrastructure would be essential for attracting foreign businesses. Thus, Beijing 
created various administrat ive entities able to provide advanced infrastructures and a 
more liberal set of investment incentives. The first that were establ ished, and probably 
the most publicised of all, were the special economic zones (SEZs). Apart from the 
short- term objective of establishing the SEZs to promote inflows of FDI, technology 
and management know-how, the long-term goal was more ambit ious, namely to act as 
laboratories for China's economic reforms. It was hoped that the more market-oriented 
approach to business operat ions would be tried in these zones first, with successful 
exper iences later being passed on to the rest of the country (Grub and Lin, 1991). The 
first four of the five SEZs, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and 
Xiamen in Fujian Province, were established along China's Southeast coast by the 
central government in early 1979. Encouraged by the rapid development in these 
SEZs, Beijing declared, in 1983, the entire island of Hainan as a 'special area open to 
foreign investment ' . In 1988, Hainan was declared a 'Super SEZ' and was given 
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provincial status with greater authority to attract FDI (Glaister and Wang , 1993). 
In the SEZs, foreign investors could expect: preferential treatment in respect of tax 
incentives, f lexible arrangements for land use (with reductions in charges), reduced 
wel fare contr ibut ions, flexible employment arrangements, preferential prices for raw 
mater ials and equipment (Child, 1994), foreign exchange provisions, much reduced 
regulat ion (Spar, 1996), a faster progression through set-up formalit ies and 
exempt ions f rom a range of duties. The SEZs are further characterised by an above-
average infrastructure (Ruggles, 1983) (eg container terminals, road networks, national 
and international airports, supply of energy, water, telecommunicat ions and services) 
and above-average skil led labour.^^ However, the SEZs' unique role of attracting FDI 
has decl ined over the years (Glaister and Wang , 1993) with the establ ishment of other 
special investment zones.^° 
China's 14 bonded zones^^ were introduced with the aim of promoting foreign trade, 
the f inishing and storing of goods and the establishment of financial services. Since 1. 
Apri l 1996, new regulat ions which set out the administrative procedures for importing, 
export ing and tax policy, offer ventures in the bonded zones further opportunit ies to 
extend their scope of activities. The distinctive advantage of bonded zo'nes is that 
ventures can import duty-free construction material, production plants, fuels and office 
f i t t ings. Also, export l icenses are not necessary for manufactured goods and they are 
exempt f rom value added tax. Finally, ventures can enjoy preferential tax treatment 
after moving into profit and are al lowed to cash up in foreign exchange. 
In the spr ing of 1984, the central government selected 14 major cities^^ along China's 
East and Southeast coasts and granted them many of the privileges it had previously 
reserved for SEZs. All of them were former treaty ports. Brown (1985) argues that this 
is a superf icial parallel to the 19th century opening up of the Chinese coast to foreign 
penetrat ion. These cities were given greater autonomy in economic policy making and 
al lowed to offer special incentives (tax and customs when upgrading existing factories: 
Brown, 1985). The open cities were further authorised to set up special districts, so-
called 'economic and technological development zones' (ETDZs), in which they 
created a particularly favourable economic environment for foreign investors (Grub and 
Lin, 1991). These are similar to the SEZs in that they offer sites for Sino-foreign JVs 
and W F O E s and are able to offer their own tax incentive packages. These reportedly 
include a uni form tax rate of 15 per cent for all projects and waiver of the usual 10 per 
cent prof i t -remittance tax. The zones are similar to the bonded zones. Phillips (1985) 
suggests that the 'open cities' offer better opportunit ies than the SEZs since, in most 
cases, the exist ing infrastructure, industrial bases, managerial and technical personnel 
109 
FDI environment in China 
and skil led worker availability are superior. 
Dur ing the second half of the 1980s, Beijing created a range of 'open economic zones' , 
including the Yangtze and Pearl river deltas, Southern Fujian, and the peninsulas of 
Shandong and Liaodong. These were al lowed to offer a variety of privileges and 
special t reatment for foreign investors - similar to those of the 'open cities' (Child, 
1994). In 1990, the Pudong district of Shanghai was granted similar rights as the 
SEZs. The development of Pudong was aimed at establishing foreign trade and high-
tech ventures as wel l as f inancial and insurance institutions. Pudong's administration 
particularly emphasises the development of 'new industries', including electronics, 
information technology, te lecommunicat ions, medicine technology and chemical 
industr ies. To date, Shanghai , with Pudong, is the country's most important and 
modern economic centre and, early in the next century, will be its most important 
f inancial centre. 
The remaining regions of China have long been lacking in the infrastructure necessary 
for economic development. Thus, China experts warn not to be too optimistic about the 
short- term traff ic connect ions of certain locations, for instance. They also recommend 
sett lement in already-developed industrial locations (Schwantes, 1991). 
Infrastructure bott lenecks in the power, te lecommunicat ions, water and transport 
sectors are considered a threat to future growth in China (Economist, 12.11.94, p.3; 
FT, 6.12.94, p.6). For instance, according to a Wor ld Bank report (1994), the lack of an 
adequate transport infrastructure has cost the Chinese economy about 1 per cent of its 
G N P annually in recent years. 
Increasingly thus, the Chinese government directs its efforts to upgrading the 
infrastructure outside the S E Z s . ' ' The Wor ld Bank calculates an infrastructure 
demand , over the next five years, worth approximately US$280bn (£179.5bn). It also 
est imates a further US$400bn (£256.4bn) will be spent to meet the surging demand for 
electrical power, ' " gas, te lecommunicat ions, '^ highways, railroads, harbours and 
airports. The Wor ld Bank forecasts further that infrastructure demand over the coming 
decade will represent 7.4 per cent of China's annual GDP (FT, 23.9.97, p.6).'^ 
Apar t f rom the hard, physical, infrastructure, China has also exper ienced an immense 
improvement in its soft infrastructure: the provision of services and labour force. In 
most of the major cities, legal and corporate consultancies, as well as f inancial service 
providers, have set up in business. Al though, as the Economist (13.9.97, p.23) 
remarks, quality still varies, encouraging foreign investors to continue making use of 
the services of providers with international reputations. 
5.3.2 Cultural environment 
Accord ing to Hofstede (1980, p.43) culture is "the collective programming of the people 
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in an env i ronment which serves to distinguish people in one environment from those in 
another". Each culture provides the grounds for a different socialisation of its members 
via the socio-educat ional process, causing 'value-sets' or 'mental programmes' which 
are culture-specif ic (Hofstede, 1985).^^ 
China is a high context culture within which people may communicate indirectly and 
the expressive manner is important. The context is high because it includes a lot of 
addit ional informat ion, such as the sender's values, posit ion, background and 
associat ions in the society. As such, the message cannot be understood without its 
context (Osland, 1990). Tradit ional Chinese social behaviour is based on Confucian 
phi losophy (Cheng, 1986; Shenkar and Ronen, 1993). According to Child and 
Markoczy (1993) the characterist ics of Confucian philosophy are respect of hierarchy, 
group or ientat ion, preservat ion of face and the importance of relationships. 
A closer look at the implications of Confucian philosophy to Chinese behaviour from 
the Chinese perspect ive is imperative. In fact, the theses of Chinese scholars, such as 
Cheng (1986) and Gao (1995) carry the student of Chinese culture far beyond 
convent ional western w isdom - or simplif ication. For instance, from the Confucian 
phi losophy character ist ics of 'respect of hierarchy' and 'group orientation'. Child and 
Markoczy (1993) derive a Chinese lack of individual responsibility. For the western 
researcher, such thinking is rather typical and logical and only few take the effort to 
look behind the curtain. 
Gao (1995), in his study provides an insight into Chinese ethics of 'the se l f and its 
implication for democracy. The Chinese ethical maxim that "every individual should 
subject the self to servicing the grand purpose of maintaining a harmonious cosmos" 
has penetrated the Chinese culture so deeply that individualism as a neutral term 
cannot even be appropriately translated into the Chinese language. In contemporary 
China this aspect of Chinese ethics is the device most frequently employed by the 
authorit ies to oppress diverse opinions: for the sake of stability and order, individualism 
should be rel inquished (ibid). Gao (1995) refuses to "take it for granted that the hostility 
to individual ism is a mode of consciousness peculiar to the Chinese tradition which is 
able to resist change" (p.302). Instead, the ideology of individualism has to be instilled 
into the Chinese consciousness from the West (ibid). 
Pye's (1982) contr ibut ion on the concept of face limits itself to statements, that include: 
"to a Chinese manager, losing face is more important than to a western manager" and 
"to a foreign bus inessman, much can be gained by helping the Chinese gain face, and 
much can be lost by any affront or slight, even if unintended." Going far beyond that, 
Cheng (1986) d iscusses the inner duality of mien-tzu and lien. A person's mien-tzu is a 
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funct ion of specific relationships between its 'owner' and its recogniser. It is attached to 
a person because of what he or she has achieved, or to the off ice or station that a 
person officially occupies or is in charge of (ibid). Mien-tzu plays a role in preserving, 
promot ing, or degrading social relationship and mutual respectabil ity. 
The posit ive value of gaining mien-tzu is honour, the negative value of breaking it is 
d isgrace due to depreciat ion or withdrawal of one's social status and prestige. 
However, to lose mien-tzu need not be regarded as a personal affront, it is to lose 
someth ing extending f rom one's basic dignity and sense of shame. Therefore, in 
proport ion and in compar ison, it does not need to be taken as seriously as breaking 
one's face in the sense of lien. This is below one's dignity, because one will then be 
unable to face society and other people. Cheng (1986, p.335) argues that "in ordinary 
c i rcumstances a person can afford to lose mien-tzu but cannot lose lien." In other 
words , to lose lien means dishonour and disgrace, whi le to lose mien-tzu means 
merely that one's honour is not honoured or not recognised (Cheng, 1986). While in 
the case of lien the individual "should always blame himself," (p.335) since it implies a 
certain fault on the part of the person who loses lien, in the case of mien-tzu "the 
b lame for losing face may be due to others, but not oneself, because it may be due to 
the insensibil ity of persons other than oneself who loses mien-tzu" (p.335). 
Chinese cultural values are largely formed and created f rom interpersonal relationships 
that take on importance in China in ways that are often not observed in northern 
European cultures. Business is transacted in the context of relationships. Therefore, a 
key to doing business in China is guanxi, the personal connect ion. Brown (1993) 
s t resses the importance of having the support of governmental departments and 
particularly officials in a position to help remove obstacles to a project. Most guanxi ties 
s tem f rom shared relationships. This is because in their high-context culture, the 
Chinese are often more concerned about the trustworthiness of foreign business 
people than about legal contracts. 
5.3.3 Forms of Investment 
Export ing, l icensing and FDI are the three archetypal methods of servicing foreign 
markets (Kaiser et al. , 1996).'® Specifically, Ding (1993) discovered four distinctive 
types of FDI in China: the equity JV, contractual JV, co-operat ive development and the 
W F O E . Authors, including Kueh (1992) and Wei (1993) also regard compensat ion 
trade'® as a form of FDI , although, according to Kueh (1992), the importance of this 
method has waned over t ime. Its share in FDI declined f rom about 20 per cent in the 
early 1980s to less than 5 per cent in 1990. Duscha (1987) considers compensat ion 
t rade agreements as predecessors of equity JVs. 
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The l iterature suggests further disagreement. Under the term FDI, Grub and Lin 
(1991), the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (February 1993) and 
Plasschaert (1993) incorporate also processing and assembly agreements [and 
international leasing: Grub and Lin (1991)], as well as compensat ion trade, JVs, joint 
deve lopment and W F O E s . Nyaw's (1993) four FDI strategies are different again. He 
includes compensat ion trade, equity and contractual JVs, and W F O E . On the other 
hand, Seo (1993) only considers equity JVs, contractual JVs and W F O E s as forms of 
FDI in China. Also of interest is the classif ication by Lee and Lo (1993, p.209). These 
authors consider processing trade, compensat ion trade, contractual JVs, equity JVs, 
and W F O E s as "new forms of trade". 
A lso divergent, when compared to the standard JV classification (as accepted in this 
thesis: equity and contractual JV), are Wascher 's (1992) and Braun's (1996) positions. 
The former regards joint development as a form of JV and the latter incorporates under 
JV, direct investments, co-product ion, counter trade, and various forms of loan and aid 
ar rangements. The existence of different understandings of somet imes one and the 
same concept creates substantial discrepancies when comparing statistics. 
The JV is the most common form of FDI in China (Woodward and Liu, 1993). It has 
been particularly favoured by foreign investors due to its ability to attract assistance 
f rom the Chinese authorit ies. It is also the most preferred form by the Chinese partner 
(Ding, 1993). The Chinese have high expectat ions in the establ ishment of JVs since 
they are regarded as crucial instruments in bringing in the technological, product and 
management know-how that is essential for the country's economic and technical 
deve lopment (Dutta and Merva, 1990; Wascher, 1992; Brown, 1993). Loong (1982) 
points out that the closeness of the JV relationship makes it preferable to direct 
borrowing for the raising of capital because of the indirect injection of foreign expertise 
in areas such as quality, control, and management . JVs are further regarded as tools 
for boost ing exports and substitut ing imports and, thus, creating and saving funds 
necessary for the importat ion of high-tech goods. 
By the end of 1996, 79.8 per cent of the total of 215,995 international JVs in China 
were establ ished as equity JVs (Kaiser and Gr imm et al. , 1997). Compared with the 
1979 to 1994 f igures (Kaiser et al. , 1996) this suggests a 1.4 per cent decrease in the 
occurrence of these type of JV. Appendix VI presents the detailed features of the two 
fo rms of JVs, equity and contractual JVs. 
The co-operat ive development Ooint development: Wascher (1992)], is a specific form 
of co-operat ion to exploit natural resources. It is mainly employed in the exploration 
and development of offshore oil resources and takes only a small share of all FDI in 
China (Kaiser et al. , 1996). It is not discussed further in this study, nor is the WFOE. 
5.4 Direct investment in China 
For the examinat ion of existing FDI in China, the Kaiser, Kirby and Fan (1996) 
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f ramework is appl ied. This was establ ished in correspondence with Beamish and 
Wang 's (1989) investigation of 840 Sino-foreign JVs."° 
5.4.1 Development of FDI in China 
Having exper ienced investment activities of foreign companies before the Chinese 
Communis t Party came to power in 1949, China ended FDI in the early 1950s." ' State-
owned jo int companies with the Soviet Union were the only form of FDI that remained. 
However, these were also terminated in the late fifties and turned over to the Chinese 
(Wu, 1982) . " ' For a long period - Wascher (1992) suggests 30 years" ' of economic 
isolat ion and self-rel iance - FDI was prohibited for historical, ideological and practical 
reasons (Ding, 1993). Nevertheless, it is suggested (Brown, 1985) that, prior to July 
1979, individual JVs existed. These were between Overseas Chinese and mainland 
Ch inese companies (private involvements in SOEs via investment corporations, so-
called Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations: this investment system was 
terminated in January 1967 during the Cultural Revolution). Al though the pace of 
investment activity was s low initially, by the end of 1996 the country's governments 
had approved a total of 283,793 foreign-funded ventures with a contractual investment 
of some US$469.3bn (£300.8bn) and US$177.2bn (£113.6bn) of utilised funds that 
were contr ibuted to approximately 140,000 ventures. 
FDI in China has passed through a number of distinct phases. The literature does not 
agree upon a certain pattern, but proposes three (Wascher, 1992) and four (Fan, 
1996) different phases f rom 1979 to approximately 1990. Both strands agree to a 
start ing period f rom 1979 to around 1982 or 1984, although this is the extent of their 
agreement . Wascher (1992) proposes a boom period (1983 to 1985) which underwent 
the refining of the legal investment f ramework, including the establ ishment of SEZs 
and open coastal cities,"" and a stagnation period (1986 to 1988). The latter was 
character ised by economic distortions (inflation, lack of foreign exchange), student 
unrest"^ and reports of problems with foreign investors in China (ie infrastructure, 
bureaucracy) . Fan (1996) extends the legislation period up to early 1989. He ignores 
the temporary setback of new project approvals in 1985 and considers only a period of 
temporary setback, commencing in June 1989 with the tragedy at Beijing's Tiananmen 
square. (This is universally considered to be the point at which reforms went into 
reverse and disi l lusionment with the Chinese regime experienced by many foreign 
investors peaked.) Wascher (1992), on the other hand, completely overlooks the June 
1989 incident and the effects of the retrenchment programme to combat inflation in 
1989 and 1990 by reducing investment and money supply, and selectively control l ing 
credit. Seo (1993) argues that the sudden switch to a tight money policy, the reduction 
of credit, the increasing interest rates, and the reduction of loan guarantees, threw the 
economy into chaos. Fan's (1996) new surge period commences in about 1991 with 
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the recovery f rom the T iananmen incident and Deng Xiaoping's re-statement of 
economic reforms. 
The past two years (1996, 1997) have seen a s lowdown in new project approvals, 
initiated certainly by the withdrawal in 1996 of preferential tax and duties on imports of 
capital equipment. Manufactur ing companies have since faced duties of up to 40 per 
cent. In 1997, China announced that, due to an improved fiscal posit ion, it would re-
introduce these preferential t reatments. However, the revised rules are likely to offer 
tax exempt ions on a narrower range of machinery than before, giving special t reatment 
to equipment that will serve high-technology industries - projects that conform to 
China's economic strategy (FT, 23.9.97, p.1). On the other hand, it is also reported 
that China aims to remove all preferential tax rates granted to foreign businesses by 
the year 2000 which will more than double the tax burden on foreign enterprises. Only 
recently. Premier Zhu announced the reform of the tax system which was last 
overhauled in 1994, as one of the government 's key tasks (FT, 16.4.98, p.4). 
There has been a steady development of FDI in China f rom 1980 when the first Sino-
foreign JV, Beijing Air Catering, was establ ished (Shenkar, 1990). Investment f igures 
up to the end of 1985 represent solely the number of, and capital commit ted through, 
equity JVs. Up to that date, the equity JV was virtually the only vehicle for FDI. Only 
f rom Apri l 1986 and April 1988 were the establ ishment of W F O E s and contractual JVs 
possible."® After two years of the new policy permitt ing foreign investment, China had 
received US$1.7bn (£641 m), including both JVs and co-operative production projects 
(Brown, 1985). 1982 witnessed a s lump in FDI, although in 1983 the investment pace 
quickened considerably and in 1984 accelerated dramatically. 
Progress in the format ion of JVs in the first few years between 1979 and 1982 was 
s low for two reasons: first, the Chinese were tardy in granting approvals and seemed 
to need to gain a broad base of experience before moving ahead rapidly (ibid). 
Secondly, since the JV law is both brief and ambiguous on many key points, foreign 
att i tudes were somewhat sceptical. Therefore it was only after some of the required 
addit ional regulat ions (eg tax laws) had been promulgated (promoted), that real 
progress was possible. Brown (1985) considers this as one of the reasons for the early 
relative success of the Overseas Chinese and prevalence of the co-operative 
product ion agreement. 
The first eleven years from 1979 to 1989 experienced two major setbacks in the 
development of investment projects. The first s lowdown in new projects and pledged 
investment was caused by austerity measures introduced by the Chinese government 
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in 1985 to cool down the overheated economy (Pomfret, 1989)." ' This corresponds 
wi th f indings by Glaister and Wang (1993), whereas others (eg Chua and Kin-Man, 
1993) regard J V management problems as being responsible for the decline. The 
second s lowdown, in 1989, when the number of projects was smaller than the year 
before, was caused by the T iananmen incident of 4. June 1989. With this event, China 
briefly retreated into a period of isolation when reforms stal led, foreigners departed, 
and economic product ion returned to its earlier levels (Spar, 1996). Winckler (1991) 
points out that the political instabilities since Tiananmen created a general negative 
inf luence which pervaded the investment cl imate. However, others, including Thoburn 
et al. (1990) and Kelly (1994) consider credit restrictions to be the cause. Introduced in 
au tumn 1988, they left prospective Chinese JV partners very short of funds. 
Eventual ly, to overcome this difficulty, the government tried to encourage WFOEs 
(Thoburn et al. , 1990, p. 16). 
F rom then until 1993, the number of approved projects, as well as contracted and 
uti l ised investment, exper ienced a steep rise. A first big jump in FDI activities in China 
was observed in 1992, when foreign companies established more projects (116%), 
wor th more of p ledged investment (111%) than in the complete period 1979 to 1991. In 
1993, the country exper ienced an even steeper rise in FDI. 83,000 new projects were 
approved, 70 per cent more than the year before. This new influx of foreign funds 
equal led (91.4%) the total number of projects approved in the previous 14 years. The 
projects approved in 1993 accounted for some US$1 l l b n (£71.2bn) worth of 
contractual and US$21.3bn (£13.7bn)"® of utilised investment which is an increase over 
the previous year of 91 and 94 per cent, ' respectively. Between 1978 and 1993, 
investment grew, according to Chinese statistics, by 360 per cent in real terms, 
equal l ing a compound grow/th rate of 11 per cent per year (FT, 7.11.94, p.iv). The 
mass ive inflow of foreign funds into the country made China the most important 
recipient of FDI in the developing wor ld (Economist, 30.4.94, p.97)"® and the second 
most important wor ldwide after the USA (China aktuell, August 1994, p.788). 
In 1994, the direct investment activities of foreign enterprises slowed down significantly 
- at least wi th respect to the number of projects and the value of contractual 
investment. In that year, Chinese authorities approved only 46,209 new projects, worth 
some US$8.5bn (£5.4bn) of contractual investment and account ing for 71 per cent of 
the contracted investment of 1993. In terms of utilised investment, however, 1994 
exper ienced a steep increase with US$39.5bn (£25.3bn), or 85 per cent more than in 
1993. A s reasons for the slow down China aktuell (June 1994, p.572), the monthly 
periodical publ ished by the German Asia-Pacif ic Business Associat ion (OAV), 
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suggests enforced government control of investment activity,^" the introduction of new 
taxat ion practice (foreign enterprises treated lil<e national ones), improved investment 
incentives in neighbouring Asian countries, a sharp rise in the costs of labour and land 
lease and, as pointed out elsewhere (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1.6.95, p.46), 
inflation and overheat ing. According to Fan (1996, p.79), another contribution to this 
s lowdown was the establ ishment of trade unions in Sino-foreign JVs by the end of 
1994 to "protect the rights of eight million Chinese from unscrupulous or negligent 
foreign employers." Despite its s lowdown, the FDI inflow to China in 1994 accounted 
for roughly half the total for ail LDCs (Economist, 18.3.95, p. 18). 
In 1995, China, with US$38bn (£24.4bn) of util ised investment, received more FDI than 
any country except the US (Economist, 1.3.97, p.30). In 1996, it secured 24,529 
foreign investment projects, down by 33.7 per cent in compar ison with 1995. The total 
contractual value of these projects amounted to US$73.2bn (£46.9bn), down 19.8% on 
that of the preceding year. However, actual investment cl imbed to US$42.3bn 
(£27.1bn), up 12.9 per cent cumulat ing in US$177.2bn (£113.6bn) by the end of 1996. 
Beij ing's announcement to phase out tax exempt ions for capital goods imports from 1. 
Apri l 1996 has certainly resulted in a rush by foreign investors to secure approval for 
project proposals by the end of the year. In 1997, util ised investment rose to 
US$45.2bn (£28.9bn), up 8.5 per cent over 1996. Contracted investment, however, fell 
by 29.3 p e r c e n t to US$51.Bbn (£33.2bn) (FT, 16.2.98, p.2). 
For 1998, the Delegat ion of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai (1997) expects 
a signif icant decrease in FDI following China's gradual wi thdrawal of preferential 
measures for foreign investors. Also, the recent devaluations by export-oriented 
economies in Asia, and the unravell ing of the financial systems in Japan and Korea, 
two of China's most important inward investors, have raised concerns about a decline 
in FDi in 1998. 
5.4.2 Importance of FDI for the Chinese economy 
The Chinese government has regarded FDI as a way of upgrading its economy and 
boost ing exports. Indeed, FDI is of considerable importance to China's economy, 
including: (a) its contribution to industrial output, (b) the generat ion of foreign 
exchange, (c) the injection of technology and know-how to develop the economy and 
(d) the absorbsion of surplus labour f rom the declining state sector.^^ In fact, during a 
sympos ium on the relationship between foreign investment and the national economy 
held in Beijing on 16. October 1996, experts said that FDI will go on playing an 
important role in the development of the economy (China Daily, 17.10.96, p.5). 
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Foreign-funded product ion of technical and consumer goods, as well as the provision 
of services, has reinforced the output power of the Chinese economy. Even prior to 
1990, fore ign- funded enterpr ises accounted for more than 8 per cent of the industrial 
output and f ixed asset investment (Thoburn et al., 1990). They have become 
increasingly important to the Chinese economy also with regard to the ever loss-
making and decl ining importance of the state sector. For instance, between 1978 and 
1992 the share of the industrial output contributed by SOEs dropped from 80 per cent 
to 48 p e r c e n t (Child, 1994). 
Foreign- funded enterpr ises contribute considerably also to China's trade, boosting its 
total vo lume f rom US$20.6bn (£13.2bn) to US$325bn (£208.3bn) in 1 9 9 7 . " Exports in 
1997 accounted for US$182.7bn (£117.1bn), up 20.9 per cent over the previous year 
(FAZ, 5.3.98, p. 18). This steady increase in China's export volume raised the country 
f rom a ranking of 32 in 1978 to ten in 1997. In 1991, the export contribution of foreign-
funded ventures increased to 16.7 per cent, compared with more than 12.6 per cent in 
1990 or an est imated US$12bn (£7.7bn), up from US$1 Obn (£6.4bn) in 1990. At 54.2 
per cent, the growth rate of exports generated by foreign-funded ventures was 
considerably higher than the growth rate for exports as a whole which stood at about 
15.8 per cent (China aktuell , February 1992). In 1993, foreign-funded f irms accounted 
for 27.5 per cent of China's exports (34.3%: China aktuell, January 1995) and for all of 
the growth in its exports over 1992 (Economist, 18.3.95, p. 18). Figures presented by 
the Economist (30.4.94, p.97) est imated the contribution to exports by foreign-funded 
ventures dur ing 1992 and 1993 at about two-thirds. 
Throughout 1994, foreign-funded ventures realised an export vo lume of US$87.7bn 
(£56.2bn) or 37 per cent of the economy's total exports (China aktuell, January 1995, 
p. 14). This represented an increase of more than 30 per cent over 1993. In 1995, one-
third of China's exports and half of its imports involved Sino-foreign JVs (World Bank, 
1997). Exports by foreign-funded enterprises totalled US$36.6bn (£23.5bn) in the first 
nine months of 1995 which was an increase of 45 per cent, while imports cl imbed 23 
per cent to US$49bn (£31.4bn) (FT, 27.6,96, p.2). 
In 1996 fore ign-funded ventures generated exports worth US$61.5bn (£39.4bn) or 40.7 
per cent of China's total (South China Morning Post, 11.2.97, p. 19). The Delegation of 
Ge rman Industry and Commerce Shanghai suggests that, in 1996, foreign-funded 
ventures contr ibuted 47 per cent of the Chinese foreign trade volume ( 4 1 % of exports 
and 5 5 % of imports) , compared with 39 per cent in 1995 (32% of exports, 4 8 % of 
imports) (FAZ, 15.1.98, p. 18). In summary, the contribution to exports by foreign-
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funded ventures is increasing, whereas their contribution to import volumes is 
decl ining. In other words, foreign-funded ventures increasingly substitute imports with 
their own product ion and boost exports simultaneously. However, according to the 
Economist (22.11.97, p.93), after double-digit export growth for many years, single-
digit growth is likely for 1998 since foreign firms playing a big role in the export sector 
are taking a more balanced view about their prospects in China. 
Exports of foreign-funded ventures are primarily in the areas of texti les, chemicals and 
electronics (China aktuell , November 1993), with textiles contributing about one-third to 
total exports that, in 1997, totalled US$46bn (£29.5bn) (FAZ, 16.2.98, p.18). Glaister 
and Wang (1993) discovered that, whereas most of the large and mid-sized JVs are 
a imed at the domest ic market, the smaller manufactur ing JVs are export-oriented. 
Simultaneously Wei (1993) argues that the above-average growth rates of the coastal 
areas can be explained entirely by their effective use of exports and FDI. 
In addit ion to the direct effects of FDI on the Chinese economy, such as the infusion of 
capital , FDI also makes a contribution in the form of technological or managerial know-
how. This is through those firms that interact with foreign invested/managed firms via 
var ious channels, as well as through those that receive foreign investment direct or 
under foreign management (Wei, 1993). Foreign-funded ventures also contribute 
considerably to China's labour employment, stabilising and absorbing surplus labour 
f rom the decl ining state sector. At the end of 1994 about 12 million Chinese were 
employed in Sino-foreign JVs or W F O E s (China aktuell, January 1995). 
5.4,3 Sources of FDI into China 
Since the early days of China's 'open-door' policy, the f low of investment capital into 
the country has been dominated by ethnic Chinese investors f rom Hong Kong and 
Ta iwan (Daniels et al. , 1985; Seo, 1993; Tsang, 1994). The former British colony has 
been the major investor both in terms of the number of projects and capital invested 
wh ich , at the end of 1992, accounted for some 60 per cent of all FDI in China (Fan, 
1996). Until 1984, more than three-quarters of the 840 Sino-foreign JVs in Beamish 
and Wang 's (1989) study were establ ished with partners f rom Hong K o n g " and the 
shares of the USA, Japan and Europe were 7.0, 6.6 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. 
Between 1984 and 1990, Hong Kong's share of FDi exceeded 50 per cent for every 
single year except 1985, when it was 48.9 per cent (Wei, 1993). 
The latest f igures on the ten largest direct investing countries in China, in the period 
1979 to 1996, are presented in table 5-2. Compared with the 1994 ranking by Kaiser et 
al. (1996), Hong Kong still leads the list of the ten biggest investors, with US$261.8bn 
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(£167.8bn) of p ledged investment, fol lowing US$200.4bn (£128.5bn) at the end of 
1994. The USA now ranks second with US$35.2bn (£22.5bn), replacing Taiwan which 
was second in 1994 and now ranks third with US$34.6bn (£22.2bn) of contracted 
investment. Japan, with US$26.4bn (£16.9bn) has kept its position as have Singapore 
(US$23.6bn; £15.1bn), the UK (US$11.9bn; £7.6bn) and South Korea (US$11bn; 
£7.1bn). Thai land which ranked eighth at the end of 1994, was replaced by Germany 
with US$5.4bn (£3.5bn) of p ledged funds, fol lowed by Canada (US$4.5bn; £2.9bn). 
Table 5-2: The top ten direct investors in China (1979 to 1996). 
Rank Country Investment 
Projects Volume (pledged) 
No. USS,bn 
-1994 -1996 % -1994 -1996 % 
1 Hong Kong 139,959 162,712 20.3 200.39 261.79 34.7 
2 USA 16,257 22,248 36.9 20.73 35.17 69.7 
3 Taiwan 27,002 35,033 29.7 23.61 34.60 46.5 
4 Japan 10,322 15,002 45.3 14.23 26.39 85.5 
5 Singapore 4,567 6,697 46.6 8.63 23.62 173.7 
6 UK 1,017 1,800 77.0 5.80 11.93 105.7 
7 South Korea 4,247 8,117 91.1 3.78 11.01 191.3 
8 Macao - 5,634 8.22 
9 Germany 892 1,503 68.5 2.72 5.41 98.9 
10 Canada 2,178 3,169 45.5 2.70 4.51 67.0 
Source: Kaiser, Kirby and Fan (1996), Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997). Note: For calculation, 
Macao's 1996 value has been added to the Hong Kong share. 
The posit ions of the UK and Germany as direct investors in China were sixth and ninth, 
respectively, at the end of 1996. Within Europe, the UK and Germany are the two 
biggest direct investors in China. However, compared on a worldwide scale with other 
direct investor nations, the shares of both the UK and Germany are remarkably small, 
account ing for 1.3 per cent and 1.1 per cent of projects or 2.5 per cent and 1.2 per 
cent of pledged volumes, respectively. In terms of utilised investments, the shares of 
the UK and Germany account for only 2 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively, 
suggest ing a below-average rate of contributing pledged funds .^ 
Analys ing new project approvals and contracted investment, ie comparing the 
accumulated 1979 to 1994 f igures and the accumulated 1979 to 1996 figures reveals 
that South Korea's and Singapore's FDI contributions have shown the most impressive 
g r o w t h . R e m a r k a b l e also are the FDI growth rates of both the UK and Germany. 
They are amongst four of the ten most important FDI providers whose contributions 
have exper ienced the most impressive growth. On the other hand, contributions from 
Hong Kong/Macao and Taiwan have experienced the most moderate growth rates 
amongst the ten most important FDI contributors to China, according to this analysis. 
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The decl ining growth of Hong Kong/Macao and Taiwan FDI to China was also 
suggested by China aktuell (June 1994, January 1995). Recently, however, it has been 
suggested (FT, 30.10.97, p.5) that Taiwanese investment in China rose strongly in the 
first nine months of 1997 (up 14%), despite Taipei 's go-slow investment policy towards 
China. Table 5-3 summar ises the findings of the growth analysis. 
Table 5-3: Growth analysis 1994 - 1996 stocks. 
Rank Pro ject Investment (pledged) 
Country Growth (%) Country Growth (%) 
1 South Korea 91.1 South Korea 191.3 
2 UK 77.0 • Singapore 173.7 
3 Germany 68.5 UK 105.7 
4 Singapore 46.6 Germany 98.9 
5 Canada 45.5 Japan 85.5 
6 Japan 45.3 USA 69.7 
7 USA 36.9 Canada 67.0 
8 Taiw/an 29.7 Taiwan 46.5 
9 HK/Macao 20.3 HK/Macao 34.7 
Source: Ovi/n analysis. 
Further analysis should reveal whether, and to what extent, the impressive growth of 
direct investments f rom the UK (projects: 77%, pledged investment: 105.7%) and 
Germany (projects: 68.5%, pledged investment: 98.9%) is reflected in the outward 
statistics of these countr ies. Compar ison of the outward investment f igures of both 
countr ies for the years 1994 and 1996 would be helpful. However, although the Office 
for National Statistics (1995)^^ observed a major increase in UK direct investment in 
the rest of the world in 1994 of 88 per cent (to £4 .3bn ) , " this was largely due to an 
increase of £1.2bn in investments in Caribbean, Central and Southern American 
countr ies. Neither China, nor the entire Asia-Pacif ic region were explicitly mentioned 
and highl ighted for their increase in importance as a direction of UK FDI. Other 
dest inat ions of UK direct investment in 1994 (total £18m, plus 10% to 1993) were 
European Union countr ies (£5.4bn). North America (£5.1 bn), other developed 
countr ies (£2.4bn) and other Western European countries (£1.3bn). 
Table 5-4: German outward investment in the period 1991 to 1995. 
Year Direct Investment 
Abroad DCs LDCs China 
DM,m Growth DM,m Growth DM,m Growth DM,m Growth 
1991 253,453 228,567 22,827 339 
1992 275,780 8.8 246,314 7.8 25,774 12.9 529 56.0 
1993 308,399 11.8 272,437 10.6 29,701 15.2 734 38.8 
1994 329,757 6.9 287,274 5.5 33,576 13.0 867 18.1 
1995 361,687 9.7 313,799 9.2 35,385 5.4 1,526 76.0 
91 - 9 5 42.7 37.3 55.0 350.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, •Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland', May 1994, May 1996, 
May 1997. Note: DCs = developed countries, LDCs = less developed countries. 
The examinat ion of German outward investment statistics reveals different results. For 
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instance, pr imary data f rom the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996) 
shows that between 1991 and 1995, accumulated German outward direct investment 
increased by 42.7 per cent, with an increase of 37.3 per cent of accumulated f lows to 
deve loped countr ies and an increase of 55 per cent of accumulated f lows to LDCs. 
German direct investment to China grew by 350 per cent between 1991 and 1995. 
This t rend was also documented by the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Hong Kong (1995). It suggested that, whereas in 1992 2.7 per cent of all German FDI 
was directed towards Asia, the respective 1994 figure was 8.1. per cent and that Asia, 
China and Hong Kong are the most important destinations for German FDI (table 5-4). 
5.4.4 Regional distribution of FDI in China 
The most preferred locations for FDI in China are the SEZs, major municipalit ies such 
as Beij ing, Shanghai , Guangzhou or Tianjin and the 14 coastal areas (Duscha, 1987; 
Campbel l , 1989; Beamish and Wang , 1989; Grub and Lin, 1991; Tsang, 1994). Nearly 
40 per cent of the 840 Sino-foreign JVs in Beamish and Wang's (1989) study were 
located in SEZs, 27 per cent in the coastal cities and 5 per cent in Beijing. Up to 1992, 
China's Eastern coastal areas absorbed more than 80 per cent of the total capital 
(China Industrial Economics Research, 1993) and a recent Wor ld Bank (1997) report 
refers to 85 per cent of all FDI being located in China's nine coastal areas and 
municipalities.^^ This is conf i rmed by f indings of Glaister and Wang (1993) who 
suggest that 16 of the 21 Sino-UK JVs in their study were located in the coastal areas 
and five in China's hinterland. 
By the mid 1990s, only about 9.5 per cent of all approved FDI projects and roughly 7.5 
per cent of all uti l ised funds were located inland. However, as the coastal areas are 
gradual ly becoming too expensive for many investors, FDI will eventually spread to the 
vast inland provinces that are backward both in terms of their economy and their 
infrastructure. In fact, changes in the directions of FDI have been evident since the mid 
1990s when FDI growth in hinterland provinces showed a bigger percentage jump (FT, 
7.11.94, p.vi) and surpassed FDI growth in the coastal provinces (China aktueil, 
September 1993). According to Fan (1996), FDI in areas such as Guangdong, Hainan 
and Beij ing decl ined dramatical ly in 1992, whereas the proport ion of investment to 
China's hinter land increased by 60.9 per cent. Elsewhere (China aktueil, January 
1995) it is suggested that the share of investment to inland provinces had increased to 
20 per cent. However, since many overseas investors prefer the coastal areas, it would 
be unrealist ic to expect overseas investments to pour into the region in large amounts 
(China Daily, 2.11.96, p.4). 
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In genera l , foreign investors target the South and Southeast coastal provinces of 
Guangdong , J iangsu, Fujian, Shandong and Shanghai (Schuller, 1994). Due to their 
proximity, Guangdong and Fujian are the most favoured investment locations for 
investors f rom Hong Kong and Taiwan (FT, 30.10.97, p.5), respectively, whereas 
China 's Northeast was primarily targeted by Japanese and Korean investors 
(Campbel l , 1989; Dong et al., 1993; Seo, 1993). Dong et al.'s (1993) f indings support 
the theory that companies with a high propensity to export tend to locate near the 
coast and particularly in SEZs where fiscal incentives for off-shore production are 
st rong: Overseas Chinese JVs export more than those with western parents. 
Whereas there is no reliable, large-scale data on the favourite destinations of UK 
investment in China, various authors have elaborated on the locations of German 
direct investment. Most of German companies have approached the urban centres, 
such as Beij ing and Shanghai (Schuller, 1994). The examinat ion of the 1994 edition of 
the investment guide of the German Asia-Pacif ic-Business Associat ion (OAV, 1994) 
suppor ts the above observat ion: up to January 1994, 25 per cent of all Sino-German 
JVs and German- funded representative offices in China were located in Shanghai, and 
more than 46 per cent in Beijing. The remaining 29 per cent of German investment 
projects were located in the Chinese coastal and inland provinces (Kaiser, 1995).^^ 
The Northeast, East and Southeast coastal areas were also identified as predominant 
locat ions for German investment by Gr imm (1994) who points out that German 
investment is highly concentrated in areas of advanced development, dominated by 
manufactur ing industries as opposed to raw material and power industries with 
relatively high growth rates. Gr imm (1994) discovered that 56 per cent of the 140 
Ge rman JVs^° were located in Shanghai , Beijing and Guangdong and about 80 per 
cent were concentrated in six locations, including, in addition to the above, Tianjin, 
J iangsu and Fujian. The high concentrat ion of German FDI projects in Shanghai, 
Beij ing and Guangdong was further conf irmed by the Delegation of German Industry 
and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). Also, interrogation of a database that logged 
Ge rman direct investments showed that 37.8 per cent, 35.8 per cent and 9.9 per cent 
of all Ge rman investment projects in China were located in Shanghai , Beijing and 
Guangdong , respectively (China-Info No.11 , 1995). According to information by 
M O F T E C (August 1995), German direct investment projects are concentrated in 
Beij ing, Tianj in, Shanghai , Shenzhen, Nanjing, Kanton, Dalian and Wuhan. 
5.4.5 Distribution of FDI by industry 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, Hong Kong and Japanese f irms have invested in the 
text i le, medicine, food, motorcycle, and electronics industries. In addit ion, enterprises 
f rom the US and Europe have contributed capital to the automotive, chemical, 
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machinery and coal industries (de Bruijn and Jia, 1993). However, it is suggested 
(Grub and Lin, 1991) that investors were initially reluctant to engage in manufacturing 
projects since manufactur ing projects were perceived as taking longer to pay 
div idends. A s a result, FDI in the manufactur ing sector had originally concentrated on 
export processing and assembl ing operations. Only after 1987 did the f low of inward 
investment gradual ly shift towards the manufactur ing sector, including electrical 
equipment, electronics, precision machinery and transportat ion equipment (ibid) - as a 
react ion to the promulgat ion of the '22 articles' (Brown, 1993). This coincides with 
f indings by Schwantes (1991) that most of the early JVs were operating in services, in 
part icular the hotel sector. 
Campbel l 's (1989) examinat ion of 496 equity JVs suggests that in the late 1980s, 71 
per cent of the investment was accounted for by six sectors, including real estate 
(25.1%), transportat ion (14.1%), manufactur ing of building materials (10.2%), food 
(8%) , consumer goods (7.8%), and electricals (6.1%). By the end of 1991, the bulk of 
investment capital (90%) was poured into productive projects (China aktuell, March 
1992). However, in 1992, the proportion of manufactur ing dropped slightly, whereas 
real estate and services increased by 40 per cent. Woodward and Liu (1993) argue 
that most of the JVs establ ished in China are engaged in the exploitation of natural 
fuels, labour- intensive manufactur ing or tourism and infrastructure-projects, such as 
highways, rai lways and port development. MOFTEC figures (August 1995) reveal that 
74.1 per cent of the total foreign capital by the end of 1994 was invested in the 
manufactur ing sector, 14.3 per cent in the real estate and services sector, 2.5 per cent 
in agriculture and less than 10 per cent in infrastructure projects. This coincides with 
Fan's (1996) argument that manufactur ing, as well as real estate and services, are the 
industr ies which have received the most foreign investment. 
Since the Chinese government places considerable emphasis on the development of 
the country 's infrastructure, publishing new investment guidelines for FDI in high-tech 
and infrastructure projects, the proport ion of te lecommunicat ions and power generating 
industr ies in China is set to increase in the 1990s. In fact, de Bruijn and Jia (1997) 
report that, recently, just these sectors have attracted investment. 
Data on the industrial distribution of UK FDI in China does not exist in comparable 
quality as it does in Germany. It is known, for instance, that the German direct 
investment structure, in general , roughly corresponds with the economy's exporting 
structure. The majority of German investors represent industries such as mechanical 
engineer ing (27%), textiles (23%), electrics and electronics (9%) and chemicals and 
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pharmaceut ica ls (9%) - industries which face a structural and cost crisis in Germany 
(Schuller, 1994). Three years earlier, Winckler (1991) suggested that two-thirds of the 
exist ing industrial co-operat ions were concentrated in mechanical engineering. The 
Delegat ion of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) points out that most 
Ge rman investors are in trading ( 6 1 % of 120 firms), services (30%) and retail (23%). 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the FDI environment in China. The legislative framework 
for FDI , including the various locations for investment, has been reviewed, the cultural 
env i ronment has been discussed and the different forms of investment presented and 
analysed. To date, the equity JV has been the most frequently used form of FDI in 
China, al though its occurrence is decreasing relative to other forms of FDI such as 
contractual JV and W F O E . 
The chapter has also documented the impressive inflow of foreign funds to the country 
s ince the opening up of the Chinese economy in 1978, the origin of these funds, their 
regional , as wel l as industrial distribution, and their economic importance to the 
Chinese economy. Analysing stocks of foreign investment in the country over a period 
of t ime has revealed that the UK and Germany have not been major players as foreign 
direct investors in China, though they are growing in importance. Both the UK and 
Germany are the most important investors in China within the European Union. 
The recent, ongoing downturn in privi leged treatment could slow the growth of FDI 
because it could also discourage round-tr ip investment. However, this is unlikely to 
deter genuine FDI because the overwhelming worldwide evidence is that tax and other 
incent ives have only marginal effects on the location decisions of f irms (World Bank, 
1997). A more serious threat to FDI f low is the current f inancial crisis in Asia which 
causes western investors to be cautious and rethink their China investment strategies. 
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Notes 
^ For a review of the political environment of business agreements in China see Chew (1996), 
Dumbaugh and Sullivan (1996), Morrison (1996), Orentiicher and Gelatt (1996). 
^ For detailed reflections on China's 'open door' policy see Hayter and Han (1998). 
^ Chen (1978) stresses that Zhou had tentatively put forward this concept as early as 1964. 
" Authors (Grub and Lin, 1991; Chua and Kin-Man, 1993; Spar, 1996) insist on 1979 as the 
year when China announced its 'open door' policy. This is wrong. Although it came into effect 
in early 1979 [not late 1979 as Tang et al. (1992) argue], it was announced in late 1978. 
^ Mao Zedong, in 1949, formed the Chinese Communist Party. He acted as its Chairman, 
State President, Head of the Central Military Committee and Chairman of the Political 
Consultative Conference of the Chinese People. He died on 9.9.1976. Since the late 1950s, 
China pursued an economic policy that would develop the country without reliance on the 
outside world. Foreign trade contacts and thus, access to the international technical progress 
were kept on a very low level (Klenner, 1986). 
^ The stagnation of China's foreign trade up to 1970 is demonstrated in Brown (1985). For a 
comprehensive overview of China's historical economic relations with the West see Brown 
(1985). His work covers, amongst others, the late Qing dynasty (1842-1911), Republican 
China (1912-1949) and Communist China (1949-1976). 
' Phillips (1985) offers a good investigation of China's rural and urban reforms. Details on 
China's internal reforms are also in Bloodworth, D. (1995) (ed.) The profile of an opportunity'. 
^ Economic systems are classified on the basis of who owns the means of production 
(capitalism - socialism) and of a country's method of resource allocation and control (market 
economies - command economies). Thus, the 'socialist market economy' is a hybrid. 
® Reforms of China's SOEs, including the shedding of millions of surplus workers, would cost 
the country some RMB500bn (£39bn) during the next five years (FT, 11.3.96, p.4). By some 
estimates, as many as 30 to 40% of the SOEs' workforce might lose their jobs if they were 
forced to operate on strictly commercial lines (Economist, 10.6.95, p.26). By the end of 1996, 
about 43.7% of the country's 400,000 (305,000 as suggested by the World Bank, 1997 and 
the Economist, 13.9.97, p.23; 370,000 in FT, 20.2.98, p.8) or so SOEs were in the red, up 5% 
over the same period of last year (Delegation of Germany Industry and Commerce Shanghai, 
1997). Elsewhere (FT, 10.9.97, p.31), it is suggested that approx. 70% of SOEs lost money in 
1996 with a worsening position in the early part of 1997. The World Bank (1997) argues that 
about half of all industrial SOEs made a loss in 1996. Most recent news indicated that losses 
of Chinese enterprises, in the first two months of 1998, were up 21.7% compared with 1997 
(FAZ, 25.4.98, p.9). SOEs produce less than 40% of industrial output, and that share is falling 
(Economist, 13.9.97, p.24). Repeatedly, the World Bank demanded more concerted efforts to 
reform China's SOEs, bolster public finance and drive forward market reforms if China is to 
maintain present levels of economic growth. Chinese authorities have given permission to 
foreign investors to buy the assets of some small SOEs in Southern Guangdong province 
(FT, 1.2.96, p.29). Further, president Jiang announced in September 1997 that China would 
speed the sale of state assets and increase public ownership (FT, 10.10.97, p.4). 
^° At the National People's Congress in March 1998, Zhu Rongji was elected Prime Minister. 
" China's official urban unemployment rate (in September 1997) was nearly 4%, compared 
with 2.9% in September 1996. This vastly understates the problem especially in the 
Northeast industrial heartland where joblessness may be as high as 20%. During the 9th five 
year plan (1996-2000) China needs to find jobs for up to 180m workers (FT, 31.7.97, p.6). 
China's gap between rich and poor is widening and government policies are heightening 
inequalities risking social upheaval. China achieved spectacular results in poverty alleviation 
early in its reforms, but the momentum slowed in the 1980s before picking up again in 1992. 
In 1995 less than 6% of the population had incomes below the absolute poverty line, or about 
70m people, compared with more than 200m people in 1981. 
126 
FDI environment in China 
" Grub and Lin (1991) argue that counter-trade was used only for some large equipment 
transfers from Eastern European countries. 
On 27.3.1950 the agreement of Sino-Soviet JVs was signed (Kraus, 1989). 
The RPR equation, in 1990, lifted China's per capita income figure from estimated US$370 
(£237.2) to US$2,000 (£1,282), making the economy about as big as the Japanese 
(Economist, 30.4.94, p.97). 
The assumed growth rate is 2.5% per year. 
The US and EU are pressing Beijing to cut tariffs on many industrial products to no more 
than 5% by early next century and to phase out tariff-quotas on imports by fixed dates (FT, 
1.12.97, p.7). 
In 1995, 1,224m people lived in China (Statistical Yearbook of China 1996). 
Others (eg Morgan-Harris and Longshaw, 1996), for the period 1980 to 1992, suggest an 
average GDP increase of 9 .1% and the SSB proposes that, between 1978 and 1993, the 
Chinese economy expanded at a compound rate of 9% for an overall increase of 260%. 
20 w u Yi was optimistic suggesting that "at this speed we'll reach our year 2000-target already 
in the next five years, which is a quadrupling of the GDP of 1980" (OAV, 1994, p. 12). 
13.5% in 1993, 12.7% in 1994, 10.5% in 1995, 9.7% in 1996. 
Originally, for 1997 the Chinese government predicted a GDP growth of modest 8%. For 
1994 and 1995, Chinese rulers expected the economy to grow at 9% (Economist, 30.4.94, 
p.97; FT, 11.1.95, p.3). The real growth rate in 1994 was 12.7% and 10.5% in 1995, though. 
23 Also the OECD (in FAZ, 14.4.98, p.17) suggests growth rates in 1998 and 1999 of 7.2 and 
7.5%), respectively. 
2" This is more than double the official target of 10%. 
2^ For a discussion of China's corporate tax system see Schroder (1990). He found that, in 
order to implement a sound system of corporate taxation, the Chinese still have a long way to 
go and further development of the institutional framework is necessary. China has entered a 
variety of investment protection agreements with 51 states and has agreements to avoid 
double taxing with approximately 30 countries (OAV, 1994, p. 15). See also Brink and Li 
(1996), Weiguo (1996) and Potter (1996) for a discussion of Chinese investment laws. 
2^ According to Grub and Lin (1991), the 22 Regulations were issued because of a sharp 
decline of FDI in China in 1986 due to foreign investors' dissatisfaction with currency non-
convertibility, employment restrictions, and difficulty in dealing with local bureaucracies. 
'^^  For an examination of the Equity JV Law see Nehemkis and Nehemkis (1980). 
2^ It applies subsidiarily to the above laws. 
2^ National and international airports have been, in the meantime, established in all of the 
SEZs and the major cities of the country. In 1995 and 1996, 17 new airports have started 
operation and 41 other airport projects are planned by the year 2000. 
3° In the SEZs above-average skills and availability of trained labour had to be well paid for. 
For an analysis of the investment climate, ie costs and quality of labour etc. in different cities 
in China see Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). 
3' Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Waigaoqiao, Zhangjiagang, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiangyu, Shantou, 
Guangzhou, Shatoujiao, Futian, Haikou, Zhuhai. 
32 Beihai, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Qingdao, 
Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Yantai, Wenzhou, Zhanjiang. 
33 One of the main issues of increased infrastructure spending is to overcome striking 
regional disparities (FT, 27.6.96, p.1). 
3'' By the year 2000, China's capacity for energy generation is to be increased to about 280m 
kilowatt. This requires investments of some US$70bn (£44.9bn) which China cannot raise on 
its own. Thus, the Chinese government encourages foreign investors to engage in so-called 
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BOT (build-operate-transfer) projects. 
At the end of 1996, the Chinese telephone network accounted for some 100m lines, lifting 
the telephone penetration rate to 6.2%. By the year 2000, so suggests the Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunications, the whole of China should be covered by a net of glass fibre wires. 
Infrastructure spending in the five year plan period 1996-2000 is estimated at US$295bn 
(£189.1bn) to US$370bn (£237.2bn), including US$60bn (£38.5bn) to USSIOObn (£64.1bn) 
for power, US$60bn (£38.5bn) for telecommunications, US$40bn (£25.6bn) to US$45bn 
(£28.8bn) for railways, US$35bn (£22.4bn) to US$45bn (£28.8bn) for oil/gas development, 
US$35bn (£22.4bn) to US$40bn (£25.6bn) for refineries, US$30bn (£19.2bn) to US$40bn 
(£25.6bn) for roads, US$20bn (£12.8bn) to US$25bn (£16.0bn) for coal, US$10bn (£6.4bn) 
for ports, US$5bn (£3.2bn) for airports (FT, 19.3.96, p.7). 
Hofstede's value dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and 
masculinity. 
Campbell (1989) refines this. His enumeration suggests export entry (direct imports, 
indirect exports via agent, indirect exports via distributor), contractual entry (licensing, 
processing and assembly contracts, CJV, counter trade, barter), investment entry (EJV, 
WFOE). 
®^ Foreign firms provide machines or product designs to Chinese enterprises and obtain, as 
payment, a part of the output. 
''° Beamish and Wang (1989) applied nine dimensions, including region of investment, source 
of investment, industry division, total investment, foreign partner equity contribution, foreign 
equity percentage, most frequently observed foreign equity percentage, foreign equity 
percentage by country, pre-determined duration of JVs. 
"•^  Daniels et al.'s (1985) thesis is that rather than simply banning FDI, the Chinese 
government set regulations on labour, taxes, and profits which made it impossible for foreign 
firms to operate profitably. Firms had to apply for permission to terminate their operations. 
Thus, the Chinese Communist Party created a situation where firms left on their own accord 
rather than being officially expropriated. 
Apart from China's economic co-operation in the 1950s with the former Soviet Union, 
authors suggest also ties with Eastern European countries and there was also the import of 
industrial equipment and technology from Western European countries and Japan in the early 
1960s and 1970s (Ho and Huenemann, 1984). There is inconsistency revolving around the 
termination of the Sino-Soviet ties. Whereas Wu (1982) suggests that the split was in 1955, 
Plasschaert (1993) and Child (1994) propose the year 1960 and Campbell (1989) and Grub 
and Lin (1991) refer to the [early] 1960s. 
Stewart and Keown (1989) suggest 12 years. 
Kelly (1994) suggests the occurrence of two distinct 'investment waves' since 1979 (with 
the first being the heavy investments by Overseas Chinese in export oriented industries 
along the East coast and the second being investments in infrastructure. 
On the occasion of the death of Hu Yaohang. 
Apart from few joint development and compensation trade projects and WFOEs in the 
SEZs and Shanghai. 3M set up the first WFOE outside of a SEZ in 1985 (Davidson, 1987). 
For details on the foreign exchange difficulties of several large domestically-oriented JVs 
see Pomfret (1989). 
As 1993 figure, Far Eastern Economic Review (1,6,95, p.46) suggests US$40bn (£25.6bn). 
Earlier, the Financial Times (7.11.94, p.vi) presents exact 50% and in its issue of 5.12.94 
(p.4) the publication suggests 33% as the share of FDI to LDCs, In 1995, FDI in LDCs rose to 
a record US$90bn (£57,7bn) (FT, 13,3.96, p,4). 
^° Recently, China started checking how much money investors are bringing into the country. 
Duscha (1987) stresses that the creation of jobs is not a declared objective of JV policy. 
Accordingly, China seems to ignore the JVs' ability to increase employment. 
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2^ In 1977, China was the 30'^ largest exporting country in the world. 
®3 A proportion of the Hong Kong investment is Taiwanese capital that is disguised for political 
reasons. However, the bulk of the Hong Kong investment is genuine Hong Kong capital, says 
Kueh (1992). 
The investment ratios were established as follows: projects UK 1,800/140,000; Germany 
1,503/140,000; pledged investment UK 11.9bn/469.3bn; Germany 5.4bn/469.3bn; utilised 
investment UK 3.5bn/177.2bn; Germany 1.7bn/177.2bn. 
In 1992, South Korea was due to establish diplomatic relations with China. 
®^ Companies were asked to supply separate information for each country with which they 
had direct investment transactions. Where outward investment to a country was channelled 
through a holding company which was itself an overseas subsidiary of the UK company, the 
whole investment was allocated to the country of the intervening subsidiary. Subsidiaries are 
companies in which the parent company holds more than half of the equity share capital. 
This suggests a different order from the findings in the Far Eastern Economic Review 
(1.6.95, p.46) where it is suggested that the US remain the top destination of UK investment 
( 4 1 % of UK FDI), followed by Commonwealth countries (23%) Europe and Asia (each 18%). 
Already in 1997, Beijing had declared Chongqing the fourth municipality. The World Bank 
report ignores this. 
Note: representative offices are not regarded as FDI projects. 
Based on an evaluation of June 1994 statistics by the German Embassy in Beijing. 
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Chapter Six 
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter f ive has introduced the foreign direct investment (FDI) environment in China: 
the legal, socio-cultural and physical infrastructures faced by the China investor when 
establ ishing a joint venture (JV). This was necessary to develop further the analytical 
f ramework establ ished in chapter three with the findings f rom a review of the literature 
on SIno-forefgn JVs. The insight der ived f rom this chapter will be used for the 
subsequent analysis and discussion of the empirical f indings throughout chapters 
seven, eight and nine. 
6.2 The model framework 
In his analysis of Sino-foreign JVs, Beamish (1993) examined JV characteristics, 
including JV design, operat ion and performance. This corresponds with the framework 
proposed in this thesis. Extensions and modif ications to the model f ramework are 
expected, according to evidence from the literature. Beamish and Wang (1989) and 
Beamish (1993) emphasise that the JV process in China is different from that in 
developed countr ies and less developed countries (LDCs) with market economies. 
Based on eleven studies carried out prior to 1989, and his own investigation of 22 JVs 
in China, Beamish (1993) compared 12 characteristics of international equity JVs in 
China with JVs in LDCs with market economies.^ He found five characteristics unique 
to China, ie ' f requency of association with government partners', 'origin of the JV 
investment ' ( from ethnically related countries), 'ratio of enacted to announced ventures' 
(less than 50%) , 'use of JVs with a pre-determined duration', and 'JV stability'. 
In chapter three of this thesis it has been established that the international JV is 
fo rmed between at least two partners. It has been establ ished also that there is a 
relat ionship between the partners (ie the formation phase of the model) and between 
the JV and its parents (ie operation phase of the model). The constellation of these 
relat ionships depends on the relative bargaining power of the partners that can change 
over t ime, thus making the model dynamic. In this aspect, the thesis model 
corresponds with that of Harrigan (1985). In chapter three it has been further 
establ ished that, as opposed to Killing (1983) and Harrigan (1985), only Datta (1988) 
has taken into account the international aspect of the JV. However, the question that 
needs to be addressed is to what extent Datta's (1988) model is able to capture the 
internal and external relationships of a Sino-western JV. The thesis model has to 
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explain the format ion and operation of an enterprise that has at least two parents, one 
f rom China and one f rom a western country. 
Fan (1996) rejected the models of Harr igan (1985) and Datta (1988) to analyse Sino-
western JVs. Instead, he emphasises cross-cultural communicat ion and understanding 
as the key aspects of international JVs. He stresses that the existence of cultural 
barriers makes the creation and operat ion of an international JV more complex and 
difficult than a domest ic one. Gaps between the perceptions, expectations and 
object ives of the partners are often confl ict ing. Also the cultural dif ferences in the 
organisat ion structure and management style complicate managing a JV and can even 
threaten its survival. Fan (1996) argues that to break down these cultural barriers the 
investor must be commit ted to JV success, be able to adapt, learn and co-operate, 
wil l ing to build up communicat ion channels and to enhance mutual understanding. 
Fan's (1996) model discusses three relationships: between the foreign firm and the 
Chinese f i rm (motivation for investment, objectives in the JV, need for partner's 
resources, bargaining power) and between the foreign and Chinese f irms and the JV 
(ownership and control , objectives, changes in management system, strategies and 
per formance) . Fan (1996) has introduced two cultural barriers in his model: one 
between the foreign f irm and both the Chinese firm and the JV. These are located at 
levels, such as: (1) East-West, (2) national origin, (3) business systems, (4) 
organisat ional and (5) individual variables. The second barrier divides the Chinese firm 
and the JV, located on cultural levels (ie organisational and individual variables) only. 
As Harr igan's (1985) model corresponds with the elements developed in chapter three 
of this thesis, so does Fan's (1996): the foreign f i rms' attributes, motivations and 
object ives are captured by JV motivat ions in the thesis model. The need for the 
partner 's resources is equivalent to the JV partner contribution of the model in this 
thesis and Fan's (1996) 'bargaining power' attribute is incorporated in the negotiation 
e lement of the thesis model . The addit ional sub-element 'JV partner selection' of the 
thesis model complements the relationship between the foreign and the Chinese 
partners. Neither Fan (1996), Datta (1988) or Harrigan (1985) examined explicitly this 
e lement of the JV formation process, despite its importance for JV success (Berg et 
al., 1982; Kill ing, 1983; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Geringer, 1991; Schuler et al., 1992; 
Hamil l and Hunt, 1993). Fan's (1996) JV 'child' attributes (ownership and control, 
changes in management system, strategies and performance) are also captured in the 
thesis model . However, the objectives of the JV are discussed in this model as the 
object ives of the parents. 
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Fan's (1996) JV model resembles much of the work of Harrigan (1985) and Datta 
(1988) . Basically, he introduced the existence of cultural barners and created an 
international JV model applicable to the analysis of Sino-western JVs. However, Fan 
(1996) did not provide further explanation of his model as he expects the reader to be 
famil iar wi th the work of Harrigan and Datta. Many questions remain open: to what 
extent do cultural components, such as food and dress influence JV formation and 
operat ion? Further, al though incorporated as model attributes. Fan (1996) does not 
establ ish a link between cultural components and JV strategies and performance. 
O n a parallel t rack to Fan, Kim (1996) proposed a conceptual f ramework for 
comprehens ion and analysis of international JVs in China. Kim's (1996) typology 
includes d imensions such as the partner status (size, experience, investment, nature 
of the equity) and JV content (chief executive off icer/organisational structure, 
account ing/ f inance, market ing/sales, production/operat ion, research and development 
and product design, motivations for JV formation, and implementat ion of technology 
t ransfer) . Kim's (1996) approach contains elements from the models of Harrigan 
(1985) and Datta (1988), although its applicability to, or usefulness for, improvement of 
the exist ing thesis model is doubly f lawed: first, Kim (1996) mixes up elements of the 
format ion and operat ion phases and does not provide the reasoning for his use of four 
di f ferent line funct ions as elements of the model. For instance, why are, JV formation 
mot ivat ions and accounting/f inance control at the same hierarchical level? Secondly, 
Kim (1996) eventual ly produces a typology of four different JVs ( 'companion J V , 
'mentor ia l J V , 'colonial J V and 'degenerate J V ) , suggesting a variety of evolutions for 
each type and the condit ions that would have brought them about.^ This, however, is 
not essent ial to the model of this thesis. 
Based on the f ramework that has been developed in chapter three, and using the 
inputs f rom Fan's (1996) 'culture JV model ' , the design of an analytical Sino-foreign JV 
model needed in this study is possible (figure 6-1). 
In an examinat ion of the literature on Sino-foreign JVs carried out at an early stage of 
this PhD research (Kaiser, Kirby and Fan, 1996) , ' a four-dimensional evaluation grid 
was appl ied, including 'level of study', 'stage in the JV life cycle', 'perspective of the 
foreign JV partner', and 'size of the foreign JV partner'. The research found that the 
majori ty of the studies examined (68.75%) were carried out on the micro level. They 
occup ied an insider's point of view, drew conclusions from case studies or surveys and 
tr ied to explain certain behavioural aspects, based on political, economic or socio-
cultural variables. Few studies (18.75%) were carried out on the macro-level, ie 
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examined, first, the political, economic or socio-cultural environment before attempting 
to arrive at suggestions for individual cases. Even fewer studies (12.5%) adopted a 
micro/macro level approach. 
Figure 6-1: The Sino-foreign JV model used in this thesis. 
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Kaiser, Kirby and Fan's (1996) work further revealed that the majority of studies 
examined had undertaken investigations of the preparation and creation of JVs as the 
first phase in the JV life cycle. The study found that the motivations for entering into a 
JV and the negotiating of a JV had attracted a major share of the writers' attention. The 
examination also discovered that in approximately half of the cases, investors from the 
US were subjected to investigation. Surprisingly, however, more papers than expected, 
researched European investment in China. 
The examination by Kaiser et al. (1996) finally revealed that most studies investigated 
the China investment undertaken by large MNEs, whereas only few studied the JVs by 
SMEs (eg Au and Enderwick, 1994; Leung and Yeung, 1995). However, authors, such 
as Wu (1993), who examined the China market entry of European enterprises, draw 
attention to the fact that less experienced firms are more likely to enter China through 
JVs. A subsequent extension of this early examination of the literature on Sino-foreign 
133 
Sino-foreign joint ventures 
JVs provides support for the finding that studies on the joint venturing in China of 
SMEs are rather limited, albeit there is substantial literature on large MNE JVs. 
Danenburg and Tan (1989) and Anyansi-Archibong (1989) discuss the increasing 
importance of SMEs to the Chinese economy's development as a result of their 
flexibility and ability to turn out new products in shorter periods of time than other 
Chinese enterprises, create employment and provide much-needed modern 
technologies. Danenburg and Tan (1989) and Anyansi-Archibong's (1989) 
contributions are based on the 1984 Chinese launch of an economic initiative 
programme featuring SMEs. This established the so-called 'Coordinating Center for 
Business Cooperation', responsible for advising and co-ordinating the activities of 
SMEs involving foreign investors. However, this is as far as these studies touch on the 
issue of FDI: they concentrate on Chinese SMEs, rather than foreign ones. 
Au and Enderwick (1994) examined the JVs of New Zealand SMEs, looking, in 
particular, at the motivations and factors for success and failure as perceived by the 
firms. Later, Leung and Yeung (1995), in a cross-industry survey of 168 SMEs from 
Hong Kong, Asia, North America and Europe, investigated the negotiation strategies of 
these firms with their counterparts in China. More recently. Kaiser (1997c), on behalf of 
the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai, documented the JV 
experiences of 25 German SMEs in China.'* Subsequently, selected findings of this 
study have been incorporated into Kaiser and Grimm et al.'s (1997) direct investment 
handbook for German SMEs with an interest in China^ Various other contributions 
used the findings of this study as the basis for their conclusions, including Grimm 
(1997, 1997b) and Hermany and Mischke (1997). New insight, however, was not 
provided by these works. 
6.2.1 Joint venture^ formation 
Foreign investors have to pay great attention to the formation stages of JVs in China. 
The length of time and difficulty associated with establishing a JV was top of the list in 
Davidson's (1987) study. Au and Enderwick (1994) suggest investors must realise JV 
negotiations, planning and preparations will proceed according to the Chinese agenda. 
In a recent contribution, Pan (1997) showed that the equity JV formation strategies 
adopted by companies from different nations differ. Examining six variables of JV 
formation (selection of the Chinese and foreign partners, foreign equity ownership, 
foreign capital contribution, JV business scope and JV location), the author revealed 
that US, Japanese and Hong Kong firm JV formation strategies differ significantly in 
their characteristics and also over time. The details of Pan's (1997) study are 
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discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. A similar study comparing, for 
instance, UK and German JV formation strategies has not yet been compiled. 
Sino-foreign joint venture planning 
JV strategies need to be developed early on in the process of establishing such a 
business, in fact as integral part of the company's overall international strategy (Stofan 
and Stultz, 1991). Newman's (1992) model of establishing a Sino-foreign JV proposes 
three stages including devising a win-win basis for co-operation, preparing scientific 
plans for joint activities and converting plans into performance. The quality of the 
conclusion at each stage in Newman's (1992) model either supports or constrains the 
potential effectiveness of the work at the following stage. Later, Brown (1993) stresses 
the importance of planning stages, including market research, an investigation of 
overseas production capabilities, industry patterns, standards and potential partners. 
These, adds Brown, should be combined with on-site visits and evaluations to 
ascertain whether the project is politically, economically and legally acceptable to 
China, as well as profitable and financable. Subsequently, a Commerzbank (1995) 
study, researching 45 German companies with a JV in China, suggested the need to 
clarify the medium- and long-term goals of an investment in China and analyse the 
market volume, the competitive situation, and the development of the market. 
Frequently, however, especially in the early days of China's open-door policy, foreign 
investors entered the Chinese market as a consequence of the so-called 'two-billion-
sock' syndrome. That is, they attempted to sell into the Chinese market whatever could 
be sold, regardless of whether there was a market for it (Pye, 1986; Frankenstein, 
1986; Beamish and Wang, 1989). This approach would not work. Instead, de Bruijn 
and Jia (1993b) advocate the necessity of a product selection process. Frequently 
executed in two phases, the process includes the identification of possibilities and final 
selection by the addition of operational criteria. De Bruijn and Jia suggest that the 
product selection strategy should depend upon market demand, local supply, the goals 
of the owners and the partners' ability, and the key operational criteria. 
SMEs have been criticised frequently for not carrying out sufficient preparation for their 
investments abroad. For SMEs, the accurate planning of a JV is fraught with difficulties 
due to the lack of readily available and reliable information (Stofan and Stultz, 1991). 
Motivations for Sino-foreign joint venture formation 
The body of literature on Sino-foreign JVs contains substantial information regarding 
the forces that drive businesses to collaborate in a JV project (Daniels et al., 1985; Tai, 
1988; Beamish, 1987, 1988; Shenkar, 1990; Grub and Lin, 1991; Aiello, 1991; 
Newman, 1992; Glaister and Wang, 1993; Gledhill, 1994). 
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In line with the findings in chapter three, there appears to be confusion surrounding the 
motivations for entering the Chinese market and a JV. Various authors propose as 
motivations for JV activity general motivations for FDI activity (Daniels et al., 1985; 
Shenkar, 1990; Glaister and Wang, 1993). For instance, Shenkar (1990), discussing 
entry into a JV, suggests the desire for profits and the utilisation of outdated 
technology as motivations for the western partner and the accumulation of technology 
and foreign exchange as motivations of the Chinese partner. For the western 
company, the vast market potential is, indeed, a pervasive motivation for doing 
business with China. It is not, however, a sufficient motivation for establishing a JV, as 
profits can also be made by exporting or setting up a wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
(WFOE). It is a reason for setting up a JV if the foreign company has no access to 
alternative modes of FDI, exporting or licensing, due to, for example, government 
regulations, tariff and non-tariff barriers. Equally, one way of utilising outdated 
technology is through transferring it into a JV. This was the strategy used by 
Volkswagen of Germany when setting up in 1984 the Shanghai Volkswagen 
Automotive Company Ltd - its JV with the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. 
It came about after VW spent substantial funds on the development of the 'Santana', a 
model that did not sell well in Europe. As a consequence, VW decided to utilise it to 
develop the Chinese market instead. However, the utilisation of outdated technology 
and the gain of technology (for the Chinese) could, generally, also have been achieved 
through licensing agreements. Also, foreign exchange could have been earned through 
exporting. 
It has also been established that partner motivations are often not symmetric (Ruggles, 
1983; Shenkar, 1990; Fan, 1996), causing conflicts and problems in various areas of 
JV activity (Shaw and Meier, 1993; Kim, 1996; Weir, 1997). A variety of authors point 
out that the main concern of western businesses in China has been to make profits 
from the world's largest (potential) market. However, the Chinese partners were more 
interested in the servicing of export markets (Ruggles, 1983; Davidson, 1987; Tai, 
1988; Beamish and Wang, 1989; Shenkar, 1990). Davidson (1987) discovered from 
his study of 47 US firms operating JVs in China that the Chinese partner wanted to 
flood foreign markets with low-priced products whereas the US partners had the 
opposite tendency. Davidson suggests further that as soon as the JV is formed, the 
Chinese want to earn as much hard currency as possible as quickly as possible. In 
addition they seek a faster pace of technology transfer than the western (US) 
managers, in accordance with the above. Weir (1997) argues that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are looking at long-term investment, establishing a market 
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presence and developing dominant national brands, whereas Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) want technology, funding and ways to keep staff employed. 
Foreign firms form JVs with Chinese local firms for a variety of reasons, eg as a means 
of developing the Chinese market, establishing a production base with cheap land and 
labour, and gaining a partner who possesses local knowledge and talent (Kim, 1996). 
In fact, the market motivation has been dominating the joint venturing of UK firms 
(Gledhill, 1994), German investors (Kohler, 1987; Stofan and Stultz, 1991; 
Trommsdorff et al., 1994; Commerzbank, 1995; Kaiser, 1997c), US firms (Daniels et 
al., 1985; Davidson, 1987; Punnett and Yu, 1990), New Zealand enterprises (Au and 
Enderwick, 1994) and Canadian investors (Punnett and Yu, 1990). Various firms have 
realised the necessity of servicing the Chinese market through FDI, rather than 
exports, in order to sustain their share in the market. For instance, the eleven US 
manufacturers and service firms in Daniels et al.'s (1985) study suggested this 
argument as their motivation for JV activity. However, a local market presence could 
have also been achieved through a WFOE. Daniels et al. (1985) do not provide 
meaningful reasoning why the firms In their sample eventually chose a JV. Also, from 
the work of Daniels et al. (1985) it Is not clear which of the motivations were most 
important to the US Investors. 
Important motivations for JV activity were also to conform to host government policy, 
spread risk, exchange resources, gain local knowledge and access to favourable cost 
production (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Commerzbank, 1995). Some authors consider 
the Influence of government mandate on the formation of JVs as very strong (Kohler, 
1987; Teagarden, 1990; Punnett and Yu, 1990; Glaister and Wang, 1993; Beamish, 
1993). For instance, establishing a JV was the only way for the US car manufacturer, 
Chrysler, to access the Chinese market (Aiello, 1991). 
The literature also suggests differences In motivations between Investors of various 
national origins. Punnett and Yu (1990) and Dong et al. (1993) found evidence of this 
in their empirical studies. Punnett and Yu (1990), in their examination of the attitudes 
of US and Canadian executives toward opportunities in China, found that - whereas 
the companies were In accord with regard to the high importance of the market 
motivation and cultural differences - government mandate as a reason for JV activity 
was rated as more important by US firms than by their Canadian counterparts. Also, 
whereas US respondents were more concerned about restrictions, Canadian 
enterprises were more interested in home government incentives. 
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Also Dong et al. (1993), in their study of 114 North American, European, Japanese and 
Overseas Chinese JVs in China, discovered that - while local market entry and profit 
generation were the first and second most important JV motives, respectively, for 
western investors - local market entry was the fourth most important only for the 
Overseas Chinese investors. On the other hand, the provision of incentives was most 
important for the Overseas Chinese investors, whereas it ranked sixth only within the 
group of western firms. The authors further distinguished between the JV formation 
motivations of North American, European and Japanese investors and revealed that 
European investors were more interested in access to raw materials, low 
transportation and labour costs than were US and Japanese investors. On the other 
hand, local market entry and profits were more important to US companies than to 
their European or Japanese counterparts. Profits were even more important to 
Japanese than to European investors. The reason for this could be that the Chinese 
market, or business environment in general, is not as familiar to Europeans. As a 
consequence they do not aim high in respect of profit in the short term. Strangely, 
however, Dong et al. (1993) refer to investors from Japan as western direct investors. 
The utilisation of cheap labour costs is often proposed as the motivation for entehng a 
JV (Tai, 1988; Tang et al., 1992; Newman, 1992; Dong et a!., 1993; Glaister and 
Wang, 1993). This needs consideration, however. The seemingly low labour costs in 
China are inflated by an extensive number of add-ons, including housing, insurance, 
pensions and training. Explicitly, it was suggested (China aktuell, January 1995, p.14) 
that China had lost its comparative labour cost advantage. As early as 1988, Hiemenz 
and Li had pointed out that, in comparison with ASEAN countries, labour costs had 
made China relatively unattractive. Subsequently, Kraus (1989) noted, that labour 
costs in China had reached a level close to that of western industrialised countries. In 
addition, the level of productivity of Chinese workers is considerably lower than in 
western economies (Tai, 1988; Shenkar, 1990; Ding, 1993; Woodward and Liu, 1993). 
These statements by Hiemenz and Li (1988) and Kraus (1989), however, seem 
inaccurate and all too general. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (1.6.95, 
p.46), in the mid-1990s the hourly manufacturing costs in Europe amounted to 
approximately US$21, whereas they stood at about US$2 in the economies of 
Southeast Asia. Again, this is too all-embracing. Nevertheless, whereas the above 
statements by Hiemenz and Li (1988) and Kraus (1989) might reflect the situation in 
China's coastal area, they are not a true reflection of the cost situation in China's vast 
hinterland, where production is considerably cheaper than along the East coast. Apart 
from Kohler's (1987) findings in the mid-1980s of 17 German enterprises which 
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expected lower factor costs from their JV commitment, there is also more recent 
evidence available: Daewoo, the South Korean car manufacturer, estimated production 
costs in China to be about 15 per cent of those in South Korea. This was born out by 
British Polythene Industries. It closed one of Its UK plants in May 1995 to shift the 
manufacture of plastic carrier bags to China. It was estimated the move would enable it 
to produce at one-tenth of the UK labour cost (FT, 7.2.95, p.21). 
Partner selection 
Partner requirements 
Selecting the right partner has been considered important in the Sino-foreign JV 
context (Campbell, 1989; Stofan and Stultz, 1991; Schwantes, 1991; Glaister and 
Wang, 1993; Shaw and Meier, 1993; Gledhill, 1994; Thiess, 1994). The local partner 
has been required to be resourceful (Economist, 6.8,94, p.65) and well connected 
(Shenkar, 1990; Kim, 1996). In developed countries, a successful JV requires partners 
to have compatible and comparable capabilities and experiences, le the partners 
should complement one another. It is difficult, if not impossible, however, in East Asian 
countries to find a local firm that has comparable management capacity and 
experience (Kim, 1996). 
Lists of Chinese partner requirements can be found In various studies. Including those 
by Tal (1988), Casson and Zhang (1992), Shaw and Meier (1993), Glaister and Wang 
(1993), Woodward and Liu (1993), Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Hong Kong (1995), Commerzbank (1995) and Kaiser (1997c). According to these 
sources, foreign investors aim to find a partner that can add value to their JVs in the 
form of securing plant space, personnel, sources of raw materials, access to 
technology and ready-made sales and/or distribution channels, access to the market, 
flexible rulings on the use of foreign exchange or state funds, fiscal concessions, etc. 
Foreign investors also seek guanxi. Tai (1988), Shaw and Meier (1993) and Woodward 
and Liu (1993) highlight the importance of developing guanxi, the art of cultivating a 
personal relationship with those in power. Another important partner requirement is a 
previous favourable association with a local company. This could be in the form of, for 
example, a principal-agent relationship (Casson and Zhang, 1992; Commerzbank, 
1995). This argument, however, appears relatively late in Glaister and Wang's (1993) 
list of partner requirements. The risk of choosing the wrong partner is reduced If the 
Chinese company is previously known to the foreign firm (Campbell, 1989). 
The primary problem with most of the studies commenting on the partner requirements 
for JVs is that they do not provide a clear ranking that would indicate the relative 
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importance of individual criteria (Casson and Zhang, 1992; Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995). 
Partner requirements vary between companies from different nations, as Dong et al.'s 
(1993) study has shown. Investigating the partner requirements of North American, 
European, Japanese and Overseas Chinese investors when forming a China-based 
JV, the authors found the provision of a local image and environment relations were 
regarded as most important within the western group of investors. However, the most 
important selection criterion for the Overseas Chinese investors was government 
relations. In general, the local partner's sources were more important to western firms 
than to Overseas Chinese. This suggests that western investors in China first and 
foremost aim at acquiring the Chinese element that they lack. This explains 
Schwantes' (1991) earlier argument that unlike the Chinese, a foreigner never has 
equal access to Chinese authorities. The provision of government relations ranks only 
seventh in the western group of Dong et al.'s (1993) investors, however. Apparently, 
Overseas Chinese investors are more aware of the crucial role of government and 
bureaucracy involved at different levels of business. The provision of government 
relations was also rated highly by Japanese investors. This indicates that the Japanese 
are closer to Chinese investors in understanding the Chinese culture and political 
environment than their American and European counterparts. Dong et al. (1993), 
however, found no significant difference between ventures with North American and 
European firms when making partner selection decisions. 
Often, JVs with local Chinese partners are established on the site of the Chinese 
parent company, as opposed to a green-field venture. While the first strategy has the 
advantage of being able to build a production-appropriate plant, the second strategy 
allows production to commence immediately and is often cheaper also.^ 
In cases where the Chinese partner is sought for its provision of a production site, the 
location of the foreign partner becomes far more important. Various authors have 
reported on the factors for investors' choices of locations, such as Thoburn et al. 
(1990), Glaister and Wang (1993), Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Hong Kong (1995) and Kaiser (1997c). These most important factors include the 
location of the partner, proximity to target markets, attitudes of government officials 
and infrastructure. Kaiser (1997c) further proposes the availability of tax concessions. 
However, tax concessions are not a dischminatory factor when selecting a location for 
FDI since they are granted to foreign investors in a variety of investment zones such 
as the special economic zones and economic and technological development zones. 
Selection process 
There are a number of ways a foreign investor can use to get in touch with potential 
partners. Thiess (1994) presented ways, such as existing contacts (customer, 
licensee), recommendations by Chinese officials, contacts established at trade fairs 
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and exhibitions or through banks, accountants, solicitors and management 
consultants, as well as own research and company database searches. Elsewhere 
(Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995), it is suggested that 
information on potential local partners can also be sought, apart from chambers of 
commerce, from broker agencies, solicitors and the CCPIT (China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade). Using databases in China, however, has not been a 
matter of course In the past. For instance, the South China Morning Post in July 1985 
(in Beamish and Wang, 1989, p.59) pointed out that it is not easy for a western 
Investor to find a suitable partner in China. The reason it cites is because China has 
nothing like the system of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council's trade enquiry 
databank, which contains information on more than 18,000 manufacturers, exporters 
and importers and a file on more than 80,000 overseas importers. De Bruijn and Jia 
(1993) support this observation, suggesting that, whereas Chinese firms can acquire 
Information about possibilities and alternatives at international exhibitions from foreign 
information centres or by sending delegations, the foreign partner initially has to go to 
Chinese government organisations. 
Increasingly, however, foreign investors In China can seek Information about potential 
local partners from Institutions, including chambers of commerce, that work with 
electronic databases, such as Chlna-on-disc™. The British Consulate General in 
Shanghai, for Instance, offers its visitors the opportunity to carry out their own China-
on-dlsc™ search - free of charge (Paul Davies interview, 11.11.96). The foreign 
investors in Campbell's (1989) study found their partners predominantly through 
previous business contacts and through the use of middlemen. 
The local partner 
Basically, foreign investors can choose as their partners SOEs, town and village 
enterprises or private Chinese firms. None of the 22 JVs In Beamish's (1993) study 
were with Chinese private sector firms. The frequency of choosing a government 
partner depends on the national origin of the foreign investors. This becomes evident 
In the works of Glaister and Wang (1993), Osland and Cavusgil (1996) and Kaiser 
(1997c). Further, from his study of Hong Kong-based, American and Japanese 
investment In China, . Pan (1997) discovered that Japanese firms were more likely to 
choose a local Chinese partner owned by the central or provincial governments, 
compared with US firms. Both Japanese and US investors were more likely than Hong 
Kong firms to select a local partner owned by the central or provincial government. 
However, the Japanese firms were more likely to do so than the US firms. The majority 
of Japanese partners chose another Japanese firm, and only a small portion of them 
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selected a Hong Kong firm. In contrast, more than half of the US firms chose a Hong 
Kong firm as the second foreign partner (Pan, 1997). 
However, as has been shown in chapter three, JVs with local private firms are more 
desirable than those with SOEs (Thoburn et al., 1990). Although large SOEs have 
good connections to local governments, they are rather inflexible, whereas a rural 
enterprise is dynamic and suffers less bureaucratic interference (Tsang, 1994). 
Sino-foreign joint venture negotiation process 
Negotiating is an art and this is particularly true in China (Campbell, 1989). According 
to authors, such as Frankenstein (1986), Tai (1988) and Eiteman (1990), negotiating 
with the Chinese is difficult for western managers, with negotiations taking longer than 
elsewhere (Daniels et al., 1985; von Glinow and Teagarden, 1988). Negotiation 
periods vary considerably, between seven months and more than four years (Daniels 
et al., 1985; Davidson, 1987; Campbell, 1989; Au and Enderwick, 1994; Kaiser, 
1997c). Harwit (1992) noted that more than four years of negotiations preceded the 
1983 establishment of the Beijing Jeep Corporation. However, statements on the 
duration of negotiations in various studies are difficult to compare since there is no 
clearly defined period of negotiation: do initial talks count as negotiations? When do 
negotiations end? These and other similar questions have to be answered first, before 
any meaningful comparison between investors of different nations, or of different 
company sizes, can be undertaken. 
Tai (1988) believes that the amount of time it takes to come to an agreement in Sino-
foreign negotiations is likely to be the greatest frustration for foreigners doing business 
in China. The reasons Davidson (1987) suggests for the long duration of negotiations 
are the administrative structure of the Chinese government, the absence of decision-
making authority on the Chinese side, and two variables that basically influence the 
time involved in establishing a JV (whether or not the Chinese partner is on the 
growing list of industries that have been organised into national corporations and the 
planned location or being one of few investors in a location). For instance, nearly half 
of the 1,676 respondents in Wei's (1993) study of Sino-foreign JVs reported that the 
Chinese team lengthened negotiations to get concessions and that the more important 
the deal, the more the Chinese were inclined to discuss it from every possible angle. 
The Chinese are thorough and methodical negotiators. During the 1996 Heseltine 
China trade mission de-briefing in London, one of the participants remarked: "We are 
dealing with the world's toughest negotiators." The personal qualities of Chinese 
negotiators were, for instance, highly regarded by the US executives in the 
142 
Sino-foreign joint ventures 
Frankenstein (1986) study where more than two-thirds of the managers asked, felt that 
Chinese negotiators tended to be co-operative. Chinese negotiators believe that 
patience - which also includes an extended get-acquainted period - is of particular 
value in negotiations. The Chinese consider social formalities as part of the substance 
of business. Lee and Lo (1993) in their study of American business people's 
perceptions of negotiating in the PRC, point out that in the course of China trade, much 
time and expense will be invested In the non-task 'sounding out' which Is necessary to 
establish and deepen relationships.^ 
However, it has been suggested that negotiation practices are becoming less time-
consuming (Stewart and Keown, 1989; Worm, 1997) and more western-style in 
content (Brown, 1993). A change in Chinese negotiating behaviour was observed by 
Frankenstein (1986) in his study of 26 managers from US manufacturing, trading and 
service firms in China. The managers had been quizzed on their perception of Chinese 
business behaviour, the operational climate and Chinese negotiation tactics. However, 
Frankenstein (1986) also noted that while closer contact with more technically 
competent end users might result In relatively direct negotiations, the Chinese side still 
functioned in a bureaucratic mode. The penalty for being seen to have given away too 
much to 'foreigners' Is likely to remain severe. This makes Chinese negotiators very 
cautious. Frankenstein (1986) identified four different phases In Sino-foreign 
negotiations: the opening moves, where the two sides reach general agreement on 
intent, mutual goals and start building a relationship, the assessment phase, that 
involves the bulk of negotiations, the end-game, where the Chinese focus on hard 
items such as price and delivery schedules, and the implementation phase - a 
continuing process of adjustment and discussion. 
Frankenstein's (1986) findings have to be treated with caution. He does not indicate 
within which Industries the 26 firms were operating (different statements might 
emanate from different Industries) nor does he distinguish between, or give a reason 
for, his selection. Furthermore, he did not Indicate his use of a questionnaire survey 
until the very end. Up to that point, the methodology used was subject to speculation. 
In his subsequent research of the case of a US MNE JV In China, Newman (1992) 
found that the character of negotiating changed between the first and second stage of 
the process. Whereas during the deal-making stage the main task was to find a way of 
servicing the separate wants of each partner, during the concept, elaboration and 
planning stage, a .mutual interest assumed dominance. This was to design a viable, 
effective structure. Campbell (1989), in his study of 21 Sino-foreign equity JVs 
emphasised the need for foreign firms to develop an understanding of the Chinese 
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negotiators' position. While they may not get any thanks for a job well done, they will 
most certainly be censured If the contract does not adequately protect China's Interest. 
As difficult negotiating issues, the 26 managers in Frankenstein's (1986) study 
detected price and technology Issues, with price being the single most difficult to 
resolve. Stewart and Keown (1989) came up with similar findings. However, they noted 
that In addition to financial matters, such as price for assets, technology and training, 
technical matters were also important In the negotiating process, indicating technical 
and budgetary issues were uppermost In the minds of the Chinese. Stewart and 
Keown (1989) studied the factors critical to negotiation success or failure as perceived 
by 50 Hong Kong-based China traders from North America, Europe and Australia. The 
results of their study suggest that factors for successful negotiations with China have 
tended to become more product and finance-related and less personal and culture-
related. Stewart and Keown (1989) recommend that China traders should expect to 
spend large amounts of time explaining technical features and negotiating the price. 
Encouraged by Inconsistency in the literature between Stewart and Keown (1989) and 
Tung (1982), as well as Leung and Wong (1993), regarding the importance of personal 
and non-personal factors affecting negotiation success or failure, Leung and Yeung 
(1995) investigated, in a cross-Industry study, the negotiation strategies of 168 Hong 
Kong, Asian, North American and European SME executives together with those of 
their counterparts in China. Contents of the negotiations were the selling price, non-
pertinent small talk, as well as financial and credit arrangements. Leung and Yeung's 
(1995) findings support the eariier observations by Leung and Wong (1993) and Tung 
(1982) and thus contradict those of Stewart and Keown (1989). However, Stewart and 
Keown's (1989) findings are confirmed by the results of a recent study of 25 German 
SME JVs. As factors influencing JV negotiations, technology transfer and investment 
volume were ahead in importance of, for Instance, guanxi (Kaiser, 1997c). This also 
coincides with an Arthur Andersen study (in People's Daily, 24.11.95, p.2), where the 
concept of quality was more important in negotiations than guanxi, for instance. 
Eiteman (1990) investigated the perception of the bargaining experiences of 25 
executives from American manufacturing firms during the 1980s, including the 
perceived strengths and weaknesses of both the Chinese and US negotiation 
approach. As the most Important perceived American strengths, Eiteman (1990) 
discovered the possession of unique technology, patience, and understanding of each 
other's objectives and desires. Highlighted as the bargaining weakness of the US side 
was a lack of patience. Another obstacle for JV negotiation with China is the absence 
of decision-making authority amongst the Chinese negotiators. Stewart and Keown 
(1989) noted that, while decisions of the western partner's delegation were made by 
144 
Sino-foreign joint ventures 
the management, no one seemed to have any authority in the Chinese teams. This 
was also found by Frankenstein (1986). More than half of the 26 US managers in his 
study thought the Chinese they had dealt with had no final decision-making authority. 
This is confirmed again in later research work by de Brujin and Jia (1993) and Tse et 
al. (1994). They note that while Chinese front-line negotiators may be decision-makers 
on special technical aspects, they do not concern themselves with overall issues and, 
as a result, have to consult their superiors more frequently than western negotiators. 
Tse et al. (1994) studied the reactions of 101 executives from Canada and China to 
conflicts in JVs, differences in intra- and inter-cultural negotiations, and how person-
related and task-related conflicts generate different resolutions by executives of 
collective and individualistic cultures. They found that Chinese executives prefer to 
consult their superiors more often than western executives. 
Tse et al.'s (1994) study found that home culture affects the executives' responses to 
conflicts. It uncovered the fact that difficulties with negotiations can be caused by the 
absence of certain areas of expertise from the Chinese negotiators' skills portfolios. 
Ten out of 12 respondents in Tse et al.'s (1994) sample assessed the (legal) business 
knowledge possessed by the Chinese as poor or very poor while six assessed their 
technical knowledge as good or very good which only four rated as poor or very poor. 
Negotiation tactics revealed in the Tse et al. (1994) study included attempts by the 
Chinese to elicit unnatural pledges, delay negotiations and rake over old ground. 
The American executives perceived the Chinese strengths to be their perpetual 
bargaining, ability to prolong discussions and their process of bureaucratic review. 
Eiteman (1990) observed the Chinese seemed to have no time restrictions. Most US 
managers in Frankenstein's (1986) study and the foreign managers in Campbell's 
(1989) study would agree that somehow clocks run slower in China. The Chinese 
team's attempt to re-negotiate business agreements was also found by Aiello (1991) in 
his study of the Chrysler Jeep JV in Beijing. The latter complains a deliberate lack of 
clarification is part of the preferred Chinese negotiating strategy that leaves contracts 
open to continual negotiation and re-negotiation. As a consequence, in the Chrysler 
case, the company was forced to adopt the strategy of annual negotiations with the 
appropriate planning authorities to determine the number of completely-knocked-down 
kit import licenses that would be issued for the forthcoming year (Aiello, 1991). Harwit 
(1992, p. 135) points out that " ]...[ once the Germans had agreed to a price for the 
engines sold to them from Shanghai Volkswagen, they believed it was a solid 
commitment ]...[ the Chinese on the other hand insisted that the selling price was too 
low, and apparently wanted to ignore the contract stipulations." Eiteman's (1990) 
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approach might be criticised in that It relied on the opinion of Chinese students in the 
US, instead of Chinese business people, reducing the validity of his research. 
For Sino-foreign JVs the contracting language is Chinese (Kohler and Wascher, 1989). 
Thus, Frankenstein (1986) and Eiteman (1990) recommend that foreign investors have 
at least one Mandarin speaker in the negotiation team. Neariy two-thirds of the 26 US 
companies in Frankenstein's (1986) research had a person speaking Chinese at the 
working level or better. Almost all managers felt that the Chinese language capability 
was at least helpful, while neariy two-thirds considered it essential. In the Stewart and 
Keown (1989) study, more than half of the firms had a person who spoke Chinese. In 
cases where Interpreters are to be used, more than half of Frankenstein's (1986) 
respondents stressed the necessity for companies to employ independent interpreters 
of their own, rather than relying on those provided by the Chinese side. This was later 
supported by Campbell's (1989) research. Contrary to this recommendation, the 
majority of the German SMEs in the Kaiser (1997c) study relied on the Chinese side to 
provide the Interpreter. Even more surprisingly, only seven out of 50 western 
negotiation teams In Stewart and Keown's (1989) study used any interpreter. 
In conclusion, authors (Davidson, 1987; Beamish and Wang, 1989; Campbell, 1989; 
Eiteman, 1990; Aiello, 1991; Newman, 1992; Woodward and Liu, 1993; Shenkar and 
Ronen, 1993) propose negotiating guidelines. However, no single negotiation method 
can apply to the whole of China. Instead, negotiating needs to be adjusted to the 
Individual negotiation environment (Stewart and Keown, 1989). Guidelines include: the 
use of a translator, the preparation and announcement of clear alternatives, the 
drawing up of an Initial written agreement, the team to stay together, the presence of at 
least one Mandarin speaker In the team, and the need to be patient coupled with the 
ability to exert pressure to finalise agreements. Negotiators are also advised to clarify 
the target market (export or domestic), clarify foreign exchange requirements, be 
flexible, draft carefully a JV contract, avoid black holes (such as "we will decide this 
later") (see Stofan and Stultz, 1991), negotiate with experienced managers only, use 
boundary-spanners who understand the viewpoint of both partners (interpreters 
familiar with both cultures may fill a new role by translating not only verbal statements, 
but also non-verbal responses - Shenkar and Ronen, 1993), maintain a written record 
of all discussions and decisions, and to know precisely who the negotiators and the 
authorities are. Shenkar and Ronen (1993) argue that effective negotiation depends 
also on an understanding of the other side's negotiation practices and the avoidance of 
an overiy aggressive behaviour.® 
Eiteman (1990) further proposes that negotiations are carried out in the home country 
since this would save foreign investors' time and accustom the Chinese to the foreign 
partner's business environment. Interestingly, two-thirds of the US managers in 
Frankenstein's (1986) eariier research agreed that the Chinese side manipulates or 
otherwise uses the home court advantage. However, this strategy is not 
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recommended: the Chinese negotiation team differs from the people later working in 
the JV. Therefore, this may not be a sensible strategy. Accordingly, most of the 
German SMEs in Kaiser (1997c) negotiated their JVs exclusively in China. 
Partners' contributions 
When establishing a JV, each firm contributes assets and attributes to it. Mutual 
advantages are combined. As a result, the most successful JVs are those where both 
parties contribute human, commercial and financial resources (Gledhill, 1994). Various 
studies have provided insight into the contributions of both foreign and Chinese 
partners (Aiello, 1991; Woodward and Liu, 1993; Gledhill, 1994; Commerzbank, 1995; 
de Bruijn and Jia, 1997). According to these authors, the foreign partner in a Sino-
foreign JV contributes primarily capital, technology, marketing and management know-
how and access to international markets. On the other hand, the Chinese side supplies 
land, the plant, access to personnel, infrastructure, some machinery and materials. 
As has been established in chapter three, the valuation of both partners' assets and 
attributes frequently causes conflict between the partners. 
6.2.2 Sino-foreign joint venture operation 
The strict distinction between formation and operation phases needs to be re-thought 
in the Sino-foreign JV context. Various authors (Frankenstein, 1986; Aiello, 1991; 
Newman, 1992; Tse et al., 1994) have suggested that the Chinese perceive the actual 
JV operation as a continuation of negotiations. Bearing this in mind, the following 
sections of the chapter discuss the ownership structure, control and management of 
Sino-foreign JVs. 
OwnersA7;p 
In China, foreign companies are permitted to hold shares of between 25 per cent and 
99 per cent of the JV's total equity - although in some industries the upper limit is 
(much) lower (see chapter five of this thesis and Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997, 
chapter six). The equity ownership structure is determined by the contributions of the 
individual JV partners. This is difficult, however, especially when the contribution 
cannot easily be expressed in monetary terms. For instance, what is the value of the 
foreign firm's management know-how and how much is its facilitation of access to 
world markets worth? Equally, how can the good relationship of a Chinese partner with 
government officials be valued? 
Measurement problems are many, but are basically of two types: first, many foreign 
investors do not understand how important a relationship with a government official is 
or could be. Dong et al. (1993) have shown this. Secondly, even if the foreign firm can 
appreciate the importance and essence of the relationship with, for instance, a senior 
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municipal government official, how can this be measured? What was the cost of 
developing the guanxi that the Chinese partner can now bring to the JV? To date, no 
study has mastered or attempted, even, to answer these important questions that 
could help academic researchers and practitioners alike. Ultimately, the value of both 
partners' contributions, assets and attributes, has to be negotiated. However, this 
frequently creates conflict between the partners. 
As has been established in chapter three, JV partners can hold majority, equal or 
minority equity shares. However, It has been outlined in chapter three that equal equity 
splits can easily lead to a deadlock in decision-making. Thus, many Investors opt 
against equal shares In a Sino-foreign JV. For instance, a manager of one of Siemens' 
numerous JVs in China has reportedly suggested that "from my interviews with many 
JVs, 1 can only recommend to pursue the majority stake when negotiating a joint 
business. In any case, a 50-50 equity distribution should be avoided" (Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995, p.29). This manager considers 
even a minority equity position a better solution than an equal distribution between a 
foreign and a Chinese partner, though his first priority is a majority JV stake. 
Whereas more than two-thirds of the US companies in Davidson's (1987) study shared 
the equity ownership of their JVs, the foreign (German) investors In both the studies of 
the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) and 
Commerzbank (1995) had the distinct majority in more than two-thirds and 50 per cent 
of the respondents, respectively. The relative avoidance of equal equity JVs in China 
was found eariier by Beamish and Wang (1989) who discovered that the foreign firms 
in their study of 805^° Sino-foreign equity JVs, had an equal equity split in 31 per cent 
of all cases, whereas they had a minority equity position in 60 per cent of the cases. In 
only 9 per cent had the foreign party a majority equity holding. The predominant 
foreign minority position was later confirmed by Beamish (1993). 
Beamish and Wang's (1989) study was carried out some ten years ago. In the 
meantime, however, the Chinese FDI approval practice has experienced a 
considerable relaxation. This suggests that Beamish and Wang's (1989) findings are 
no longer comparable in terms of their equity distribution between the partners. Later 
findings by Pan (1997) from a study of 373 Sino-Japanese and 653 Sino-US JVs 
confirm this assertion. Over time, the Japanese and US investors have shifted 
gradually from a 50:50 to a majority equity position. This happened especially during 
the period 1991 to 1993, following on from the 1988 to 1990 period when US 
contributions of noticeably less than 50 per cent equity were the norm. 
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Authors have also investigated the equity preferences of investors from different 
foreign countries. Beamish and Wang (1989) revealed that investors from Hong Kong 
seem much more willing to take a minority position than investors from Europe, the US 
or Japan. Whereas a minority share of less than 40 per cent has experienced the 
highest frequency within the group of Hong Kong investors (36.2%), within the groups 
of US, Japanese and European investors the highest frequency was observed with 
equal equity distribution (US: 33.9%, Japan: 46.3%, Europe: 46,7%). The Japanese 
investors in Pan's (1997) study were more likely to own a 50 per cent or higher equity 
share in the JV than US firms (55.2% to 44.4%). 
Joint venture control 
The share of ownership of the JV is perceived as a mechanism of control (Osland and 
Cavusgil, 1996). However, in chapter three it has been shown that ownership and 
control do not necessarily correlate (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1988). Beamish (1993) 
suggests that in LDCs (such as China), foreign firms are typically able to exercise 
greater control than their equity levels would suggest. However, it is unclear whether 
this is due to the nature of their contribution, or to a more sophisticated knowledge of 
the control mechanisms available. Some 17 out of 22 JVs in Beamish's (1993) study 
indicated that split control is most common in China. 
Shenkar (1990), Teagarden (1990) and Beamish (1993) consider it effective to divide 
up control along functional lines. To have one partner making nearly all decisions 
increases the probability of poor JV activity performance in China. The local economy, 
politics and culture in China are so far removed from the experience of most western 
firms and managers, as to make dominant foreign control extremely risky. Similarly, 
the Chinese lack of technology and managerial skills makes their dominant control 
equally risky. Teagarden and von Glinow (1990) observed Sino-foreign JVs that split 
the control of management functions became profitable faster than passive alliance 
forms. However, Ding's (1993) later examination of the linkage between control 
strategy and performance in Sino-US JVs, revealed that effective managerial control 
exercised by the US partner over the JV operation is positively related with the JVs' 
performance. He could not find any significant performance difference between US-
dominant and shared management JVs. 
As a measure of control, Osland and Cavusgil (1996) proposed determination of who 
makes the final decision on prices of the JV's output. In none of the ventures in Osland 
and Cavusgil's (1996) sample of eight Sino-US JVs and a total of 18 organisations in 
the US, China and Hong Kong, was this a Chinese manager. The authors argue that 
the structural variable 'JV size' affects the extent of control desired. In two of the JVs, 
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control is shared, in three the US has dominant control and in three other JVs it is split 
as each side manages the functions that it considers as most important. 
The literature shows that marketing is controlled by the foreign side (Dong et al., 1993; 
Commerzbank, 1995; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996) as controlling marketing and sales 
secures long-term control over the JV. The foreign partner also controlled pricing 
(Osland and Cavusgil, 1996), and production (Commerzbank, 1995; Kim, 1996), 
whereas the human resources issue was considered best taken care of by the Chinese 
(Ireland, 1991; Woodward and Liu, 1993; Dong et al., 1993; Osland and Cavusgil, 
1996; Kim, 1996). Conversely, however, scholars such as Hendryx (1986) and Tai 
(1988) regard retaining control of personnel management as imperative for the 
success of a business in China. 
Kim (1996) argues that the external variables seem to be more important than the 
internal ones in controlling JVs. The partner who controls the external variables 
appears to have more influence on the direction of JV development. It is especially 
noteworthy that the variables close to the market (external-front end) are more 
important than external back-end variables (Kim, 1996). In three cases of Hong Kong 
firms, Kim (1996) revealed that the internal variables are mostly controlled by the 
Chinese, with the exception of production and operation functions. In contrast. In all 
three cases (Kim, 1996), foreign firms had majority control over the external variables. 
However, the findings relate to Hong Kong-based enterprises and the extent to which 
they can be transferred into the context of western firms has to be questioned. Studies 
have shown that Hong Kong FDI is different from that of, for instance, US firms which 
have more in common with the UK and Germany than Hong Kong (Dong et al., 1993). 
Most dissatisfaction with JV performance occurred in the shared-control ventures in 
Osland and Cavusgil's (1996) sample where Chinese governmental bodies controlled 
production and pricing issues. Accordingly, Osland and Cavusgil (1996) insist that the 
sample JVs managed entirely by the US sides ranked as some of the best JVs in 
China, with sales growing strongly, seemingly solid long-term profitability, hard and soft 
technologies being transferred, a harmonious relationship between the partners being 
enjoyed, and stakeholders being very satisfied with the ventures. 
The points of view of different nationalities' with regard to control over decision areas 
were investigated by Dong et al. (1993). The study made the distinction between 
western and Overseas Chinese investors. Its authors found that in both groups, foreign 
partners had much more control over such areas as product planning and quality 
control, and a little more over marketing. On the other side, local partners had more 
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control over production planning, wages and labour policy, and management 
recruitment. Dong et al. (1993) also found that on dividend policy, organisation, 
purchasing, budgeting, accounting as well as export and import, control was roughly 
shared between the partners. Compared with western companies, Overseas Chinese 
were found to have relatively more control over pricing policy, quality control, and 
export and import and to leave more control in the hands of their local partners on 
matters such as wage and labour policy and organisation. They also found that both 
partners co-operated with each other over the decisions on capital expenditure, 
organisation, product planning, budgeting, and loan funds, whereas disagreement 
arose more often in areas of dividend policy and quality control. However, 
disagreement often exists in the decision over pricing policy, accounting, management 
recruitment and marketing. 
Sino-foreign joint venture management 
Managing a JV in China differs from that in developed countries (Zamet and Bovarnick, 
1986) and in other LDCs (Fan, 1996). Hofstede (1991) has argued that contrasting 
cultural characteristics of nations give rise to distinctive patterns of managerial 
behaviour. The hazards of JV management are particulariy intense in Sino-foreign JVs 
due to extreme differences in managerial systems and philosophies (Davidson, 1987). 
It is "indeed frustrating and challenging" as one manager in Davidson's (1987, p.93) 
study of Sino-US JVs stated. An effective management style varies according to 
different cultures and the recognition and understanding of the cultural differences of 
groups helps to solve some of the problems in conducting international business 
(Chow et al., 1987; Campbell, 1989). The key to a JV's success is to be able to find the 
right management approach based on good communication and mutual understanding 
- a right balance between prescribed western management techniques and sensitivity 
to the Chinese culture (Ireland, 1991; Chua and Kin-Man, 1993; Fan, 1996). 
Culture has a profound impact on JV management. In their comparative study of the 
attitudes of Chinese and American managers to JV success, Baird et al. (1990) found 
numerous significant attitudinal differences between 67 American and Chinese 
managers with regard to their management philosophies and their leadership 
behaviour. Differences between American and Chinese management thinking were 
discovered eariier by Nehemkis and Nehemkis (1980) from two cases of Sino-US JVs. 
Baird et al. (1990) further found that Chinese managers regard power relationships in 
their managerial philosophies as important, whereas US managers' management 
philosophies are much more personal, group- and delegation-oriented. Further, 
Chinese managers were less tolerant of ambiguity than their American colleagues. 
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Baird et al. (1990) discovered Chinese managers exercise an impersonal approach 
based on competition, collectivism and an emphasis on authority, whereas the 
Americans regard the involvement of equal-work groups as ideal. A problem affecting 
western managers highlighted by Baird et al. (1990) was vertical communication - the 
system of 'who-reports-to-whom' in the Chinese business. Hendryx (1986) found 
vertical lines of communication being initially stronger than any horizontal patterns 
instituted by a JV management. Von Glinow and Teagarden (1988) found that extreme 
departmentalism inhibits co-operation between individuals and between units. 
From his early study of the Sino-US Tianjin-Otis JV, Hendryx (1986) discovered that 
autonomy among departments produces irrelevant activities and that strong vertical 
lines of communication produce a high degree of regional and inter-bureau rivalry. As 
strategies to combat vertical communication, Hendryx proposes articulation of 
company goals to all departments in the JV in an attempt to get them talking and co-
operating and, in so doing, to integrate their activities to achieve common goals. The 
conflict of loyalty between the venture and the parent companies was also detected by 
Shenkar (1990) as a major JV management problem. As a solution, the Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) recommends the operative 
management of the JV be left with the Chinese. Conversely, Stofan and Stultz (1991) 
insist that the general manager of the JV should be from the foreign party. 
Hendryx (1986) also identified slow decision-making as a problem of JV management. 
He suggests many decision-making difficulties stem from the way the JV's board of 
directors is structured: although the board is the highest authority within the JV, the JV 
is subject to Chinese laws which are administered by bureaucrats. For this reason 
some successful JVs attempt from the very start to strengthen the power of their 
boards and the foreign general manager through negotiation and lobbying. 
Subsequently, Ireland (1991) studied 30 US, European, Hong Kong-based and 
Japanese China investors. The study revealed US and European companies consider 
their management approaches fail to cope with a system where developing and using 
guanxi - facilitated by frequent interactions in both work and social contexts (Chua and 
Kin-Man, 1993) - is necessary to progress. Ireland (1991) discovered that all of the 
companies executed management changes in their JVs with foreign and Chinese 
elements. Many of the companies employed Chinese general managers to fuse foreign 
and domestic management goals. To this end, Davidson (1987) has pointed out that in 
an effort to develop a corps of effective Chinese managers, most JVs have been 
pairing up US and Chinese managers at the same levels. Ireland (1991) detected the 
extent to which Sino-foreign JVs have adopted formalised business procedures, such 
as a structured process for decision-making, varies greatly with the nationality of the 
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foreign partner. Among Hong Kong and European companies, about 50 per cent had 
made serious efforts to install formalised procedures, whereas the US expatriates had 
been frustrated over the slow absorption rate of these practices (Ireland, 1991). 
Child and Markoczy (1993) investigated the behaviour of host country managers in 30 
Sino-foreign JVs with European (11), US (7), Japanese (7) and Kong Kong-based (5) 
partners. The authors revealed that two-thirds of local managers were reluctant to 
make decisions and accept responsibility for their actions, were unwilling to share 
information or provide inadequate information. Also, communication between 
departments was considered very poor. Child and Markoczy also discovered that 29 
foreign partner managers had observed great differences between their home country 
personnel practices and those they were obliged to follow in China. Eleven of the 30 
JVs were able to recruit at their discretion on the open labour market. Others still 
experienced restrictions, especially pressures from local labour bureaux to take on 
people indiscriminately without regard to competence or required numbers. Only three 
of the JVs said that it was straightforward to lay off poor-performing workers. After 
some resistance, two-thirds of the JVs were operating incentive bonus schemes, while 
40 per cent of them had a differential salary system aimed at reflecting responsibility. 
Child and Markoczy (1993) propose Chinese JV managers, who were particulariy 
reluctant to change existing practices and control in human resource management, 
were, conversely, willing to permit the importation of new commercial, financial and 
technical practices and even to accept foreign leadership in those areas. 
Various authors have attempted to profile the Chinese manager (Davidson, 1987; 
Teagarden, 1988; Shenkar, 1990; Ireland, 1991; Woodward and Liu, 1993). China has 
experienced a lack of managers resulting from the Cultural Revolution in the sixties 
and seventies (Hendryx, 1986; von Glinow and Teagarden, 1988; Tsang, 1994). 
Davidson (1987) points out that the Chinese manager does not concern himself with 
the relationship between costs and revenues, that he is very cautious, lacks inter-
departmental communication and has a poor relationship with workers. The author 
refers to the Chinese manager as somebody who implements other people's plans and 
who has an aversion to individual decision-making. This is confirmed in the studies of 
Shenkar (1990), Ireland (1991), and Woodward and Liu (1993). Accordingly, von 
Glinow and Teagarden (1988) found that the Chinese were not responsible for financial 
planning. Whereas Chinese managers are inexperienced in issues such as profit, 
planning, pricing, hiring and firing, cost control and marketing, the younger Chinese 
managers, aged between 30 and 40, were not as burdened by these traits (Woodward 
and Liu, 1993). 
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Worm (1997) from his study of Scandinavian businesses in China confirms this, 
suggesting that it is far from true that decision-making processes are always long and 
drawn-out in Chinese firms, many of which are small and patriarchal ]...[ these types of 
firms, often run by Overseas Chinese, or to an increasing extent by private Chinese 
entrepreneurs, are known to be very flexible, indicating rapid decision-making. Also 
Pearson (1997) in her recent contribution, 'China's new business elite' sheds light on a 
rather diffeijent species of Chinese managers, also in its historical context." 
Frequently, foreign investors expatriate managerial personnel to their JVs in China who 
manage and monitor the local venture. Wu (1993) argues that any firm that does not 
have such resources should avoid using high resources commitment modes to enter 
China. However, expatriate foreign management personnel in JVs in China frequently 
experience problems (Tung, 1982; Campbell, 1989). Tung (1982) suggests an 
expatriate failure in US MNEs of 30 to 40 per cent. Studying US corporate executives 
and their families in China, Tung (1986) discovered they experience problems both 
working and living in the different Chinese cultural environment. Root causes were the 
different Chinese lifestyle, customs and behaviours, inadequate facilities, the Chinese 
attitude toward life and foreigners, food and language difficulties. 
The value of the above studies regarding the expatriation of personnel has been 
depreciating over time. Since the 1980s, when they were conducted and composed, 
the working environment in China has changed drastically and much of what was said 
more than ten years ago, is no longer valid. The situation for expatriates has improved 
remarkably, at least in the major cities along China's East coast. 
One strategy for reducing high expatriate failure is sound preparation of staff due to be 
sent to China, for instance. Not only is it important to familiarise expatriate managers 
with the Chinese language but also with the socio-cultural differences between the 
home country and China (Commerzbank, 1995). Training expatriates for an 
appointment in China needs a special approach far removed from that which is 
applicable to other foreign locations. Eariier, Zamet and Bovarnick (1986) pointed out 
that, since China presents an alien environment, western standard practices need to 
be re-interpreted in order to prove effective. They discovered several characteristics 
that tend to separate foreign company expatriates in China from foreign company 
expatriates elsewhere, including the level of management that is more senior in China. 
Worm (1997) in his study of 19 JVs and two WFOEs with Scandinavian parents 
provides an insight into multiple cultural differences between Chinese staff and 
Scandinavian expatriates. In a total of 44 interviews with managers of both cultural 
traits he establishes a relationship between cultural values (= independent variable) 
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and phenomena affected by cultural values and practices (= dependent variable). 
However, since Worm (1997) limits the applicability of his study to Scandinavians, as 
opposed to Europeans (such as UK and German), its value is not clear. 
6.2.3 Joint venture performance 
Measurements of performance 
The performance of Sino-foreign JVs has been measured in various ways (Beamish, 
1993; Dong et al., 1993; Glaister and Wang, 1993). Additionally, Osland and Cavusgil 
(1996) propose and discuss technology transfer and the export contribution of JVs, ie a 
JV performs if it transfers technology or if it contributes to exporting, although these 
measures seem to be measures applied by the Chinese side, rather than by the 
foreign investors. As in the general international JV context. Tang et al. (1992) have 
criticised the inappropriate application of performance measurement methods in the 
Sino-foreign JV context as well. This is based on validity and reliability problems. 
Interestingly, when assessing the performance of JVs, foreign and Chinese partners 
do not apply the same standards. Tang et al. (1992) noted Chinese partner satisfaction 
ratings were much higher (mean = 7.5) than those of the foreign partners (mean = 
3.5). Osland (1993), who studied the performance of Sino-US equity JVs from the 
perspectives of both US and Chinese managers, came to a similar conclusion. This 
coincides with parallel findings by Dong et al. (1993), who investigated performance 
assessment by both local and foreign partners in Sino-foreign JVs, based on 
profitability, growth, competitor comparison and overall satisfaction. In accordance, 
Osland and Cavusgil (1996), detected that US managers expressed more 
dissatisfaction with their JVs and their partners than did their Chinese counterparts. 
Table 6-1: Findings on JV performance. 
Study Per formance result 
Davidson (1987) More than two-thirds of 47 US enterprises achieved/exceeded 
per formance expectat ions 
Campbe l l (1989) 10 out of 13 Sino-foreign JVs cla imed to have good or very good 
profitability 
E i teman ( 1 9 9 0 ) ' ' 10 out of 17 Sino-US JVs were an economic success 
Pearson (1991) Most of the interviewed managers were posit ive about the JVs' 
per formance 
Stelzer e t a l . (1992) Nearly two-thirds of the Sino-US JVs met /exceeded performance 
expectat ions 
Dong et al . (1993) Foreign partner was satisfied with JV per formance 
Ding (1993) 53 per cent of the Sino-US JVs expressed a high level of 
satisfaction with f inancial per formance 
C o m m e r z b a n k (1995) 47 per cent of the 45 German companies expressed satisfaction 
with the JVs' economic development 
Os land and Cavusgi l 
(1996) 
43 managers and government officials were satisf ied with the 
per formance of eight Sino-US JVs. Each JV in the sample was 
profitable and in seven of the eight cases, profit levels exceeded 
both partners' expectat ions 
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Zhao and Culpepper (1997) in a study of 82 US and 107 Chinese managers aimed at 
ascertaining whether or not US and Chinese managers rate criteria within performance 
dimension groupings similariy. They found support for a greater similarity in 
performance assessment orientations among the two groups of parent managers than 
expected. Manager groups generally show a high level of agreement about which 
performance criteria are most crucial in JV performance assessment. In three of the 
five dimensions tested, ie the financial, marketing and relational dimensions, there was 
a remarkable correspondence in ratings of importance of criteria within dimensions 
suggesting the Chinese are further along the learning curve than previously thought. 
Expression of performance 
Opinion on the actual performance of Sino-foreign JVs is divided. Whereas some 
authors (Davidson, 1987; Kraus, 1989; Campbell, 1989; Eiteman, 1990; Pearson, 
1991; Stelzer et al., 1992; Ding, 1993; Dong et al., 1993; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996) 
report strong performance of JVs, others have not found any evidence of positive JV 
performance. Table 6-1 summarises these findings. 
All the above measures of performance are subjective and individual comparison 
between studies is difficult since good or very good profitability in one study might be 
considered only satisfactory in another. For instance, whereas Stelzer et al.'s (1992) 
foreign investors considered a return on investment (ROI) of 11.6 per cent as 
satisfactory, Cable & Wireless were disappointed by 15.2 per cent (Woodward and Liu, 
1993). Can these JV performance satisfaction measures thus be expressed in 
quantitative terms? Various authors quantified the performance of Sino-foreign JVs. 
And here again, the opinion of the literature is divided. Whereas some sources report 
Sino-foreign JVs are profitable (Brown, 1985; Eiteman, 1990; Stelzer et al., 1992; 
Harwit, 1992; Shaw and Meier, 1993; Ding, 1993; Duffy, 1995; Commerzbank, 1995; 
FT, 25.6.96, p.6; China Daily, 2.11.96, p.3; Asien-Pazifik, 20.1.97, p.8), others point 
out that foreign investors find it difficult to make money with JVs in China (Tai, 1988; 
Shenkar, 1990; Baird et al., 1990; Newman, 1992; Beamish, 1993). Table 6-2 
summarises quantitative findings on JV performance. 
Negative voices about the performance of Sino-foreign JVs include that of Tai (1988, 
p.9). He points out that "whatever money is made by foreign-financed enterprises, it is 
not made in anywhere near the quantity or with anywhere near the ease expected." 
According to Shenkar (1990), many JVs in China seem to have run into major 
difficulties. Table 6-3 summarises the findings of dissatisfactory JV performance. 
Sino-foreign JV performance was also expressed in stability terms. 16 out of 
Beamish's (1993) 22 JVs were relatively stable, though the author does not specify 
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how stable 'relatively stable' ventures are. Conversely, Osland and Cavusgil (1996) 
discovered instability in their sample of Sino-US JVs. 
Table 6-2: Quantitative findings on JV performance. 
S t u d y Performance result 
Ste lzer e t a l . (1992) 60 per cent of the US parents reported a f ive-year-average Rol of 
10 per cent or higher. The overall average w a s 11.6 per cent 
S h a w and Meier (1993) More than half of the foreign investors made a return on sales of 
10 per cent and another third achieved between 6 and 10 per cent 
C o m m e r z b a n k (1995) Nearly half of the 45 Sino-German JVs that were older than two 
years achieved an average profit of 8.5 per cent of turnover after 
tax 
Duffy (1995) 80 per cent of the approximately 6,000 Sino-foreign JVs in 
Shanghai made money, though the average profits were modest at 
about US$150,000 
FT (25.6.96, p.6) Hong Kong investors made return of approximately 25 pe rcen t 
Ch ina Daily (2.11.96, 
p.3); Asien-Pazi f ik 
(20.1.97, p.8) 
The majority of the 500 or so biggest Sino-foreign ventures were 
profitable in 1995 (concentrated in electronics, machinery, food 
processing, texti les, garments, automobi les) 
Reasons for success and failure 
From his study of 47 US firms with JVs in China, Davidson (1987) suggests that JV 
performance depends largely upon qualitative variables such as individual 
personalities, organisational cultures, administration styles and management 
philosophies. This finds confirmation in the work of Tai (1988) who also considers 
cultural variables as important factors for the success or failure of Sino-foreign JVs. 
Subsequently also Beamish and Wang (1989) consider personal attributes as 
important for JV success in China. In detail, a long-term flexible attitude to overcome 
foreign exchange difficulties, to offer China what it needs, to show patience and 
willingness to reconsider some of the traditional methods Chinese have used for the 
execution of business, are considered as success factors for JV activity. 
Table 6-3: Findings on dissatisfactory JV performance. 
S t u d y Performance result 
Beamish (1993) 14 of 22 MNEs assessed the JV per formance as unsatisfactory 
FT (16.2.98, p.2) FIDUCIA (China-based management consul tancy) f inds that 54 
per cent of 96 managers of S ino-European investments in China 
indicated that JVs had performed worse than planned 
Later, Wilpert and Scharpf (1990) researched the factors for success and failure in 
Sino-German JVs and examined the impact of socio-cultural values on the behaviour 
of interacting managerial systems and managers from two different cultures. The 
authors discovered significant differences in the concepts of time, quality, space and 
privacy. While for German managers time was a limited good, it was not for the 
157 
Sino-foreign joint ventures 
Chinese. Tolerance in terms of quality was wider in the Chinese than in the German 
concept and finally, German managers needed more space and privacy than did the 
Chinese managers. For foreign firms to be successful in the Chinese environment, 
acknowledgement of the different cultural setting is of considerable importance. 
Personal qualities, such as sincerity, good faith, honesty and patience were also found 
by Au and Enderwick (1994) from their study of 13 New Zealand SMEs with JVs in 
China as the most important factors for success. In Au and Enderwick's study, 
persona! factors were considered even more important than knowledge of the target 
country, familiarity with the Chinese business practices, good business connections, 
and relationships with Chinese officials. 
On the other hand, there are a variety of factors that constitute problems for foreign 
investors and, in cases, eventually cause JV dissatisfaction, even failure. Economic 
and management problems, including an over-estimation of the Chinese market, low 
labour productivity, unavailability of raw materials, and slow bureaucratic decision-
making were considered to be the most significant difficulties for JV activity in China. 
This by the four UK companies in Woodward and Liu's (1993)" and the 13 New 
Zealand investors in Au and Enderwick's (1994) study, as well as the 96 managers of 
Sino-European investment projects in the FIDUCIA study (FT, 16.2.98, p.2). However, 
problems for foreign JV entrepreneurs were also caused by the country's inadequate 
infrastructure. This was repeatedly suggested by authors, including Tai (1988), Dutta 
and Merva (1990), Woodward and Liu (1993) and Gledhill (1994). 
Hu and Chen (1997) from their research of 2,576 Sino-foreign JVs found that 
performance of such ventures is more dependent upon partner-related factors, such as 
partner commitment, and number of partners than JV- or environment-related factors, 
such as product/industry characteristics and location. In detail, the authors detected a 
positive correlation between the number of partners and performance. The same 
applies to JV duration and total JV investment. However, the authors found the effect 
of control on performance to be insignificant. 
The results of the Au and Enderwick (1994) study have to be treated with caution. Out 
of an initial sample of 13 China investors, only two SMEs 'survived' the JV process and 
reliable insights are thus based on only two respondents. Equally, although the findings 
of the FIDUCIA study are the most recent available, the study only presents 
frequencies of pre-determined answers. New insights into the problems of JVs in China 
of foreign (here European) companies could not be captured by the FIDUCIA study. A 
more qualitative approach could have met this methodological shortcoming. 
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According to Davidson's (1987) and Kohler and Wascher's (1989) eariy investigations 
of the difficulties of joint venturing in China, problems were more technical in nature. 
These included staffing, operational procedures, transfer pricing, sourcing, technology 
selection, dividend policy, product line, pricing, cost/investment allocation, market 
priorities and management control. Kohler and Wascher (1989) investigated the 
problems of 14 German enterprises during the formation of their JVs in China. The 
authors split the JV development process into five phases: initiation, negotiation, 
waiting, implementation and operation. Found to cause difficulties for German 
investors in China were the long duration and cost of negotiations, unclear instances, 
and the limited competencies and responsibilities exercised by the Chinese institutions 
and bureaucracy. The authors found relatively few problems in the implementation 
phase, though they were more severe. They included language and translation 
problems. Kohler and Wascher (1989) also discovered numerous problems with input 
factors for production in China, with Chinese managers and pioneering personnel 
being the most frequently stated. 
Later, Shenkar (1990), studying the cases of three Sino-foreign JVs,^'' found that many 
of the problems experienced by the JVs were a product of their structural complexity 
rather than the cultural and political differences between the foreign and the Chinese 
parent environments. Shenkar's (1990) cultural impact-neglecting statement was 
rather new in the international JV literature. However, the author's simplistic framework 
fails to assess the differential weight of cultural, economic, political and legal factors. 
Furthermore it lacks differentiation between different types of JVs, eg different 
ownership constellations. In accord with Shenkar (1990), Bennet and Zhao's (1995) 
UK companies reported cultural and management difficulties to be less of an issue in 
the transfer of technology to China than negotiations, habit and bureaucracy. 
Conversely, from a survey of 121 of the 250 largest listed companies in the UK with 
direct investments in Ch ina ,G ledh i l l (1994) proposes cultural issues, legal and 
regulatory aspects as the major difficulties for foreign (UK) companies when investing 
in China. This is supported by findings in the study of the Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). However, there is no ranking provided. As 
a result, it can only be assumed that the order of presentation corresponds with the 
order of importance. Operational issues that were all too important in Shenkar's (1990) 
research were less weighty than in that of Gledhill (1994) and the Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). 
Interestingly, language difficulties were a problem for only a few of the respondents in 
Gledhill's (1994) study. However, he fails to provide details for this: Did the companies 
consider the language barrier as not too important? Did their partners in the Chinese 
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companies all speak English? Or had their own staff a good command of the Chinese 
language? No answers are given to these questions, indicating, again, the dominant 
positivist approach of studies, such as those of Gledhill (1994) and of the Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). Conversely, Frankenstein (1986), 
Eiteman (1990) and Ireland (1991) categorised the lack of language skills as a major 
obstacle to the smooth operation of Sino-foreign JVs. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Chapter six has developed further the JV model framework that has been designed in 
chapter three of this thesis. Fan's (1996) JV research framework comes closest, 
meeting the requirements of an analytical JV model being used in this thesis to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the entry strategy for UK and German SMEs into the 
Chinese market. Various authors have written on issues in the joint venturing of foreign 
investors in China. However, only few have carried out research into the joint venturing 
in China of SMEs - an unsurprising result, bearing in mind the literature on SME 
internationalisation (chapter two) and international JVs (chapter three). 
The greatest difference between the literature on international JVs, and in particular 
those in mature market economies ]...[ of Killing (1983) and Harrigan (1985) is that a 
demarcation line between the formation and operation phases in the model cannot be 
drawn. Instead, the operation phase in a Sino-foreign JV is a continuation of the 
formation phase of such a venture. 
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Notes 
' In his work of 1985, Beamish dist inguished between countr ies based on their state of 
deve lopment . For detai ls see the characterist ics in Beamish (1985). Addit ional characterist ics 
are: origin of investment, announced JVs actually enacted, use of JVs versus other modes of 
invo lvement , use of JVs with a pre-determined durat ion. 
' T w o d imensional matr ix with two poles, JV status and content. 
^ The number of studies w a s 32. 
" The study was carr ied out in 1996 by Jan Bulk and analysed and written up by the 
candidate . It w a s finally publ ished by the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Shangha i in 1997. 
* Publ ished as 'Direkt invest i t ionen in China - ein Handbuch fur den Mittelstand' in 1997, 
joint ly by the Delegat ion of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai and the German 
Assoc ia t ion of Chambers of Commerce (DIHT), Bonn. 
^ The l i terature on Sino-foreign JVs has suggested a variety of advantages, including a faster 
real isat ion of sales vo lumes, compared with WFOEs , greater revenues, lower costs and less 
risk, creat ion of power vis-a-vis competi tors, faster project approval through the help of a 
local partner, preferent ial t reatment with regard to raw material sourcing, and with the 
recru i tment of personnel and managers (Newman, 1992; Gledhil l , 1994; Delegation of 
G e r m a n Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995; Osland and Cavusgi l , 1996). The 
Delegat ion of Ge rman industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995), in its sun/ey of 165 
G e r m a n compan ies of which 120 were already active in China, also insisted on the 
preferent ia l t reatment of Sino-foreign JVs with regard to taxes, importation regulat ions and 
legal condi t ions. However , during the past few years preferential t reatments have been 
gradual ly w i thdrawn by the Chinese government. The latter study's emphasis on German 
f i rms in Hong Kong with operat ions in mainland China, its al l -embracing approach 
( investment forms, location analysis, industry and regional focus, motivations) and its 
exc lus ive posit ivist approach, limit the applicability of its f indings. 
O n the Chinese side, JVs are we lcome since they co-develop China's economy through the 
t ransfer of technology, the acquisit ion of managerial skills, influx of capital, infrastructure 
deve lopmen t and generat ion of foreign exchange (Daniels et al. , 1985; Stofan and Stultz, 
1 9 9 1 ; Tang e t a l . , 1992; Woodward and Liu, 1993; de Bruijn and Jia, 1993; Dong e t a l . , 1993; 
Delegat ion of Ge rman Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995; Osland and Cavusgi l , 
1996) . Thoburn et a l . (1990) argue that, compared with compensat ion trade arrangements, 
JVs int roduce to China new, instead of second-hand, equipment. To this end, von Gl inow and 
Teaga rden (1988) as wel l as Dutta and Merva (1990) highlight the Chinese' exclusive interest 
in 'state-of- the-art ' technology. The Chinese feel cheated, so found Kohler and Wascher 
(1989) , if the foreign partner wants to bring in older, though more adequate, machines. It is 
not surpr is ing perhaps that Davidson (1987) and de Bruijn and Jia (1993b) found that US and 
Japanese f i rms, respect ively were reluctant to transfer technology to China since they fear 
that Ch ina, once it has the 'state-of-the-art ' technology, could become a competi tor. On the 
other hand, Bennet t and Zhao (1995) in a study of 207 UK companies of which 75 were 
a l ready engaged in transferr ing technology to China and the others having expressed an 
interest in doing so, d iscovered that UK companies were much more will ing to transfer their 
technology and bel ieved that the condit ions for doing so have improved. 
In fact, technology transfer into China has attracted considerable interest among the research 
commun i t y (Duscha, 1987; Roessner et al. , 1992; Woodward and Liu, 1993; Jia, 1993; de 
Brui jn and Jia, 1993, b; Tsang, 1994). Duscha (1987) investigated the character ist ics, forms, 
locat ions and consequences of transferring technology to China through co-operat ion 
be tween Chinese and foreign enterprises, focusing on 22 Sino-foreign equity JVs. Duscha's 
(1987) study, whi le responsible for opening the discussion into a variety of issues of FDI in 
Ch ina, is rather dated, like Campbel l 's (1989) work. These studies carr ied out in the 1980s 
canno t be more than a start ing point for research in many aspects, al though Campbel l (1989, 
p.2) refers to his work as the "most comprehensive analysis of equity JVs in China yet 
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publ ished." The investment f ramework in China has since changed drastical ly: investment 
priori t ies have changed and so have preferential t reatments for foreign investors, labour 
regulat ions, etc. as wel l as the condit ions for expatr iates, for instance. Furthermore, 
Campbel l ' s (1989) work does not provide a distinction in the data of, for instance UK and 
G e r m a n investments, or even between European and other O E C D investors. 
Later, Tsang (1994) establ ished a f ramework for analysing the factors wh ich influence the 
mode of international technology transfer, defining the best strategic opt ions for transferring 
technology for large enterpr ises as wel l as SMEs. He found that, unlike W F O E s , JVs enable 
the Chinese to share the management with the foreign partner and to receive comprehensive 
on- the- job training in corporate management . Equally, JVs are the only vehicles of 
technology transfer that al low foreign f i rms to part icipate in the Chinese market whi le keeping 
contro l over the activit ies. Lan (1996) crit icised the low eff iciency of JVs in transferring 
technology to China. However, the general applicabil ity of Lan's s tatement must be 
cha l lenged: the study is conf ined to a sample of 172 investors (JVs and W F O E s ) f rom Hong 
Kong, Macao and Ta iwan, 115 f rom Japan and 74 f rom western nat ions in the Northeastern 
Ch inese city of Dal ian, exclusively. Legal aspect studies on technology transfer include Seid 
(1996) , Hill and Evans (1996), S impson (1996), Birden (1996) and Savona (1996). 
De Bruijn and Jia (1997), on the contrary, shed light on the JV in China of the late 1990s 
whe re such a strategy faces new economic and legal condit ions which require changes in the 
way exist ing JVs operate and new JVs are structured. 
^ For a d iscussion of the advantages and d isadvantages of both strategies see Kaiser and 
G r i m m et al . (1997, chapter nine). 
^ Another study that invest igates the negotiat ion process involving US execut ives is Adler et 
a l . (1996). However, the study does not offer relevant new insight. 
^ A comprehens ive set of negotiat ing recommendat ions for preparing, carrying out and 
conclud ing negot iat ions is provided in Shenkar and Ronen (1993). 
' ° The total sample consisted of 840 JVs. 
See also and Darby (1995) on .management and customer orientat ion in Sino-foreign JVs'. 
^2 E i temann (1990) surveyed 25 US companies that were involved in negotiat ions with 
Ch inese. 18 f i rms eventual ly establ ished a JV. Of those, one f i rm abandoned it before an 
assessmen t was possible. 
" Th ree UK compan ies had a JV and one a compensat ion trade a g r e e m e n t 
Hewlet t -Packard China Ltd., Ramada Renaissance Guil in, Hubei Pig Improvement 
Company Ltd. 
Compan ies other than those with a totally domest ic business. 3 1 % of the companies have 
a l ready invested in China. 3 7 % plan to do so. 5 3 % of the investors have done so with JVs. 
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Chapter Seven 
Survey Results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the questionnaire surveys carried out in the UK 
and in Germany. In cases (UK-2, UK-6 and UK-7), the survey findings are 
supplemented by in-depth information derived from interviews with managerial 
personnel at these small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).^ The structure of this 
chapter follows the research pattern of the JV framework that has been developed in 
chapters three and six. The data from the questionnaire surveys in the UK and in 
Germany are analysed two-dimensionally: first, with respect to the nationality of the 
SMEs and, second, with respect to the firm size of the companies. Thereby two size 
categories are established as in eariier research by Braun (1982), for instance. The 
firm size category one (Size One) has between one and 200 employees and the firm 
size category two (Size Two) between 201 and 500 employees. The distribution of the 
UK and German SMEs, according to this categorisation is indicated in table 7-1. 
Contingency analysis of the data shows that there is no significant relationship 
between the criteria 'nationality' and 'firm size'.^ 
Table 7-1: Distribution of SMEs according to nationality and firm size. 
Firm size category UKSIVIEs German SIVIEs I 
Size One (1-200) 4 6 10 
Size Two (201 - 500) 4 5 9 
Mv 1 1 2 
Z 9 12 21 
Note: mv = missing va lue. 
For reasons of confidentiality, the names of the UK and German SMEs have been 
disguised. Instead, these companies are referred to as UK-1 to UK-9 and GER-1 to 
GER-12, respectively, and these companies' joint venture (JV) operations as UK-1-JV 
to UK-9-JV and GER-1-JV to GER-12-JV. Equally, the German case study firm (see 
chapters four and eight) is referred to as GER-0 and its JV as GER-O-JV. The 
individual products and locations of the JVs have been disguised, too. This has been 
considered necessary due to the (perceived) relatively small number of UK and 
German SME investment projects in China. 
The survey data presented in this chapter is analysed applying frequency analysis. 
Similarities and differences between the responses of each of the two groups of SMEs 
(UK - German; Size One - Size Two) are analysed for their significance by applying 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient.^ 
Survey results 
The subsequent chapter eight cross analyses four cases of UK and German SMEs 
with JVs in China, including GER-0, UK-3, UK-4 and UK-8. In chapter nine, the survey 
and case study findings are discussed. 
It is worth noting the respondents have not always consistently answered all questions, 
particulariy when they were asked for financial information which included turnovers, 
investment figures and expatriate remuneration. In these cases, missing values were 
accepted and these are indicated in the tables containing the survey data by 'mv'. 
7.2 Survey results 
7.2.1 S M E background information 
Ownersliip 
Of the nine UK SMEs, eight were limited liability companies and one was a public 
limited company. In contrast, nine of the 12 German SMEs were organised as limited 
liability companies (German equivalent = GmbH) and three as limited partnerships 
(German equivalent = KG). 
Industry 
All nine UK SMEs were engaged in manufacturing; seven of those in mechanical 
engineering, one in electronics and another one in construction. Ten of the German 
SMEs operate in manufacturing and two in services. Of the manufacturers, six were 
active in mechanical engineering, three in electronics and one in textiles. Kaiser and 
Grimm et al. (1997) suggest that investments in the automotive, machine building and 
electronics industries are relatively most frequently represented by German 
companies. For instance, of the total of 293 German-funded investment projects in 
China that were examined, 18 per cent were active in the machine building industry 
and 17 per cent in electronics. A further 4 per cent of the companies were operating in 
the textiles industry. Comparison of the empirical findings in this thesis and the eariier 
findings by Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997) suggest, therefore, agreement in their 
individual distribution of investment projects, particularly as many automotive 
investments in the Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997) classification could be classified as 
mechanical engineering investments in a broader sense. 
A substantially different industry structure was identified by Thoburn et al. (1990) 
studying the experiences of Hong Kong firms in China. He discovered investment • 
industry sectors, including footwear, textiles and clothing, food, metal products, 
services and electronics. This suggests that Hong Kong firms entered China more 
often due to its availability of cheap labour, rather than its market prospects. 
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Number of employees 
On average, the UK SMEs employ more personnel than the German SMEs. The UK 
firms had an average workforce of 237 employees. In detail, four firms had up to 200 
employees and four firms had between 201 and 500 employees." One UK respondent 
refused to release information. The eleven German SMEs that provided information 
employed, on average, 217 staff. In detail, six companies had up to 200 employees 
and five had between 201 and 500 employees. 
Countries of activity 
Of the UK SMEs, none was active in fewer than ten countries. Detailed statements are 
not possible, however, since the respondents did not specify which countries, exactly, 
they were doing business in. Instead they indicated that they were active in more than 
ten, more than 40, 60, 100 countries or active worldwide. The same applies to the 
German SMEs. For instance, three German SMEs indicated that they were active 
worldwide, two were operating in Europe and another two specified Europe by adding 
West and East. Two SMEs were operating in the US and Europe and, additionally, in 
Africa and Asia, respectively. Only three respondents quantified their answers, 
suggesting that they were active in more than ten, more than 40 and more than 50 
countries, respectively. 
With regard to size of the participating firms, the data do not suggest a meaningful 
trend. Although, within the UK SMEs, Size One SMEs were active worldwide or in 
more than 40 countries, similar answers were provided by the larger firms and the 
same applies to the German SMEs. 
Foreign operations 
The JV in China was the sole foreign operation for three UK SMEs. The remaining 
firms had either a second JV, a representative office or a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE), in addition to their China-based JV. In contrast, most (six) of the 
German SMEs only had their JV in China. The other SMEs had a representative office, 
another JV or a WFOE. As the literature in chapter two suggests, the smaller SMEs 
have fewer foreign operations compared with the larger firms. None of the smaller UK 
SMEs had a WFOE. Less clear is the relationship in the case of the German SMEs. 
Whereas four smaller SMEs have one JV, only one has, in addition, a representative 
office and another one has a second JV. Comparable findings result from the German 
Size Two SMEs with the notable exception that one of these firms had two WFOE and 
two JVs (table 7-2). 
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Table 7-2: SME background information. 
Dimension U K S M E s German SMEs 
Ownerstlip 8 * Ltd.; 1 * Pic 9 * GmbH; 3 * KG 
Industry 7 * mech. eng.; 1 * electr.; 1 * 
construct. 
6 * mech. eng.; 3 * electr.; 1 * 
textiles; 2 * services 
Number of employees 237 (average) 217 (average) 
7.2.2 Ch ina exper ience 
Of the UK SMEs, one liad 17 years of business experience with China prior to 
engaging in its JV while others had ten, eight and five years. One SIVIE did not specify 
this, but indicated that it had been "exporting machinery for several years." Three UK 
companies had no prior experience with China. Of the German SMEs, all but two had 
previous experience of doing business with China in the form of exporting (4), 
exporting and licensing (3), licensing (1), joint venturing (1) and buying (1). The smaller 
UK SMEs did not have considerable experience with China prior to engaging in their 
JV. This appears to contradict the staged approach of internationalisation examined in 
chapter two. There it has been outlined that especially smaller firms would gain 
experience through other marketing sen/icing means before engaging in a JV. The 
German SMEs did not specify the length of their export commitment, making it 
impossible to correlate firm size and the duration of the enterprises' China 
commitment. 
7.2.3 Joint venture formation 
Joint venture planning 
The eight UK SMEs that answered the question of how they had planned their China 
JV, insisted that they planned their JV project in about the same way as their other 
projects elsewhere. The mean value was 3.4 on a scale from one to five, whereas one 
indicated that the project was planned much better than its operations are usually 
planned. Five SMEs stated that the JV project in China was not planned as well as 
operations are usually planned. The JVs of the eight German SMEs that answered this 
question, were also planned in a similar manner as the German SMEs' other 
operations elsewhere. However, the mean rating here was 2.6 suggesting a tendency 
that the German SME JVs were perceived to be planned slightly better than the UK 
SME JVs. The analysis of the data further showed that Size Two firms perceived that 
the planning of their operations was slightly better (mean rating = 2.9) than their usual 
operations, than Size One firms did (3.1). This confirms findings in the literature 
(chapter three) suggesting that there is a tendency that the accuracy of planning 
diminishes with decreasing firm size. 
166 
Survey results 
UK-7's company executives carried out on-site research (market and environment) 
while participating in a UK department of trade and industry (DTI)-sponsored trade 
mission to China. UK-2 which intended to target industrial clients, merely thought that 
"you need to test your material and products if you want to manufacture in China." A 
formal business plan, however, was never produced. This was also the case with UK-6 
whose business plan estimated that there was a market that would absorb 40 units of 
equipment in the first year and 100 units in the second year. However, the figures were 
rather vague and not based on any solid market evaluation. 
Motivations for production in Cfiina 
This question consisted of two parts, to satisfy the requirement of motivation 
exploration outlined in sections 3.2.1 and 6.3.1 of chapters three and six, respectively. 
While the first question asked why the SMEs engaged in an FDI project, the second 
explored why they had chosen a JV instead of a WFOE. 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
As table 7-3 reveals, the most important motivation of both the UK and German SMEs 
was access to the vast Chinese market. The market motive was also suggested in 
chapter two as motivation for SMEs to seek a foreign investment project. Of a total of 
21 UK and German SMEs, only two companies sought local manufacture to service 
export markets exclusively. A further important motivation for the SMEs was the fact 
that an FDI presence in the Chinese market would allow them to enter the market 
faster. Reaction times are much shorter if a firm is present locally. Consumer needs 
can be recognised and implemented faster than with exporting, since the flow of 
information through the export channel takes much longer. 
Table 7-3; Motivations for engaging in an FDI project in China. 
Motivations UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Potential market 1.3 1 9 1.8 1 12 1.3 1 10 1.8 1 11 
Strategic Asia-Pacific position 1.8 2 9 2.2 4 11 2.0 3 10 2.0 2 10 
Cheap labour 2.2 3 9 1.8 1 12 1.9 2 10 2.1 3 11 
Faster market entry 2.4 4 9 2.3 5 12 2.1 4 10 2.5 5 11 
Necessary to be there 2.9 5 7 1.9 3 11 2.4 5 9 2.1 3 9 
Overcome import duty 2.9 5 8 3.4 7 10 3.1 8 9 3.2 7 9 
Following customers 3.0 7 7 5.0 9 9 4.1 9 7 4.1 9 9 
Raw materials 3.1 8 8 2.5 6 11 2.9 6 9 2.7 6 10 
Approached by PRC 3.1 8 7 3.8 8 9 3.0 7 7 3.9 8 9 
Key: I = impor tance, R = rank, n = respondents, r^p ^^f - .7792; r^ p j i^e 
.5833; r^ p en, ( a = . 0 1 ) = .7667. 
.9292; r3p (a = .05) 
The SMEs further considered the necessity 'to be there' as an important motivation for 
engaging in FDI activity in China. Also the UK and German SMEs considered the 
availability of cheap labour as important. Cost competitive manufacturing in the 
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Chinese market would also allow the SMEs to establish a strategic position from where 
to service neighbouhng markets in Asia. 
Both UK and German SMEs considered the bypassing of the imposition of import 
duties to be moderately important. Also, the UK and German SMEs would, as a trend, 
not shift production to China for reasons of raw material availability. Equally, most 
SMEs did not move to China because of the approach by a Chinese organisation. 
Finally, the UK and German SMEs did not move to China-based production because 
they followed a customer. 
Overall, the perceived importance of the motivations of the UK and German SMEs for 
establishing an FDI presence is statistically similar at the 5 per cent significance level 
(rsp_na. = .7792). 
The Chinese market's vast potential, the establishment of a strategic position within 
the Asia-Pacific region and the availability of cheap labour were also amongst the most 
important motivations for establishing an FDI presence of both Size One and Size Two 
SMEs. With a correlation coefficient of r^ p si^e = .9292 the ranking of the importance of 
the individual FDI establishment motivations suggests similarity at both the 5 per cent 
and the 1 per cent significance levels. 
This suggests that neither nationality nor firm size significantly influence the perception 
of the importance of motivations for establishing a direct investment operation in 
China. However, nationality is more likely to be a discriminator between the SMEs. 
Motivations to form a joint venture 
Table 7-4: Motivations to form a JV instead of a WFOE. 
IVIotivations U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Partner's Cliina business knovi^l. 1.8 1 9 2.8 12 11 2.6 10 9 2.2 1 11 
Required by PRC 2.0 2 8 2.7 10 10 2.2 5 9 2.8 8 9 
Smootti way througti bureaucr. 2.2 3 9 2.2 4 10 1.8 2 10 2.7 6 9 
Partner's l<nowledge of customer 2.3 4 9 2.1 3 12 2.2 5 10 2.2 1 11 
Less financial input 2.4 5 9 1.7 1 10 1.6 1 8 2.4 3 11 
Strat. action to pre-empt compet. 2.4 5 9 3.0 15 8 2.0 3 8 3.1 11 9 
Favourable government treatm. 2.6 7 9 2.6 9 9 2.3 7 9 2.8 8 9 
Limitation of risk 2.6 7 9 2.4 5 8 2.3 7 8 2.7 6 9 
Less management input 2.8 9 9 2.0 2 10 2.1 4 9 3.0 10 10 
Overcoming national, prejudice 3.0 10 9 2.4 5 9 4.7 16 7 2.5 5 13 
Access to raw materials 3.1 11 8 2.5 7 11 3.0 12 10 2.4 3 9 
Political insurance 3.2 12 9 2.8 12 9 2.9 11 10 3.1 11 8 
Sharing of distribution channels 3.3 13 8 2.5 7 11 2.5 9 10 3.2 14 9 
Access to partner's skills 3.7 14 9 2.7 10 10 3.2 13 9 3.1 11 10 
Trade union relationship 4.1 15 9 4.2 16 11 4.1 15 10 4.2 16 10 
Access to partner's technology 4.2 16 9 2.9 14 12 3.5 14 10 3.5 15 11 
Key: I = importance, R = rank, n = respondents, r 
. 4 2 6 5 ; r3p_„i, ( a = . 0 1 ) = . 5 8 2 4 . 
sp_nal . 3 4 1 2 : r s p . s i z e = . 3 4 1 5 ; r^p^i , ( a = . 05 ) = 
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The reasons for the UK and German SMEs to exploit the Chinese market potential and 
cheap labour in the form of a JV (table 7-4) were substantially different at the 5 per 
cent significance level ( r j p nat = .3412). The UK SMEs decided, first and foremost, to 
joint venture because of the potential Chinese partner's business knowledge, its ability 
to smooth the way through the Chinese bureaucracy and its knowledge of customers. 
In other words, the UK SMEs sought attributes of their potential Chinese partners. The 
SMEs believed that their potential Chinese partners would contribute something to the 
JV that the SMEs could not provide themselves. 
UK-6 had considered the alternative of setting up a WFOE for "about five minutes 
only." The main reason for rejecting this strategy was the lack of knowledge of the 
Chinese market and the culture which would have meant recruiting "a lot of Chinese 
management capacity." From engaging in a JV, the UK SME expected cultural 
guidance through local operation conditions, local labour laws and factory regulations 
and better access to local customers. Also UK-2 sought the Chinese element which 
could open doors for the UK SME that "would otherwise be closed." 
An interesting aspect is that the UK SMEs engaged in JV activity because they felt that 
this was required by the Chinese government. This argument ranked surprisingly high 
(second). 
The German SMEs' most important motivations for engaging in a JV were rather 
different from the UK SMEs'. It seems that the German SMEs were seeking, first and 
foremost, assets rather than the attributes of their potential Chinese partners. In detail, 
the German SMEs considered establishing a JV because they could save financial and 
managerial resources as established in chapter two, as the critical 'ingredients' for 
SME internationalisation. The empirical findings within the group of UK SMEs suggests 
that for them, the resource inputs of the potential Chinese partners are less important. 
This contradicts the findings in the literature in chapter six. 
For some UK SMEs the Chinese partner's potential resource contribution was an 
important argument. UK-6, for example, hoped to be able to expand with only a 
reduced management commitment and UK-7's prime reason for not going it alone in 
China was that a WFOE would have required a large amount of capital. However, UK-
7 also lacked the essential contacts and did not have the management talent in order 
to "run the show on the spot." This particular case confirms the opinion of the literature 
in chapter two, as why enterprises engage in a JV rather than a WFOE. 
With regard to the partner's knowledge of customers and its ability to smooth the way 
through bureaucracy, the attitudes of both UK and German SMEs towards JVs were 
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similar. However, what was most important for the UK SMEs (business knowledge and 
the requirements of the Chinese government), was only of medium importance to the 
German SMEs. 
Both groups of SMEs further sought to limit financial and business risk and hoped to 
be granted favourable government treatment through joining forces with a Chinese 
company. UK-6 believed that the Chinese government would grant favourable 
treatment in terms of tax reductions, protective tariffs, foreign exchange regulations 
and input permits. However, the respondent could not specify where exactly these 
favourable treatments had appeared. Apparently, the potential Chinese partner had 
indicated this or the SME had done some reading about investment locations in China. 
It appears also that the UK SME had no sound understanding of the provision of 
location incentives, revealing a clear lack of in-depth research on the part of the SME. 
The UK and German SMEs showed further similarities: they do not desire the Chinese 
partner's technology, do not appreciate the potential partner's trade union relationships 
nor the Chinese company's skills and they do not believe that having a Chinese 
partner works as political insurance. However, UK-6 feared the risk of expropriation 
and considered the JV as political insurance. The SME anticipated political conflicts, 
such as escalating disputes with the US over issues of intellectual property rights. 
Also Size One and Size Two SMEs showed significant differences at the 5 per cent 
significance level with respect to the ranking of the perceived importance of individual 
motivations for engaging in a JV, instead of a WFOE {rsp_s\ze = 3415). Whereas for Size 
Two SMEs the partner's China business knowledge is the most important, it is only the 
tenth important for Size One SMEs. Equally important for Size Two SMEs was the 
partner's knowledge of customers and the third most important motivation for this 
group of SMEs was the fact that joint venturing demands less financial input and an 
easier access to raw materials. On the other hand, the most important motivation for 
Size One SMEs was the partner's contribution of finance and its ability to smooth the 
way through bureaucracy. Size One SMEs also considered their JV establishment as a 
move towards pre-empting competition. 
With regard to the least important motivations for engaging in a JV, both Size One and 
Size Two SMEs showed considerable agreement. They did not engage in a JV solely 
to get access to the partner's skills or its technology or because of the partner's 
relationship with trade unions. 
Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
According to table 7-5, for both the UK and the German SMEs, the approach by a 
Chinese company was the most important way of finding a partner, although a Chinese 
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company's approach was only of minor importance for engaging in an FDI project in 
the first place (see table 7 - 3 ) . 
UK-7 was approached by Chinese authorities that were searching for a company to 
team up with to manufacture INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. The idea of joint 
venturing with a Chinese company that was sought by the port authorities of CITY 
[North China] with help from the relevant Chinese ministry was so new for UK-7 and 
inevitably linked with one particular Chinese company that an alternative partner was 
never considered. 
Table 7 - 5 : Ways of finding the partner. 
Way of finding partner UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
F R F R F R F R 
Approached by Chinese side 3 1 4 1 2 2 5 1 
Partner was agent 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Chinese organisation helped 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 5 
Home organisation helped 1 4 0 6 1 4 0 6 
Other 1* 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 
Partner met at trade fair in China 0 6 2 2 0 6 2 2 
Partner met at trade fair at home 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 
Alternative partners for choice 6 9 7 8 
Key: F = frequency, R = rank, n = respondents. Comment: * "sought them ourselves." r^ p ,,3, = 
. 5 1 3 6 ; r,p_3ize = - 2 0 7 5 ; r^ p , , , ( a = . 0 5 ) = . 6 7 8 6 ; r3p_„, ( a = . 0 1 ) = . 8 5 7 1 . 
An important way of finding a partner for a later JV for both the UK and the German 
SMEs was also the teaming up with a former agent of the SME. This strategy saves 
time, management and finance. One of UK-2's two partners in the JV, a Taiwanese 
company, had been a good agent acting on behalf of the UK SME in Taiwan. The 
Taiwanese company had carried out "one or two businesses" in China. Thus, UK-2 
relied on the Taiwanese company to find a potential Chinese partner to team up with. 
UK-2 did not consider alternatives itself A similar situation applies to UK-7 that also 
has two partners. The SME had known its Singaporean partner as an agent "long and 
well and the Singaporean company introduced the whole thing to us." Both UK SMEs 
relied on their Taiwanese and Singaporean partners, respectively, to select an 
appropriate Chinese partner company. 
The UK and German SMEs also reported the helping hand of a Chinese organisation 
as having contributed to finding the JV partner. However, this proves a risky strategy 
since Chinese organisations represent their own interests, rather than those of UK or 
German SMEs when proposing a Chinese partner company to them. 
Whereas UK-2 and UK-7 had their Taiwanese and Singaporean partners, respectively, 
who searched for, and selected, a Chinese company to team up with, UK-6 did its own 
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homework. Although the SME had been exporting machinery to China for some years, 
it had not established any relationship with its current partner prior to forming the JV. 
However, the county where UK-6 is located has close ties with the government of the 
Chinese partner's province and had sent various UK delegations to China. During such 
visits, managers of UK-6 had met the Vice Governor of PROVINCE and established 
contacts. Later, the UK SME had been sent a list of machine tool companies obtained 
from the central government from which the company selected and visited three. 
Overall, a correlation coefficient of rjp nat = 5136 suggests that the ranking of the 
importance of ways of finding a partner as perceived by the UK and German SMEs is 
rather different at a significance level of 5 per cent. 
The analysis of the perceived importance of ways of finding a Chinese partner with 
respect to firm size suggests, at the 5 per cent level, an even more significant 
difference with a coefficient of r^p_size = .2075. Whereas the approach by the Chinese 
side and the partner being a former agent were similarly suggested rather frequently 
by both groups of SMEs, the helping hand of a Chinese organisation was accepted 
more often by Size One SMEs than by Size Two SMEs. However, in cases where a 
partner was met at a trade fair in China, the situation was reported to be the reverse. 
No Size One SME met its later partner during such an event in China, whereas two 
Size Two SMEs did so. In none of the cases was the partner met at a trade fair in the 
home countries of the UK and German SMEs. This applies to both Size One and Size 
Two firms. 
Partner selection criteria 
Table 7-6: Partner selection criteria. 
Selection criteria UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Trust between top management 1.7 1 6 1.8 1 11 1.4 1 9 2.1 1 8 
Reputation 2.0 2 6 2.4 6 9 1.8 2 8 2.9 6 7 
Links to officials 2.1 3 7 2.1 3 11 1.8 2 8 2.4 4 10 
Location of partner 2.2 4 6 1.9 2 12 1.8 2 9 2.2 3 9 
Size of partner 2.3 5 6 3.1 8 12 2.6 7 9 3.1 8 9 
Products of partner 2.3 5 7 2.1 3 12 2.2 5 9 2.1 1 10 
Provision of local currency 2.3 5 7 2.9 7 12 2.6 7 9 2.8 7 10 
Complementary resources 2.4 8 7 2.3 5 12 2.3 6 9 2.6 5 10 
Access to technology 3.5 9 6 3.9 9 10 3.4 9 7 4.0 9 9 
Key: I - importance, R = rank, n = respondents, r, 
. 5 8 3 3 ; r 3 p „ , ( a = . 0 1 ) = . 7 6 6 7 . 
,p_„3 , = . 6 4 5 7 ; r3p_3^e = 7 4 4 1 ; (a = . 05 ) 
As table 7-6 reveals, the most important criterion for partner selection for the UK and 
German SMEs was trust between the top management teams. Trust was deemed to 
be even more important than certain assets or attributes. As has been established 
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above (see table 7 - 5 ) past favourable association was the second most important way 
of finding the later JV partner. The UK and German SMEs also show similarities when 
they value a potential partner's links to officials or its location or the partner's range of 
products. All these selection criteria were important to both groups of SMEs. 
The UK and German SMEs show discrepancies with respect to criteria such as partner 
reputation and size of the partner. The reputation of the Chinese partner is more 
important and its size considerably more important to the UK SMEs than it is to the 
German SMEs to whom size is only of medium importance. Findings with respect to 
motivations for JV activity suggest that the German SMEs looked more at the Chinese 
partner's complementary resources than did the UK SMEs, although in both cases this 
criterion was important for partner selection. Surprisingly, however, the potential 
Chinese partner's ability to provide local currency was considered to be more important 
a selection criterion for the UK SMEs than for the German SMEs. This is surprising 
since, when asked for the motivations for joint venturing, the German SMEs suggested 
that they would joint venture because they expect the Chinese to contribute finance 
(table 7 - 4 ) . The UK and German SMEs were unanimous, in that, they not considered 
access to the partner's technology as an important criterion for partner selection. 
For UK-7 it was crucial to have a partner with contacts in the particular specialised 
business and a partner with experience in the business. UK-6 assessed the 
manufacturing facilities of its potential Chinese partners and, purely on engineering 
grounds, made the decision of whom to select as its partner. The UK SME did not 
apply criteria, such as the potential partner's profitability. UK-6 further sought the 
"Chinese partner's ability to manufacture our product," mechanical and electronical 
engineering skills and the ability to understand and operate software. 
Overall, the perceived importance of the selection criteria of the UK and German SMEs 
suggests a similarity which is significant at the 5 per cent level ( f s p nat = . 6 4 5 7 ) . 
The analysis also suggests significant similarities between Size One and Size Two 
SMEs in their perception of the relative importance of partner selection criteria ( r j p size = 
. 7 4 4 1 ) . As a matter of fact, compared with the coefficient regarding the nationality, the 
coefficient regarding firm size is bigger, suggesting an even stronger correlation 
between the perceptions of the two groups of SMEs. For both groups, trust between 
the top managements is the most important partner selection criterion as are the 
partner's location and links with officials. Discrepancies in the ranks between the 
groups appear with regard to the Chinese partner's reputation and its products. 
Whereas Size One firms consider the partner's reputation as the second most 
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important criterion. Size Two enterprises thought this was only sixth important. With 
respect to the products of the partner, the reverse is the case. The provision of local 
currency, complementary resources and access to technology provided by the 
potential partner were not perceived as important selection criteria by either group. 
Partner characteristics 
Number of partners 
The vast majority of SMEs have joined forces with only one partner, with the exception 
of UK-7 and UK-2 which have, in addition to their Chinese, a Singaporean or a 
Taiwanese partner, respectively. UK-2 has two partners and for major decisions to be 
made, all three partners have to be in agreement, since a 70 per cent agreement is 
necessary. In other words, no two partners can make a major decision for the JV 
without the support of the third party. Not surprisingly, therefore, decision-making in 
this JV can take long. 
Partner size 
There is no significant trend to be read from the data provided by the UK SMEs, 
although partnering with a company with a similar turnover appeared only relatively 
less frequently (one similar, one smaller, two much smaller, one larger, one much 
larger than the UK SME). It is equally difficult to detect a clear trend within the group of 
German SMEs (four with similar turnover, two larger, two much larger, two smaller). 
Nevertheless, German SMEs tend not to joint venture with Chinese companies that are 
smaller (in terms of turnover) than they are themselves. 
Within the group of UK SMEs only one company indicated that its Chinese partner has 
a workforce of similar size to its own and the remaining results are not sufficient to 
read a particular trend (one similar workforce to UK SME, one smaller, one much 
smaller, three much more). Within the German SME JVs, however, the workforce of 
the Chinese partners tend to be larger than that of the German SMEs (two similar, 
three more, three much more, two fewer). 
Firm size analysis suggests that two Size One SMEs had a Chinese partner with a 
perceived turnover that was smaller, one much smaller, two of similar size, one larger 
and one that had a much larger turnover than the SMEs. Of the Size Two SMEs one 
had a Chinese partner with a smaller turnover, one with a much smaller turnover, three 
with a similar turnover, two with a larger and three with a much larger turnover. One 
SME within this group could not estimate its partner's turnover. Overall, this does not 
suggest a particular trend within the group of Size One SMEs. The larger Size Two 
SMEs had relatively less frequently partners with a smaller (or much smaller) turnover. 
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With regard to the number of employees, of the Size One SMEs, one Chinese partner 
had less, three similar, one more and two much more employees than the UK firm. Of 
Size Two SMEs, two had a Chinese partner with less employees and one with much 
less. Two indicated that their Chinese partner would have more and five that it would 
have much more staff. One SME could not estimate the number of employees of its 
Chinese partner. What has been said above with regard to turnover, also applies to the 
employee criterion. The larger Size Two firms relatively more frequently joint ventured 
with a company that had more or much more employees than the SMEs themselves. 
Partner company type 
The findings with regard to the group of UK SMEs do not suggest a clear trend. It was 
expected that the majority of JVs would be formed with Chinese state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) partners, since the vast majority of Chinese enterprises are SOEs. 
Eartier it has been reported (Rainalter, 1995) that only a few private firms have entered 
into Sino-foreign JVs. The empirical results show that three UK SMEs have a private 
company partner and four an SOE. There is more of a trend, however, within the group 
of the German SMEs, where eight out of ten companies joined forces with a Chinese 
SOE and only two with a local private firm. 
The analysis with regard to firm size shows that of the Size One SMEs, four SMEs 
each partnered with an SOE and a private enterprise, respectively, whereas within the 
group of Size Two SMEs eight were partnering with an SOE and one with a private 
one. This suggests that the larger SMEs in the samples show a distinct preference for 
SOEs as partners in their JVs. 
Joint venture negotiation process 
Negotiation contents 
Table 7-7: Contents and conflict areas of the negotiation process. 
Content and conflict aspects UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
C/C R* C/C R* C/C R* C/C R* 
Valuation of assets 8/6 1/1 12/6 1/1 9/0 1/10 10/4 3/5 
Financing 8/5 1/2 12/6 1/1 8/0 6/10 9/6 4/2 
Equity shares 8/2 1/8 11/2 4/9 9/5 1/1 11/2 1/11 
Technology selection/transfer 7/3 4/6 9/3 10/4 3/1 12/4 6/2 12/6 
General manager appointment 7/2 4/7 11/3 4/6 3/0 12/10 5/0 13/13 
Composition of BoD 7/1 4/13 11/3 4/6 7/3 8/2 9/3 4/6 
Distribution of responsibilities 6/3 7/3 11/3 4/6 5/1 11/6 7/1 11/12 
Staffing issues (nos, salaries) 6/3 7/3 10/0 9/12 9/0 1/10 9/4 4/3 
Training of staff at home 6/1 7/11 2/0 13/12 9/2 1/5 9/3 4/6 
Intellectual property rights 6/1 7/11 6/1 11/10 7/1 8/7 9/2 4/10 
Royalties 5/1 11/9 4/2 12/1 7/1 8/7 8/2 10/9 
Market priorities 5/1 11/9 12/4 1/4 9/4 1/3 11/8 1/1 
Expat. Issues (nos, salaries) 4/2 13/3 11/1 4/11 8/1 6/9 9/4 4/3 
Key: C/C = content/conf l ict , R = rank. * The second value in this co lumn is the result of the ratio 
of aspec t conf l ic t /aspect content; the higher the ratio the higher the rank. r^sp_nat_comen\ = -2279; 
^sp_nat_conflict 
= .6429. 
.1877; r, sp_size__conient .8082; r3p_3ize_conf,,c,= 0290; r3p (a = .05) = .4780; r3p_„„ (a = .01) 
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Table 7-7 indicates that the valuation of assets and the financing of the JV were the 
most frequently cited contents of the negotiations of the UK and German SMEs. Since 
the SMEs had only a limited amount of resources to contribute to the JV, they had to 
negotiate the highest possible value of this contribution and in turn had to try to 
negotiate the value of the Chinese contribution as low as possible. In other words, with 
the smallest possible input, the SMEs attempted to get the highest possible equity 
share in the JV. Ownership often does, as has been argued in chapter six, correlate 
with control, though it is not a necessary pre-condition. Of equally high importance to 
the SMEs was the financing of their businesses. Again, the SMEs had only scarce 
financial resources with which to finance the JV in China. As is known from chapter 
two, finance is a critical issue within SMEs and it was, therefore, given considerable 
attention in negotiations. 
The distribution of equity shares in the JVs was also an issue that was negotiated by 
nearly all of the SMEs (eight UK, eleven German firms). UK-6's Chinese partner was 
very insistent on a stake of 51 per cent and since UK-6 did not want to risk the 
negotiations failing it did not push for a majority stake in the JV, even though the firm 
was keen to be the majority owner. UK-6's bargaining position was too weak to 
demand a higher share of the equity. 
Furthermore, control issues were of similar importance to both UK and German SMEs. 
It was fairly important to both groups what the board of directors would look like and 
who would have the right to appoint the general manager of the JV. With these two 
'instruments' a partner can co-determine the JV's strategies and policies. Technology 
selection and transfer issues were negotiated for seven UK and nine German SME 
JVs. This suggests that, especially in the case of German SMEs, many other issues 
were negotiated more frequently. 
However, with regard to the importance of issues such as market priorities and 
expatriation, the two groups display considerably different attitudes in their 
perceptions. Whereas market priorities was the content of negotiations in only five 
cases within the group of UK SMEs, it was discussed by all 12 German SMEs and 
their negotiation partners. All but one German SME started manufacturing in China 
because they wanted to service the Chinese market. The SMEs had to make clear the 
market focus before they signed the contract. Further, expatriate issues were the 
content of the negotiations of only four UK SME JVs making it the least important issue 
within the group of UK SMEs. In contrast, eleven German SMEs wanted to discuss 
with their Chinese negotiation partners the issue of expatriating staff to the JV, 
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including the number and the coverage of costs. With regard to the actual expatriation 
of German personnel, this emphasis on expatriate issues is rather surprising. 
Amongst the least frequently discussed negotiation contents in both groups of SMEs 
was the royalty issue. Royalties are usually paid when patents are licensed. As will be 
seen later in this chapter (table 7-14), patents were amongst the least frequently 
provided contributions of the UK and German SMEs. 
With respect to the other contents of negotiations, a clear statement is not possible 
and further attempts to read from the data would result in analytical wasteland. Overall, 
the analysis suggests that the UK and German SMEs do not reveal any statistically 
significant correlation in their frequency of stating individual negotiation contents 
(''sp_nat_content ~ .2279). 
Important contents of the negotiations of UK-2-JV (UK-2's outstanding bargaining 
position was its product) were the product programme, ie which machines to 
manufacture, how many sales outlets to establish and where, the selection of the 
personnel, time scales and projections for the next three years, and the financial side 
"which is very different from ours." For UK-7 it was very important to keep the contents 
of the agreement "as simple as possible" since later court actions were not regarded 
as a solution. In the negotiations, the parties agreed that the UK side would do all the 
exporting, and that UK-7 would supply the know-how and should get an up-front 
payment for this. 
When employing the criterion 'firm size', however, the rank correlation analysis 
suggests significant ( 1 % significance level) similarity between Size One and Size Two 
firms (rsp_size_content " -8082) with contents, such as the valuation of assets, equity share 
distribution, market priorities and training of staff ranking rather high. On the other 
hand, aspects, including the distribution of responsibilities, technology selection and 
transfer as well as the general manager appointment were the least frequently 
discussed negotiation contents by both Size One and Size Two enterprises. 
The comparison of ,at_content and rsp size.contem suggests that is rather the criterion 
'nationality' than 'firm size' that discriminates between two groups of SMEs. 
Negotiation content conflict 
Interestingly, the valuation of assets and the finance issues of the JV that were 
amongst the most frequently discussed issues in negotiations, were also the 
negotiation contents that were relatively most conflicting for both groups of SMEs. For 
instance, although UK-6's outstanding bargaining position was its technology which 
"the Chinese partner had no access to," the Chinese refused to accept the proposed 
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valuation of this technology contribution. UK-7 stressed that the only issue that came 
near a major problem was the valuation of its know-how contribution. "The Chinese 
said it was too high, but they did not really know the value of the know-how." And 
neither did UK-7. Instead, "it was a horse trading." UK-7 signalled its unwillingness to 
compromise, and the Chinese side eventually accepted the value suggested. 
Royalties for technology provision to the JV were the greatest area of conflict for the 
German SMEs. However, they are amongst the least frequently conflicting negotiation 
contents for the UK SMEs. Within the group of UK SMEs, five negotiated royalties and 
only one firm experienced conflict. Within the German SMEs only four negotiated 
royalties and two of those had difficulties. This suggests that royalties were amongst 
the relatively most conflicting issues - every second negotiation was in conflict. The 
reason is clear again: where market prices are missing, the price is subject to tough 
negotiations. 
Equity distribution was, although frequently negotiated, relatively rarely a conflict issue 
in the negotiations of the JVs. UK-6 was in conflict over distribution of equity. The 
Chinese partner insisted on the majority stake and the UK SME did not want to risk 
failure of the negotiations. Thus, it did not push for a 51 per cent plus stake, even 
though it was keen to be the majority owner. The negotiation of market priorities was 
relatively unproblematic for the UK SMEs, while it was an issue for the German SMEs. 
Relatively more German SMEs discussed the market focus of their JVs. Consequently, 
they were more often prepared to argue with the Chinese side about this. 
There is no significant similarity to be read from the data in table 7-6 (rsp_nat_confiict = 
.1877) and the dissimilarity between the SMEs is greater even when analysed with 
respect to the criterion 'firm size' (rsp si^e connici = 0290). Firms of both size groups have 
experienced conflicts when negotiating their JVs in considerably distinct areas. For 
instance, whereas the equity distribution was relatively most frequently the issue that 
caused conflict within Size One firms, it ranked only eleventh within the larger SMEs. 
In contrast, whereas the larger firms relatively frequently had to argue with their 
partners about financing and personnel, these issues caused less conflict within the 
group of Size One firms. 
SME negotiation team 
As a trend, the UK and German SMEs had more than one manager involved in 
negotiations with their Chinese counterparts. Three UK SMEs each had two or more 
than two managers involved. A single manager held negotiations in two UK SME 
cases. .Of the German SME JVs, five were each negotiated with two or more than two 
managers, respectively (table 7-8). 
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UK-6 had five managers involved in the negotiations and UK-2 had two of its staff 
involved, the managing director and the chairman of the company plus one of its staff 
from its Singapore office. UK-7 negotiated its JV with two UK managers and its 
Singaporean agent, who speaks Chinese and acted also as an interpreter. 
As a trend, the smaller and larger firms had two or more directors involved in 
negotiations; differences between the two groups could not be detected. 
Table 7-8: SME negotiation team. 
Size of SME negotation team U K S M E s G E R SMEs Size One Size Two 
F F F F 
Single director 2 0 1 1 
Two directors 3 5 3 4 
More than two directors 3 5 4 5 
Z 8 10 7 10 
Key: F = frequency. 
Location of negotiation 
From chapter six (section 6.3.1) it is known that negotiating in China can take an 
inordinate amount of time. This applies to the majority of the six UK SMEs that held the 
entire negotiations in China, and to UK-2 which negotiated its JV in Taipei in the first 
place and later in CITY [East China] with no meeting between all three parties in the 
UK. Only two UK SMEs held negotiations both in China and in the UK. One of those 
was UK-6: after signing a memorandum of understanding in China, the Chinese 
company sent representatives to the UK for negotiations and, indeed, most of the 
negotiations were carried out in the UK. 
With the German SMEs, the situation was reversed: the majority of the six SMEs 
negotiated their JV in China and in Germany, although five were negotiated exclusively 
in China. Surprisingly, one German SME JV was negotiated in Germany solely. 
When analysed the location of negotiations with respect to firm size, it becomes 
evident that Size One enterprises carried out relatively most of their negotiations 
exclusively in China, whereas Size Two SMEs employed a strategy of holding 
negotiations both in China and at home (table 7-9). 
Table 7-9: Location of negotiations. 
Location of negotiations UK SMEs G E R SMEs Size One Size Two 
F F F F 
PRC 6 5 7 4 
PRC/at home 2 6 2 6 
At home 0 1 0 1 
Taiwan/PRC 1 0 1 0 
Z 9 12 .10 11 
Key: F = frequency. 
Duration of negotiations 
For the majority of five UK SMEs, negotiations had taken longer than expected and 
two UK SMEs indicated that the duration of negotiations was as expected. One of 
those was UK-2, whose negotiations lasted for nine months. Two SMEs perceived the 
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duration of the negotiations to be shorter than expected, including UK-6. There, the 
deal was agreed after only three months. The other SME that considered negotiations 
being shorter than expected was UK-7. In this case, negotiations took place in three 
phases, starting in CITY [Northeast China] where "we went over and where 
discussions commenced." After participating in a trade mission to China, the parties 
signed a simple version of an agreement during a third visit of UK-7 staff to China. 
Eventually, from the first approach by the Chinese until the signing of the agreement, a 
period of approximately 18 months to two years was needed. 
Four German SMEs perceived negotiations to be longer than expected and four SMEs 
expected it to take the amount of time it actually took. Two German SMEs perceived 
the negotiation process to be shorter than expected. 
There is no difference to be read in the data between the perceptions of Size One and 
Size Two enterprises (table 7-10). 
Table 7-10: Duration of negotiations. 
Duration of negotiations UK SMEs G E R SMEs Size One Size Two 
F F F F 
Longer than expected 5 4 4 5 
As expected 2 4 3 3 
Shorter than expected 2 2 2 2 
Z 9 10 9 10 
Key: F = frequency. 
Language of negotiations 
For both the UK and the German SMEs a combination of English and Chinese was the 
most frequently used language of the negotiations. In addition, three UK-JVs were 
negotiated exclusively in English and two exclusively in Chinese. Of the German JVs, 
three each were negotiated exclusively in English or Chinese, respectively (table 7-11). 
Table 7-11: Language of negotiations. 
Language of negotiations U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
F F F F 
English 3 3 5 1 
English/Chinese 3 6 3 5 
Chinese 2 3 1 4 
I 8 12 9 10 
Key: F = frequency. 
The analysis suggests further that Size One SMEs had more often carried out JV 
negotiations in English, compared with Size Two SMEs which have, relatively more 
often negotiated their JVs in both English and Chinese or exclusively in Chinese. 
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Use of interpreters 
Negotiating a JV with Ciiinese counterparts who do not speak German, and frequently, 
English, was a challenge for the SMEs from the UK and Germany. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, all eight UK SMEs that answered the question, had used one or more 
interpreters. For the negotiations of UK-6's JV, interpreters were provided by both the 
UK SME and the Chinese partner. Since the Singaporean partner spoke Chinese and 
none of the Chinese team English, negotiations were held in Chinese. For the 
negotiation of their venture, UK-6 and the Chinese side provided interpreters. 
Moreover, the Singaporean participant in the negotiations spoke Mandarin which 
helped communicate as the UK team spoke no Chinese and the Chinese no English. 
Of the German SMEs, ten used the services of one or more interpreters, whereas one 
did not employ an interpreter. There, both the German and the Chinese teams 
negotiated the JV in English. This is dangerous, however. When contracting, the 
Chinese authorities demand a Chinese version of the JV contract which has authority 
over an English translation (table 7-12). With regard to use of interpreters there is no 
considerable difference between Size One and Size Two SMEs to be read in the data. 
Table 7-12: Use of interpreters. 
Use of interpreters U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
F F F F 
Yes 8 10 8 10 
No 0 1 0 1 
I 8 11 8 11 
Key; F = frequency. 
The cultural differences between the European and Chinese negotiators manifest 
themselves in language problems, problems with the negotiation styles, the slow pace 
of the negotiations and other cultural issues. These were the problem areas of 
negotiating a JV in China most frequently cited by both the UK and the German SMEs. 
The problems appear similarly to the smaller and larger firms alike. UK-6 and its 
partner communicated well with respect to the engineering business. The biggest 
difficulty experienced by UK-6 were business and cultural issues. Thus, difficulties in 
mutual understanding between UK-6 and its Chinese partner were programmed. 
Another difficulty was that UK-6's Chinese partner had no understanding of dealing 
with customers and marketing the product, "since its only customer was the 
government." Three UK and German SMEs did not make any comments on this issue. 
Factors for successful negotiations 
Both the UK and German SMEs cited patience of the SME team as the most important 
factor for successful negotiations, as was the sincerity of the SME team and a good 
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personal relationship. This reflects basically what has been found with regard to factors 
for JV performance and partner selection. 
Table 7-13: Factors for successful negotiations. 
Successfu l negotiation factors U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R N 1 R n 1 R n 
Patience of SME team 1.3 1 8 1.4 1 11 1.2 2 10 1.3 1 9 
Good personal relationship 1.4 2 8 1.7 5 11 1.4 3 10 1.8 2 9 
SME team's sincerity 1.5 3 8 1.4 1 12 1.1 1 10 1.8 2 10 
Good interpreter on SME side 1.5 3 8 1.6 3 11 1.4 3 10 1.8 2 9 
SME's technical expertise 1.6 5 8 2.0 8 11 1.9 8 9 1.8 2 10 
Knowledge of PRC bus. practice 1.8 6 8 1.6 ' 3 12 1.6 6 10 1.9 6 10 
Partner's need for SME product 1.8 6 8 1.7 5 11 1.5 5 10 2.0 7 9 
Preparation of SME team 2.0 8 8 1.7 5 10 1.7 7 9 2.0 7 9 
Uniqueness of SME product 2.1 9 8 2.0 8 9 1.9 8 8 2.2 10 9 
Offer good financing 2.1 9 8 2.0 8 10 2.1 10 9 2.0 7 9 
Familiarity with social customs 2.4 11 8 2.4 11 10 2.4 11 9 2.3 11 9 
Knowledge of PRC pol./soc. sit. 2.6 12 8 2.5 12 10 2.5 13 8 2.6 12 10 
Past reputation in selling to PRC 2.9 13 7 2.5 12 12 2.4 11 9 2.8 13 10 
Key: I = importance, R = rank, n - respondents. r ^ p _ „ ^ t 
. 4780 ; r3p_„ „ (a = .01) = .6429. 
.8704: r sp_size = .8260; r3p ^ , (a = .05) = 
For reasons outlined earlier in this chapter (tables 7-11 and 7-12), the UK and German 
SMEs considered, also, the use of a good interpreter as important for successful 
negotiations. Also of importance to both groups, were their own technical expertise, 
although this was considered less important by the German SMEs. Knowledge of 
Chinese business practices was considered more important by the German SMEs than 
their UK counterparts and of less importance to the success of negotiations were the 
uniqueness of the SMEs' product, willingness to offer good financing, familiarity with 
social customs, knowledge of China's political and social situation and the SME's past 
reputation in selling to China. However, only past reputation and knowledge of China's 
political and social situation were considered moderately important by the UK SMEs 
whereas other factors were considered important (table 7-13). 
UK-2 emphasised the importance of being polite, not putting the Chinese down in any 
way, and showing strength since "negotiating is a diplomatic exercise." The UK SME 
also stressed the importance of being sure of the facts and protecting oneself. "We 
made sure to have 70 per cent agreement before any decisions could be made." 
Rank correlation analysis (rjp ^ a , = .8704) suggests that both the UK and German SMEs 
display a significant similarity of their perceived importance of negotiation success 
factors. Also when calculated for Size One and Size Two enterprises, the coefficient 
( r s p . s i z e = .8260) suggests a significant similarity between the two groups of SMEs, both 
at the 5 per cent and the 1 per cent significance levels. Comparing the two correlation 
coefficient values suggests that the SMEs show a greater similarity in their perception 
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of the negotiation success factors when distinguished between nationality, rather than 
firm size. In other words, SMEs of different sizes display a somewhat greater 
dissimilarity in their perceptions of factors for successful negotiations. 
For instance, the SME's technical expertise was considered relatively more important 
for successful negotiations by Size Two SMEs than by Size One SMEs, ranking 
second and eighth, respectively. Also, the need to offer the Chinese side a good 
financing deal was considered more important by Size Two firms. 
Partner contributions 
This section looks at the contributions of both partners in the JV as well as the 
importance of the Chinese contributions as perceived by the SMEs. 
SME's contribution 
The most frequently observed contributions of the UK and German SMEs were cash, 
SME technology, management expertise and technical training. Apart from the scarce 
resource capital (all SMEs used their working capital to finance the JV) the UK and 
German SMEs contributed their technology to the joint undertaking. In many cases this 
is special technology which the SMEs attempt to exploit in the Chinese market rather 
than licensing it to a Chinese company. Since most of these technologies are 'high-
context' technologies the SMEs also have to provide the necessary training. 
Table 7-14: Contributions of the SMEs. 
SME cont r ibut ion UK SMEs GERSMEs Size One Size Two 
F R F R F R F R 
Cash 7 1 12 1 9 1 9 1 
Technology 7 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 
Management expertise 5 3 9 2 5 4 8 2 
Technical training 5 3 7 4 6 3 5 4 
Machinery 4 5 6 5 5 4 5 4 
Access to world markets 4 5 4 7 4 7 4 6 
Patents 3 7 5 6 5 4 2 7 
Key: F = f requency, R = rank, rjp nat = -8929; r, 
.01) = . 8 5 7 1 . 
3p_3„e = .6725; r^p erit (a = 05) = .6786; r3p_,„ (a 
On the other hand, machinery, access to world markets and patents were the least 
frequently contributed assets and attributes by both the UK and the German SMEs. 
The vast majority of UK and German SMEs came to China to exploit the potential 
Chinese market, but not to open their traditional export markets to the output of the 
JVs (table 7-14). 
Contrary to the existing opinion not to expect a cash contribution from the Chinese 
partner, all (originally) four partners in UK-7-JV contributed a bit over US$156,000 
(£100,000) in cash. Additionally UK-7's contribution was know-how and the Chinese 
183 
Survey results 
contributed contacts. After all partners had put in their contributions, UK-7 received an 
up-front payment for its technology supplied to the JV. It was further agreed that UK-7-
JV could send six Chinese staff to the UK SME for training. Those would be paid by 
the JV and UK-7 would provide accommodation and also a small amount of pocket 
money. UK-2's contribution was "a lot of test equipment" and US$230,000 (£147,436) 
in cash. "They have equipment already to do this and they have reasonable technical 
expertise." UK-6's main contributions to the JV were access to technology and the 
design of machinery. 
The similarity in the ranking of the SME contributions that appears at a first glance is 
supported by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient which suggests a significant 
similarity at the 1 per cent level (rsp ^ a , = .8929). However, there is no statistically 
significant correlation between the responses of Size One firms and Size Two SMEs 
( • " s p . s i z e = -6725). In other words, with regard to firm size, the UK and German JV 
entrepreneurs display dissimilarities in their behaviour. 
For instance, whereas cash and technology were cited most frequently as 
contributions by Size One SMEs, only cash was also cited most frequently by Size Two 
SMEs, whereas these firms contributed technology only third most frequently. On the 
other hand, management expertise was relatively more often contributed by Size Two 
firms than by Size One enterprises. A considerable difference also appears with regard 
to the contribution of patents: whereas it ranks fourth within the group of Size One 
firms it only ranks seventh (or last) within the Size Two firms. 
Chinese partner's contribution 
Table 7-15: Importance of Chinese partner's contributions. 
Chinese partner contribution UK SMEs G E R SMEs Size One Size Two 
1 R N 1 R N 1 R n 1 R n 
Local labour 1.9 1 8 2.0 2 11 1.9 1 10 2.0 2 9 
Contacts to customers 2.0 2 8 2.0 2 12 2.0 3 10 2.0 2 10 
Access to markets 2.1 3 8 1.9 1 12 2.0 3 10 2.0 2 10 
Machinery and facilities 2.3 4 8 2.5 6 11 2.6 6 9 2.3 5 10 
Contacts with government 2.3 4 8 2.3 4 9 1.9 1 7 2.6 6 10 
Land 2.5 6 8 2.3 4 11 2.8 9 10 1.9 1 9 
Plant 2.6 7 8 2.7 8 11 2.6 6 9 2.8 8 10 
Cash 2.7 8 7 2.8 9 12 2.2 5 10 3.3 9 9 
Materials 2.7 8 7 2.5 6 10 2.6 6 7 2.6 6 10 
Key: I = importance, R = rank, n = respondents, r^ p ng, = .8417; r^ p ji^^ = .0582; r^, 
.5833; r^p^;, (a = .01) = .7667. 
(a = .05) = 
Local labour, contacts to customers, access to markets and government contacts were 
amongst the most important Chinese partner contributions to both the UK and German 
SMEs. This suggests that Chinese partner attributes rather than assets were most 
appreciated by the UK and German SMEs. Of less importance to the SMEs were 
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Chinese partner asset contributions, such as plant or cash. To expect cash from the 
Chinese partner would not have been very realistic since it is exactly this contribution 
that is sought by the Chinese side (table 7-15). 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs show similarities in the perception of the 
importance of the Chinese partner's contributions (r^p nat = .8417). 
However, when analysed with respect to firm size differences, the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient { r ^ p _ s \ z e = .0582) suggests considerable dissimilarities between 
Size One and Size Two firms. Although local labour, contacts to customers and access 
to markets were regarded as similarly important by both groups of SMEs, the Chinese 
contribution of land was ranked first within Size Two firms whereas it ranks only ninth 
(or last) within the group of Size One firms. This big discrepancy heavily influences the 
calculation of the correlation coefficient and apart from this huge discrepancy, the 
results within both groups do not suggest too many differences in the firms' perceived 
perceptions of the importance of certain Chinese contributions. 
7.2.4 Sino-foreign joint venture operation 
Joint venture bacl<ground information 
Joint venture establishment 
The UK SME JVs were established between 1987 and 1996. The German JVs are 
more recent, having been formed between 1990 and 1996. 
Total investment 
Six UK SME respondents answered this question. The investment volumes span a 
range between US$0.39m (£0.25m) and US$14.Om (£9.0m). Of the ten German SMEs 
that answered this question, the smallest investment was US$0.56m (£0.36m) and the 
highest US$10.8m (£6.9m). 
In the UK sample, the smaller SMEs had the smallest total investment JVs and the 
same applies to the German SMEs (without an exception). 
Number of employees 
The eight UK SMEs providing information on this aspect, employ on average 102 staff 
with one employing fewer than ten, five employing between ten and 100 and two 
employing between 100 and 500 staff. The JVs of the seven German SMEs that 
commented on their JVs' workforce employ on average 56 staff. Four JVs employ up 
to 50 staff, two between 50 and 100, and one more than 100, but less than 200. 
As a trend, also the UK Size One SMEs employ less personnel in their JVs than Size 
Two SMEs do (with one exception), whereas the positive correlation between the size 
of the German SMEs and the number of employees in their JVs is clear. 
Joint venture location 
The following categorisation of locations in China was applied for the presentation of 
the disguised locations of the JVs (table 7-16). 
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Table 7-16: Disguised locations of the UK and German SME JVs. 
Region Provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions 
Northeast Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei 
East Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangxi 
Southeast Jiangxi, Fujian 
South Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Yunnan 
Remote Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang Uygur 
Five UK SME JVs were located in East China, three in North China, one in South 
China and one in China's remote area. Of the German SMEs, three were located in 
East China, five in Northeast China, one in Southeast China, two in South China and 
another one in China's remote area. This suggests that both the UK and the German 
SMEs sought investment locations in the more privileged areas of China, compared 
with the under-developed West of the country. 
Size One firms show no particular trend with respect to location distribution and are 
about equally located in North, East and South China. Size Two firms, on the other 
hand, are located rather in North and East China than in South China. Also, the two 
SMEs that established their JVs in China's remote area, are Size Two firms. 
Choice of location 
In several cases, the selection of a particular Chinese partner pre-determined the 
choice of location a priori. Accordingly, three UK SMEs could choose the location of 
their JV, three had no choice and three did not answer this question. Of the German 
SMEs, six had a choice of location, three had no choice and three did not provide 
information on this aspect. 
Table 7-17: Criteria for choice of location. 
Criteria for choice of location UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Availability of trained labour 1.3 1 3 1.5 1 12 1.4 1 7 1.5 1 8 
Location of partner 2.0 2 3 2.7 6 12 2.9 6 7 2.1 3 8 
Availability of cheap labour 2.0 2 2 2.2 3 11 2.5 5 6 1.9 2 7 
Infrastructure 2.3 4 3 2.0 2 12 1.6 2 7 2.5 4 8 
Proximity to target market 2.7 5 3 2.5 4 11 2.0 3 7 3.1 7 7 
Sources of raw material 2.7 5 3 3.0 7 12 3.1 7 7 2.8 5 8 
Investment incentives 2.7 5 3 2.6 5 8 2.0 3 4 3.0 6 7 
Advised to go there -- - 0 4.5 8 2 -- -- 0 4.5 8 2 
Key: I = importance, R = rank, n = respondents. = .6220; r^^^^^ = .2054; r^ p „,i (a = 05) = 
.6786 ; r3p_„ i , (a = .01) = .8571 . 
The most important criterion for the choice of location was the availability of trained 
labour, for both the UK and the German SMEs. Inevitably linked with the availability of 
trained labour as a factor influencing the choice of location was the availability of cheap 
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labour. Important for both groups of SMEs was the state of the infrastructure available 
at the individual locations where JV activity could take place (table 7-17). 
Divergent opinion exists about the importance of the partner's location which was more 
important to the UK SMEs than it was to the German SMEs. A look at the frequency of 
the SMEs choosing a green-field or take-over operation, might provide insight into this 
aspect. For UK-7 this criterion was important and further, the location of a galvanising 
plant nearby was considerably convenient for the SME. The reason for UK-7's 
preference of this argument was that the firm delegated the task of finding a location to 
its Chinese partner. 
Of minor importance to both groups were further proximity to target markets (though it 
was more important to the German SMEs), sources of raw material and investment 
incentives. 
UK-2 had made its choice of East China as location of its JV on the grounds of market 
considerations. The SME considered the location of its JV "quite convenient for the 
company with a lot of development in place and a great need for our products." UK-2 
had also Investigated a neighbouring province north of its eventual location and one in 
CITY [North China]. Eventually, UK-2 had chosen the location because of market 
considerations. A fact that considerably contributed to UK-2's choice, however, was 
that its Taiwanese partner had an operation already where the JV was later set up. 
UK-6 considered the investment incentives provided by individual provincial 
governments as helpful, though they did not affect the SME's decision-making. They 
were considered to be largely the same in all provinces. A stronger factor affecting UK-
6's choice of location was the fact that its county has close ties with the government of 
PROVINCE where UK-6-JV is located. During a delegation visit to China - "at a time 
when nobody was seriously considering the setting up of a plant in China" - UK-6 
managers had met the Vice Governor of PROVINCE and this "friend in a high place" 
was considered a crucial factor for the choice of location. 
Overall, the perceived importance of criteria for the choice of location is dissimilar 
between the UK and German SMEs (rsp ^at = .6620). More dissimilarities appear when 
the SMEs are grouped with respect to firm size. With a correlation coefficient of rsp_size -
.2054 the group responses are dissimilar even at the 10 per cent significance level. For 
instance, whereas the location of the Chinese partner ranked third within the group of 
Size Two firms, it ranked sixth within the Size One enterprises and the reverse is true 
with regard to investment incentives, suggesting that they were more important to the 
smaller firms than to the larger enterprises. Considerable differences also appear with 
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regard to proximity to target markets: whereas this criterion is the third most important 
within the group of the smaller firms, it is the second least important within the larger 
enterprises. 
Production site 
Of the eight UK SMEs that provided information on this aspect, five took over the 
existing production facilities of their Chinese partners and only three established their 
operations on a green-field site. Of the 12 German SMEs, seven took over existing 
premises from their Chinese partner, three erected buildings on a green-field and two 
rented office space. 
UK-2-JV commenced production in a building that was contributed by the Chinese 
partner. UK-7, on the other hand, erected its own building since its Chinese partner is 
a design company that only had an office building. This had taken the SME no less 
than 18 months. Also UK-6-JV needed to erect a new factory since older premises 
were not equipped with air conditioning that was essential for precise manufacturing. 
Analysis with regard to firm size suggests that Size One SMEs had a take-over in four 
cases, a green-field operation in three and an office in two cases. Size Two SMEs 
preferred a take-over in eight cases and they had green-field sites in three cases only. 
Product range 
Of the UK SME JVs, four produce the same product range as their UK parents, 
whereas five manufacture only a limited product range, compared with that of the UK 
SME parents. Of the German SMEs three JVs produce the same product range as the 
German parent and nine a more limited range. 
For instance, UK-7's JV produced only the INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS and UK-6's 
JV manufactured a product range that was restricted to two types of machines, 
although there were plans for a future product range expansion. Restricted also was 
the range of equipment that UK-2-JV manufactured. 
Of Size One SMEs, four manufacture the same range of products, and six a product 
that is limited compared with what is produced at home. Of Size Two SMEs, three 
manufacture the same range and eight a limited one. Thus, firm size does not reveal 
any differences between the groups. 
Target market 
With their JVs, six UK SMEs target the domestic Chinese market, one both the 
Chinese and export markets and one investor manufactures exclusively for export. 
One UK respondent refused to provide details on this aspect. Of the German SME 
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JVs, eight target the domestic Chinese market, three both the domestic and export 
markets and one exports its entire output. 
Also firm size analysis suggests that both groups of SMEs target the domestic Chinese 
market first and foremost. Of the Size One SMEs, seven target the domestic market, 
one export markets and one both the domestic and export markets. Of the Size Two 
SMEs, seven also target the domestic market, three target both the domestic and 
export markets and one SME targets export markets exclusively. 
Market share in China 
Five UK SMEs were able to specify their 1996 share of the Chinese market: one 
company had a market share of approximately 4 per cent, two of 10 per cent and the 
other two of 30 and 35 per cent, respectively. Two German SMEs could specify this: 
their shares were 10 and 15 per cent, respectively. Seven respondents did not answer 
this question and three indicated that it was unknown. In fact, it is difficult for SMEs to 
determine their absolute market shares. This was established earlier by Simon (1996). 
Joint venture ownership 
The nine UK SMEs own, on average, 46.4 per cent of their JVs in China. In detail, 
three SMEs hold majority stakes, three have minority stakes and three share the equity 
with their partners equally: in one case an SME holds 50 per cent, in another two 
cases (UK-2-JV, UK-7-JV) 33.33 and 25 per cent, respectively. UK-7 had originally 
three partners in its JV and the equity was equally split over the four participating 
companies. In due course, one Chinese partner has sold its stake to the other Chinese 
company and the Singaporean company sold 10 per cent of its share to UK-7 and 5 
per cent to the Chinese partner. UK-7 was very eager to increase its share in the 
venture and thus agreed to take over from the partner that was pulling out.^ 
There is more of a trend in sample of German SMEs: six have accepted the minority 
position in their JVs, four JVs are equally owned by the German and the Chinese 
partners and only one German SME holds a majority equity stake of 51 per cent. The 
average equity of the eleven German SMEs that answered this question is 47 per cent. 
The average equity share holding of Size One SMEs accounts for nearly 43 per cent. 
The larger Size Two SMEs had, on average, 51 per cent ownership. Further, whereas 
within the group of Size Two firms there was an equal distribution of majority, minority 
and split equity SME ownership, the smaller Size One SMEs had more often a minority 
equity position. This was both relative to a majority and split ownership position and 
relative also to minority shares holding SMEs within the Size Two group of firms. 
Joint venture control 
The JVs of the UK SMEs had, on average, 5.7 members on their board of directors 
(BoDs). In detail, one BoD has three members, four BoDs have five directors, one six, 
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two have seven members and one eight. In four of these cases control was shared 
with an equal number of directors (three each or one each, respectively) on the board, 
in two cases the UK side had one director more than the Chinese side and in three 
cases the relationship was reversed. The chairman of the BoD was nominated by the 
UK side in two out of seven cases and by the Chinese side in the remaining five cases. 
The JVs of the ten German SMEs that provided information on this had, on average, 
5.1 directors on their BoDs. In detail, one JV BoD had seven members, two had six, 
five had five members, one had four and another BoD had three directors. In three 
firms the seats were equally distributed, in one the German side had more seats than 
the Chinese and the reverse applied in five cases. In one case the German and the 
Chinese sides had an equal number of seats on the BoD and a third-country national 
had another seat on the board. The chairman of the BoD was nominated by the 
German side in nine cases and by the Chinese in three. However, the Chinese partner 
nominated the general manager of the venture in eight cases and the German side in 
only four. The distribution of functional responsibilities are shown in table 7-18. 
Table 7-18: Distribution of responsibilities. 
Company function UK SMEs G E R SMEs Size One Size Two 
UK PRC Ge PRC 1 PRC 2 PRC 
Production 4 3 6 2 7 1 6 2 
Marketing 4 4 4* 9* 3 5 5 3 
Finance 4 3 4 3 5 2 6 2 
Personnel 5 3 4 6 4 5 5 4 
R&D 6 2 8 0 7 1 7 1 
Key: UK = UK directors, PRC = Chinese directors, Ge = German directors, 1 = directors of 
SMEs in size category one, 2 = directors of SMEs in size category two, n = respondents. * 
responsibility shared in two JVs. 
Firm size analysis shows that Size Two enterprises have on average 6.5 directors on 
their BoDs, whereas Size One firms have only five on average. With regard to the 
nomination of the chairman of the JV, there is no clear trend to be read from the data 
provided. Within the group of Size One firms the Chinese nominated the chairman in 
four cases and the foreign side in five. Within the group of Size Two SMEs, the 
chairman was nominated by the Chinese in four cases and by the foreign party in six. 
Most significantly, the majority of the UK (six out of eight) and the German SMEs (eight 
out of eight) were not prepared to give away research and development responsibility. 
Also with regard to the personnel function the distribution of responsibility is 
considerably unbalanced: the UK SME was in charge in five cases, the Chinese side in 
only three. Within the German SMEs, the personnel function was more frequently in 
the hands of the Chinese side (six cases) than the German side (four cases). By and 
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large, the production function rests within the foreign side (four UK vs. three Chinese; 
six German vs. two Chinese). The finance function is in the hands of the foreign side in 
the majority of JVs (four UK vs. three Chinese, seven German vs. three Chinese). 
For instance, UK-2 considered it extremely difficult to make its partner produce 
accounts in a meaningful way and to send these sets of accounts on a bi-monthly 
basis. Subsequently, UK-2 even had to insist that the JV's management produces 
monthly accounts because of the Taiwanese partner's reluctance to strictly oversee 
the business and demand the accounts. "We have now taken on what the Taiwanese 
should have been doing," the managing director of UK-2 said. 
Marketing is the responsibility of the Chinese. Within the group of UK SMEs in four 
cases each are the UK or the Chinese side in charge of it. Within the group of German 
SMEs, the distribution of responsibilities is unbalanced and rests with the Chinese in 
seven out of eleven JVs. In only two JVs is the marketing responsibility shared. 
The analysis further revealed that both Size One and Size Two enterprises preferred to 
keep responsibility of research and development as well as of production in their JVs. 
This is not different to the findings when the data is analysed according to the criterion 
'nationality'. An unbalanced distribution of responsibilities can also be detected in the 
finance function. Again, both Size One and Size Two firms were keen to be in charge 
of this. With regard to the marketing and personnel functions, the Chinese side was 
slightly more frequently in charge within the group of Size One firms, whereas the 
control constellation was reversed within the group of Size Two SMEs. Responsibility 
of the marketing function was shared in one case between the Chinese side and a Size 
One firm and in two cases between the Chinese party and Size Two enterprises. 
All seven of the UK SMEs that answered this question, suggested that there was joint 
decision-making in their ventures' boards. Of these seven companies, three remarked 
that decision-making was a problem (of those, one remarked that it was a problem 
"sometimes") and four insisted that it was not a problem. Of the 12 German SMEs that 
answered this question, eight insisted that there was joint decision-making in their 
ventures in China and four that this was not the case. Of the eight that had joint 
decision-making, three faced problems. Four did not answer this question and the 
remaining five respondents did not experience any problems with decision-making. 
Joint decision-making was employed about equally frequently in the JVs of Size One 
and Size Two firms. The question of whether joint decision-making was a problem did 
not provide a meaningful answer within Size One firms and the distribution of answers 
was considerably unbalanced within the group of Size Two firms: six had no problems 
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and only two experienced problems with decision-making in the JV (four Size One 
firms had difficulties with joint decision-making and three did not). 
Joint venture management 
General manager 
The general manager was nominated by the UK side in five out of seven cases and by 
the Chinese side in two cases. Interesting, none of the JVs that were majority-owned 
by the UK or German SMEs (UK-1, UK-5, UK-10, GER-10) had a general manager 
appointed by the Chinese partner company [with the notable exception of GER-0]. 
Firm size analysis suggests considerable differences between Size One firms and Size 
Two enterprises with regard to the nomination of the general manager. Whereas within 
the group of Size One firms, the Chinese side appointed the general manager twice as 
often as the foreign side did (six vs. three), within the group of Size Two firms the 
reverse applies (four vs. six). 
Expatriates sent to China 
The eight UK SMEs that answered this question, had sent, on average, 0.9 expatriates 
to China. In detail, three SMEs expatriated no employees, three expatriated one 
employee each and two expatriated two employees. The question of the costs of 
expatriate staff was answered rarely. One UK SME suggested that the costs for its 
expatriate were US$62,400 (£40,000) in total. Another UK SME faced expatriate costs 
of US$62,400 (£40,000) for remuneration, US$18,720 (£12,000) for allowances and 
US$70,200 (£45,000) for accommodation, totalling US$151,320 (£97,000) per year. In 
another JV, an expatriate costs US$200,000 (£128,205) for salary and allowances. 
Earlier this UK company purchased a house at the cost of .US$300,000 (£192,308). 
Comparing these costs for expatriate staff, the total cost of US$62,400 (£40,000) 
seems to be rather low. In three cases the costs of the expatriates were covered by 
both the UK SME and the JV; in two other cases the JV covered the expatriate costs. 
Ten German SMEs provided information: five sent expatriates to their JVs in China. In 
detail, four had expatriated one manager and one had expatriated two managers. 
When asked about the cost of expatriation, only three respondents provided 
information. The three companies suggested US$300,000 (£192,308), US$250,000 
(£160,256) and more than US$300,000 (£192,308). 
Not surprisingly (with regard to the literature in chapter two), the larger Size Two firms 
had more than twice expatriated managers or even more personnel to their JVs to 
China. On the other hand. Size One firms sent personnel in three cases, and seven 
Size Two firms expatriated staff to China. 
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UK-2 which at the time of interviewing, had no expatriate in China, considered it 
essential to have its own staff there. "Although we frequently go out to China (once a 
year! and its Singaporean partner six times per year) you need a European out there," 
said the managing director of UK-2. "We do not know, what they are doing. Production 
in China is a long way away." UK-2's original idea was that the JV's Taiwanese 
president would visit the JV on a regular and frequent basis to oversee the operation. 
To the anger of UK-2, "unfortunately, this has not happened." It was finally agreed by 
UK-2 that the UK SME would send a European to China since the JV's business is not 
proceeding "as quickly as we thought it would." 
7.2.5 Joint venture problems 
Table 7-19: JV problems. 
Problem area U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Concept of quality 1.5 1 8 1.7 2 11 1.6 2 10 1.7 1 9 
Recruiting personnel 1.6 2 8 2.4 10 12 2.4 11 10 1.8 2 10 
Personnel motivation 1.9 3 8 2.0 6 10 2.1 6 9 1.8 2 9 
Repatriation of profits 1.9 3 7 1.4 1 7 1.5 1 8 1.8 2 6 
Local sourcing 2.0 5 9 2.8 18 12 2.4 11 10 2.4 11 11 
Insuff. training of PRC managers 2.0 5 7 2.4 10 10 2.1 6 9 2.4 11 8 
Low labour productivity 2.1 7 8 3.0 21 12 2.7 17 10 2.6 17 10 
Communication with local staff 2.1 7 7 2.3 8 9 2.4 11 8 2.1 5 8 
Technology transfer 2.3 9 9 1.7 2 12 1.7 3 10 2.2 8 11 
Loss of control 2.3 9 8 2.3 8 10 1.9 5 9 2.7 17 9 
Mismatch in management styles 2.3 9 7 2.4 10 8 2.3 9 8 2.4 11 7 
Dividend policy 2.3 9 6 2.9 19 9 2.9 21 8 2.4 11 7 
Damaging reputation 2.4 13 7 2.0 6 7 1.8 4 9 3.0 21 5 
Bureaucracy 2.4 13 7 2.6 16 8 2.6 16 9 2.5 15 6 
PRC commercial practices 2.4 13 8 3.0 21 10 2.8 18 9 2.7 17 9 
Corruption 2.4 13 8 1.9 4 8 2.1 6 8 2.1 5 8 
Foreign exchange restriction 2.6 17 7 2.5 15 6 2.8 18 6 2.3 9 7 
Transfer pricing 2.6 17 8 2.4 10 9 2.6 15 7 2.5 16 10 
Infrastructure 2.7 19 7 2.4 10 11 2.3 9 10 2.8 20 8 
Restriction on sales and import 2.7 19 7 2.6 16 8 2.9 21 9 2.3 9 6 
Unfair competition 2.7 19 7 1.9 4 8 2.4 11 8 2.1 5 7 
Political risk 2.9 22 7 3.8 24 8 3.3 24 9 3.3 23 6 
Absence of detailed invest. Law .3.0 23 7 2.9 19 10 2.8 18 10 3.1 22 7 
Creating a new competitor 3.1 24 8 3.5 23 12 3.2 23 10 3.5 24 10 
Key: I = impor tance, R = rank, n = respondents. r ^ p „^^ = .4778; r ^p^,^^ = .4376; r3p_,^, (a = .05) 
3 4 3 5 ; r 3 p „ i , (a = .01) = .4748. 
As table 7-19 suggests, the Chinese partner's concept of quality was the most striking 
issue of the JV activity for both the UK and German SMEs. The UK and German SMEs 
came to China with quality expectations the Chinese manufacturing environment did 
not want to, or could not, meet. In many cases insufficient quality of the products 
manufactured in China hampered the SMEs' efforts to service the domestic, but also 
overseas markets. For instance, UK-2 considered manufacturing low quality products 
dangerous since this could eventually damage the SME's reputation worldwide. 
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Further, if product quality would not be sufficient, domestic customers (genuine 
Chinese and foreign manufacturers) would continue buying from abroad. 
A matter that does not concern all of the JVs, but several is the fact that in order to be 
able to export goods manufactured in China and, thus, to meet export ratios, products 
must meet a certain standard of quality. UK-7-JV is required to export as much as 30 
per cent of its output. However, at the time of this investigation the JV experienced 
problems with product quality and could, thus, not meet its target. UK-7-JV is 
considerably interested in being able to meet its export target and perhaps even 
increase it since this would bring in foreign exchange which could be used to capitalise 
the JV (which was at the time of investigating under-capitalised). 
Also of importance for both groups of SMEs was the issue of repatriating profits. 
Whereas this was important for the UK SMEs (rank 3) it was very important for the 
German SMEs (rank 1). However, neither the UK nor the German case SMEs could 
provide meaningful comments on this problem that would have further advanced its 
understanding. 
A further problem of considerable importance to the German SMEs was the transfer of 
technology, although this was only rated as being ninth important to the UK SMEs. An 
important aspect here is that it was criticised (UK-6) that although the Chinese 
engineers' standards are sufficiently high to understand the technology transferred, 
they would have problems in transforming theory to practice. 
The reverse constellation has been observed with the recruiting of personnel. Whereas 
this was second most important for the UK SMEs, it was only the tenth most important 
JV problem for the German SMEs. Personnel motivation, on the other hand, appeared 
to be rather important for both groups of SMEs with a mean value of 1.9 and 2.0, 
respectively. Of equal, relative, importance to both groups of SMEs were further the 
problem of communication with staff, the potential loss of control and a mismatch in 
management styles. All these problems were regarded as nearly equally important by 
the UK and the German SMEs, ranking between seven and ten on a list with a total of 
24 problems. 
For instance, for UK-2 that manufactures test equipment, the loss of control of its 
technological know-how (dissemination) "is at the back of my mind," said the managing 
director of the SME. This managing director's main concern was that "overnight, 
someone who you have trusted, produces your product." As a strategy, the SME does 
not transfer cutting-edge technology. "It's a question of trust." UK-7 that had trusted its 
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Chinese partner stressed that the Chinese company decided "not to play fair any 
longer even though they rely on our know-how." 
The remaining problems (on the list of JV problems) were either relatively unimportant 
to the SMEs (including the creation of a new competitor, political risk, absence of a 
detailed investment law) or showed major discrepancies in the perceptions of the two 
groups of SMEs. For instance, local sourcing and insufficient training of Chinese 
managers were perceived the fifth most important problems for the UK SMEs, whereas 
they ranked only eighteenth and tenth, respectively on the German side (for the UK 
SMEs this latter was an important problem, for the German SMEs it was only of 
medium importance). 
At the time of the investigation, UK-6-JV was assembling the parts supplied by UK-6 
and eventually, most of the machines should be produced in China using also local 
supplies. However, UK-6 fears that after two years even critical components would 
have to be imported from Japan, for instance, where UK-6 was at the time of 
interviewing, purchasing certain materials and components. Also to UK-2, the 
availability of quality components is very important since it can use only high quality 
components for the manufacture of its equipment in the JV. 
Similar applies to the low productivity of local labour. Whereas the UK SMEs 
considered this problem as important (mean = 2.1, rank 7), it was only medium 
important for the German SMEs, ranking twenty-first (mean = 3.0) and thus amongst 
the least important. UK-6 criticised the low efficiency and therefore the pace things 
happen in its JV. This is "the only area that worries me. I would like have things done 
faster." UK-6 believes that it could change (increase) the pace of operation in the 
venture if it had the majority in the JV. Although UK-6 could appoint the general 
manager in the JV, a Taiwanese manager from its partner, this manager apparently 
does not represent the interests of the UK SMEs as it had hoped when it made the 
decision to appoint this general manager ]...[ and considered it an alternative to 
expatriating a UK manager who would have been too expensive for the SME. 
On the other hand, problems that were perceived by the German SMEs as important, 
were unfair competition, corruption and damaging reputation, whereas these problems 
ranked only considerably lower on the list of JV problems of the UK SMEs. 
Overall, a Spearman rank correlation coefficient of rjp nat = -4778 suggests that the UK 
and German SMEs perceived the importance of JV problems similarly. This is true on 
the 1 per cent significance level even, whereas group similarities between Size One 
firms and Size Two enterprises exist on the 5 per cent significance level only (rsp si^ e = 
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.4376). The gravest differences between Size One and Size Two firms exist with 
regard to the recruiting of personnel that ranked second within the group of Size Two 
firms though only eleventh within the group of Size Two firms. Differences are also 
considerably with regard to loss of control (which is more feared by the smaller firms), 
infrastructure and restrictions on sales and imports which was considered a more 
important problem by the smaller firms than by the larger. 
A comparison of rsp ^at and ysp_s\ze suggests that the size criterion is a more important 
discriminator than nationality. 
7.2.6 Joint venture evaluation 
Joint venture performance 
On average, the UK SMEs were more satisfied with their JVs than were the German 
SMEs. Whereas the most satisfactory performance criterion of UK SMEs were supply 
fees, for the German SMEs it was local market share, followed by return on investment 
(Rol) and export performance, management and supply fees and 'in comparison with 
competitors' (competitors' performance). The least important criteria for German SMEs 
were growth and royalty fees. Comparison with competitors and management fees, 
however, were the second most satisfactory success criteria for UK SMEs, followed by 
local market share, Rol, growth, export performance and royalty fees (table 7-20). 
Table 7-20: JV performance. 
Performance criteria U K S M E s G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
S R n S R n S R n S R n 
Overall satisfaction 2.4 7 2.9 9 2.4 7 2.9 9 
Supply fees 2.7 1 3 3.0 5 7 2.7 2 7 3.3 6 3 
Management fees 2.8 2 5 2.8 4 4 2.9 4 7 2.5 1 2 
Compared with competitors 2.8 2 5 3.0 5 4 2.8 3 6 3.0 3 3 
Local market share 3.0 4 5 2.5 1 4 2.5 1 6 3.3 6 3 
Rol 3.3 5 6 2.7 2 7 2.9 4 7 3.2 4 6 
Growth 3.5 6 6 3.2 7 6 3.5 6 6 3.2 4 6 
Export performance 3.6 7 5 2.7 2 3 4.0 7 4 2.5 1 4 
Royalty fees 4.0 8 3 4.3 8 4 4.2 8 5 4.0 8 2 
Key: S = degree of sat isfact ion, R = rank, n = respondents. Three companies indicated that it 
w a s too early to make any comments on the success of their ventures. = .1905; rjp si^e = 
.0446; r^ p (a = .05) = .6190; r^ p „ „ (a = .01) = .8095. 
The managing director of UK-2 was "quite disappointed with what they have achieved 
so far. They have not shown that they can do this." At the time of interviewing, the JV 
was not manufacturing. The seven employees of UK-2-JV, in 1995, turned over mere 
£70,000. For 1996, UK-2's managing director expected nearly double this turnover. 
Spearman rank correlation analysis suggests that the UK and German SMEs did not 
display significant similarities with regard to their degrees of satisfaction with JV 
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per formance (Psp nat = .1905). With regard to firm size dif ferences, the dissimilarities are 
more distinct ( rsp size = .0446). For instance, whereas Size Two f irms are most satisfied 
with their JVs ' export performance, this ranks only seventh within the group of Size 
One f i rms and a reverse situation appears with regard to local market share. Overall, 
the smal ler f i rms are more satisfied with the performance of their JVs than are the 
larger f i rms. 
Factors for joint venture success 
For success of a JV in China, the UK and German SMEs perceived the following 
attr ibutes as important (table 21). 
Table 7 -21 : Attr ibutes for JV success. 
S u c c e s s attribute UK SMEs G E R S M E s Size One Size Two 
1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 1 R n 
Patience 1.3 1 8 1.5 2 10 1.3 1 8 1.5 1 10 
Sincerity 1.5 2 8 1.3 1 12 1.3 1 10 1.5 1 10 
Good business connections 1.5 2 8 2.0 6 10 1.5 3 8 2.0 6 10 
Good product 1.6 4 8 1.9 5 11 1.7 5 10 1,9 3 9 
Adapting to thie Ctiinese market 1.8 5 8 1.7 3 10 1.6 4 10 1.9 3 8 
Relationships witti PRC officials 1.9 6 8 2.1 7 9 2.0 7 9 2.0 6 8 
Familiarity with PRC bus. pract. 2.0 7 8 1.8 4 10 1.9 6 10 1.9 3 8 
Key: I = importance, R = rank, n = respondents, rsp ^a, 
.6786; r^  (a = .01) = .8571. 
,4554; r sp_size .5916; r^  (a = .05) = 
Pat ience and sincerity were considered most important attributes for success with JVs 
in China by both the UK and the German SMEs. Good business connections were 
perceived as second most important by the UK SMEs, but only sixth most important by 
the German SMEs. Instead, the German SMEs perceived the ability to adapt to the 
Chinese market as third most important attribute for success in a Sino-foreign JV. The 
UK SMEs perceived this factor as fifth most important only, fol lowing a good product 
(rank four). Relationships with Chinese officials and familiarity with Chinese business 
pract ices were the least important attributes for JV success for the UK SMEs. 
Familiarity with Chinese business practices ranked fourth with the German SMEs, 
fo l lowed by good product, good business links and relationships with Chinese officials. 
In the case of UK-2 that manufactures testing equipment, the fact that the SME has 
moved on-site with service capabilit ies meant considerable orders for the firm. 
However, the managing director of UK-2 also suggested the need to be patient and "to 
give them support, service support and information." 
Accord ing to the calculation of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of rsp ^a, = 
.4554, the UK and German SMEs did not show significance similarities with respect to 
attr ibutes of JV success. However, inter-group correlation is stronger when the 
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criterion f i rm size is applied {r^p ^ize = -5916). Whereas both Size One and Size Two 
f i rms regard pat ience and sincerity as the most important attributes for JV success, 
their percept ions differ considerably with regard to the factor 'good business 
connect ions ' and 'familiarity with Chinese business practices'. Whereas the former is 
more important to smaller f irms, the latter is more to larger f i rms. In summary, the 
criterion 'nationality' is stronger a discriminatory factor than f irm size. 
Joint venture as resource commitment relief 
The managers of the UK and German SMEs were also asked whether and to what 
extent joining forces with a local Chinese company would reduce their own resource 
commi tment to the market entry strategy with respect to management , f inancial and 
information resources. Table 7-22 shows the results: for the UK SMEs joint venturing 
with a local Chinese company meant a medium relief to their commitment with equal 
regard to management , f inancial and information resources. The German SMEs 
perceived the JV as not being a relief with regard to management and financial 
resources and a medium relief with regard to information needs. 
Table 7-22: JV as resource commitment relieving strategy. 
Chinese partner contribution UK SMEs GERSIVIEs Size One Size Two 
R n R n R n R n 
Management resources 3.4 8 3.7 10 3.4 9 3.7 9 
Financial resources 3.4 8 3.6 9 3.3 8 3.9 9 
Information needs 3.1 8 3.0 11 2.9 9 3.2 10 
Key: R = perceived degree to which JV partner helped reduce the SMEs' resource commitment 
for the FDI market entry strategy. 
As a t rend, the smaller Size One firms regard the JV strategy more as a strategy that 
eases the resource scarcit ies of SMEs than the larger Size Two enterprises. The 
smal ler f i rms suggest that in terms of management and financial resource ease, the 
benefi ts f rom joint venturing are moderately whereas the larger f irms cannot see such 
an ease. Al though with regard to information needs, the smaller f irms appreciate the 
JV more than the larger f irms do, though also they regard the provision of essential 
informat ion by the JV strategy as moderately easing the resource situation of SMEs. 
In conclusion, f ive of the nine UK SMEs would again engage in a JV, two suggested 
that it was too early to answer this question and one did not know at the t ime of the 
survey. One respondent did not answer this question. Of the German SMEs seven 
wou ld again engage in a JV in China, one indicated that it did not know and four SMEs 
did not provide an answer to this question. There is no dissimilarity between the 
responses of Size One and Size Two SMEs. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed the details of the joint venturing in China of nine UK and 12 
Ge rman SMEs. Making a distinction between UK and German SMEs as well as Size 
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One and Size Two SMEs is sensible since both nationality and f irm size facilitated 
di f ferences between two groups of SMEs. On the other hand, various dimensions of 
the JV process applied to all SMEs on an equal basis. For instance, the market motive 
was the pr ime motivation for UK and German and large and smaller SMEs to set up an 
FDI presence in China. As is known from the literature in chapter six, this applies to 
large MNEs alike. Differences were significant in areas in which the resource situation 
of f i rms was a major influencing factor, eg in the planning of a JV, partner selection, 
and negot iat ions. Also, the smaller f i rms are more satisfied with their JVs than their 
larger counterparts, suggest ing that the smaller f irms did not have expectat ions laid out 
as detai led and as the larger f i rms in the sample. Again, with regard to the JV's ability 
to relief the resource commitment of the SMEs when entering the Chinese market, the 
smal ler f i rms were more likely to support this argument than the larger f irms. In those 
cases, it was more difficult for the Chinese partners to contribute assets or attributes 
which the larger SMEs needed since they did not have them themselves. 
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Notes 
^ A 5 0 minutes interview was held with the managing director of UK-2 on 2 . October 1 9 9 6 , An 
interview was also held with the managing director of UK-6 on 3 0 . September 1 9 9 6 , lasting one 
hour. A further 4 5 minute interview was carried out with the managing director of UK-7 on 3. 
October 1 9 9 6 , 
^ Contingency analysis would indicate whether differences are significant or not [HQ: firm size 
category and nationality are independent; H,: firm size category and nationality are dependent], 
Chi^^p = , 0 4 and Chi^„j, = 6 , 6 3 , thus HQ not rejected, 
3 r 3 p = 1 - [6 ZD^I{n'-n)] 
One company had 5 5 0 employees and another one 5 1 5 , Both were accepted as SMEs, 
^ At the time of interviewing, UK-7 held 3 5 % in the JV, the Chinese partner 5 5 % and the 
Singaporean partner 1 0 % , 
2 0 0 
Chapter Eight 
Cross Case Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has presented, and analysed, the results obtained from two 
quest ionnaire surveys. Addit ionally, qualitative f indings f rom in-depth interviews with 
managers of selected UK companies were analysed. Chapter eight analyses the 
exper iences and strategies of one German and three UK SMEs with a joint venture 
(JV) in China - according to the research f ramework that has been established in 
chapters three and six. Four cases were chosen since cross case analysis allows the 
investigator to progress f rom descript ion and partial analysis to an interpretative level 
of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Explicitly, this chapter studies the JV 
format ion and operat ion phases of the four cases, evaluates their performance and 
identif ies problems that occurred while joint venturing in China. The subsequent 
chapter nine discusses the overall f indings of the questionnaire surveys and interviews 
as wel l as the insights of the case studies against the background of the body of 
l i terature d iscussed in chapters two, three, five and six. Appendix Vl l contains the 
detai led cases of the four SMEs with a JV in China. These are presented in the same 
format as the cross case analysis executed in this chapter. 
Table 8-1 presents an overview of the four cases, including aspects such as industrial 
sector, year of establ ishment, volume of investment, number of employees and 
location of the JVs. Names, specific products and locations have been disguised. 
Table 8 - 1 : Summary of the cases studied. 
GER-0 UK-3 UK-4 UK-8 
Industry Mech, Engineering Mech, engineering Electronics Road infrastructure 
Established January 1995 May 1996 March 1994 March 1995 
Investment £2,77m £2,09m £0,11m £0,78m 
Employees 95 25 20 54 
Location East China East China East China South China 
8.2 Basic facts about the cases 
8.2.1 The c a s e S M E s 
All four SMEs were establ ished as limited companies. Whereas both GER-0 and UK-3 
are active in the mechanical engineering business, UK-4 operates in the electronics 
industry and UK-8 in road infrastructure. The companies have in common, however, 
that they are important players in their respective industries. For instance, as much as 
GER-0 considers itself as the second most important manufacturer of MECHANICAL 
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C O M P O N E N T S wor ldwide with a market share of 13 per cent (GER-0 Annual Report 
'94, 1994) so insists UK-3 to have an international reputation for its commitment to 
h igh engineer ing standards and quality production. Further, UK-8 holds no less than 80 
per cent of the market for ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS in the UK. Finally, 
the manag ing director of UK-4 est imates his market share being "fairly high" since the 
products of UK-4 are niche market products. In terms of company size (number of 
employees) GER-0 is the largest of the four case companies, with a workforce in 
excess of 500. The other three companies have a workforce of distinctly less than 500 
employees . In detai l , at the t ime of the investigation, UK-3 employed 210 staff, UK-8 
90 and UK-4 ten in their operations in the UK. 
8.2.2 International bus iness activities 
Al though international markets are very important to the four SMEs, the ways the four 
compan ies generate their foreign turnovers vary considerably. For instance, GER-0, at 
the t ime of the investigation, had subsidiaries (wholly foreign-owned enterphses 
[WFOEs ] and JVs) on four continents except Afr ica. On the other hand, UK-3's 
bus iness activities limit themselves to export ing and the installation of 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. For UK-3 the JV in China is the only investment 
project abroad. The same applies to UK-4 and UK-8 that had also pursued only export 
activit ies prior to engaging in their foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in China. 
However , in the course of the research project, UK-8 bought a 50 per cent stake in a 
S ingapore-based enterprise. In addition, UK-8 has two agents in Hong Kong and one 
in Dubai which acquire business on behalf of the SME. 
8.2.3 The SiWEs' China experience 
Of the four SMEs, only two were experienced in doing business with, or in, China. One 
of those is GER-0 . Its first commitment in the Chinese market was a know-how 
t ransfer agreement with a state-owned enterprise (SOE) signed as early as 1982. UK-
3 had prior exper ience with China through export ing to the country since 1985. In other 
words , both SMEs had approximately 15 years of China experience before they started 
commit t ing funds into a joint investment project in the country. On the other hand, 
neither UK-4 nor UK-8 were engaged in China business prior to establishing their JVs 
in China. UK-8 would not have even undertaken the step towards business in China 
wi thout the impetus f rom the Chinese side. In this particular case the Chinese were, in 
1992, searching the world markets for suitable ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
P R O D U C T S and companies in the West they could team up with to manufacture and 
install such products in China. Only after the Chinese company had initially 
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approached the UK SME had it started to develop a business interest in entering and 
developing the Chinese market. 
8.3 Joint venture formation 
8.3.1 Joint venture planning 
The JV planning procedures employed by the four SMEs were considerably different. 
There was , on the one hand, GER-0 whose planning efforts were considerably 
intensive and sophist icated. The company started as early as 1990, with the active 
search for opportunit ies of contracting with a potential Chinese partner company. 
During the entire process, the director for overseas affairs of GER-0 proceeded along 
his set of criteria establ ished in his so-called 'JV evaluation handbook'. During its 
evaluat ion process, GER-0 relied on country-specif ic information provided by the BfAl, 
the German government- funded body that provides information about market and 
investment opportunit ies abroad. Also, the German SME was the only company out of 
the four SMEs studied in-depth, that looked thoroughly into opportunit ies of f inancing 
the investment project through a national or a supra-national grant or loan. For 
instance, the German SME applied for, and obtained, f inance from the German 
Development Bank (KfW) at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent. This is considerably lower 
than the market interest rate. The director for overseas affairs of GER-0 also looked 
into the possibil ity of f inancing the project through EClP, the investment f inancing 
f lagship of the European Community (European Communi ty Investment Partners), 
Eventually, this was not considered appropriate for no further reasons given. 
On the other hand, there was UK-3 whose planning is best described as a 'gut-
approach' , ie anything but scientific and professional. The SME aimed at setting up a 
company first and would only then look how the market works. UK-4 put more effort 
into the planning of its operation in China than UK-3 did. Originally, UK-4 intended to 
enter into a contract manufactur ing agreement with a local company. Initially UK-4's 
managing director contacted the British embassies in various Asian countries and 
asked them for basic information about companies that would be able to manufacture 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES on its behalf. After assessing the company details he had 
received, according to his set of criteria (basically quality-of- labour considerations), 
UK-4's managing director subsequently shortl isted two companies and inspected them. 
At the end of this process he decided to shift production to China because production 
would be cheap and quality of labour sufficient. 
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A s was said above, UK-8 was approached by the Chinese side. Interestingly, all the 
information that the S M E used during the planning and assessment process, was 
provided by the SME's potential Chinese partner. All the f igures that helped the UK 
S M E est imate the vast potential for its INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS were based 
on f igures created by the Chinese side exclusively. However, UK-8 insists that it had 
carr ied out independent market research. 
8.3.2 Motivations for production in China 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
The reason of three out of the four SMEs (GER-0, UK-3, UK-8) to engage in an FDI 
project, was the potential which the Chinese market would hold for the companies. 
Only UK-4 was , at the t ime of the investigation, not primarily interested in servicing the 
Chinese market. Instead the SME intended to manufacture cheaply in the country. This 
would make the UK SME cost-competit ive with respect to its competitors. As a matter 
of fact, for UK-4 low cost production was the only feasible strategy to withhold the 
increasing competi t ive pressures in its traditional markets. 
The other SMEs , GER-0 , UK-3 and UK-8, agreed in that it was perceived difficult, if not 
impossible, to utilise the vast potential of the Chinese market by pursuing export 
strategies exclusively. The higher price of the exported products, compared with locally 
produced goods, would make continued penetration of the Chinese market difficult. 
A lso, react ion t imes would be too long and transport costs too high. These three SMEs 
considered being present on-site with an operation as necessary and essential to 
succeed in the Chinese market. 
Motivations to form a joint venture 
The mot ivat ions of the SMEs to establish a JV with a local Chinese company were 
rather dif ferent. For GER-0 the ' fol lowing-the-customer'-motivation was the prime 
driving force behind, and the initiator for, its decision to establish a JV instead of a 
W F O E . In concrete, GER-0 fol lowed one of its main customers in Germany, KMP^ that 
was about to set up a JV with a Chinese SOE based in CITY [East China]. KMP's plan 
was that it wou ld join forces with one division of the SOE and GER-0 with the other 
division of the SOE which manufactured both ENGINEERING PRODUCTS and 
M E C H A N I C A L C O M P O N E N T S . The distinct advantage for GER-0 of fol lowing this 
customer was that KMP would create the market potential which GER-0 could exploit, 
initially at least. This constituted a high business security factor for the German SME. 
The UK S M E , UK-3, sought, first and foremost, the Chinese element, the links and 
customer knowledge of its potential partner, from a commitment in a JV. The Chinese 
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e lement was the pr ime reason also for UK-8. For this SME it was necessary to acquire, 
wi th the establ ishment of a JV, knowledge of both the Chinese language and the 
business environment. UK-8 considered further as necessary to obtain valuable 
contacts which are essential in the infrastructure business in China, Also UK-8 hoped 
that its Chinese partner would bring links to Chinese authorit ies and potential 
customers. For these reasons, the UK SME did not pursue the idea of setting up a 
local manufactur ing facility on its own. UK-8's managing director considered the going 
it alone as "simply impossible." Finally, and this was put forward only by UK-8, the 
S M E revealed that it did not have the financial and managerial resources, which are 
necessary to set up a W F O E . 
Interesting is also the case of UK-4. This SME joined forces with a Chinese company 
and establ ished a JV only because its Chinese business partner insisted on that. UK-
4's initial intention was to manufacture high quality ELECTRONIC DEVICES at low 
cost in the form of contract manufactur ing. Clearly, thus, UK-4 had never considered 
the possibility of sett ing up a W F O E . 
8.3.3 Partner select ion 
Finding ttie partner 
Interestingly, in two out of the four cases (GER-0, UK-8) the SMEs ' way of f inding the 
later Chinese partner was somewhat pre-determined. For instance, GER-0 held 
negotiat ions with the SOE ABC^ that was also in negotiations with GER-O's customer 
KMP: As establ ished above, KMP wanted GER-0 to join forces with a division of ABC. 
In the case of UK-8 it was the initiative of a Chinese enterprise that the JV, in the end, 
came into existence. Would the Chinese company not have approached UK-8, a JV 
would not have been establ ished. Also UK-8 was likely not to have entered the 
Chinese market even without the initial approach by the Chinese. From the very 
beginning, UK-8 was thus somehow 'attached' to this particular Chinese company that 
was to become its later partner in the joint undertaking. 
The other two SMEs, UK-3 and UK-4, undertook partner search processes. UK-3 
approached various potential partners in North, South and East China. UK-4 sought 
the assistance of the British embassies in various countries of Asia before personally 
examining the short- l isted companies on-site. However, apart f rom the embassies, UK-
4's managing director did not approach any other organisations that could have 
provided contacts with potential business partners in these countr ies. Had he done 
this, he could have possibly identified a company that would have agreed to UK-4's 
originally proposed contract manufacturing business. Due to limited t ime and f inance, 
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and due to only l imited knowledge of the means available to search for partners, the 
UK S M E ended up being restricted in its choice of its partner company in CITY [East 
China] and thus restricted to the mode of contracting. 
Partner selection criteria 
If there was an S M E defining a set of criteria to select its later partner in the JV, then it 
was GER-0^ and, to some extent, also UK-3. GER-0 used a set of criteria that was 
previously successful ly appl ied for the establ ishment of GER-O's other overseas 
operat ions." Eventual ly, GER-0 had to choose between a manufacturer of 
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS based in a provincial capital in North China and the state-
owned A B C that was said to have a good reputation in and out of CITY [East China]. 
For UK-3 it was important to select a partner that would bring in the desired Chinese 
e lement (ie local business knowledge, contacts, guanxi, etc.) and that would have a 
large market share in China. Also, UK-3 wanted a partner that was interested in the 
business and in the proposed collaboration. However, of hidden, though considerable 
interest of UK-3 was the fact also that the potential Chinese partner "had no idea about 
the product." UK-3 hoped that its Chinese counterpart would be a silent partner that 
would not part ic ipate in the management of the JV. From this, it became clear that UK-
3 needed its Chinese partner exclusively for getting business out of the Chinese 
market. Wi thout the necessity of finding a way to acquire the essential 'guanxi ' and 
since it was bel ieved that a JV is the best way to do so, UK-3 would have very likely 
decided to set up a W F O E . This inherent reluctance of joint venturing becomes evident 
in the subsequent course of the JV formation and operation process. 
UK-4 had found only one Chinese company that would produce its ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES. It d id, therefore, not have the choice of selecting its Chinese partner from a 
pool of potential partner companies. In the case of UK-8 it is not clear whether the UK 
SME's decis ion to join forces with a particular Chinese enterprise resulted f rom the 
diff icult ies the S M E expehenced when searching for alternative partners, or the actual 
assessment of the Chinese partner. It cannot be reconstructed whether it applies, what 
UK-8 insists on, namely that the Chinese company met approximately 80 per cent of 
UK-8's partner requirements, such as having a reputation as a manufacturer of ROAD 
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E PRODUCTS, contacts and credibility amongst customers, etc. 
Partner characteristics 
All four SMEs have been teaming up with only one Chinese company each. In all four 
cases, also, had the Chinese partner a considerably larger workforce than the 
partner ing SME. Only UK-4's Chinese partner is a privately owned company. The other 
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SMEs ' Chinese partners are SOEs (partners of GER-0 and UK-8) or an authority under 
a part icular Chinese ministry in the case of UK-3, 
Interestingly, in only two of the four cases were the Chinese partners familiar with the 
industry the JVs would operate in (GER-0, UK-8), GER-O's partner, ABC, was engaged 
in the manufacture of ENGINEERING PRODUCTS as well as MECHANICAL 
C O M P O N E N T S . UK-8's partner manufactures machinery for the road and bridge 
construct ion industry as well as bridges and bridge furniture. In contrast, UK-,3's 
partner was a port authority in CITY [East China] and UK-4 teamed up with a company 
engaged in the manufacture of knitting yarn feeders. For instance, UK-4's partner 
considers itself as the largest Asia producer of Yarn feeders for knitting machines, 
UK-3 took advantage of the fact that its partner had no expert ise in the industry the JV 
wou ld be operat ing in. Due to this fact UK-3 insisted on appoint ing the general 
manager of the JV. So the SME would be able to control daily operat ions of the JV. 
8.3.4 Joint venture negotiation p rocess 
Negotiation contents and conflict 
The main negotiat ion issues of the four SME cases were rather different. For instance, 
GER-O had the product programme of the JV-to-be on top of its list. The German SME 
of fered approximately 65 per cent of its entire MECHANICAL C O M P O N E N T S 
product ion programme and the Chinese partner selected what should be manufactured 
in the JV. Further issues in the negotiat ion process were the planning of future 
operat ions, contents of the feasibility study, the distribution of the JV's equity, and the 
valuat ion of both partners' contributions. The latter was, initially at least, a major 
negotiat ion problem. 
The valuat ion of both partners' contributions was also an issue of interest and a point 
of confl ict in the case of UK-3-JV negotiations. The remarkable dif ference was, 
however, that, in this particular case, the conflict could not be solved easily. The 
Chinese side simply insisted on its proposed value of the UK machinery. The UK SME, 
on the other hand, refused to agree to this. However, since UK-3 did not want to risk 
the business l icence, it eventually obeyed to the Chinese company 's dictate.^ An 
important issue for UK-3 was further the supply of material. This had to be ensured in 
the course of negotiat ions since the availability of cheap input factors was one of the 
reasons for UK-3 to commence production in China, Another negotiat ion content which 
was of interest to the UK SME was the market focus of the JV, Also, this caused 
dispute between UK-3 and its Chinese partner. The Chinese side wanted to export as 
much as 50 per cent of the JV's output, whereas it has been the objective of UK-3 to 
develop a new, ie the Chinese, market, but not to sell as much as 50 per cent of 
product ion in overseas markets. Eventually, UK-3 had to agree to a 50 per cent export 
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share. In this particular case, the Chinese party's bargaining position was too strong 
for the UK S M E to wi thhold. The market focus was also a problem in the case of GER-
0. A lso GER-0 came to China to develop, first and foremost, the domest ic market. As 
opposed to GER-0 , UK-3 had also difficulties with negotiat ing its equity stake in the JV. 
The UK S M E was not permit ted holding the majority stake in the joint undertaking. 
A n important aspect in the negotiat ions of UK-8-JV was the status of the UK SME as 
provider of a certain component whose formulation was to be kept secret. This was a 
chemical component which absorbs the shock of the traffic when it hits the ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS and it was considered an essential one for the 
uniqueness of the entire product. The Chinese side accepted the UK SME's standpoint 
wi thout major discussions and agreed also to the importation of equipment for the 
manufactur ing and installation of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. UK-8 
insisted on that, al though the price of the equipment purchased in the UK was 
considerably higher compared with buying it in China. UK-8 insisted on that the UK-
sourced equipment would guarantee higher eff iciency and quality of the products 
manufactured and installed. 
The S M E cases show clearly that companies with a strong bargaining power can press 
more through negotiat ions than f irms with less bargaining power. UK-8 had a clear 
f i rm-specif ic advantage (replace ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS without 
closing the individual bridge) and could thus impose more pressure on negotiations. 
Repeatedly the Chinese side agreed to what the UK SME demanded or desired. At 
only one occasion, namely when UK-8 opted for a majority stake in the JV, the 
Chinese side opposed vehemently. 
A lso GER-0 was able to press most of its demands through negotiat ions: the product 
p rogramme, the majority stake, and the fact that the German director for overseas 
affairs was appointed chairman of the JV. Overal l , compared with its other operations 
wor ldwide, GER-O's JV in China seems not to be an organisational except ion. The only 
issue GER-0 had to agree with, although it did not like the idea, was the long duration 
of the JV. Originally, GER-0 eyed at a JV duration of 15 years, but eventually agreed to 
a durat ion of 50 years. Overal l , GER-0 had its clear idea of what would be acceptable 
and what not as the outcome of negotiations. The SME was prepared even to withdraw 
f rom its proposal to joint venture. The SOE ABC offered GER-0 even a 60 per cent 
equity share in the JV. Would the investment have been larger, ABC's opinion of the 
foreign equity share and that of the municipal government would have been different. 
Os land and Cavusgi l (1996) found that the extent of control that is desired is affected 
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by the size of the JV. However, GER-O's strategy was to have an equity share as large 
as necessary, but low enough to keep the partner interested in the joint business. 
The durat ions of the JVs vary considerably across the four cases. Whereas GER-O-JV 
has a durat ion of 50 years, UK-3-JV should last for 30 and UK-4-JV for 20 years. UK-
8-JV was establ ished as the JV with the shortest durat ion: it is due to expire after 12 
years. All JVs are extendable depending on the mutual agreement of the partners and 
the approval of the respective municipal authorit ies. Whereas for two SMEs JV 
durat ion was not an issue of conflict, for two other SMEs it was: GER-0 initially insisted 
on 15 years, but later agreed to the Chinese proposal of 50 years, because the 
Chinese side insisted on such a long duration. In the case of UK-3-JV it was the 
reverse: here UK-3 opted for the longer duration of 30 years whereas the Chinese side 
wanted only 15 years. Eventually, the parties agreed at 30 years. 15 years were 
considered not long enough by the UK SME as duration of the JV. 
UK-4 did not report any issues in negotiations that caused conflict between it and its 
Chinese partner. This was certainly due to the reason that UK-4's deal was a 
manufactur ing agreement in which the JV produces according to orders f rom the UK 
SME. JV issues were, thus, not really relevant to the UK SME. 
SIVIE negotiation team, location, duration, language of negotiations, interpreters 
The negotiat ion teams altered on both sides, the foreign and the Chinese. In the case 
of GER-0 , managers of the overseas business division prepared the JV formation up to 
the signing of the so-called 'letter of intent'. The final talks and the signing of the 
contract were accompl ished by GER-O's director for overseas affairs. 
This w a s rather different in the cases of UK-3, UK-4 and UK-8 where the managing 
directors of the SMEs initiated the preparations of the investment projects themselves. 
The reason is certainly that the UK SMEs were smaller in size and had nothing like an 
overseas affairs department as had GER-0. In the case of UK-3 the managing director 
init iated the deal and prepared and carried out negotiat ions. Only towards the end of 
the process was the expertise of Price Waterhouse's local office in CITY [East China] 
consul ted. Jointly with UK-3 it worked out the final documents. The story of UK-4 reads 
similarty: here the managing director of UK-4 carried out the preparations and 
negotiat ions and received some legal support f rom Hong Kong-based solicitors 
towards the end of JV preparations. In the case of UK-8-JV negotiations were carried 
out between three parties: UK-8, the potential Chinese partner and a Chinese 
commerc ia l organisat ion based in Beijing, UK-8-JV was negotiated, initially, by the 
managing director of UK-8 who later delegated negotiations to his technical director 
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who went to China to get ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS installed on-site. 
This was necessary to get the JV approved. 
Three out of the four JVs (GER-O-JV, UK-3-JV, UK-4-JV) were approved by the local 
authori t ies, due to their relatively small investments. Only UK-8 was approved by the 
Administrat ive Bureau for Industry and Commerce in Beijing. 
Whereas UK-8-JV needed approximately two years of preparation and negotiation 
(four meet ings) and UK-3-JV eight negotiation meetings spread over a total of 18 
months, the actual sorting out of details in the case of UK-4-JV had taken 
approximately six months, al though UK-4 commenced thinking about overseas 
product ion in 1992 already. Also GER-O-JV became operational after only about six 
months of preparat ions and negotiations. This was due to GER-O's determined 
approach towards the undertaking and its professional proceeding through 
preparat ions. Further, the Chinese side could manage to get the JV approved by the 
municipal government so quickly for two main reasons: first, ABC had close links with 
the municipal government of CITY [East China]. Secondly, the Chinese partner wanted 
the deal. A B C certainly refrained from delaying or even jeopardising its deal with GER-
0 since this could have affected its main deal with KMP to form the proposed (bigger) 
KMP-JV to produce ENGINEERING PRODUCTS. This certainly saved GER-0 funds 
that would have been necessary othenwise for extended negotiations, addit ional travel 
to China, etc. 
Long negotiat ion periods as in the case of UK-8-JV are resource demanding and 
expensive. In this particular case, the SME first had to install successfully one of its 
R O A D INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS on-site and had to get this approved by the 
Chinese Ministry of Transport. Only then did the authorit ies approve the JV. 
8.3.5 Partner contributions 
SME's contribution 
The UK and German SMEs whose cases were studied in-depth contr ibuted, first and 
foremost , cash to their JVs. GER-0 and UK-8 additionally contributed know-how and 
the former also drawings. Apart from know-how, UK-3 brought into the JV machinery. 
On the other hand, the exclusive contribution of UK-4 was cash which, together with 
the cash contr ibut ion of the Chinese partner, was used to purchase machines for the 
product ion of ELECTRONIC DEVICES. 
Chinese partner's contribution 
GER-O's partner, ABC, contributed its own MECHANICAL C O M P O N E N T S 
programme, machinery, land, warehouse facilities. It was also responsible for the 
staff ing of the JV. Also in the case of UK-3-JV the Chinese partner contributed land 
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and the building in which the JV commenced its operat ions, UK-3's partner 
contr ibuted, however, no cash to the JV, but instead 'guanxi ' that were considered as 
very important by the UK SME. 
In contrast to the notion not to expect cash from the Chinese partner, UK-4's Chinese 
partner poured in cash (twice as much as the UK SME). Also UK-8 contributed 
f inancial resources to the JV, apart f rom knowledge of the local business community, 
contacts, and the responsibil ity for staffing the JV. As in the case of UK-3-JV the 
Chinese partner's knowledge of the business environment, contacts and links to 
officials were very important for the UK SME. 
In the case of GER-O-JV there exists contradictory opinion with regard to a Chinese 
partner 's cash contr ibution. According to GER-O-JV's German production and quality 
assurance manager, the Chinese partner had not contributed any money to the JV. On 
the other hand, his assistant insisted that the Chinese side also poured in local 
currency. The production and quality assurance manager of the JV considers land to 
be the most important contribution of the Chinese partner since, "as a foreigner you 
never have the right to acquire land." Instead, China knows the system of land leasing 
of up to 99 years. Subsequent ly, the land and buildings on it fall back to the Chinese 
people. A problem that relates to the Chinese partner's contribution of land is that, 
f requent ly, foreign direct investors failed to reassure themselves when establishing a 
JV: the Chinese partners bring into the JV land and later, a third party starts claiming 
money on the basis of its right which it holds in the land. This problem was conf irmed 
by Mr. Gotschl ich of the German Centre for Industry and Commerce in Shanghai 
( interview on 5.11.96). However, this is not the case in GER-O-JV - at least it had not 
been detected at the t ime of the investigation. 
A major contr ibut ion of UK-4's partner to the JV was the Chinese f irm's municipal 
government connect ions. This good relationship to the municipal government of CITY 
al lows the Chinese partner company to pledge that "we complete all the formalit ies and 
after f ive days, the JV can be set up." 
8.4 Joint venture operation 
8.4.1 Joint venture background information 
Joint venture establishment, total investment and workforce 
All four S M E JVs were establ ished as equity JVs and in the legal form of a limited 
liability company according to Chinese law. The total investment in the JVs ranges 
f rom £108,974 (UK-4-JV), £0,77m (UK-8-JV) and £2,09m (UK-3-JV) to £2,8m (GER-O-
JV), At the t ime of the investigation, the workforces of the JVs ranged from 20 (UK-4-
JV), 25 (UK-3-JV) and 54 staff (UK-8-JV) to 95 employees (GER-O-JV), 
Joint venture location 
All four JVs are located along China's East coast in economic and technological 
deve lopment zones where they can enjoy special t reatment in terms of tax 
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concessions, for instance. Also, f rom their locations, the JVs have relatively easy 
access to road, air and sea transport infrastructures as wel l as to electricity, 
communicat ion and social infrastructures. 
Three out of four JVs (GER-O-JV, UK-3-JV, UK-8-JV) are located in close proximity to 
their respective markets. UK-4 is the exception. This JV's sole client is its SME parent 
in the UK. Further commonal i t ies appear: all four JVs are located on the factory sites 
that originally belonged to their Chinese parents. In the cases of GER-0, UK-3 and UK-
4 the Chinese parent companies are still operating in neighbouring buildings on the site 
shared. In the case of UK-8, the Chinese parent company has erected a building which 
hosts the JV's operat ion and where the JV pays rent to the Chinese company. 
Choice of location 
GER-0 had chosen to locate in CITY [East China] due to reasons, including proximity 
to target markets, the location being a civilised area, tax concessions granted in the 
economic and technological development zone with no taxes to be paid in the first two 
years and half the rate from year three to five. Also UK-3 based its decision to locate 
near CITY [East China] on the proximity to target markets, although for UK-3 the 
availabil ity of a suitable factory building, the availability of skilled labour and cheap 
material (steel) and access to river and sea shipping were of further relevance. 
Access to river and sea shipping was also of importance to UK-4 when deciding to 
locate in CITY [East China]. As is known from above, UK-4 did not have a great deal of 
a choice between various partners and no choice with regard to location at all. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that UK-4 would have refused to team up with its current 
Chinese partner, in case its JV location had not offered access to a harbour. 
As in the cases of GER-0 and UK-3 so was UK-8's location decision determined by the 
potential market argument, but also by the possibility to access a major port of the 
country which makes the supply of the special chemical component convenient, fast 
and cheap. In addit ion, UK-8's choice of location was inf luenced by lower production 
costs, relative to elsewhere, the availability of trained labour and the preferential 
t reatments granted in the economic and technological development zone. However, 
wi th regard to economic and technological development zones it must be noted that 
the concessions granted in one of the numerous zones are the same all over the 
country. They are, thus, not really a dischminating factor when choosing a location for 
FDI activity. 
Production site 
After a period of one-and-a-half years when it had to operate in an old building that 
belonged to the Chinese parent, GER-O-JV has been operat ing in a new, purpose-built 
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building erected on the site that was contributed by the Chinese parent. The advantage 
of this location for GER-0 is that it is in the immediate neighbourhood of GER-O-JV's 
customer KMP. This saves time and money for transportation of GER-O-JV's output 
and makes thus GER-O-JV's products attractive to the KMP-JV. 
UK-3-JV, on the other hand, operates, as UK-4-JV does, in a building that existed 
already when the JV was formed. The difference, however, is that in the case of UK-3 
the Chinese partner contributed the building, whereas in the case of UK-4-JV, the 
building is rented off the Chinese parent company. The advantage in both cases is that 
the JVs could start their operations relatively early after being established. This was 
different in the case of UK-8-JV where the new company had to wait approximately 
one year before it could start manufacturing ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS in 
the purpose-built building outside of CITY [South China]. 
The case of UK-3 presents a situation that is problematic for many foreign investors in 
China. UK-3 had agreed that its Chinese partner contributes a building to the JV. The 
UK SME had hoped to be able to commence production considerably earlier than in 
the case where a building had to be erected first. Secondly, if the Chinese partner 
brings in an existing building, cash funds could be saved up for other investments, 
foreign machinery, for instance, or special components or parts. However, since the 
state of the contributed building In the case of UK-3-JV was rather poor, a lot of funds 
and time had to be spent to refurbish the building. In this particular case, the managers 
had assumed the building would do what it should do." This, however, turned out to be 
a big mistake. The concepts of quality of Chinese and UK (or German) managers are 
different. Especially the concept of quality Is very subjective and there is no standard 
measure that would facilitate comparison. 
Product range 
In all four cases the JVs in China manufacture only a fraction of the range of products 
that is produced in the SMEs' home plants. For Instance, In the case of GER-O-JV, the 
product programme is restricted to MECHANICAL COMPONENTS for the power and 
chemical Industries. The same applies to UK-3: although UK-3-JV produces the full 
range of standard INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS, compared with the full range of 
products manufactured by the SME in the UK, the JV's product range represents only 
a fraction. This is true also for UK-4-JV and UK-8-JV. The JVs have in common also 
that the SMEs Intend to extend the JVs' product ranges gradually. 
Target market 
Apart from UK-4, the German and UK SMEs came to China to engage in a JV in order 
to service, first and foremost, the domestic Chinese market (Sino-foreign customers 
and Chinese clients) and, in cases also neighbouring Asian markets. This would help 
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to establish a position in Asia and also to generate, through exports, foreign exchange 
that would be needed to purchase materials, machinery, etc. The SMEs did not intend 
to target also their traditional export markets with products manufactured in the JV. 
However, in various cases had the SMEs agreed to export a certain share of their JVs' 
production. For instance, in its fifth year of operation, GER-O-JV must export as much 
as 30 per cent of its entire output which is considered a lot by GER-0. Had GER-0 not 
a network of subsidiaries that is able to absorb parts of the production of the SME's 
China-based JV, absorbing as much as 30 per cent of the annual JV production could 
become an even more difficult task. 
UK-3-JV should export 50 per cent even of its annual output, according to its JV 
contract. As in the case of GER-O-JV also here the foreign parent helps the JV meet 
this goal. For instance, at the time of the investigation, UK-3-JV was processing an 
order from UK-3. Advantageous in the case of UK-3-JV is that if the JV can attract one 
of UK-3's clients it is able to offer a better deal than UK-3 could and UK-3 would not 
object to this. UK-8 managed to include in the JV contract a "we will try" phrase. This 
means the JV is encouraged to export, but will not be penalised if it cannot meet a 
certain target. Although not required, UK-8 has been looking into the possibility of 
exporting certain components to the UK, such as finished steel components. 
What all of the JV entrepreneurs (except UK-4) have learned is that, in order to target 
the domestic market, a network of contacts and connections is essential. Without 
knowing the right people, a JV cannot operate successfully. This is particularly true for 
UK-3-JV and UK-8-JV which are both in the infrastructure business. There, orders 
have to go through planning bureaux, etc. The statement of UK-3-JV's general 
manager hits the point: "In China you do not necessarily have to offer the best product 
at the best price, but, instead, having the right contacts is more important." 
Market share in China 
The only SME that could roughly estimate its market share in China was GER-0. It 
suggested 3 to 5 per cent as at the end of 1995. For subsequent years (fifth year of 
operation) the assistant sales manager estimated approximately 10 to 15 per cent. UK-
8-JV could only estimate its local market share in CITY [South China], at 20 per cent, 
but not for the whole of China. UK-3 had no idea whatsoever about the size of its 
market share, neither that of its competitors. This, again, reflects the poor preparation 
of the JV project which is rather characteristic of the UK SME JV cases in this study. 
8.4.2 Joint venture ownership 
The ownership constellation in the four SME JVs is substantially different. Whereas 
GER-0 holds a majority share of 51 per cent in its JV, UK-3 shares the equity equally 
with its Chinese partner. Both UK-8 and UK-4 have minority positions in their JVs, with 
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UK-8 having 49 and UK-4 having only 33 per cent. The negotiations behind these 
equity stake distributions are Interesting. For Instance, GER-0 that insisted on the 
majority share In the JV, could have easily gone for more than 51 per cent. The 
Chinese partner offered even 60 per cent equity. However, GER-0 preferred to have 
51 per cent only. It hoped that so the Chinese partner would keep being interested In 
the joint undertaking. GER-0 did not want a Chinese company that understood its 
commitment in the JV as a portfolio investment. Instead, the German SME wanted the 
Chinese partner's contribution in terms of corporate skills. Also, GER-O's strategy was 
to combine a risk position as small as possible with a control position as big as 
necessary to avoid dissipation of Its technological know-how. 
As GER-O so was UK-3 very keen to have the majority stake In Its JV. However, 50-50 
was as much as the Chinese side was prepared to go. Although UK-3 did not like the 
Idea of sharing the equity equally. It eventually had to agree to It. UK-3's willingness to 
accept the equal equity JV was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese partner had no 
Idea of the Industry In which the JV would be operating In. UK-3 would so be able to 
control the JV. Also UK-8 intended to obtain the majority stake In the JV. However, In 
this particular case, the Chinese partner was not even prepared to share the equity 
equally. 49 per cent was the most the foreign SME could get. The Chinese negotiation 
partners were not prepared to discuss the Issue of equity distribution further. Although 
previously they had agreed to various Issues that had been demanded by the UK 
SME, In this respect they did not provide any room for negotiations. Eventually, UK-8's 
bargaining position was not strong enough to push through Its desire for a majority 
position In the JV. 
Also UK-4 holds the minority share in Its JV. However, as opposed to UK-8, UK-4 
never wanted to go for the majority stake In the venture. The UK SME was not even 
interested In an equal distribution of the equity. Since UK-4 had no Intention of opting 
for a JV In the first place, but only wanted a contract manufacturing agreement. It 
welcomed its minority position of 33.33 per cent. Contractually, UK-4 could increase its 
equity share. On this the Chinese party comments: "If the English party wants to have 
more shares, It has to send a person to China." UK-4 expatriating a British manager to 
the JV in China, however, seems very unlikely, for the reasons outlined above. 
8.4.3 Joint venture control 
According to the distribution of equity, the distribution of control varies in the four SME 
JVs under In-depth study. The number of seats In the boards of directors (BoDs) varies 
considerably, from four (GER-O-JV) and five (UK-4-JV; UK-8-JV) up to six (UK-3-JV). 
GER-O-JV's BoD has four seats which are equally distributed amongst the partners. 
The German SME Insisted that the general manager is a Chinese national, since a 
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German (or foreign) general manager was considered not effective in the Chinese 
environment. The director for overseas affairs of GER-0 has taken on the 
chairmanship of the JV and the Chinese side the vice-chairmanship. That one side 
holds the chairmanship and the other the vice-chairmanship is common in Sino-foreign 
JVs with equal ownership distribution or slight diversions from that. Clearly, its majority 
stake gave GER-0 the confidence to appoint a Chinese general manager, although the 
German SME had the right to send to China a German general manager. If there are 
arguments within the JV, the German SME can easily play out its 51 per cent. 
This is different in the case of UK-3 that only has 50 per cent of the equity. Since UK-3 
insisted, as compensation for not being granted the majority stake in the JV, to appoint 
the general manager, the chairmanship is held by the Chinese side. The managing 
director of UK-3 is vice-chairman of the JV. This will change after three years when the 
chairmanship will be handed over to the UK side. Responsibilities in the JV are not 
distributed according to a fixed structure. However, according to the managing director 
of UK-3, the Chinese side is in charge of selling to the Chinese market and of 'Chinese 
relations', whereas UK-3 would help the JV with selling and marketing in China. 
Additionally, the UK side is responsible for manufacturing, technology, sales and 
marketing in overseas markets. 
The frequency of board meetings is rather similar across the different JVs. Both GER-
O-JV and UK-3-JV hold meetings once every six months (to take place in China or 
England, as in the case of UK-3). On the other hand, the BoDs of both UK-4-JV and 
UK-8-JV meet once a year only either in the UK or in China. In addition, the foreign 
managers of all four SMEs go out to China if and when this is necessary. Going out to 
China for board meetings means a considerable financial and managerial resource 
effort for the SMEs. Thus, more meetings with their Chinese counterparts in China are 
hardly feasible. The demand on SME resources would become too great. 
Contents of the board meetings are, apart from the future company policy, operating 
problems, investment decisions, appointments of additional foreign staff or senior 
Chinese personnel in strategic positions (GER-O-JV), or staff issues, marketing and 
selling, production, financing, accounting and further investment (UK-3), as well as 
component sourcing (UK-8-JV). 
At the time of the investigation, none of the SMEs had experienced major problems 
with decision-making in the JV, though UK-3-JV shows tendencies of disputes. 
Interestingly, the fact that UK-3's Chinese partner is not familiar with the 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS business, manoeuvres the UK SME into a position 
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where it Is able to control the JV, although the equity share would not suggest so. 
Consensus decision-making as it Is practised In GER-O-JV Is, thus, not commonplace 
in UK-3-JV. 
In the case of UK-4-JV, the equity distribution clearly reflects on who has control of the 
JV. Three out of the five members in the BoD are from the Chinese partner. The 
Chinese side holds both the chairmanship and the general management of the JV. 
Also the Chinese side Is In charge of production, management of the entire company 
and of technology. UK-4 is responsible for the marketing of the JV's products and for 
new product development. Although control lies clearly within the Chinese parent, both 
parties in UK-4-JV have contractually agreed that, for major decisions regarding the 
JV's investment or management appointments, etc., UK-4 has to agree. Up to the time 
of the investigation, this agreement has worked well between the partners. 
The number of seats in the BoD of UK-8-JV is distributed according to the equity 
distribution: the Chinese side holds three seats and the UK side two. In the JV the 
Chinese side Is in charge of administration and the commercial issues while UK-8 
oversees the technical side of the undertaking. For this reason, UK-8 expatriated one 
of its employees to China to look after the technical side of the JV and to supervise the 
Installation of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. 
8.4.4 Joint venture management 
In all JVs studied in-depth Chinese managers are In the key organisational positions. In 
three out of four cases (GER-O, UK-4, UK-8) a Chinese national Is the general 
manager. Only UK-3 agreed with its Chinese partner that one of Its British employees 
would be appointed general manager. Both GER-0 and UK-4 were not Interested In 
providing the general manager to their JVs. The reasons for that have been 
established above. 
Three out of the four SMEs had, at the time of the Investigation, expatriated personnel 
to their JVs. UK-8 considers expatriating staff to the JV In China important since 
"otherwise we could lose it altogether." GER-0 wanted to have a German in China who 
looks after the technical side of the JV and so did UK-8 that needed a British engineer 
on-site to supervise the Installation of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. UK-3 
had expatriated a British manager who took over as general manager of the JV. In all 
three cases the expatriation of a second manager was not planned. This was certainly 
due to the considerably high financial burden which an expatriate imposes on a 
business (the costs of one expatriate in UK-8-JV are about 40 times that of a local 
employee). For instance, the German expatriate costs some DM400,000 (£179,213) 
217 
Cross case analysis 
per year and the general manager of UK-3-JV creates costs of between US$187,200 
(£120,000) and US$234,000 (£150,000) per year. The respective shares of the costs 
that are born by the JVs (cost of living on-site) are only relatively small in the cases of 
GER-0 and UK-3. However, this is different in the case of UK-8-JV where the JV 
covers between 60 and 70 per cent of the expatriate costs. 
Having foreign and Chinese managers in one company can cause difficulties. This is 
due to different management styles, concepts of work and quality, attitudes, etc. For 
instance, UK-3-JV's general manager recognised that active decision-making is in 
conflict with the Chinese authoritarian philosophy. Although this is not the case in 
GER-O-JV and also not in both UK-4-JV and UK-8-JV (since the entire JV 
management is in Chinese hands, there is no conflict in decision-making), there are 
major discrepancies in UK-3-JV. There, the British general manager and his deputy 
cannot co-exist as managers. The relationship between the two partners is 
characterised bydistrust. 
Interestingly, in all three cases where the Chinese side was originally responsible for 
domestic marketing and sales (GER-O-JV, UK-3-JV, UK-8-JV) the foreign expatriate or 
the foreign managers at home had gradually taken over and contributed to the 
marketing and sales task more than was originally intended. Since the Chinese side in 
these three cases did not perform satisfactorily in this discipline, the foreign side had to 
step in. Also, as is the case with UK-8-JV, the UK parent company was about to 
replace its technical supervisor (after his mission was completed) with an engineer who 
would also look after the commercial side of the JV, although this was given, originally, 
into the hands of the Chinese side. 
8.5 Joint venture problems 
Apart from UK-4 that had, at the time of the investigation, no serious problems with its 
JV in China, the JV problems of the German and UK SMEs were various, ranging from 
the sourcing of components to production, marketing and managerial communication. 
In the case of UK-4 this is, to a very large degree, due to the constellation of the 
partners in the JV. UK-4 sought a cheap way of producing its ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
and found this in its JV. The managing director is required only once a year to come to 
China or even less frequently if the Chinese managers come to the UK for the board 
meeting. Inter-personal problems did not exist at the time of the investigation. 
8.5.1 Production 
Production of goods locally is frequently a bottleneck in Sino-foreign JVs if the entire 
output, or parts of it, are to be exported. Often, the quality of the manufactured goods 
is not sufficient as that it would meet quality standards required by overseas markets. 
Previously it has been suggested that products manufactured by Sino-foreign JVs are 
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not easily exportable since they lack quality (Campbell, 1989; Trommsdorff et al., 
1994; Schuchardt, 1994; Kaiser, 1997). 
This was particularly the case with UK-4-JV whose output Is exported to the UK 
exclusively. To ensure high and sufficient quality standards of its ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES manufactured In China, UK-4 had sent an engineer to CITY [East China] to 
train the workforce. Consequently, the managing director of UK-4 is satisfied with the 
quality standard of the output of the JV. Also UK-3 was very Insistent on reaching a 
high standard of quality of the products manufactured in Its JV operation in China. High 
quality is one of the marketing features of UK-3. In fact, the managing director of UK-3 
was "quite surprised with the standard of quality amongst the workers" which "is as 
good as here." To get there, also UK-3 had sent a (welding) engineer to China to train 
the staff of the JV. In addition to that, the UK SME helped with the provision of 
sophisticated welding equipment. 
Not producing goods of sufficient quality cannot only hamper the JVs' efforts to exports 
parts of the, or the entire, output, but it can damage the reputation for high quality 
which the SMEs enjoy In their traditional markets. Neither GER-0 nor UK-3 nor UK-8 
could afford producing low quality goods under their names. The managing director of 
UK-8 hits the point: "Everyone gets a first order. But If the customer is not satisfied with 
the quality, you will not get another one." To avoid any complications with quality in 
production, UK-3 was even prepared to train two engineers In the UK, although the JV 
contract does not require UK-3 to bring Chinese JV personnel for training to the UK. 
8.5.2 Local sourcing 
Offering the highest quality of products suggests not only having a quality-conscious 
workforce, but also high quality components and materials. The local sourcing of high 
quality products is not always possible In China. However, It is desirable since It allows 
to keep costs down and save foreign exchange. 
All of the JVs were, at the time of the investigation, sourcing materials and/or 
components locally in China. The shares of components and/or materials sourced 
locally by the JVs of the components and/or materials sourced by the JVs In total, 
varied considerably. For Instance, UK-3-JV sourced, at the time of the investigation, 
nearly 100 per cent (steel) and GER-O-JV as much as 90 per cent of components and 
materials locally. Certain components needed by GER-O-JV were not available In 
China (not of the required quality or not at all) and, thus had to be sourced overseas. 
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On the other hand, UK-8-JV sourced only approximately 30 per cent of the value of its 
components locally. The remaining 70 per cent in terms of value (= the special 
chemical component) were shipped over from the UK. In the future, this ratio should be 
reduced to 50 per cent to save further production costs and make so the product more 
competitive in the Chinese market. Equally, UK-4-JV had been sourcing only 
approximately 30 per cent of its parts locally. These were printed circuit boards and 
plastic materials. However, the vast majority of parts, ie resistors and capacitors, were 
being sourced in Thailand and Japan, in the future, UK-4-JV wants, as does UK-8-JV, 
to increase its local content. However, according to UK-4, "there will always be these 
15 per cent of supplies that need to be sourced in Europe since they cannot be made 
in China." The non-availability of certain supplies in China is a rather common problem. 
Apart from a low and sometimes not even sufficient quality of local supplies, a sourcing 
problem has been also the lack of reliable Chinese suppliers. This applies to GER-0-
JV's local sourcing. However, the known problems of local sourcing had not been 
experienced by UK-8-JV. Also UK-3-JV that sources almost 100 per cent of its steel 
demand locally had not experienced major problems with local sourcing. This was, 
certainly, due to the fact that the quality of the steel needed for the JV's production of 
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS was sufficient. Would the JV have sought 
specially processed steel, for instance, substantial problems with quality could have 
appeared. This could have required the JV to source steel in Japan, for instance. 
8.5.3 Productivity 
Although labour costs are considerably lower in China, relative to the UK or Germany 
(GER-O-JV pays approximately £4,979 per year for a Chinese worker) productivity is 
lower than in the UK or in Germany. For instance, productivity of Chinese workers in 
GER-O-JV is "somewhere around 30 per cent of ours," said the director for overseas 
affairs of GER-0. 
Also UK-3 criticises that, in terms of productivity, UK-3-JV still has a long way to go. 
Also - and this is frequently overlooked by foreign entrepreneurs who consider 
manufacturing in China - there is a big gap between what Chinese workers earn and 
what they actually cost. In many cases, the basic salaries have to be topped by a 
factor of between 1.5 to 1.8 to arrive at the real costs of a Chinese employee (GER-O-
JV: 1.48; UK-3-JV: 1.79). 
8.5.4 Foreign exchange 
Foreign exchange had been a further problem for some of the SME JVs, primarily 
GER-O-JV. Although by the end of its second year of operation (= 1996) the JV should 
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have generated a foreign exchange surplus of some US$200,000 (£128,205), it failed 
to do so. Fortunately for the JV, the JV contract provided for the German SME to help 
the JV with exporting and thus with generating foreign exchange. On the other hand, 
for UK-3-JV that sources predominantly locally and sells Its products mainly In China, 
but also to overseas markets where customers pay In US dollars, foreign exchange Is 
not much of a problem. 
8.5.5 Collision of interests 
Whereas the collision of interests has obviously not been a problem In the cases of 
UK-3-JV^ and UK-4-JV, It was an issue In the case of GER-O-JV. GER-0 did not come 
to China to serve, from there, Its traditional export markets. Also, according to the JV 
contract, GER-O-JV should manufacture only a narrow range of products. The main 
goal of GER-0 was to service the domestic Chinese market with the products 
manufactured In the JV. At one occasion, GER-O-JV produced a special mechanical 
component and offered this to one of GER-O's customers at 60 per cent of the price 
demanded In Germany. Certainly, this became an Issue of conflict. 
8.5.6 Sales and marketing 
In many JVs sales and marketing has become, as outlined above, a problematic Issue. 
Although the Chinese side was. Initially, In charge of this function. Increasingly the 
foreign side had taken on this function. For Instance, although guanxl were considered 
Important by the foreign managers, the sales strategies of the Chinese staff were 
criticised for being to defensive, reluctant as well as relying too much on guanxl solely. 
The production and quality assurance manager of GER-O-JV, for instance, points out 
that "aggressive customer acquisition as we know it in Germany Is not commonplace in 
China and even disliked." Thus, the transfer of sales know-how to the JVs has been 
considered extremely necessary by the foreign managers of GER-O, UK-3 and UK-8. 
GER-O-JV and UK-8-JV have In common that their products are located at the top end 
of the market. Customers have to pay more to be able to afford the products of these 
two JVs, compared with that of competitors - Chinese and Sino-foreign. Only UK-3-JV 
Insists that its products are price-competitive, compared with the products of Chinese 
and also foreign companies. The higher price of the products of GER-O-JV is caused 
not only by higher wages to be paid in CITY [East China], but also due to the fact that 
GER-0 would not allow the JV to go too low with its prices. 
The price Issue is very important when selling into the Chinese market. Often, Chinese 
customers do not buy what is good, but what is cheap. This is an experience which 
was made by GER-O-JV, UK-3-JV and UK-8-JV. For instance, Chinese customers 
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would not buy the ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS of UK-8-JV which have a life 
expectation of some 15 years. Instead they purchase those with a life expectation of 
approximately five years, which is only a third of these of UK-8-JV. The reason is that 
UK-8-JV products are approximately 1.5 to two times more expensive. The Chinese 
government is short of money and, thus, price is a major issue when negotiating the 
sale of the JV's sophisticated products. 
8.5.7 Communication 
Communication between the foreign and the Chinese directors (on the board level) 
and between foreign and Chinese managers is a major problem only in the case of 
UK-3-JV. There, constructive communication between the general manager and his 
Chinese deputy has suffered a complete breakdown. Not only does this lack of 
communication in this particular case stem from a lack of awareness of cultural 
diversity, but also from inherent and developed distrust between the managers. This 
distrust culminates in the situation where the British general manager placed his vice-
general manager at a position in the company where he can detect immediately "if 
anything is only slightly out of balance." Already earlier in the JV process, UK-3 had 
experienced considerable problems with its Chinese partner, including the valuation of 
its machinery contribution. 
8,6 Joint venture evaluation 
The opinions on the peri'ormance of their JVs were rather different among the SMEs 
that were studied in-depth. For instance, GER-0 was rather content with the JV's 
performance. "It is a good success." GER-0 had planned two loss-making years and 
profits from the third year on. Surprisingly, the second year loss of GER-O-JV had 
fallen even below the planned. Sales volume by the end of August 1996 accounted for 
some RMB8.02m (£0.59m) which is an increase of 39.2 per cent over the same period 
of 1995. This is also 25 per cent more than what was planned for the year. 
The managing director of UK-3 had estimated that within five years, "if everything goes 
well," the UK SME would make more profit in China than in the UK. However, at the 
time of the investigation, none of the interviewees (neither the general manager of UK-
3-JV nor the managing director of UK-3) could specify the success of the JV, although 
there were orders in the pipeline. The JV was established only in May 1996 and the 
interviews were carried out in November and December 1996. In other words, the JV 
had less than six months time to generate results. Due to a lack of suitable financial 
performance assessment criteria, UK-3-JV was assessed along a set of other criteria. 
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For instance, although relationship business is very important In China, the general 
manager admitted that the JV had not done Its homework sufficiently. "Building 
relationships takes a long time." 
Both the Chinese directors and the managing director of UK-4 did not release 
Information on the JV's turnover in the financial year 1995. However, it was Indicated 
that orders had grown approximately 10 per cent In 1996 compared with 1995. Both 
parties showed satisfaction with their JV, though they did not quantify this. The 
Chinese partner repeatedly expressed his satisfaction with the performance of the JV, 
referring to UK-4-JV's profitability and added another assessment criteria of the 
venture's performance. "We made a lot of friends and friendship between two 
countries." 
Neither the general manager of the JV nor the managing director of UK-8 were 
satisfied with the JV's performance In 1995. A reason was certainly that building works 
In the factory had just finished and the JV could only then start to conduct business. 
For this reason, in 1995, instead of 5,000 metres of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS, only 1,941 metres were produced and Installed. A further reason was 
that the pledged funds of the two parties arrived only late at the JV. Looking into the 
future, the managing director of UK-8 was convinced that the JV would "run a lot better 
from now on" and for 1996, 1997 and 1998 he expected turnovers of some RMB16.0m 
(£1.2m), RMB27.0m (£2.0m) and RMB40.4m (£3.0m), respectively. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This cross case analysis has shown that the four cases studied in-depth vary, in 
places, considerably In their joint venturing in China. For instance, whereas UK-3, UK-
8 and GER-0 came to China to exploit the potential of the vast Chinese market, UK-4 
was Interested, predominantly, In exploiting low cost production In China. Moreover, as 
opposed to the other three cases, UK-4 Is a camouflaged contract manufacturing 
agreement. This becomes evident, again and again, throughout the entire JV formation 
and operation process: negotiations were not really a problem for UK-4, le the 
distribution of equity and control, and so was not the management of the JV. Overall, 
UK-4 was Interested first and foremost in the cheap production of high quality 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES, and this was as much as it was interested In. Other JV 
issues that were of considerable interest to the other SMEs studied in-depth, 
concerned UK-4 only marginally or not at all. 
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Another aspect that is striking is the difference in size between GER-0 on the one side 
and UK-3, UK-4 and UK-8 on the other. It has been established that GER-0 was the 
largest (in terms of number of employees) of the four SMEs. This became evident also 
throughout the JV preparation process. Both the planning and negotiating was given 
much more attention in the case of GER-0 than in the other cases. Also, GER-0 had 
much more bargaining power to play out during negotiations than the other SMEs had. 
However, in the particular case of GER-0 the reason that it had more bargaining power 
could also be found in the fact that its potential Chinese partner did not want to risk 
negotiations with KMP to form the more important (to it) KMP-JV than GER-O-JV would 
be. This remains open to speculation. 
Apart from the differences, this cross case analysis has also shown that the four SMEs 
were more or less content with their JVs, despite the problems some of the JVs 
experienced. Whereas the directors of GER-O and UK-4 expressed satisfaction with 
the present performance of their JVs, the directors of UK-3 and UK-8 were optimistic 
that their JVs would generate positive results in the future. In all cases were the JVs 
rather new and did not have enough time to exploit their full potentials. 
224 
Cross case analysis 
Notes 
^ Name disguised. 
^ Name disguised. 
^ Despite it was established that the SME's search process was somewhat pre-determined. 
Selection criteria included the partners' turnover (total and MECHANICAL COMPONENTS), 
market shares, number of employees, turnover per capita, industrial focus, location, range of 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS, licences for ENGINEERING PRODUCTS and MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS, sales and distribution networks, production, technical know-how and 
managemenL 
^ As a matter of facL the SME had no choice but to finally agree to what the Chinese offered (for 
details see case studies in Appendix VII). 
® The collision of interests between UK-3 and UK-3-JV is a latent problem. UK-3 does not want 
the JV to cannibalise its own export sales. UK-3-JV attempts to serve traditional customers of 
UK-3 with cheaper products, since "there is enough for all of us." In the long-term this attitude 
could create conflict in the relationship SME and JV. 
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Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the empirical findings presented in chapters seven (survey results) and 
eight (cross case analysis) are discussed. The debate follows the framework that has 
been established In chapters three and six and that corresponds with the framework 
that has been applied for the analysis in chapters seven and eight. The empirical 
findings of this research are discussed against the background of the body of 
knowledge derived from the evaluation of the literature. This enables to identify to what 
extent the findings of this study confirm earlier findings by other authors. It also helps 
explain certain shifts in thinking about foreign direct Investment (FDI) In China. The 
subsequent chapter (ten) concludes this study. 
9.2 Joint venture formation 
9.2.1 Joint venture planning 
In chapter two the concept of psychic distance was Introduced. It has been suggested 
by authors. Including Johanson and Wiedershelm-Paul (1975) and Buckley (1989) that 
countries with a dissimilar culture are psychically more distant to the home country 
than countries with a similar culture. From the work of Hofstede (1980, 1985) and 
Wilpert and Scharpf (1990) It has become apparent that European cultures, such as 
the UK and German, are distant to China's. The concept of psychic distance would 
explicitly argue that UK and German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
serve other, psychically closer countries first and the Chinese market only when they 
have gained experience in servicing the psychically closer market(s). In the export 
literature the concept of psychic distance has been evaluated and accepted, though 
opponents exist who vehemently question its applicability (see chapter two, section 
2.4.1). Authors, including Carlson (1975), Buckley and Mathew (1979) and Schmidt et 
al. (1995) insist that for SMEs psychic distance weighs more heavily than for large 
companies. 
For instance. It has been suggested that German companies would engage in the 
markets of Eastern Europe with priority to the Chinese market (FT, 27.7.95, p. 19, FT, 
19.7.96, p.2). German companies perceive Eastern Europe being psychically closer 
than China. Moreover, the markets of Eastern Europe are also physically closer to 
Germany than is the Chinese market. For example, travelling to Eastern Europe is less 
time- and cost-intensive for German SMEs than is travel to China. This is an important 
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argument especially in anticipation of evolving problems with, or in, an investment 
project. The managing director of UK-7 hit the point: when asked for (anticipated) 
drawbacks of his joint venture (JV) operation in China, he pointed out that "if things go 
wrong, we are so far away." 
The concept of psychic distance would suggest that the SMEs are expected to put 
more effort into the planning of their investment projects in China than they would in a 
psychically closer country. The findings in this study do not support this. Both the UK 
and the German SMEs planned their China JVs more or less the same way as their 
usual operations, though the empirical evidence suggests that the German SMEs 
believed that they had planned their China JVs 'nearly better' than their normal 
operations. As the German SMEs so the larger SMEs perceived more than the smaller 
SMEs in this study that the planning of their operations was better than their usual 
operations. However, the difference is only marginal. 
Various authors (Bilkey, 1978; Buckley, 1979; Robinson and Pearce, 1984; Harrigan, 
1985; Buckley et al., 1988; Stratos, 1990; Hamill and Hunt, 1993; Laughton, 1995) 
have suggested that SMEs employ methods of strategic planning to a limited extent 
only. Companies frequently do not carefully examine the market, competition, the 
venture's strengths and weaknesses, and its prospects (Killing, 1983), but take 
shortcuts (Buckley, 1979, 1997; Braun, 1982). Transferred to unfamiliar environments, 
this can have dangerous effects and one of the great dangers is that an external 
approach by a powerful customer, supplier or foreign official could induce SMEs to 
make investments without sufficient consideration of alternative modes of operation 
(Buckley, 1979). Stratos (1990) in a study of European SMEs showed that the larger 
the business, the more frequently it plans strategically. Equally, Simon (1992, 1996) 
found that only a few companies have marketing experts, let alone marketing 
departments, and as a rule, they do not engage in formal market research. 
Overall, the majority of the SMEs in this study neglected what authors, such as Stewart 
and Keown (1989) and de Bruijn and Jia (1993b) have demanded, namely to take a 
special approach towards the Chinese market. Instead, the planning of the SMEs 
confirm Frankenstein's (1986) and Eiteman's (1990) experiences: foreign firms 
frequently misperceive the characteristics of the Chinese market. 
How might the discrepancy in the perceived quality of planning of their JVs between 
the UK and German SMEs and the smaller and larger SMEs (to a lesser extent) be 
explained? SMEs that are active in a number of different foreign countries have 
collected experience in doing business there. Perhaps it is these companies that 
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cannot see a great necessity to plan their JVs in China more thoroughly than they plan 
their operations usually. Individual SMEs could experience themselves In international 
business and markets in more than 100 countries or on a worldwide scale even. 
Relatively more UK than German SMEs in this study operate In foreign countries. With 
regard to firm size, there Is no meaningful trend to be read In the data. The larger 
SMEs were found having more foreign operations than the smaller SMEs. The larger 
SMEs had more opportunity than the smaller firms to make experiences In 
international business In host countries, though this constellation is more obvious in the 
case of the UK SMEs rather than the German SMEs. 
Thus It Is likely that those SMEs which made experiences In International business 
before (UK SMEs and Size Two SMEs) consider their planning of the China JV much 
more routinely than the other firms. For instance, the exporting preference of German 
companies has been observed previously by Klenner (1986) and Trommsdorff et al. 
(1994) who suggest that German companies export as long as possible before they 
engage in FDI. Further comparison between UK and German SME foreign market 
presence Is difficult. Although Berger and Uhlmann (1984) established that German 
SMEs (with export ratios exceeding 20%) export, on average, to 12 Industrial countries 
and 14 less developed countries (LDCs), comparable UK data are not available. 
Not only were the SMEs experienced in international business in general. Five UK and 
ten German SMEs had, in addition, collected prior experience In doing business with 
China, through exporting as well as higher forms of market commitment, such as 
licensing and JV activity. This supports the evolutionary model of internatlonalisatlon 
empirically through which companies proceed when servicing foreign markets (chapter 
two, section 2.4.1). It also supports the argument that the German SMEs In this study 
perceived the Chinese market more distant and challenging than did the UK SMEs. 
With respect to firm size there appears contradiction with the theory. The smaller 
SMEs had, compared with the larger ones, less experience in doing business with, or 
in, China. Although the evolutionary model would suggest that resource weak, 
relatively inexperienced firms gradually develop their market presence before they 
enter into an FDI project, the smaller UK SMEs in this study appear to have 
established their JVs with only less prior experience in the Chinese market. They did 
not have sufficient resources to learn about the peculiarities of the Chinese market and 
took the opportunity to invest in the country without extensive preparation. With regard 
to the German SMEs, it is not possible to draw any conclusions In this respect. 
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A recent Commerzbank study (1995) found that all of the investigated 48 German 
direct investors in China were engaged in trading with, or licensing to, China prior to 
their FDI activity. Also, the three New Zealand SMEs with China JVs in Au and 
Enderwick's (1994) study had previous trading and investment experience in countries 
other than China and two had previous business relationships with China even. These 
companies learned about international business and markets and, in particular, the 
Chinese while going through less resource-demanding market entry strategies before 
committing substantial funds to an FDI project. 
GER-0 that had a licensing agreement with a Chinese company before establishing its 
JV is an example for a company following the path of incremental learning about a 
foreign environment and increasing of resource commitment. The UK SMEs, however, 
did not benefit to a great extent from earlier experiences in doing business in, and with, 
China. With the exceptions of UK-7 and UK-6 (that had been exporting machines to 
China for several years), the UK SMEs that were studied joint ventured in China 
without previous China experience. However, they had collected considerable 
international business experience from business with other countries. Whereas pre-JV 
contacts with China would have benefited the joint venturing of UK-2, UK-3 and UK-8, 
this is different in the case of UK-4. This SME moved to China as a resource seeker 
that intended to utilise China's cheap labour resources in the form of a contract 
manufacturing agreement. 
The UK and German SMEs reveal no clear trend with regard to the above psychic 
distance hypothesis. Although one UK SME (UK-1) that had been doing business with 
only ten countries indicated that its JV in China was planned better than its usual 
operations elsewhere, another UK SME (UK-3) that indicated equally ('planned better') 
had operations on a worldwide scale. And whereas UK-1 had other wholly foreign-
owned enterprises (WFOEs) and JVs, apart from its China JV, UK-3 had no further 
project in addition to its China-based JV. 
What the data clearly suggest, however, is the fact that the SMEs recognised the 
importance of planning their JVs, However, this was a very relative recognition which 
was met totally differently by the individual firms. Overall, the production of a sound 
business plan was the exception (UK-7, GER-0) rather than the rule. 
The empirical data of this study suggest also that most of the UK SMEs studied relied 
heavily on information about market prospects or competitors that was provided by 
their potential Chinese partners. None of the UK SMEs carried out independent market 
research, for instance. At best, the research undertaken, was an accumulation of 
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exporting experiences. UK-2 and UK-3 made it clear: "We could not afford it." The 
entire planning of the majority of the SMEs was characterised by vagueness and a 'gut 
approach', rather than a scientific one. 
To date, in the major Chinese cities various Chinese and international consultants offer 
their services to conduct market research, for example. Also, the UK and German 
chambers of commerce in China or the China-Britain Trade Group have basic 
information readily available and carry out, or commission, market research for SMEs 
that intend to explore the market before committing substantial funds. Further, with its 
support programme ECIP,^ the European Union offers financial assistance towards the 
carrying out of market studies in LDCs especially to SMEs. None of the UK SMEs 
studied had approached such an institution for assistance. In most cases the SMEs 
were not aware of the existence of such programmes,' in others the firms were not 
prepared to spend scarce funds on services for which they could not see a necessity. 
A closer look at the ways the UK and German SMEs financed their JVs reveals this 
missing awareness of the availability of means of support. All nine UK SMEs financed 
their JV operations with working capital. Of those only one received support in the form 
of a UK or a European grant. The situation is similar with the German SMEs. There, all 
eleven firms that provided information, used their working capital and only two received 
a grant from a German or a European institution, respectively. 
GER-0, for instance, that had carried out research into the available means of 
financing a JV, obtained finance from the German Development Bank (KfW) at an 
interest rate of 2.5 per cent which was lower than the market interest rate. The 
company also acquired financing through EClP. However, this was not considered 
appropriate for the company. 
The German SMEs with a JV in China in the earlier study by Kaiser (1997c) reflect this 
trend: only two applied for, and received, financial assistance from a national support 
organisation. The remaining SMEs indicated that they were not aware of the availability 
of such funds. 
The shortcut approach applied by most SMEs in this study, is dangerous. Not having 
the relevant information available leads to inaccurate planning and wrong projections 
regarding revenues, profits, payback periods, etc. The heavy reliability on information 
from the potential Chinese partners exposes the SMEs to the risk that the Chinese 
partners create an - non-reflected - perception of the market opportunities for SMEs. 
In the cases of UK-7 and UK-8 where the Chinese side invited the SMEs for JV 
activity, the Chinese party was likely to pursue its own interests. These were getting 
capital and know-how transferred, rather than offering a huge market for the foreign 
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companies. This thinking can easier be understood when consulting Teagarden and 
von Glinow's (1990) argument. It suggests that for a Chinese company an indicator of 
success is the attraction of a foreign investor that transfers technology. 
The rather passive, at best re-active, attitude of most of the SMEs with respect to 
information gathering is also captured in the fact that none of the UK SMEs that were 
studied in-depth, had taken on responsibility in preparing the feasibility study. 
However, just this feasibility study is the essential document in the JV approval 
process (see Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). 
The SMEs' limited gathering of relevant information and the fact that they tend to take 
a shortcut approach confirms earlier findings by Buckley et al. (1988). There, only 15 
out of 43 UK firms with a direct investment in Australia considered an alternative 
country for their investment and when searching for alternatives, the SMEs spent, on 
average, two to six months. Comparing search periods as done above, can be 
misleading, though. Some firms are more sophisticated and efficient at collecting and 
processing data than others. Further, 26 out of 43 firms in Buckley et al.'s (1988) study 
did not carry out any form of market research overseas. However, they consider, 
paradoxically, that the money and executive time spent on market research is likely to 
be one of the best investments before a commitment to FDI. Also Kaufmann et al. 
(1990) found that, as a rule, alternatives to co-operation often were not even assessed. 
An example for being not very well informed about the Chinese environment of their 
JVs are the cases of UK-6, UK-8 and UK-4. For instance, UK-4's managing director did 
not know who approved the JV and he also insisted that the signing of the JV contract 
and the operation of the business had started simultaneously. This, however, seems 
rather unlikely. A look at the approval procedures suggests this (see Kaiser and Grimm 
et al., 1997, chapter seven). 
9.2.2 Motivations for production in China 
For reasons established in chapters three and six, this thesis distinguishes between 
motivations for engaging in an FDI project and motivations for JV activity, as opposed 
to establishing a WFOE. The SMEs in this study have provided insight to both of these 
separate, though related issues. The body of literature, however, has not executed this 
distinction, making comparison and analysis of the empirical findings with the findings 
of earlier research difficult. 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
A physical presence in the Chinese market would help the UK and German SMEs to 
more effectively and faster access the vast potential market than through exporting. 
Buckley et al. (1988) stress as the benefits of being close to customers the opportunity 
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to overcome cultural and business naivety and to better understand consumers and 
competitors in target markets. Also Mr. Yang of the China-Britain Trade Group 
(interview, 11.11.1996) emphasised the importance of being present in the Chinese 
market if firms are interested in doing business on a long-term basis. Also, reaction 
times are much shorter if a company is present locally. Consumer needs can be 
recognised faster than with exporting since the flow of information through the export 
channel (particularly with direct exporting) takes much longer. 
Also with respect to firm size, the potential of the vast Chinese market was the salient 
motivation for establishing an FDI presence. 
Both above market seeker arguments detected as the main driving forces of the SMEs' 
Chinese market entry confirm earlier findings of various studies, including Au and 
Enderwick's (1994) and Kaiser's (1997c) studies of New Zealand and German SME 
JVs in China, respectively. The findings also resemble the results of other studies on 
large firms with investments in China, from different countries of origin, including the 
UK (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Gledhill, 1994), Germany (Kohler, 1987; Stofan and 
Stultz, 1991; Trommsdorff et al., 1994; Commerzbank, 1995), Europe (Dong et al., 
1993), US (Daniels et al., 1985; Tang et al., 1992; Dong et al., 1993; Punnett and Yu, 
1990), Canada (Punnett and Yu, 1990) and Japan (Dong et al., 1993). 
The results also confirm findings on SME direct investment in the general context (see 
Buckley and Mathew, 1979 and Buckley et al., 1988 for UK; Braun, 1982; Berger and 
Uhlmann, 1984 and Schmidt et al., 1995 for Germany; Onida et al., 1985 for Italy; 
Bertin, 1986 for France). 
It has been found that the UK and German SMEs also considered it necessary to be in 
the Chinese market. This argument needs consideration, however. In the early days of 
China's open door policy many foreign investors went to China because "they needed 
to be there" - regardless of what they could offer Chinese consumers. Surprisingly 
many of the UK and German SMEs considered this argument as important for 
establishing a foreign presence. This phenomenon is known as the 'two-billion-sock 
syndrome' or the 'one-billion-bottles-of-coke syndrome'. In other words: especially in 
the early days of China's open door era many foreign enterprises went to China 
because of the necessity to take part in the opening of this new, untouched market. 
Whether the product of the foreign enterprise was needed and wanted by the Chinese 
consumer was of secondary importance only. 
The availability of cheap labour was further regarded important by the SMEs and it was 
more important to the German SMEs than it was to the UK SMEs. Continuously 
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increasing salaries and social costs have made manufacturing in the West very 
expensive. Whereas the cheap labour argument was important for the German SMEs, 
it was apparently not too important for the UK SMEs. Compared with Germany, as a 
manufacturing location the UK is considerably cheaper. UK firms are thus, compared 
with German firms, less frequently pushed to FDI. The availability of cheap labour 
manoeuvred these SMEs into a position where they could manufacture cost 
competitively and would so be able to combat domestic as well as other international 
competitors. By exporting goods to the Chinese market that are manufactured in the 
UK or Germany at a higher cost and whose transport adds additional costs, the long-
term penetration of an increasingly competitive Chinese market was considered by all 
SMEs as a strategy no longer viable. 
Interestingly, whereas the availability of local labour was the prime reason for UK-4 to 
establish its JV, it was only secondary for the other UK SMEs studied. These firms 
entered China in order to serve the vast Chinese market. Continuously increasing 
salaries and social costs have made manufacturing in Germany very expensive. 
Recently it has been shown that, on average, companies in the mid-1990s 
manufactured at a labour cost of US$21 per hour in Europe, compared with US$2 in 
the economies of Southeast Asia (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1.6.95, p.46). 
Repeatedly, organisations such as the Association of the German Industry (BDI) have 
demanded that manufacturing becomes cheaper in Germany for two reasons: first, to 
prevent German manufacturers shifting their (entire) production to cheap-labour 
countries. Secondly, to attract direct inward investment into the country. So far, these 
voices have not been clearly heard or understood in Germany. At the time of writing 
this thesis, the number of unemployed people in Germany exceeded four million. 
The analysis with respect to firm size reveals no difference between the SMEs as far 
as the availability of cheap labour is concerned. 
As the market seeker motivation has been found to be an important motivation, so the 
resource seeker motivation (cheap labour) has been found previously as an important 
motivator for FDI or JV activity (Kohler, 1987; Tang et al., 1992; Dong et al., 1993; 
Kim, 1996). However, whereas the literature concludes that the market seeker 
motivation is the most important for foreign investors (apart from Kim, 1996 whose 
firms ranked it second), the position of the resource seeker motivation is not 
unchallenged. For instance, the UK firms in Glaister and Wang's (1993) study and the 
German firms in the studies by Commerzbank (1995), Delegation of German Industry 
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and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) and Kaiser (1997c) considered this motivation as 
less important than the market seeker motivation. 
Inevitably linked with the ability to cost-effectively manufacture in China is that this 
manoeuvres the SMEs to establish a stable strategic position from where to sen/ice 
neighbouring Asian markets. Various foreign companies have established their Asian 
headquarters in China. There, they manufacture and from there they co-ordinate their 
activities in Asia. There is no clear opinion in the literature about the importance of this 
argument for establishing a market presence in China: whereas the UK firms in 
Glaister and Wang's (1993) research and the German firms in the Commerzbank 
(1995) study considered this motivation as important, less than half of the 25 German 
SMEs in Kaiser's (1997c) research engaged in FDI for this particular reason. 
Where the literature clearly contradicts the findings of this study is with respect to the 
argument of bypassing import duties that were imposed by host governments. 
Whereas the UK and German SMEs considered this argument as only moderately 
important, both the US and western firms in the studies of Daniels et al. (19.85) and 
Dong et al. (1993) considered this motivation as important. 
As a trend, but with the exception of UK-3 that was looking for cheap steel supplies, 
the UK and German SMEs did not shift production to China because of access to raw 
materials. The Sino-foreign JV literature attached only secondary importance to access 
to raw materials (Daniels et ai., 1985; Tang et al., 1992; Dong et al., 1993), though the 
UK firms in Glaister and Wang's study hoped to get materials and natural resources. 
Also, being approached by a Chinese organisation to joint venture in China was not 
really regarded as a motivation by the SMEs to actually do so. However, without the 
Chinese approach in the cases of UK-7 and UK-8, these SMEs would not have 
engaged in a foreign production project. On the other hand, without the prospect of the 
vast potential market and of being able to manufacture at a low cost, these companies 
would not have accepted the Chinese companies' invitations. 
The UK and German SMEs did not commende China-based production because they 
needed to follow a customer. This confirms findings by Dong et al. (1993) and Kaiser 
(1997c). UNCTAD (1993) research revealed only about a quarter of the multinational 
SMEs are subcontractors to large firms; the bulk of firms seems to be independent. 
O'Farrell et al. (1996) have suggested that client following is a "unique characteristic of 
service firms in its occurrence and importance." However, of the 21 UK and German 
SMEs participating in this survey, only two were service firms. 
Interestingly though, the following-the-customer motivation was one of the main driving 
forces behind, and the initiator for, GER-O's move to China. It was GER-O's German 
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customer that initiated the thinking within GER-0 about JV activity in China. For GER-0 
moving to China by piggy back meant a considerable business security factor. 
Overall, neither nationality nor firm size significantly influence the perception of the 
importance of motivations for establishing an FDI operation in China. However, 
nationality is more likely to be a discriminator between the SMEs than firm size. 
Motivations for joint venturing 
The reasons for the UK and German SMEs to exploit the Chinese market potential and 
cheap labour in the form of a JV were substantially different. Whereas the UK SMEs 
sought attributes of their potential Chinese partners, such as their cultural guidance 
through the Chinese market, the provision of contacts, etc., it seems that the German 
SMEs were seeking, first and foremost, assets rather than the attributes of their 
potential Chinese partners. Also with respect to firm size, the SMEs showed significant 
differences: whereas the larger SMEs sought partner attributes, such as their partners' 
business knowledge or knowledge of customers, the smaller SMEs sought assets of 
their Chinese partners, including finance. However, the Chinese partner's ability to 
smooth the way through bureaucracy was also an important motivation for the smaller 
SMEs in the study. 
Interestingly, similar to the analysis according to nationality, both the smaller and larger 
SMEs reveal similar attitudes with respect to the least sought attributes or assets of 
their Chinese partners. None of the firms would engage in a JV solely to get access to 
the partner's skills or its technology or because of the partner's relationship with trade 
unions. 
Having a Chinese local partner who helps access potential Chinese customers, is not 
equally important to all foreign investors, however. Whereas it is of only minor 
importance to a foreign investment project operating in the consumer goods industry, it 
is of distinct relevance for foreign investors that operate in infrastructure industries, for 
instance. Without a Chinese local partner who has valuable contacts to the relevant 
planning bureaux at provincial levels, for instance, the selling of infrastructure products 
is difficult. This was suggested by a representative of Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation in an interview in Shanghai in autumn 1996. UK-8's separate "do it 
ourselves" attempt to export and install ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS has 
clearly shown that - it failed. 
Both UK-3 and UK-8, that are active in the infrastructure business, highlighted the 
importance of having the 'Chinese element' in their organisations. The case of UK-8 
that manufactures and installs ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS highlights the 
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importance of establishing a close and beneficial relationship with the Chinese officials. 
If the essential relationship with the relevant bodies cannot be established, the order 
will go to a different manufacturer. A foreign manufacturer without the help of a local 
Chinese element would face extreme difficulties in finding its way through all the 
different instances and eventually establish such a beneficial relationship. 
The literature is not clear about the importance of the potential partner's knowledge of 
the Chinese environment and customers. Whereas some studies detected the 
importance of this argument, including Raveed and Renforth (1983), Kohler (1987) and 
Kim (1996), others found this motivation not being too important for foreign investors 
(Punnett and Yu, 1990; Glaister and Wang, 1993). 
The German SMEs considered establishing a JV because they could save financial 
and managerial resources. These are, as is known from chapter two (section 2.3.3), 
critical 'ingredients' for SME internationalisation. Wells (1973) established, for instance, 
that firms that are relatively small in their industry find a partner's contribution of capital 
and management more important than do large firms. Also for the UK firms in Glaister 
and Wang's (1993) study it is the potential Chinese contribution of capital that is the 
important motivation for JV activity. The importance of the local partner's 
(management) resource contributions as the motivation for a JV was also emphasised 
by Raveed and Renforth (1983) as well as Endres (1987). The remarkable distinction 
between the two studies is, however, that Raveed and Renforth's (1983) research is 
China-specific whereas Endres's (1987) later study refers to JVs in the general 
context. In other words this means that the local partner's management resource 
contribution has been found important to foreign investors regardless of the level of 
economic development of the host country. 
Conversely, for the UK SMEs the resource inputs of the potential Chinese partners are 
rather less important, though the cases of UK-6, UK-7 and UK-8 suggested that they 
hoped their Chinese partners would contribute valuable resources. This UK SME 
pattern resembles very much what Young et al. (1989) suggest as contributions 
required by foreign MNEs of their local partners in LDCs. However, for both the UK 
and German SMEs the potential Chinese partner's financial input is more important 
than its management input. 
Surprisingly high (second) within the UK SMEs ranked the argument that engaging in a 
JV was required by the host government. Although it is known from ealier studies 
(Beamish, 1985; Datta, 1988) of FDI activity and FDI in China (Kohler, 1987; 
Teagarden, 1990; Punnett and Yu, 1990; Aiello, 1991; Beamish, 1993; Glaister and 
Wang, 1993) that government mandate played an important role, this is more an issue 
of the past than of the present. 
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For the German SMEs in this study government mandate was a relatively unimportant 
motivation for JV activity, certainly compared with earlier findings by Kdhler (1987) 
where 13 out of 17 German firms considered this 'very important'. It is possible that the 
differences may be a result of the fact that the firms in Kdhler's (1987) research were 
large and the firms in this study are SMEs. However, there is no indication in the 
literature that would support such thinking. It is much more likely that the differences 
result from the time distance between these two studies. When Kohler (1987) carried 
out her study, China's open door policy had been 'in operation' for less than ten years. 
The law governing WFOEs was promulgated only a year prior to Kohler conducting her 
study. This suggests that the German firms in Kohler's (1987) study established their 
JVs at a time when engaging in FDI in the form of a WFOE was hardly possible or not 
possible at all (Kohler does not provide information on the establishment of the JVs). 
However, the Chinese government's attitude towards WFOEs and majority foreign 
equity JVs has changed and is more relaxed, though various industries remain closed 
or restricted to FDI at all or investment in the form of a WFOE or a majority foreign 
equity JV (see chapter five). Comparison with the more recent results of the study of 
25 German SMEs with JVs in China (Kaiser, 1997c) is not possible since there was no 
indication made by these SMEs with respect to government mandate. 
The establishment of the majority of the UK SMEs in this study falls into this period of 
relaxation. All, but one of the UK SME JVs were established between 1992 and 1996 
and one (UK-9-JV) in 1987. 
The UK and German firms in this study showed considerable agreement with respect 
to the importance of their partners' knowledge of customers and the partners' ability to 
smooth the way through bureaucracy as motivation for JV activity. Bureaucracy has 
long been regarded as a great barrier to doing business in China (Fan, 1996). Thus, 
the SMEs hoped that teaming up with a local Chinese firm could help overcome this 
problem. The German and UK foreign investors, respectively, in the studies of Kohler 
(1987) and Glaister and Wang (1993) revealed the same attitudes. 
The limitation of financial and business risk and the hope for favourable government 
treatment was important as motivation for both the UK and German SMEs. Especially 
for SMEs the move to FDI as the highest form of market commitment is a very risky 
strategy. This has been discussed in detail in chapter two of this thesis. Thus, for many 
SMEs failure of an FDI project abroad often means jeopardising the operation at home 
(Buckley et al., 1988; Buckley, 1989) because the proportion of financial resources 
committed to an FDI project is likely to be greater in an SME than in a large firm. Thus, 
SMEs seek to reduce their risk in a foreign undertaking through partnering with another 
company. 
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The findings of this study with respect to risk reduction do not confirm the literature. 
Whereas Datta (1988), Glaister and Wang (1993) as well as Dong et al. (1993) found 
the limitation of financial risk an important motivation for JV activity, Endres's (1987) 
early study on international JVs suggested differently. The discrepancy between 
Endres (1987) and Datta (1988) is difficult to explain since both authors elaborated on 
JVs in the general context and of large MNEs, at about the same time. In the Chinese 
context, however, it seems to be clear: risk reduction is an important motivation for 
teaming up with a local company (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Dong et al., 1993). If the 
venture fails, the loss can be born by two parties. 
This aspect needs more consideration, though. As is known from chapter six, the 
Chinese contribution is only rarely in the form of cash, but rather in the form of land 
use rights, the provision of local contacts, cultural guidance, etc. Capital, on the other 
hand, is frequently the contribution of the foreign side. Whereas teaming up with a 
local Chinese partner does certainly reduce the risk of business failure (due to the 
contribution of the above stated essential attributes for Chinese market entry), the 
argument that joint venturing with a Chinese partner would share the risk, cannot be 
accepted for the reasons outlined above: how does it affect a business if it loses its 
contribution of being able to act as a cultural guide? How does it affect a business if it 
loses its contribution of knowing important people with the Chinese authorities? 
Whereas cash contributions and machinery (as the contributions by the foreign party) 
are lost in case of business failure, the Chinese partner will certainly not lose its 
knowledge of important people, for instance. 
It has frequently been argued that teaming up with a local Chinese company would 
give JVs preferential treatment with regard to- taxes and import duties, for instance. 
Dong et al.'s (1993) western respondents considered the provision of incentives as an 
important reason for JV activity, though this is not explained in more detail in Dong et 
al.'s (1993) study. However, this argument lacks plausibility: foreign investors establish 
their projects at certain locations because they may be promised exemptions from, or 
reductions of, tax payments, etc., or faster approval of a proposed project. However, 
any incentive of this kind is equally available for foreign companies that establish any 
kind of FDI project. The provision of certain incentives has often not been rated very 
important for whatever decision of a foreign investor desired by host government 
authorities. Also UNCTAD (1997) has shown this. Thus perhaps, the German investors 
in the Commerzbank (1995) study perceived this motivation as less important. 
Another argument with respect to favourable treatment is that teaming up with a local 
partner would grant an FDI project in China a better allocation of scarce resources. 
Because of the centralised planning of raw material allocation, it can happen that once 
the set amount of raw materials, steel for instance, is distributed to 'special' 
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manufacturers, all the others in demand have to wait for new deliveries or have to 
identify suppliers elsewhere, or halt production. Having an influential partner might 
ensure that the flows of supply are not disrupted. The allocation system works similarly 
in the finance sector: once, the scarce financial funds are allocated to borrowers, no 
further projects can be funded through loans, however important they are. The 
increasing criticism of Chinese lending practice in connection with, for instance, 
China's imminent entry to WTO could lead also to an even more reduced amount of 
the credit funding. On the other hand, it could lead also to an improved evaluation of 
the creditworthiness of borrowers in order to avoid bad loans. Viable projects are then 
more likely to get funding than others do. 
In agreement, the UK and German SMEs do not desire the Chinese partner's 
technology, neither his trade union relationships nor his skills and they do not believe 
that having a Chinese partner works as political insurance. For several years, 
especially the US, but also Europe and Japan, have been in dispute with the Chinese 
government over intellectual property rights violations. In 1995, China and the US were 
close to a trade war over this issue. The situation was only relaxed when China agreed 
to combat the illegal copying of intellectual property, eg music or computer software. 
The extent to which this was the Chinese paying lip service can only be speculated. 
These empirical findings are rather contrary to the literature: for instance, the UK firms 
in Glaister and Wang's (1993) research hoped the Chinese partner would bring into the 
JV technology and patents. Datta (1988) and Kim (1996) stress that foreign investors 
could benefit from the Chinese partner's skills. Also contradictory to the empirical 
findings in this research, authors (Raveed and Renforth, 1983; Endres, 1987; Datta, 
1988) considered the political insurance contribution as one of the most important 
contributions of a Chinese JV partner. Possibly these differences can be explained by 
the fact that the latter three studies were all conducted at a time when scholars were 
heavily concerned with political stability in China. Various authors (see Bloodworth, 
1996) have speculated what would and could happen to foreign businesses if the 
Chinese government changed its attitude towards an open economy. With the death of 
Deng Xiaoping, the great architect of the Chinese socialist market economy in 
February 1997, the discussion seems to have calmed down. The Chinese government 
with president Jiang Zemin and prime minister Zhu Rongji is believed to continue this 
course towards economic reforms. 
9.2.3 Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
The importance of finding a suitable and resourceful JV partner has been frequently 
suggested in the literature (see sections 3.2.1 and 6.2.1 of chapters three and six, 
respectively). However, according to Lassere (1984) few companies compare 
239 
Discussion 
alternative potential partners, and screen the motives and capabilities of candidates 
when choosing partners. 
Being approached and invited by a Chinese company to join^ venture was for both the 
UK and the German SMEs the most important way of finding a partner. It was, 
however, of only minor importance for engaging in an FDI project in the first place (see 
section 9.2.2). With regard to scarce SME resources in the form of finance and 
executive capacity, this was the easiest way for SMEs to find a local partner to join 
forces with. This passive or re-active strategy, at best, however, bears the danger of 
choosing a partner without proper assessment. Also, alternative partners might not 
even be sought. The cases of UK-7, UK-8, but also GER-0 provide empirical evidence 
for this statement. 
For the SMEs in this study an important way of finding a JV partner was the teaming 
up with a former agent. The advantages of this strategy have previously been 
highlighted by authors, including Reynolds (1984), Endres (1987), Kraus (1989) and 
Campbell (1989), amongst others. In his early study of UK direct investors in India and 
Pakistan, Tomlinson (1970) found that favourable past association was the single most 
important criterion for the UK companies to choose a partner for JV activity. Also the 
majority of Campbell's (1989) firms had chosen partners who they had known from 
previous business relationships. However, although this strategy saves time, 
management and finance (as the cases of UK-2 and UK-7 have shown that relied on 
their Taiwanese and Singaporean partners, respectively, to select an appropriate 
mainland Chinese partner) and allows two companies to establish a relationship, to get 
to know each other and to develop mutual understanding and trust, it bears two distinct 
dangers; first, if one partner is good and suitable, this does not mean that there is not a 
better and more suitable one elsewhere. Secondly, as Lassere (1984) argues, having 
a good distributor is no guarantee for getting a good JV partner. 
A further strategy that was employed by the UK and German SMEs in this study that 
helped save limited resources was to accept the helping hand of a Chinese 
organisation. However, also this strategy moves the SME into a passive position from 
where it has to rely too much on the goodwill and true intentions of the other party. 
Thus, Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997) in their guideline for German SMEs have 
recommended to be cautious with this strategy. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs displayed significantly different ways of finding their 
partners for the later JVs. With regard to firm size, the difference in the perceived 
importance of ways of finding the Chinese partner were even graver. For instance, the 
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smaller SMEs have more than the larger SMEs accepted the helping hand of a 
Chinese organisation since this helped save resources. 
Partner selection criteria 
The selection criteria applied by the UK and German SMEs were significantly similar. 
Also with regard to firm size, the SMEs suggest significant similarities in their 
perceptions of the importance of partner selection criteria, which is even stronger than 
when analysed according to nationality. In both cases, trust was the most important 
criterion for partner selection for the SMEs in this study. This corresponds largely with 
the opinions expressed in the literature (Casson and Zhang, 1992; Glaister and Wang, 
1993; Kaiser, 1997c). For the SMEs, this is of particular relevance. SMEs commit 
scarce funds to a JV. In many cases they take only a minority equity position and often 
they do not expatriate a manager to the JV to look after the business. In the majority of 
cases, the SMEs have to rely on the goodwill of their partners. The managing director 
of UK-8 made clear that "you have to trust them if you want the deal." 
Important for the SMEs were further their valuations of the partner's links to officials, its 
location and range of products. Good connections to the Chinese authorities 
responsible for placing orders were amongst the most important criteria for UK-3, UK-7 
and UK-8 that operate in the infrastructure business. There, without the necessary 
contacts, foreign (and local) enterprises cannot survive. The literature has not 
expressed a clear opinion on the issue of the importance of government links. 
Whereas the German companies in Schwantes' (1991) study and the UK companies in 
Glaister and Wang's (1993) work considered links to officials as important, for the 
western firms in Dong et al.'s (1993) and the German firms in the Commerzbank 
(1995) studies, links to officials were only moderately important. Further, only ten of the 
25 SMEs in Kaiser's (1997c) study regarded the partner's connections as important. 
Apparently, the UK and German SMEs in this study have understood to a greater 
extent than the firms that were reported in the literature (Dong et al., 1993; 
Commerzbank, 1995; Kaiser, 1997c) the importance of being well-connected in China. 
The empirical findings in this research with respect to the importance of the partner's 
location as partner selection criterion are in line with the literature (Schwantes, 1991; 
Casson and Zhang, 1992; Dong et al., 1993; Delegation of German Industry and 
Commerce Hong Kong, 1995; Kaiser, 1997c). As will be shown in section 9.3.1 later in 
this chapter, most of the SMEs in this study have taken over an already existing 
production facility from their Chinese partners, and most of the SMEs valued their 
partner's links to customers, etc. With respect to the latter argument, it needs to be 
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added that China was used to a principle where a firm would carry out business in its 
home province only. An enterprise from the South rarely had a chance to develop 
contacts with potential clients in the North of China (see Vanhonacker, 1997). 
With regard to the importance of matching product profiles, the literature shows 
divergence. This was an important selection criterion for the UK firms in Glaister and 
Wang's (1993) study. However, it was not important for the German firms in the 
research by the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) and 
of only minor importance to the German SMEs in Kaiser (1997c). 
Whereas the UK and German SMEs have shown agreement with respect to the 
importance of the above partner selection criteria, with regard to the partner's 
reputation and firm size, discrepancies arise. Partner reputation is more important and 
its size considerably more important to the UK SMEs than it is to the German SMEs. 
For instance, the Chinese partner's reputation as a manufacturer of ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS was an important selection criterion for UK-8. 
Contrary to the attitudes of the UK SMEs in this study, the UK firms of Glaister and 
Wang (1993) considered reputation as not a considerably important selection criterion 
and the partner's company size less important even. Company size was found least 
important by Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) and 
Kaiser (1997c). 
As the findings with respect to motivations for JV activity would suggest, the German 
SMEs looked more at the Chinese partner's complementary resources than did the UK 
SMEs (it was of importance for both groups-of firms). The literature suggests a treruj 
that would support the importance of the Chinese partner's resource contribution 
(Schwantes, 1991; Casson and Zhang, 1992; Glaister and Wang, 1993; Dong et al., 
1993; Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995). In contrast, 
the German SMEs in Kaiser (1997c) indicated they were less interested in their 
partners' resources. 
In section 9.2.2 it was found that the German SMEs were motivated by the potential 
financial contribution of a Chinese partner to a greater extent than UK SMEs were. 
Surprisingly, thus, the Chinese partner's fitting with local currency is more important a 
selection criterion for the UK SMEs than it is for the German SMEs. The findings in the 
literature with respect to the partner's fitting with finance do not correspond, either. 
Whereas the German companies in the studies of Schwantes (1991) and Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995), the UK firms in Glaister and 
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Wang's (1993) research and the German SMEs in the study by Kaiser (1997c) 
considered it as important, Dong et al. (1993) suggested that it was of little importance. 
Access to Chinese technology was also not considered important for partner selection. 
The SMEs came to China to exploit their own technology, a technology which is, in 
many cases, their firm-specific advantage. In other words, if the potential Chinese 
partner had no technology to offer, this did not influence the partner selection choice. 
On the other hand, the SMEs would not select a partner whom they could not trust. It 
is difficult to identify a clear opinion in the literature with regard to the importance of the 
partner's technology. Whereas Glaister and Wang's (1993) UK firms and Kaiser's 
(1997c) German SMEs reflect the findings in this research, the companies in Casson 
and Zhang's (1992) work considered the partner's technology as important, though. 
Partner selection process 
Thiess (1994) proposed a three-stage partner selection process, including the 
application of so-called 'killer' criteria in the first stage, 'soft' criteria in the second stage 
and 'strong' criteria in the third. He defines killer criteria as products, location, size and 
type of enterprise, whereas a Chinese partner's willingness and ability to co-operate, 
credibility, company, image and capital situation are soft criteria. Company analysis 
and project analysis are strong criteria. To what extent have the UK and German 
SMEs in this study applied a selection process similar to this? 
Of all the SMEs investigated, GER-O's partner selection process comes closest to 
Thiess's (1994) model. The remaining case (UK) SMEs displayed a partner selection 
process that was characterised by superficiality and shortcuts. This contradicts earlier 
findings in the literature. Glaister and Wang's (1993) UK firms undertook at least a 
reasonable level of analysis when selecting their partners: ten of the 21 companies 
carried out in-depth and exhaustive investigations and six investigated their potential 
partners reasonably thoroughly. The German SMEs in Kaiser (1997c) suggest similar-
all but five companies had investigated their potential partner with regard to their own 
partner selection criteria. However, when approaching potential partners, the relative 
majority of these German SMEs had initial conversations with only one Chinese firm. 
Partner characteristics 
Various authors have argued that certain partner characteristics are crucial for the 
success of a JV (in China) (Tsang, 1994; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996; Pan, 1997), 
including the number of partners, partner size and company type. 
Number of partners 
Some scholars have examined the extent to which the number of partners in a JV 
affects its performance (Beamish, 1985; Endres, 1987). The more partners in a JV, it 
might be argued, the more parties want to be involved in decision-making and this 
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might complicate decision-finding or, indeed, make decision-making impossible. The 
case of UK-2 could, basically, serve as an example here. Osland and Cavusgil (1996) 
discovered an extreme scenario: a board meeting with US and Chinese directors 
lasted for 33 hours and ended without a decision made. The vast majority of UK and 
German SMEs have joined forces with only one partner, with the exception of UK-2 
and UK-7 that have, in addition to their Chinese partner, a Taiwanese or a 
Singaporean partner, respectively.^ 
Partner size 
Authors, including Killing (1983), Rugman et al. (1985) and Lane and Beamish (1990) 
recommend, for the creation of successful JVs, partners of similar size (in turnover and 
number of employees), though Kogut's (1988) (insignificant) data would suggest the 
reverse. 
There is no trend to be read from the data provided by the UK SMEs, though 
partnering with a company with a similar turnover appeared relatively less frequently. It 
is equally difficult to detect a clear trend within the group of German SMEs. 
Nevertheless, German SMEs tend not to joint venture with Chinese companies that are 
smaller (in terms of turnover) than they are themselves. 
Interestingly, only one UK SME indicated that it did not know the exact size of its 
Chinese partner company. However, the interviews revealed that the companies, with 
the notable exception of GER-0, did not carry out thorough partner examinations. It is 
thus unlikely that the companies which have indicated the relative size of their 
partners, did know how big their partners were - especially in terms of turnover. For 
instance, the managing director of UK-8 knew that the Chinese partner had a 
workforce of "around 1,000 employees." As a matter of fact, the company had 1,200 
employees. It also appeared during the interviews that the SMEs were not very 
interested in this information. Company size was just another piece of information the 
SMEs could not make use of 
It was easier (at first glance) perhaps for the UK and German SMEs to assess their 
potential Chinese partners' workforce size. Only one UK SME indicated that its 
Chinese partner would have a workforce of similar size as its own and the remaining 
results are not sufficient to read a particular trend. Within the group of German SME 
JVs, however, the workforce of the Chinese partners tend to be larger than that of the 
German SMEs. 
Firm size analysis suggests that the larger SMEs had relatively less frequently partners 
with a smaller (or much smaller) turnover, whereas within the group of the smaller 
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SMEs a particular trend cannot be read. The same applies to the employee criterion. 
The larger SMEs relatively more frequently joint ventured with a company which had 
more or much more employees than the SMEs had themselves. 
Company type 
It has been argued that private firms might behave totally differently from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and that foreign firms would prefer private over government 
companies as partners in their JVs (Killing, 1982; Raveed and Renforth, 1983; Endres, 
1987; Beamish, 1987). It has also been argued that JVs would be more stable when 
they are established with local private firms (Stuckey, 1983; Beamish, 1984, 1985; 
Young et a!., 1989) or local authorities (Thoburn et al., 1990). The findings with regard 
to the group of UK SMEs do not suggest a clear trend: only a slight majority of SMEs 
have a state-owned partner. However, it is expected that the majority of JVs would be 
formed with Chinese SOEs since the vast majority of Chinese enterprises are still 
SOEs. Also, earlier it has been reported (Rainaiter, 1995) that only a few private firms 
have entered into Sino-foreign JVs. There is more of a trend within the group of the 
German SMEs, where eight out of ten companies joint ventured with a Chinese SOE. 
Thus, the results from the group of German SMEs rather than the group of UK SMEs 
tend to confirm the earlier findings in the literature: whereas none of Beamish's (1993) 
22 JVs were with Chinese private sector firms, only one of Glaister and Wang's (1993) 
21 UK firms joint ventured with a Chinese private enterprise. Osland and Cavusgil 
(1996) stress that their large US MNEs rarely attempted to partner with enterprises 
other than SOEs. 19 of the 25 German SMEs with JVs in China had chosen an SOE 
as partner (Kaiser, 1997c). 
The analysis with regard to firm size suggests that the larger SMEs show a distinct 
preference for SOEs as partners in their JVs. 
9.2.4 Joint venture negotiation p rocess 
Negotiation contents 
For the SMEs in this study the valuation of their assets and the contribution of the 
Chinese partner as well as aspects of the financing of the JV were most frequently 
discussed in the course of establishing the Sino-foreign JVs. In both cases is the 
scarcity of SMEs reflected. Thus, the SMEs were obliged to 'turn around every penny' 
before agreeing on the value of certain contributions. Accordingly, also the financing 
aspect was given a high priority when negotiating the JV. Further of high importance 
was the distribution of the JV's equity amongst the partners. Whereas two out of three 
UK SMEs studied in-depth (UK-3, UK-8) and GER-0 insisted on the majority stake in 
245 
Discussion 
the JV, only UK-3 and GER-0 could push their desire through negotiations. In the case 
of UK-8 the Chinese side insisted on the majority stake and UK-8 had to agree 
eventually. Also UK-6 had to give in in its battle with the Chinese party for the majority 
51 per cent. Both UK-6's and UK-8's bargaining powers were not strong enough. 
Of similar importance to the UK and German SMEs were further control issues, ie the 
composition of the board of directors (BoD). However, basically, the composition of the 
BoD is determined by the distribution of the JV's equity. It is commonplace and also 
provided for in the JV legislation that the majority partner in a JV holds the majority of 
seats on the BoD. Further of interest to the UK and German SMEs was the aspect of 
who appoints the general manager. Again, the same applies as was said with respect 
to the composition of the BoD. However, some firms, amongst them GER-0, have 
adopted a policy to appoint a Chinese national, perhaps one from the Chinese partner, 
who is in charge for the day-to-day business of the JV. Many foreign investors (eg 
GER-0) are of the opinion that only Chinese nationals could create a good corporate 
culture in the JV and make the business successful. On the other hand, UK-3 would 
have aborted its negotiations if the Chinese side had not agreed that UK-3 would send 
an expatriate general manager. 
Less frequently discussed by both the UK and German SMEs was the selection and 
transfer of technology. 
Major discrepancy between the experiences of the UK and German SMEs appeared 
with respect to issues such as market priorities and the expatriation of SME managers 
which were more frequently discussed during the negotiations of the Sino-German JVs 
than during the establishment of the Sino-UK JVs, This surprises with regard to the 
actual expatriation of German personnel to the JVs in China. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs do not reveal any significant similarities with regard 
to the frequency of stating individual negotiation contents. However, when analysing 
according to 'firm size', the larger and smaller SMEs show similarity. Contents, such as 
the valuation of assets, equity share distribution, market priohties and training of staff 
rank rather high within both groups of SMEs. On the other hand, aspects, including the 
distribution of responsibilities, technology selection and transfer as well as the general 
manager appointment were the least frequently discussed negotiation contents by both 
Size One and Size Two SMEs. In summary, it is rather the criterion 'nationality' than 
'firm size' that distinguishes the SMEs. 
Negotiation content conflict 
The valuation of the partners' contribution and aspects of financing the JV that were 
the most frequently negotiated issues, were also the negotiation contents that were 
relatively most conflicting for both groups of SMEs. The cases of UK-3, UK-6, UK-7 
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and GER-0 highlight the difficulty of know-how or technology valuation. For certain 
know-how and technologies there is no market price. Instead, the determination of 
contributions' values is often more a matter of tough negotiations. 
The negotiation conflict with regard to financing and valuation issues was previously 
found by Frankenstein (1986) with price being the single most difficult term to resolve. 
Explicitly, the 26 companies in Frankenstein's research spent 17 per cent of their 
negotiation time discussing price issues. Financial matters were also discovered by 
Stewart and Keown (1989) to be important factors in the negotiation process. 
The UK and German SMEs showed also agreement with regard to the conflict that 
arose when negotiating the distribution of the equity share in the JV. For both groups 
of enterprises this issue was only relatively rarely a matter of conflict. Exceptions are 
known, including UK-3 and UK-8. UK-6 that initially desired a majohty stake in its JV, 
eventually agreed to a minority share since it did not want to risk failure of the 
negotiations. This corresponds with findings by Davidson (1987) and Kaiser (1997c). 
With respect to royalties, the experiences of the UK and German SMEs are 
considerably different. Whereas they were the greatest area of conflict with the 
German SMEs, royalty conflicts occurred least frequently with the UK SMEs. Only four 
German SMEs negotiated the royalty issue and two of them regarded it as conflicting. 
Relatively, thus, the royalty issue is the aspect that is most conflicting. Discrepancies 
arose also with regard to market priorities. Whereas this aspect was relatively 
unproblematic for the UK SMEs (though UK-3 reports some conflict with regard to the 
target markets of its JV), it was conflicting in the case of the German SMEs. As 
established earlier, relatively more German SMEs discussed the market focus of their 
JVs in the first place. For them it was very important and, consequently, they were 
more often prepared to argue with the Chinese side about this. The occurrence of 
conflicts between the German SMEs and their Chinese partners with respect to the 
market focus of JVs confirms the opinion of the literature (Ruggles, 1983; Davidson, 
1987; Tai, 1988; Beamish and Wang, 1989; Shenkar, 1990). 
The conflict areas that confronted the SMEs are significantly dissimilar, both with 
regard to nationality and firm size. Whereas the distribution of equity caused conflict 
most frequently within the group of the smaller SMEs, it was rather non-conflicting 
within the larger SMEs. On the other hand, whereas the larger firms relatively 
frequently argued with their partners about financing and personnel issues, these were 
rather less conflicting within the group of the smaller firms. 
S/WE negotiation team 
The composition of the negotiation team has been considered a major success factor 
when negotiating with the Chinese (Eiteman, 1990). As a trend, the UK and German 
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SMEs had more than one manager involved in negotiations with their Chinese 
counterparts. As earlier reported in the literature (Simon, 1996), both the UK and the 
German SMEs were represented in the negotiations by their managing directors -
owner-managers, in the majority of cases. The cases of the UK SMEs confirm this. In 
only a few SMEs was this delegated to an executive officer. On the other hand, as 
VobaRaiba (1996) and Grimm (1997b) have suggested, only a few SMEs can afford 
the specialist staff to carry out this task. There were no differences between the 
smaller and larger SMEs with respect to members of the negotiation team. Assertions, 
such as smaller SMEs could not afford to involve an equal number of managers in 
negotiations did not prove true. 
Location of negotiation 
For many of the managing directors negotiating the JV meant spending a considerable 
amount of valuable time on not only talking, waiting for decisions to be made and 
socialising with their Chinese counterparts, but also for travelling from Europe to China. 
In addition, this is expensive and it is, relative to large firms, more expensive to SMEs. 
The vast majority of UK SMEs had to accept this since their negotiations were carried 
out exclusively or also in China. In contrast, the German SMEs in their majority 
negotiated their JVs both in China and in Germany. This helped them save scarce 
SME funds in the form of capital and managerial capacity. 
Overall, in the majority of cases, the negotiations of the SME JVs needed a 
considerable amount of SME firm resources. This was in the form of mainly the 
managing directors' time for preparation, travel and execution of negotiations, as well 
as communication, consulting, etc. This substantial amount of funds which is relatively 
larger in SMEs than in large firms, reduced the SMEs' strategic flexibility especially 
during the negotiations: after committing substantial resources, a decision to abandon 
a project due to negotiation difficulties, for instance, would have been very expensive. 
In other words, sunk costs would have been very high. 
Eiteman (1990) proposed that negotiations should be carried out in the home country 
since this would save time and accustom the Chinese to the foreign business 
environment. This argument supports all the UK and German SMEs that have carried 
out their negotiations also, or exclusively, in the UK or Germany. It saves the SMEs' 
scarce resources and communicates the UK and German business environments to 
the Chinese. It is certainly an argument that needs consideration. However, in many 
cases, the Chinese negotiation team is different from the team that works in the JV 
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later. The inevitable question then is how the later managers can benefit from 
negotiations that are carried out in the UK or Germany. 
Interestingly, the smaller SMEs earned out relatively most of their negotiations 
exclusively in China, whereas Size Two SMEs employed a strategy of holding 
negotiations both in China and at home. Perhaps the larger SMEs had more 
bargaining power to demand this from their Chinese counterparts. 
Duration of negotiations 
The fact that negotiations require substantial company resources is not so much of a 
problem when negotiations can be completed within weeks. It becomes a great 
problem, however, when they last for months or years, as is often the case in China. 
Daniels et al. (1985) discovered negotiation periods of between seven months and four 
years and Davidson's (1987) US MNEs negotiated two years on average. The average 
duration for the negotiation of their JVs was less than two years in the case of the New 
Zealand SMEs of Au and Enderwick (1994). The 25 German SMEs in Kaiser's (1997c) 
study spent, on average, four years and four months from the first collection of 
information until the granting of the business licence. 
Negotiations can easily become a major problem of an SME's entire JV preparation 
process. A certain amount of funds, time, etc., is allocated to the preparation of a 
project. When the actual preparation exceeds the set time-scale, not only more 
management time, but also additional funds are necessary. In the worst case, this can 
endanger the whole undertaking. For instance, American tractor manufacturer John 
Deere was reported (Yatsko, 1997) having plans to establish four farm equipment 
factories in China. Only later it learned that negotiating JVs and getting them approved 
was not the six-month procedure that had been expected. Eventually, the company 
dropped two of the projects because it did not have the resources to support them. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of SMEs perceived their negotiations having 
taken longer than expected. The amount of resources the firms allocated was based 
on what was financially bearable, but not what would have been reasonable for the 
case of China. The analysis with respect to firm size does not reveal any differences 
between the smaller and larger SMEs. 
Language of negotiations and use of interpreters 
With exceptions, English is not spoken in China. Shenkar (1994) suggests this with 
regard to the work of western researchers in China. This fact is, however, of equal 
interest to the UK and German SMEs in this study. Thus, Frankenstein (1986) and 
Eiteman (1990) argued that there should be a Mandarin speaker in the foreign 
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negotiation team. Chinese interpreters are often very keen to act more as 'interpreter' 
than as translator: contents, alternatives, etc. disappear and affect negotiations as well 
as the entire JV - disadvantageously often. Having somebody in the team who speaks 
Mandarin, improves the quality of discussions since the interpreter tries harder to stick 
to the core meaning of the conversations, without applying much own interpretation. 
When employing the services of interpreters, it is important that the interpreter not only 
is fluent in both languages, but also has an understanding of the topic that is being 
discussed. For instance, the research of the UK-8 case has shown that it is inevitable 
to have negotiations (discussions) translated by somebody who is familiar with the 
topic. When the English speaking marketing manager of UK-8-JV was temporarily not 
available, a hotel employee was asked to assist as interpreter for the conversation 
between the researcher and the Chinese general manager of UK-8-JV. Though this 
person spoke English, the conversation had to be postponed since the interpreter had 
no understanding of the issues discussed. 
In most cases it is a distinct problem for SMEs to appoint a Mandarin speaking 
manager. As has been shown in chapter two (section 2.3.3) of this thesis, SMEs 
frequently lack not only managerial time and capacity, but also managerial quality. 
However, the ability to speak several foreign languages, including Chinese, certainly is 
a managerial quality. In contrast, Simon's (1992, 1996) 'hidden champions' employ 
managers that can speak several foreign languages. However, these worid class 
SMEs are the exception rather than the rule. 
Thus, negotiating a JV with Chinese counterparts who do not speak German, and 
frequently not English, was a challenge for the SMEs from the UK and Germany. Not 
surprisingly, thus, all eight UK SMEs that answered the question, had used one or 
more interpreters. Interpreters were also provided in the negotiations of the China JVs 
of the 25 German SMEs (Kaiser, 1997c). In detail, the Chinese side provided the 
interpreter in eleven cases, in six cases was an independent interpreter employed and 
the German side provided the interpreter in five cases. Both sides provided interpreters 
in five cases and no interpreter was used in only three cases. 
The smaller SMEs had more often carried out JV negotiations in English, compared 
with the larger SMEs which have, in turn, relatively more often negotiated their JVs in 
both English and Chinese or exclusively in Chinese. With regard to use of interpreters 
there is no considerable difference between Size One and Size Two enterprises to be 
read in the data. 
Negotiation difficulties 
China and the UK as well as China and Germany are characterised by a considerable 
psychic distance, and it was found that SMEs are more affected by psychic distance 
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than large firms (Carlson, 1975; Buckley and Mathew, 1979; Schmidt et al., 1995). In 
environments, such as the Chinese, SMEs are at a disadvantage when negotiating 
contracts since they often lack the competitive advantage of large firms and have only 
a poor understanding of Chinese negotiation styles (Leung and Yeung, 1995). 
The cultural differences between the European and Chinese negotiators which 
manifest themselves in language problems, problems with the negotiation styles, the 
slow pace of the negotiations and other cultural issues were both for the UK and the 
German SMEs the most frequently cited problem areas of negotiating a JV in China. 
For instance, for UK-6 problems did not arise with regard to engineering, but with 
business and cultural issues. The problems appear similariy to Size One firms and 
Size Two firms alike. 
Factors for successful negotiations 
As known from chapter three, Hamill and Hunt (1993) discovered, as the factors for 
successful negotiations to create bargaining power through controlling the 
technological know-how, the ability to cultivate good relationships with the authorities 
and the venture partners with matching the requirements of the country for foreign 
currency, modernisation, technology transfer and exports. 
Indicating that patience and sincerity of the SME team and a good relationship with the 
Chinese negotiation partners are important factors for successful negotiations, both the 
UK and German SMEs reflect what has been found with regard to partner selection. In 
many cases where the SMEs had no expatriate on-site who could oversee the 
business and report to the headquarters if and when things were going wrong, the UK 
and German firms had to trust their partners. Accordingly, the managing director of 
UK-8 said that "there is no use establishing a JV without trusting the partner." 
As important factors for successful negotiations considered were further the use of a 
good interpreter (for the reasons outlined above), the SME's technical expertise and 
knowledge of the Chinese business practices, whereas of less importance to the 
success of negotiations were the uniqueness of the SMEs' product, its willingness to 
offer good financing, and familiarity with social customs, knowledge of China's political 
and social situation and the SME's past reputation in selling to China. 
As a trend, the above observations contradict eariier findings by Stewart and Keown 
(1989) who studied the factors for successful negotiations with Chinese partners. 
Whereas the empirical results in this thesis would suggest personal qualities, such as 
patience, sincerity and relationship-building as the most important factors for 
successfully negotiating with the Chinese, Stewart and Keown (1989) found that the 
factors for successful negotiations with China tend to be rather product and finance-
251 
Discussion 
related, and less personal and culture-related. Thus, the findings in this study are more 
in line with earlier findings by Tung (1982) and Leung and Wong (1993) who 
discovered personal factors more important for successful negotiations than finance 
and product issues. The results of this thesis clearly suggest, however, that product 
and financing issues rank fifth and sixth at best (chapter seven, section 7.2.3). 
In a more recent study, Leung and Yeung (1995) undertook an identical investigation 
to the earlier research by Stewart and Keown (1989) and extracted support in their 
data for the works of Tung (1982) as well as Leung and Wong (1993) and rejection of 
Stewart and Keown's (1989) results. However, Stewart and Keown's (1989) findings 
are confirmed by the results in the study of 25 German SMEs with JVs in China 
(Kaiser, 1997c). As factors influencing negotiations, technology transfer and 
investment volume were ahead in importance of, for instance, guanxi. 
Eiteman's (1990) findings neither support nor reject the empirical results in this thesis 
or Stewart and Keown's (1989) conclusions, respectively. Although Eiteman (1990) 
found important the possession of an unique technology, he classified this factor as 
'inherent strength', whereas patience of the US team and mutual understanding for 
each other's objectives and desires, for instance, were classified as 'developed 
strengths.' Eiteman's (1990) study lacks, however, a ranking that would incorporate 
'inherent' as well as 'developed' strengths. 
Apart from what UK-2's managing director suggested, namely "to be polite, to be sure 
of the facts and to protect yourself," a further important factor for successful 
negotiations is the SME's ability to make concessions to the Chinese, to be able to 
compromise where it does not affect the SME's business disadvantageously. GER-O's 
negotiation with its Chinese partner with respect to the JV duration serves as example 
for this: whereas GER-0 wanted 15 years, its Chinese partner, ABC, wanted 50 years. 
GER-0 that was very determined of what it wanted from the proposed JV and that was 
prepared to withdraw from its proposal, agreed. By compromising, GER-0 showed its 
willingness to co-operate. On the other hand, its concession was not at a cost for the 
German enterprise. Compared with duration findings in the literature of, on average, 16 
years and with over 60 per cent between eleven and 20 years (Dong et al., 1993) this 
appears exceptionally long. 
Further, UK-3 that insisted on a majority stake in its JV accepted a 50-50 equity 
distribution which was wanted by the Chinese side. The UK SME was prepared to give 
in since it knew that its Chinese partner would not be familiar with the industry the JV 
would be operating in. Thus, UK-3 would be the dominant partner anyway. 
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A negative example is the proposed JV between ABC and UK-9: after three years of 
discussions the parties withdrew from their proposals, because the valuation of 
contributions could not be solved. 
Both the UK and German SMEs displayed significant similarities in their perceptions of 
the importance of negotiation success factors. Also with regard to firm size, the 
perceptions of the SMEs are significantly similar, though the similarity is greater when 
analysed according to nationality. In other words, SMEs of different sizes display 
greater dissimilarity in their perceptions of factors for successful negotiations. 
However, there is no meaningful interpretation of these differences. 
9.2.5 Partner contributions 
S M E contributions 
It has been argued that JVs are formed to combine advantages of the partners 
(Blodgett, 1991) and that firms forming JVs need partners for a variety of potential 
contributions (Beamish, 1987). 
Accordingly, capital, technology, management expertise and technical training were 
the most frequently observed contributions of the UK and German SMEs. This reflects 
exactly what the Chinese side desires when entering a JV with a foreign company and 
what the literature (Woodward and Liu, 1993; Commerzbank, 1995) suggests. Apart 
from the scarce resource capital (all SMEs used their working capital to finance the 
JV), the UK and German SMEs contributed their technology to the joint undertaking. In 
many cases this is special technology which the SMEs attempt to exploit in the 
Chinese market rather than licensing it to a Chinese company. Since most of these 
technologies are 'high-context' technologies the SMEs also have to provide the 
necessary training, initially at least. This was the case with UK-3 and UK-4 where the 
SMEs sent an engineer to the JV to train local staff in manufacturing the products. 
On the other hand, machinery, access to worid markets and patents were the least 
frequently contributed assets and attributes by the SMEs in this study. This does not 
surprise too much. Machines to manufacture certain products can easily be purchased 
in China and it is rather the soft technology, human resource, that is most important for 
producing high quality. This was outlined in the case of GER-0. Further, the vast 
majority of UK and German SMEs came to China to exploit the potential Chinese 
market, but not to open their traditional export markets to the output of the JVs. 
Interestingly, whereas the SMEs show significant similarities with respect to nationality, 
the SMEs display no significantly similar responses when analysed according to firm 
size. For instance, although cash was the most frequently cited contribution of the 
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smaller and larger SMEs, technology was perceived more important a contribution by 
the smaller SMEs than by the larger. On the other hand, management expertise was 
relatively more often contributed by the larger firms than by the smaller ones. This 
supports the argument that managerial capacity is limited in smaller firms. The smaller 
SMEs could not involve too much managerial capacity in the JV business. 
Chinese partner's contributions 
It has been argued (Contractor, 1984; Hamill and Hunt, 1993; Woodward and Liu, 
1993; Commerzbank, 1995) that the local partner contributes expertise, capital, 
location-specific knowledge on politics, economic and customs environments, contacts 
with government officials, faster entry into the domestic market, marketing personnel, 
plants, facilities and land, materials, local labour, infrastructure and trade union 
relationships as well as access to financial institutions. 
Accordingly, local labour, contacts to customers, access to markets and government 
contacts were amongst the Chinese partner contributions that were most important to 
both the UK and German SMEs. This suggests that Chinese partner attributes rather 
than assets were most appreciated by the UK and German SMEs. It was just the 
importance of these cultural attributes that was also reflected in the motivations of the 
UK and German SMEs for entehng a Sino-foreign JV. Getting contacts to customers 
and to the government and access to the Chinese market were perceived valuable 
since the SMEs could not provide these atthbutes by themselves. 
Of less importance to the SMEs were Chinese partner contributions, such as plant or 
cash - in other words, assets. To expect cash from the Chinese partner would not have 
been very realistic since it is exactly this contribution that is sought by the Chinese 
side. This was suggested by both Mr. Davies of the British Consulate General in 
Shanghai (interview on 21.11.96) and the production and quality assurance manager 
of GER-0-JV. in contrast, UK-4's Chinese partner poured into the JV double the cash 
contnbution of the UK SME and UK-7's Chinese partners contributed the same amount 
of cash as the UK SME did. 
In summary, the UK and German SMEs display significant similarities in their 
perception of the importance of the Chinese partner's contributions. However, when 
analysed according to firm size, the SMEs show considerable differences in their 
perceptions. For instance, the Chinese contribution of land was ranked first within the 
larger firms, whereas it ranks last within the group of smaller SMEs. Apart from this 
huge discrepancy, the results within both groups do not suggest too great differences 
in the firms' perceived perceptions of the importance of certain Chinese contributions. 
Contribution valuation problem 
The exact valuation of the partners' contributions is a problem. This has been shown 
above (section 9.2.4). Chinese companies do not trust their foreign partners and vice 
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versa. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the UK and German SMEs' strong, 
though implicit, desire to be sincere and trust each other. Reports on the fraud of both 
Chinese and foreign companies are plenty: as the Handelsblatt (5./6.7.96, p. 18) 
reports of Chinese who overvalue their asset contributions sometimes two and three-
fold, and quote fantasy figures for second-hand machines, so the Economist (6.8.94, 
p.65) knows of a foreign firm that contributed equipment to a Sino-foreign printing JV 
that was supposedly worth more than US$2.6m (£1.7m), though its true value was only 
US$0.5m (£0.3m). Further, a Hong Kong investor allegedly provided 15 pieces of 
equipment to a JV, of which two were made in Japan in the 1930s and two in China in 
1973 and 1983 and which were allegedly worth US$2.12m (£1.36m), whereas local 
inspectors found the true value to be US$20,000 (£12,821) (FT, 5./6.11.94, p.2). 
Whether this was the real 'true' value is debatable again. 
In section 9.2.4 of this chapter it has been established that the valuation of 
contributions was on top of the list of negotiation conflicts. Of the 25 German SMEs in 
Kaiser's (1997c) study only 14 had no problems with the valuation of contributions. 
Of the SMEs studied further, UK-3, UK-6, UK-7, and GER-0 experienced conflict in the 
valuation of the SME technology or know-how. The case of UK-3 is exceptional, 
compared with the others: the valuation of the SME's contributions created substantial 
dispute between the two parties. Since UK-3 had put into the planned JV too much 
time and money already, it could not afford at that stage to jeopardise the undertaking 
or to withdraw even. On the other hand, GER-0 was prepared to withdraw from its 
project in case it could not have negotiated a deal with which it was entirely satisfied. 
On the other hand, the assets and attributes of UK-4 and UK-8 had been valued 
without major conflict. UK-4's know-how had not been valued and accepted as a 
contribution to the JV at all. This was because the deal between the UK SME and the 
Chinese company was a 'camouflaged' contract manufacturing agreement where the 
UK company Wanted to produce at a low cost and the Chinese company to obtain 
'production fees', but was not interested in the UK SME's technology. This becomes 
obvious further in the fact that the Chinese company's line of business is completely 
different. In the case of UK-8-JV, the Chinese established the relevant figures (with 
respect to the value of UK-8's contribution) and UK-8 accepted. 
9.3 Sino-foreign joint venture operation 
9.3.1 Joint venture background information 
Establishment, total investment, number of employees 
The analysis reveals that the German SMEs approached China as a location for JV 
activity later than the UK SMEs. For German firms growth markets in Eastern Europe 
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have been considerably more important than markets in distant China. Whereas with 
respect to nationality of the SMEs a meaningful statement concerning the investment 
volume cannot be made, it becomes obvious that smaller SME JVs had the smallest 
total investments. 
The UK JVs employ, on average, nearly double as many staff than do the German 
SME JVs. Firm size analysis shows that the smaller SMEs have fewer personnel than 
the larger SMEs. 
Joint venture location 
China's developed areas of the East, Northeast, Southeast and South have attracted 
the majority of the UK and German SME investment. This high concentration of UK 
and German SME JVs in the coastal areas, in special economic zones (SEZs) and 
major municipalities with attractive investment zones, corresponds with earlier 
observations by Beamish and Wang (1989), Glaister and Wang (1993), Schuller 
(1994) , Grimm (1994), Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong 
(1995) and Commerzbank (1995). These sources report a range of 76 to 85 per cent 
of international, UK and German direct investment, respectively being located in 
coastal areas. Shenkar (1990) stresses the environmental distinctiveness of these 
areas from the rest of China. 
For some years, now, various sources have been reporting the gradual shift of new 
direct investment inflows from China's east coastal areas to its remote West (China 
aktuell, September 1993, January 1995; FT, 7.11.94, p.iv; Fan, 1996). However, the 
empirical results of this study do not support this, though the vast majority of the JVs 
are fairly recent. This clearly suggests that the UK and German SMEs considered it as 
important to have, on the one hand, supportive infrastructures and, on the other, 
proximity to their markets and customers. Especially for exporting JVs it is important, if 
not essential, to choose a location that has access to a harbour. The same applies to 
SMEs that rely on the importation of certain goods. Equally, being close to an airport, 
for example, eases the transport of not only urgently needed parts and materials, but 
also of expert staff that come to China for fixing production problems, etc. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs in this study contradict what has recently been 
demanded by the general manager of another German SME JV, based in Chongqing. 
He said that (German) SMEs should locate in China's remote areas because of lower 
costs for land use rights, labour, electricity, etc. This corresponds with what 
Commerzbank (1995) suggests as attractions of investing in China's hinterland - as 
opposed to the coastal areas where investors get above-the-average economic 
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growth, high demand, and a better infrastructure. Moreover, GER-0 which had located 
its JV in China's East coastal area, argues that in CITY [East China] it saw emerging 
the worid's biggest region and "you have to move into areas that are civilised, 
othenfl/ise you'll find nobody to send there" ]...[ with hindsight to the later expatriation of 
one of its engineers. For SMEs that do not intend to expatriate staff to their China 
venture, as was the case with the majority of SMEs in this study, this argument loses 
of impact. 
Whereas with respect to the smaller firms a clear preference of location cannot be 
identified, the larger SMEs are located in North and East China rather than in the 
South. Interestingly, the two SMEs that 'dared' to locate in China's remote area are 
larger SMEs, suggesting that for smaller SMEs a location too remote is not suitable. 
Choice of location 
The availability of trained labour was the most important criterion for the choice of 
location for the SMEs in this study. The importance of the availability of trained labour 
for foreign investors was recognised by Chinese municipalities that wanted to attract 
FDI. For instance, in its investment promotion brochure, the government of CITY [East 
China] emphasises its super kids as its special asset, known for their "superb mental 
arithmetic skills based on using the abacus" (The People's Government of CITY, 1996, 
p. 18). However, trained labour that meets the requirements of foreign investors and 
particulariy of many SMEs that produce with special technologies, is a relatively scarce 
resource in China. Whereas in China's coastal areas trained labour is available, there 
is still a big lack in the remote areas of China. This makes production difficult. 
The availability of cheap labour is inevitably linked with that of trained labour as a 
factor influencing the choice of location. The majority of SMEs that came to China 
intended to service the Chinese domestic market. This meant competition would be 
fierce from domestic as well as other foreign companies, making cost-competitive 
production necessary. At least this was cited by the UK and German SMEs as second 
most important motivation for engaging in an FDI project. The state of the 
.infrastructure was of further importance for the SMEs. The SMEs prefer to locate in 
such locations in China that are privileged by a functioning infrastructure in terms of 
transportation, telecommunication and the provision of supporting services for carrying 
out their business. 
Apparently, this was one of the reasons why the SMEs located in China's coastal 
areas. It reflects the opinion expressed in the literature on both large UK and German 
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firms (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong 
Kong, 1995) as well as German SMEs (Kaiser, 1997c). 
The opinion about the importance of the partner's location is more important to the UK 
SMEs than it is to the German SMEs. It is difficult to state why this discrepancy arises. 
In one case (UK-7) the choice of location was pre-determined. There, the potential 
Chinese partner was in charge of selecting the location of the JV and, naturally, opted 
for a location nearby its own. Similarly, UK-2's choice of location was influenced in that 
its Taiwanese partner had an operation in China already. Also this finding corresponds 
with the literature: both Glaister and Wang (1993) and Delegation of German Industry 
and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) detected this motivation as considerably important 
for their UK and German firms' partner selection. 
The SMEs did not select a location because it was close to their target markets or 
sources of raw materials. This heavily contradicts earlier findings by the Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). There, the choice of location was 
determined by the proximity to customers in 93 out of 120 cases. Further, the UK and 
German SMEs would not have chosen a location because of the provision of 
investment incentives, such as preferential tax treatment or exemption from certain 
duties, etc. The minor importance of proximity to target markets clearly contradicts 
what Glaister and Wang (1993), Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong 
Kong (1995) and Kaiser (1997c) found with respect to UK and German firms. For the 
firms in these studies, proximity to target markets was the most or second most 
important or frequently cited criterion, respectively. Overall, however, the German 
SMEs in this study are more likely to show similarities with the firms in the studies by 
Glaister and Wang (1993), Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong 
(1995) and Kaiser (1997c). 
With regard to investment incentives and raw material sources, the findings in this 
study correspond with the findings of Glaister and Wang (1993) and Delegation of 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995). In contrast, the German SMEs in 
the Kaiser (1997c) study expressed great interest in investment incentives, including 
tax concessions. 
For instance, both GER-O-JV and UK-4-JV enjoy tax concessions. Kaiser and Grimm 
et al. (1997) extensively discussed the different areas and requirements to be met in 
order to be eligible for tax reduction or exemption. According to this source, the kind of 
tax treatment which GER-0 and UK-4 received, is very common in China. It is not 
really a discriminatory factor for location choice. UK-6 explicitly states that tax 
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concessions, for instance, did not affect the SMEs' choice of location since they were 
considered to be largely the same in all provinces. 
Overall, the perceived importance of criteria for the choice of location is not 
significantly similar between the UK and German SMEs and it is even less similar 
when the perceptions of the SMEs are analysed according to firm size. For instance, 
the location of the Chinese partner is more important for the larger, whereas the 
provision of incentives is more important to the smaller SMEs. While proximity to target 
markets is important to the smaller SMEs, it is neariy least important to the larger 
SMEs. 
Production site 
The majority of UK and German SMEs had taken over existing production facilities, 
whereas three UK and German SMEs each erected new buildings on green-field sites 
(two German SMEs rented office space). Without longer periods of building a 
production site, these SME JVs could start with production at an eariy stage in their 
existence. This reflects the observations in Kaiser's (1997c) study where only eight JVs 
established a green-field operation. 
Taking over or renting already existing production and office buildings is not always as 
satisfactory and uncomplicated as in the cases of UK-2 and UK-4. This shows the case 
of UK-3. There, substantial renovation works had to be carried out. Although with the 
erection of a green-field operation, these kinds of problems can be avoided, the 
construction of purpose-built premises does not allow an immediate production start. 
For instance, UK-7 spent no less than 18 months to build its factory). Further, buildings 
are expensive and need to be paid, in many cases, with the cash contribution of the 
foreign partner. However, this money would be better used for the importation of high 
quality machinery, raw materials, etc. Sometimes, however, the establishment of new 
buildings cannot be bypassed since existing premises cannot be used at all or cannot 
be refurbished at a reasonable cost or do not exist, as was the case with UK-7. 
The larger SMEs more often preferred a take-over operation than the smaller SMEs. 
Product range 
As a trend, the UK and German SMEs manufacture only a limited product range, 
compared with their production at home. The SMEs started with a small fraction of 
their product programme that was, as the case of UK-3 shows, initially only assembled 
by the JV and later completely manufactured locally. Also as a trend, the product 
programme was gradually extended in the SME JVs. The SME tested production and 
the market with a small fraction of products before they introduced more products to 
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their JVs. This also meant committing further funds in the form of sending expert staff 
to the JV or a new set of machines, etc. 
Also with regard to firm size analysis, it becomes obvious that both groups of SMEs 
manufacture only a limited range of products, though the difference in responses is 
greater within the group of the larger SMEs. The reason for this is possibly that the 
whole product range of the larger SMEs is larger than that of the smaller SMEs. 
Target market 
With their direct investment projects, the majority of UK and German SMEs target the 
domestic Chinese market, rather than export markets. One SME JV within every group 
of SMEs exports its entire production. Within the group of UK SMEs this is UK-4. Other 
SMEs were required to also export a certain fraction of their production, although they 
came to China in order to service the domestic market. Being prepared to export a 
certain share of their production was the phce the SMEs had to pay for being approved 
by the Chinese authorities. For instance, UK-7 agreed to export as much as 30 per 
cent of its annual output and UK-3 50 per cent even. Also GER-0 had to agree to sell, 
within five years, up to 30 per cent of its production into overseas markets. UK-8, on 
the other hand, could bypass this requirement by including an 'as-much-as-we-can' 
phrase into the JV contract. 
This is rather wise since committing itself to a certain export contribution often creates 
problems. In many cases is the quality of products manufactured in China not sufficient 
to satisfy the demand of the world markets. In most cases also, do exports from the 
JVs into the SMEs' traditional export markets create so-called 'cannibalism' effects that 
are highly unwanted by the UK and German parents. Engelhardt and Seibert (1981) 
suggest the danger of cannibalism can be reduced in that country-specific product 
differentiations allow the marketing of JV products in countries only with similar or 
equal structures of need as the market that hosts the JV. On the other hand, country-
specific product adjustments can damage the reputation of the investor (ibid). 
An SME JV that is the only subsidiary and whose parent company is not able or not 
willing to absorb parts of the JV's output, could easily drift into serious problems. In the 
case of GER-O-JV, the Mexican subsidiary (and subsidiaries in Australia and South 
Africa) helped the JV to meet its export target. Without an order from the Mexican 
customer, GER-O-JV's export situation would have faced serious problems since the 
German SME, following its global strategy, co-ordinates the market activities of its 
various subsidiaries. A a single venture's own export ambition often does not go hand 
in hand with such a strategy. This was previously suggested, for instance, by Gomes-
Casseres (1989) and Hill et al. (1990). Also firm size analysis suggests that both 
groups of SMEs target the domestic Chinese market first and foremost. 
Market share in China 
Both Stratos (1990) and Simon (1992) discovered that many SME entrepreneurs did 
not know the size of their shares in individual markets. For instance, Simon (1992) 
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argues that some of the 'hidden champions' operate in extremely fragmented markets 
for which clear market definitions and reliable statistics do not exist; what the 'hidden 
champions' do know, however, so argues Simon (1992, 1996), is when they are the 
market leader. Five UK and two German SMEs specify or estimate their 1995 shares 
of the Chinese market ranging from 4 per cent to 35 per cent. Also GER-0 could 
specify its market share in China, accounting for some 3 to 5 per cent. 
9.3.2 Joint venture ownership 
On average, the SMEs have taken on minority equity positions in their China JVs. 
Although corresponding with the average German SME investment share observed by 
Kaiser (1997c), the average minority shares of the SMEs are higher than the average 
foreign equity holdings of 43 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively, that were detected 
by and Dong et al. (1993) in their research of Sino-European, Sino-US and Sino-
Japanese JVs, and Pan (1997), who examined Sino-Japanese and Sino-US JVs.^ The 
higher foreign equity of the SMEs compared with the firms in Dong et al.'s (1993) study 
may have resulted from a relaxed Chinese government attitude towards foreign 
ownership during the past years. It would not explain, however, the discrepancy with 
Pan's (1997) recent findings. To explain the discrepancy with company size of the 
investing company would prove useful at first glance, though there is no indication in 
the literature that would support this. 
The detailed analysis of the equity shares reveals that there is no trend within the 
group of the UK SMEs. Three UK SMEs hold majority stakes, three have minority 
stakes and three equal equity stakes. There is more of a trend to be read within the 
sample of German SMEs: six have accepted the minority position in their JVs, four JVs 
are equally owned by the German and the Chinese partners and only one German 
SME holds a majority equity stake. The German SMEs' minority equity position in six 
out of eleven JVs clearly contradicts findings by the Delegation of German Industry 
and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) and Commerzbank (1995). These suggest that 
German companies prefer a distinct capital majority in more than two thirds and more 
than 50 per cent, respectively, of Sino-German JVs. 
The empirical findings of this study on ownership distribution strongly contradict earlier 
observations by Davidson (1987) of Sino-US JVs and Woodward and Liu (1993) of 
foreign investors in general. Explicitly, Woodward and Liu (1993) revealed that in two 
thirds of cases the foreign and Chinese partners shared the ownership of the venture. 
The equity structure of the SMEs in this study corresponds much more with the 
ownership structure detected in Beamish and Wang's (1989) examination of the data 
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of 805 Sino-foreign JVs. The Beamish and Wang (1989) study shows that foreign 
investors had a minority equity position in 60 per cent of the cases, whereas they 
shared the equity in 31 per cent and were majority owners of their JVs in 9 per cent of 
all cases only. Later, Beamish (1993) stressed that most foreign firms in China have a 
minority equity position, though equal ownership is quite common. 
This must be treated with caution and eventually this will have to be amended. 
Beamish and Wang's (1989) sample contained a substantial number of firms from 
Hong Kong and it is known that direct investors from Hong Kong are much more willing 
to take a minority position than investors from Japan, the US and Europe (Beamish 
and Wang, 1989). Pan (1997) found even that Japanese investors would more 
frequently opt for a 50 per cent or majority position in a Sino-foreign JV than US firms. 
In 1993, Beamish predicted that, with the increasing relaxation of the investment 
conditions in China and the encouragement of WFOEs, more foreign firms take a 
larger equity position. Pan's (1997) data largely confirm this prediction. They show a 
shift of Japanese and US equity stakes from 50-50 to a majority position between 1991 
and 1993, compared with the period 1988 to 1990. However, no large volume data 
exists that provides useful insight into the equity holding development of UK and 
German investors in China that allows comparison. 
Interestingly, the larger SMEs own, on average, 51 per cent of the equity, whereas the 
smaller SMEs own nearly 10 per cent less equity. Further, the smaller SMEs had more 
often a minority equity position than the larger firms. 
9.3.3 Joint venture control 
It has been established in chapter six (section 6.2.2) that ownership is perceived as a 
control mechanism. However, it has been found also (chapters three and six, sections 
3.2.2 and 6.2.2) that the level of ownership does not necessarily correspond with the 
level of control. Explicitly for LDCs, such as China, Beamish (1993) discovered that 
foreign firms are typically able to exercise somewhat greater control over their JVs 
than their equity levels would suggest. This was the case with UK-3 that controls the 
JV despite having only a 50 per cent equity stake. However, UK-3's Chinese partner is 
not familiar with the industry the JV would operate in and it would have to rely, thus, on 
the UKSME. 
Contrary to that is the case of GER-0. Although the German SME could have gone for 
a share bigger than absolutely necessary for a majority stake, it refused to take a 
bigger stake since it did not want to have a passive partner. The avoidance of a silent 
partner is also known from Hamill and Hunt's (1993) research of the company APV 
that could have opted for 100 per cent ownership in its JV in Hungary. However, the 
company preferred a 60 per cent equity stake, instead. Both companies, GER-0 and 
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APV, believed that the long-term success of the JV required the active Involvement of 
local partners in decision-making. 
In chapter five (section 5.3.3) the need for, and functions of, the BoD have been 
established. The SME JVs in this study had at least three directors on their boards. 
Regarding the number of board directors, the JV law provides a minimum of three and 
a maximum of fifteen members, depending on the size of the venture. As a trend, the 
Chinese had an equal or larger number of directors on the JVs' BoDs than the foreign 
side. Overall, the distribution of seats in the BoD in this study reflects that in the 
majority of cases, the Chinese side held majority equity stakes. This corresponds with 
earlier findings by Campbell (1989) where of the 17 equity JVs for which information 
was available, more than half had a Chinese majority on the BoD and a third of the 
boards had an equal number of Chinese and foreign members. 
UK-2 that has a Chinese and a Taiwanese partner and three out of eight seats on the 
BoD, believes that "the Ethnic Chinese are running the show." Thus, in order to protect 
its interest in the JV, the stipulations of the contract provided for a 70 per cent 
agreement for decisions to be made. A similar constellation was found by Brown 
(1985) in the case of the Schindler Elevator JV. Although the Chinese partner held six 
out of eight positions in this JV's BoD, including the chairmanship, any change in the 
articles of association required assent by one of the western directors. Also UK-4's 
managing director has to agree to major decisions to be made regarding investment or 
management appointment, though the UK SME held one third of the equity and had 
two seats of five on the BoD only. 
Despite the relatively unequal distribution of equity and BoD seats, in the vast majority 
of the SME JVs in this study was decision-making shared between the partners. This 
coincides with earlier findings by Beamish (1993) where 17 of 22 JVs exercised split 
control (and thus joint decision-making). However, as Lane and Beamish (1990) 
emphasise, when decisions are shared within a JV, they are in fact not being jointly 
made, but rather divided or split between the partners on knowledge, skill, experience 
and understanding of the particular issue. 
This was the case with the UK and German SMEs that had split decision-making 
authority of most of the different functions in their JVs. Only two SMEs indicated that 
they had not split responsibilities of individual functions. 
To divide up control along functional lines has been found effective (Shenkar, 1990; 
Teagarden, 1990; Beamish, 1993). It has been suggested also that to have one 
partner making nearly all the decisions increases the probability of poor performance in 
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a Sino-foreign JV. Teagarden and von Glinow (1990) observed that Sino-foreign JVs 
with split control of management functions became profitable faster than passive 
alliance forms, though there are also other, contrary voices. Ding (1993) and Osland 
and Cavusgil (1996) detected that the JVs that were managed entirely by the US side 
performed much better than JVs that were managed by the Chinese side. However, 
Ding (1993) could not observe any significant performance difference between US-
dominant and shared management JVs. 
The vast majority of SMEs retained research and development responsibility and could 
so avoid to disclose their firm-specific advantages. This was previously demanded by 
Reynolds (1984) and Daniels et al. (1985). The SMEs made it clear during negotiations 
that they did not want to give too much of their firm-specific knowledge away to their 
Chinese partners. For instance, UK-8 insisted to supply the special, chemical, 
component to its JV, whose secret formulation the SME was not prepared to disclose. 
The supply of this special component had become a major source of income for the 
SME and to disclose its formulation would have meant to threaten this. 
The SMEs also, as a trend, retained the production function and, in the majority of 
cases, also the finance function. This is in line with findings by Commerzbank (1995) 
where two thirds of the 45 German JV entrepreneurs in China were in charge of 
production. Osland and Cavusgil (1996) observed that the two shared-control JVs in 
their study where governmental bodies controlled production as part of five year plans, 
were the most dissatisfactory of all. 
It is known that the Chinese are traditionally bad in financial reporting procedures. On 
the other hand, western companies are experienced in forecasting and planning, for 
instance. Thus, it was important for the SMEs also to retain control over the finance 
function. The problems that UK-2 had when giving away the finance function to its 
Taiwanese partner are documented in chapter seven of this thesis. Also, UK-8's 
general management is in Chinese hands. Due to dissatisfactory performance of the 
finance function that rests with the general management, UK-8 planned to send an 
expatriate to help solve the problem. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs kept control over all the functions that were part of 
their expertise: research and development, production and finance. The SMEs, in the 
vast majority of cases, entered China to exploit their firm-specific advantages, their 
technologies in producing what the Chinese market needed. Thus, the firms 
considered it essential to control these functions. Further, since the SMEs intended to 
manufacture high quality products (for export markets and for the Chinese market), it 
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was also important for them to keep the production function in the JVs. Contrarily, in 
the case of UK-4-JV, the production function was given to the Chinese partner. 
However, UK-4 gave its approval to the JV that it could manufacture UK-4-standard 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES only after an engineer of UK-4 had trained staff on-site and 
examined the quality of the output. 
The distribution of responsibility with regard to the personnel function, is considerably 
unbalanced. A clear trend for both groups of SMEs cannot be recognised from the 
existing data. Whereas the UK SMEs are in charge of the human resources function in 
the majority of cases, in the Sino-German JVs responsibility relatively more frequently 
rests with the Chinese party. Compared with the findings in Osland and Cavusgil's 
(1996) study where the Chinese side perceived human resource management as very 
important and the parties thus agreed that control rests with the Chinese side, only the 
German SME JVs reveal a similar trend. Also Ireland (1991) and Woodward and Liu 
(1993) consider the Chinese side taking on responsibility of the human resources 
function as beneficial to the operation. On the other hand, authors, such as Hendryx 
(1986) and Tai (1988) stress to retain control of personnel management, thus 
supporting the attitudes of the UK SMEs in this study. 
The UK and German SMEs agree in the majority of cases that the marketing function 
should rest with the Chinese side, with the notable exception of UK-4. This SME 
markets the entire production of its JV in Europe. These results contradict previous 
findings by Daniels et al. (1985) and Osland and Cavusgil (1996). Also of the 45 
German firms with a JV in China in Commerzbank (1995) nearly two-thirds controlled 
marketing and sales. 
However, it became also evident from further research into the SMEs that in several 
cases, including UK-3, UK-8 and GER-0, the western managers had gradually taken 
on a share of the responsibility of the marketing and sales function. In the case of 
GER-0 the Chinese marketing staff was lacking the pro-active approach that was 
needed and relied too much on people they knew from somewhere. UK-3-JV's British 
general manager hits the point when he suggests that "the Chinese (customers) want 
to see the European manager." Conflict about the marketing in JVs was previously 
detected by Dong et al. (1993) in a study of Sino-Japanese, -US and -European JVs. 
As a trend, the bulk of UK and German SMEs had not experienced major problems in 
decision-making. Apparently, the SMEs in this study paid considerable attention to a 
decision-making that would not rest on one party's majority stake. 
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The JV law provides for board meetings to take place at least once a year (see 
Campbell, 1989). Contents of the board meetings are various issues regarding further 
investments, the future course of the JV, etc. It is thus essential for the SMEs to 
participate in these meetings. This means, however, travelling to China on a frequent 
basis and spending funds and management time. Osland and Cavusgil (1996) showed 
that board meetings are not always a matter of a day or so. In one of their, admittedly 
extreme, cases of Sino-foreign JVs a board meeting had lasted for 33 hours without a 
decision made. 
Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997) in their China direct investment guide for SMEs 
stressed that SMEs could appoint a so-called alternate director (a solicitor, 
representative of a chamber of commerce, etc.) who would participate in board 
meetings in China and look after the interests of the foreign SME. However, since the 
joint venturing in China in the vast majority of cases is 'chiefs business', the SME 
would not delegate this so important right to an outsider. 
In cases, BoD meetings take place both in China and in the home country. However, 
an SME director still has to travel to China and in the majority of cases this has to be 
more than once a year (see cases UK-3, UK-8, GER-0). 
The larger SME JVs have, on average, more directors on their BoDs than the smaller 
firms. With regard to the nomination of the chairman of the JV, there is no clear trend 
to be read from the data provided. As was the case with the analysis according to 
nationality, also when analysed according to firm size, it suggests that both groups of 
SMEs preferred to be in charge of research and development as well as of production. 
Further, both the smaller and the larger SMEs were keen to be in charge of the finance 
function. With regard to the marketing and personnel functions, the Chinese side was 
slightly more frequently in charge within the group of the smaller firms, whereas the 
control constellation was reversed within the group of the larger SMEs. 
Of the larger SMEs the majority had not experienced problems with decision-making, 
whereas within the group of the smaller SMEs a clear trend cannot be worked out. 
9.3.4 Joint venture management 
An important instrument of controlling the overall management of a JV is the 
appointment of the general manager. The JV law suggests that the general manager 
can be appointed by the Chinese or the foreign partner (chapter five, section 5.3.3). 
The UK and German SMEs in this study could appoint the general manager in five and 
four cases, respectively. As a trend, this suggests that general manager appointment 
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does not reflect equity and control (BoD) distribution in the SME JVs. Some JVs that 
were minority-owned by the UK and German SMEs had a general manager appointed 
by the foreign party. 
For instance, GER-0 that had the majority share in its JV insisted that a Chinese 
national would be in charge of the general management (see section 9.2.5). Certainly, 
its majority stake of 51 per cent gave GER-0 confidence in appointing a Chinese 
general manager and if there are arguments between the partners, "we can play out 
easily our 51 per cent." In the case of UK-4-JV where the UK SME held only one third 
of the equity, the appointment of the general manager was not an issue. The Chinese 
side was very keen to have its own general manager and the UK SME expressed no 
interest in expatriating staff because this had meant an extraordinary financial burden. 
This was different in the cases of UK-3 and UK-6. Although UK-3 had only 50 per cent 
of the equity in the JV, it insisted to appoint the general manager and would have 
withdrawn from its proposal even if the Chinese partner had agreed to it. UK-3's 
Chinese partner was not familiar with the industry and the business the JV would be 
operating in. Thus, UK-3 regarded it as essential to have a UK-3 manager on-site for 
the management of the JV. Without lengthy negotiations about this, the Chinese side 
accepted UK-3's demanding position since it knew that the UK SME's management 
input would be essential to the successful operation of the JV. 
Also, UK-6 that only had 48 per cent of the equity in its JV, was granted the right to 
appoint the general manager, though this was difficult. However, for the SME this was 
only possible since it did not have to expatriate UK staff to the JV, but could ask its 
Singaporean distributor to take on the post of general manager. This strategy, at first 
glance, should have proven beneficial since the UK SME had a Chinese element in its 
JV that would look after the UK SME's interests, but for much lower a cost than UK 
personnel would do. Indeed, the use of Overseas Chinese in the management of Sino-
foreign JVs is a strategy that saves resources of the SMEs. 
Whereas in the cases of the smaller SMEs the Chinese side appointed the general 
manager twice as often as the foreign side (six vs. three), for the larger SMEs the 
reverse applies (four vs. six). This contradicts the results in Campbell's (1989) study, 
where the general manager was frequently foreign and in some cases the majority of 
subordinate managers were foreigners also. 
To represent more effectively their interests, foreign investors expatriate employees to 
their JVs in China. Wu (1993) stressed the importance to afford an expatriate in a JV. 
As a trend, the UK and German SMEs expatriated only a relatively small number of 
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employees to their JVs. The maximum number of employees the UK SMEs could or 
would afford was two. Also five German SMEs had expatriated staff to their JVs in 
China and the maximum number was also two. This is in line with previous findings by 
Kaiser (1997c) where of the 25 German SMEs with a JV in China only eleven, and 
thus less than half, had expatriates on-site. 
This suggests that relatively more UK SMEs considered it essential to have an 
expatriate on-site who would look after their business interests, implement SME 
technology, etc. The expatriate jobs were considerably different. Whereas UK-3's 
expatriate was the JV's general manager, UK-8's expatriate supervised the installation 
of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS and had to report to the Chinese general 
manager. Also the German expatriate in GER-O-JVwas only a 'level two' manager who 
had no decision-making authority with regard to the overall business of the JV. 
The range of expatriate jobs was also wide in the case of the German SMEs studied 
by Kaiser (1997c). There, the managers were in positions, including general manager 
in seven cases, deputy general manager in three cases, deputy chairman (3), finance 
director (2), technical director (2) and general sales manager (1). Overall, however, the 
empirical findings of this study as well as the findings of Kaiser (1997c) show that the 
SMEs sent expatriates to look after the functions the SMEs had a firm-specific 
advantage in, technical matters, finance and also general management. From the 
cases of UK-3 and UK-8 the importance of having an expatriate manager on-site 
became evident. UK-2 that had, at the time of interviewing, no expatriate in China, 
considered it essential to have its own staff there. 
However, expatriating UK or German personnel to China means a considerable 
financial burden for an SME that ranged, in the case of the SMEs in this study, 
between US$62,400 (£40,000) and US$300,000 (£192,308) per year. Not only have 
the salaries of the expatriates to be increased and funds for travel, housing, relocation, 
children's education, etc. be provided. The SME needs also to replace the employee in 
its operation at home. In most cases, the expatriates are experienced and skilled 
employees for whom replacement is difficult to recruit. 
Although UK-7 felt that it was necessary to have its own staff on-site, it could not afford 
to send a UK engineer to the JV. On the other hand, the JV in that UK-7 held 
(eventually) 40 per cent of the equity, was not prepared to cover the cost of an 
expatriate. In this particular case, the ethnic Chinese opposition in the JV BoD 
(Chinese and Taiwanese) was too strong. 
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The actual financial burden which the SME has to bear on its own depends, amongst 
others, on how much the JV management is prepared to cover. Frequently, the foreign 
company covers the expatriate's salary and the premium on top of that. The costs that 
occur on-site (accommodation and subsistence, etc.) are paid by the JV. However, 
since the expatriate issue is a critical one at board meetings and provided the fact that 
the UK and German SMEs do not have, in the majority of cases, the majority in their 
JV's boards, it is difficult for the SMEs to negotiate with their Chinese partners to cover 
the costs of foreign expatriates. UK-2-JV and UK-7-JV serve as examples for that. 
Equally, the limited resources of SMEs are reflected in expatriate preparation for an 
overseas assignment in China. Although authors, including Tung (1982, 1986), Zamet 
and Bovarnick (1986) and Commerzbank (1995) demanded adequate expatriate 
preparation, as a trend the expatriates that were sent to China by the UK and German 
SMEs in this study, did not receive China-specific preparation in, for instance, cultural 
issues, language, etc. UK-3's expatriate had to insist on a several week-long language 
training, because the UK SME did not offer the training in the first place. This 
corresponds with the findings of Kaiser (1997c) were only one German SME offered its 
expatriate preparation. Four SMEs, however, indicated that their expatriate staff had 
worked in Asia before and two that their managers had studied in Asia for some time. 
Not surprisingly (with regard to the literature in chapter two), the larger SMEs had more 
than twice as often expatriated a manager or even more personnel to their JVs to 
China. On the other hand, the smaller firms sent personnel in three cases, and seven 
larger SMEs expatriated staff to China. 
9.4. Joint venture problems 
During the various phases of the JV process as discussed in this study (JV formation: 
planning, partner selection, negotiation, JV operation, ownership, control, 
management), the UK and German SMEs experienced a variety of problems. These 
problems were located, as can bee seen from the subsequent sections, both internal 
and external, though Killing (1983) argues that JV problems are located internally 
rather than externally. 
The Chinese partner's concept of quality was the most striking aspect of the JV activity 
for the SMEs. In many cases, so was feared by SMEs, such as UK-2 and UK-8, would 
insufficient product quality not only hamper the SMEs' efforts to service the domestic 
and, especially export, markets. It could also harm the SME's reputation. UK-7-JV, for 
instance, that was required to export as much as 30 per cent of its output, at the time 
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of the investigation, experienced problems with product quality. It could, thus, not meet 
its set export target. 
Apart from the quality problem, the SMEs also experienced problems with the 
repatriating of their profits. The Chinese JV law provides for the unrestricted 
repatriation of profits abroad. However, neither the UK nor the German case SMEs 
could provide meaningful comments on this problem that would have further advanced 
its understanding. 
The SMEs show discrepancy with regard to problems linked with the transfer of 
technology. Whereas the German SMEs considered the transfer of technology as 
relatively problematic, for the UK SMEs it was not. UK-6 made an interesting comment, 
stating that, although the Chinese engineers' standards are sufficiently high to 
understand the technology transferred, they would have problems in transforming 
theory to practice. The reverse constellation has been observed with the recruiting of 
personnel. Whereas this was highly important for the UK SMEs, it was only of less 
importance as a JV problem for the German SMEs. 
Rather important for both groups of SMEs appeared to be the problem of lacking 
motivation of Chinese personnel and the problem of communication with Chinese staff, 
the potential loss of control and a mismatch in management styles. Though these 
problems were felt to be of equal importance to both groups of SMEs, they were, 
absolutely, not too important to the SMEs. 
However, communication between the Chinese and the foreign sides was a major, and 
an important, problem in the case of UK-3. In this case the problem stemmed not only 
from the potential mutual misunderstanding between two different cultures, but also 
from inherent and developed distrust of the UK general manager towards his Chinese 
vice-general manager. Already earlier in the JV process, UK-3 had experienced 
considerable problems with its Chinese partner, including the valuation of 
contributions. 
The problem of a lack of control over the JV and firm-specific technology diluting into 
Chinese terrain was feared explicitly by SMEs, including GER-0, UK-2 and UK-7. The 
latter had trusted its Chinese partner, but "the Chinese company decided not to play 
fair any longer." 
The remaining problems on the list of JV problems were either relatively unimportant to 
the SMEs or showed major discrepancies in the perceptions of the two groups of 
SMEs. Local sourcing and insufficient training of Chinese managers, for instance, were 
perceived relatively important problems for the UK SMEs, whereas they were relatively 
unimportant for the German SMEs. 
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The economic importance and problems of local sourcing were discussed in studies, 
including Campbell (1989), Trommsdorff et al. (1994) and Schuchardt (1994) and so 
was the strong desire of the Chinese government to develop local suppliers. Various 
SMEs (UK-2, UK-6, GER-0) feared that, due to problems with the quality and 
availability of supplies, also in the future certain supplies would have to be sourced 
overseas. This increases the cost of manufacture in China and thus competitiveness. 
Similar applies to the problem with low productivity of the local labour: whereas the UK 
SMEs considered this problem as relatively important, it was highly unimportant for the 
German SMEs. The cases of UK-6 (chapter seven) and GER-0 (chapter eight) provide 
some insight into this particular problem for the China investors. However, UK-3 
praised the productivity of its JV's Chinese workforce, after training the staff and 
providing state-of-the-art welding equipment to them. UK-3 has criticised, however, the 
efficiency of the venture's administration staff. 
Problems, such as unfair competition, corruption and the potential of the JV damaging 
the SMEs' reputation were perceived as important by the German SMEs, whereas they 
were perceived as only relatively unimportant by the UK SMEs. 
The above results somehow contradict earlier findings by Gledhill (1994). He found 
more than 60 per cent of the UK firms having experienced problems in establishing 
effective distribution networks or in recruiting suitably qualified and experienced 
managers, in understanding the Chinese business culture and in communicating 
western concepts and concerns. Almost half of the respondents in Gledhill's (1994) 
study had problems with recruiting skilled workers. Less than a third of the firms had 
language problems. Conversely, Eiteman, Frankenstein and Ireland categorised the 
lack of language skills as a major obstacle to a smooth JV operation. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs perceived the importance of JV problems 
significantly similarly and so did the smaller and larger SMEs in this study. 
Considerable differences exist between the smaller and larger SMEs with regard to the 
recruiting of personnel that ranked very highly within the group of larger SMEs, but 
only considerably low within the group of smaller SMEs. Further, loss of control is more 
feared by the smaller SMEs. Infrastructure and restrictions on sales and imports are 
considered more important a problem by the smaller firms than by the larger ones. 
Overall, the size criterion distinguishes more between each two groups of SMEs than 
the criterion 'nationality'. 
9.5 Joint venture evaluation 
9.5.1 Joint venture performance 
SME joint venturing in China: does it make sense economically? Is it a viable strategy 
for UK and German SMEs entering the Chinese market? These are the imperative 
questions which need to be answered by this research. 
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Overall, the UK SMEs were satisfied with their JV performances in China and the 
German SMEs expressed medium satisfaction with the overall performance of their 
China enterprises. In this respect, the companies in this research confirm earlier 
reporting by authors, such as Davidson (1987), Campbell (1989) and Dong et al. 
(1993) on satisfactorily performing JVs in China. However, as shown in chapter six, 
there is also negative evidence with respect to JV performance. 
A closer look at the individual factors that constitute the SMEs' responses reveals that 
the SMEs were not satisfied with their JVs' royalty fee generation and export 
performance (only UK SMEs). With respect to the remaining individual performance 
criteria, including supply and management fees, return on investment (Rol), in 
comparison with competitors, local market share and growth, the SMEs showed 
medium satisfaction (although the UK SMEs expressed satisfaction with their JVs' 
overall performance). 
What has caused the SMEs' dissatisfaction with their JVs' export performance? Only a 
few UK and German SMEs entered the Chinese market to manufacture for export 
markets exclusively (UK-4: electronics, GER-6: textiles) or in addition to the Chinese 
domestic market (UK-3: mechanical engineering, GER-4: mechanical engineering, 
GER-8: electronics, GER-9: mechanical engineering). Although this contradicts 
findings by Stofan and Stultz (1992) as well as Delegation of Germany Industry and 
Commerce Hong Kong (1995) that German firms would produce for export markets, 
the empirical results in this study support findings of two recent studies by Wascher 
and Schmitt (1994) and Commerzbank (1995). In the latter study, none of the 48 
German companies engaged in the investment project for export reasons. 
Interestingly, the above SMEs that came to China with the intention to export, 
considered the export performance of their JVs satisfactory (UK-3, GER-6) or 
moderately satisfactory (UK-4, GER-4, GER-9). The other SMEs (exclusively UK) 
perceived the export performance of their JVs as unsatisfactory or not at all 
satisfactory even. The German non-exporting SMEs did not indicate their degree of 
satisfaction with export performance. 
In these latter cases the SMEs came to China without the intention of exporting, but 
had to agree to exporting quasi as the price that had to be paid to get JV approval. 
Daniels et al. (1985) from their study of eleven US manufacturing and service direct 
investors in China, found that none of the former exporters to China was required to 
export a fixed ratio of their output from China. The authors argue that the higher the 
technology of a company the more likely it might gain an initial opportunity to export to 
China and when forced to shift to local production, these firms are less likely to have to 
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export from China. Daniels et al.'s (1985) observation corresponds with the legal text: 
the Chinese JV law encourages Sino-foreign JVs to market their products outside 
China, unless they are needed in the country. 
in fact, JVs have been reported to be required to fix a minimum export ratio in the JV 
contract (Tai, 1988). It has been reported (Delegation of German Industry and 
Commerce Hong Kong, 1995) that if a JV exports at least 70 per cent of its output and 
thus earns a foreign exchange surplus in every year, it is granted a special status 
when being approved and, thus, additional privileges. In the meantime, though, this 
over-emphasis on export requirement has been softened. JVs are considered now, 
more than previously, as a means of import substitution (Kraus, 1989). 
Again, these latter enterprises were not committed to exporting and they ran into 
difficulties with fulfilling their determined export ratios. Exporting substantial volumes of 
their ventures' production to their own traditional export markets conflicted with the 
SMEs' market target strategies. GER-0 stressed this point: "We are not here to 
export." Further, even if agreed to export a fixed ratio of output, this has been difficult 
for many JVs (Kraus, 1989). Frequently the quality of the goods manufactured in Sino-
foreign JVs is not sufficient for export markets and foreign investors refuse to export 
the goods since this could damage the firms' reputation for high quality products. 
Although there is a trend amongst the SMEs that suggests overall satisfaction with JV 
performance, various SMEs indicated that it would be "too early" to make any 
meaningful and detailed comments on satisfaction. Some of the JVs were established 
only in 1995 or 1996. In many cases production was delayed by ongoing building 
works, especially with those JVs that started in a green-field site. Tang et al. (1992) 
detected considerably higher satisfaction ratings for equity JVs established before 
1983, compared with those established after that time. Dong et al. (1993) confirm this. 
Where managers could not evaluate the JV's financial performance, because the JV 
had not been in operation for long enough a period, other criteria were applied. In the 
case of UK-3-JV, for instance, that had been in operation only since May 1996, the 
general manager stressed that the JV had not done its homework with regard to 
establishing relationships. However, this is considered very important. And while he 
praised the quality standard the JV had achieved, he criticised its achievements in 
terms of productivity and administration efficiency, though, overall, "what we have 
achieved in the first months looks quite good." Both the general manager of the JV and 
the managing director of UK-3 allowed for time giving the new JV a chance to learn 
from its mistakes. Having the necessary patience, however, correlates with financial 
staying power. This, however, can cause trouble for many SMEs which lack the 
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necessary funds. Also UK-2-JV, UK-6-JV, UK-7-JV and UK-8-JV were behind their 
scheduled results for the year 1995. GER-O-JV, on the other hand, met its financial 
goals for the year. 
UK-8 managers also measured their satisfaction with the JV in China at the generation 
of business for headquarters. Since it had contractually agreed that all but one 
component can be sourced in China and that UK-8 would supply this special 
component, the UK SME generates a substantial income from that. Whereas, when 
UK-8-JV started its operation, these deliveries accounted for only approximately 5 per 
cent to the UK SME's total earnings, in 1998 UK-8 intended to supply approximately 
100 tonnes of the component to the JV - a similar amount as the SME uses in the UK. 
Also UK-7 fixed in the JV contract that it would sell a set amount of components to its 
JV. The managing director of UK-7 considered the JV as "one of our biggest 
customers." However, he was satisfied moderately with the JV's overall performance. 
Despite the modest success of the JVs, none of the 21 UK and German SMEs 
indicated that they would not again join forces with a Chinese company to operate a 
business in China. Two UK SMEs suggested that it was too early to answer this 
question and one UK and one German SME each were not sure. Five UK and seven 
German SMEs, however, were positive about it. One UK and four German SMEs did 
not answer this question, suggesting, implicitly, that it was too early for them to make a 
clear statement and that they rather need some more time before they can make an 
assessment. These SMEs seemed to be aware that investing in China requires 
patience - patience with the Chinese and with oneself when waiting for financial 
returns. Appropriately, Lane and Beamish (1990) emphasised that expectations of 
early or easy returns are early indicators of future problems. The SMEs in this study 
were prepared to let their JVs grow up first, before they started evaluating them. 
This empirical result corresponds with the findings in the study of German SME JVs in 
China (Kaiser, 1997c) where 23 out of 25 firms indicated that they would again engage 
in a JV in China. 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs did not display significant similarities with regard to 
their degrees of satisfaction with JV performance. With regard to firm size differences, 
the dissimilarities are more distinct. For instance, whereas the larger SMEs are most 
satisfied with their JVs' export performance, the smaller SMEs are nearly least 
satisfied with export performance and the situation is reversed with regard to local 
market share. Overall, the smaller firms are more satisfied with the performance of 
their JVs than are the larger SMEs. 
9.5.2 Fac tors for joint venture s u c c e s s 
What determines the SMEs' JVs' overall satisfactory performance? In an interview 
carried out in November 1996, Mr. Yang of the China-Britain Trade Group in Shanghai 
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summarised his views: "Conduct research, come to China, find a suitable partner and 
make the agreement work." 
For the SMEs in this study all of the pre-determined answers, including patience, 
sincerity, good business connections, good product, Chinese market adaptation, 
relationships with Chinese officials and familiarity with Chinese business practices, 
were considered as 'very important' or 'important' for JV performance. Unambiguously, 
the UK and German SMEs perceived patience and sincerity as 'very important'. 
Basically, the SMEs indicated the importance of two broad categories of factors for JV 
success. SME-inherent strengths in attributes and assets (patience, sincerity, good 
product, Chinese market adaptation, familiarity with Chinese business practices) and 
strengths that evolved from joining forces with a Chinese partner (good business 
connections, relationships with Chinese officials). SME-inherent strengths play a role 
more important than strengths which evolved through joint venturing. 
The importance of success factors such as patience and sincerity was also perceived 
by the New Zealand SMEs in Au and Enderwick's (1994). study. Also with regard to the 
other success factors that were important for the UK and German SMEs, Au and 
Enderwick's (1994) study shows distinct similarities (see chapter six, section 6.2.3). 
These findings also correspond with observations by Davidson (1987) who 
emphasised qualitative variables such as individual personalities as success factors of 
joint venturing US MNEs in China. For UK-2 that manufactures test equipment, the fact 
that the SME has moved on-site with service capabilities meant considerable orders 
for the firm. However, the managing director of UK-2 also suggested the need to be 
patient and "to give them support, service support and information." 
Overall, the UK and German SMEs did not show significant similarities with respect to 
attnbutes of JV success. However, inter-group correlation is stronger when the 
criterion firm size is applied. Whereas both the smaller and larger SMEs regard 
patience and sincerity as the most important attributes for JV success, their 
perceptions differ considerably with regard to the factor 'good business connections' 
and 'familiarity with Chinese business practices'. Whereas the former is more 
important to smaller SMEs, the latter is more to larger. Overall, the criterion 'nationality' 
distinguishes more strongly between each two groups of SMEs than firm size does. 
9.5.3 Joint venture as resource commitment relief 
The strengths that evolved through joining forces with a Chinese entity evolved 
exclusively from the Chinese partner's attributes, rather than its assets. For the SMEs 
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the Chinese partner's contribution of resources was only a medium relaxation or not a 
relaxation of the SMEs' critical internationalisation resources situation. Whereas the 
UK SMEs considered their Chinese partners' contributions towards their own 
managerial, finance and information needs as medium relaxing, the German SMEs 
regarded only the Chinese companies' information contribution as relaxing and 
management and financial contributions as not relaxing. In other words, the German 
SMEs were relatively more dissatisfied with their Chinese partners' contribution. As 
was established earlier in this chapter (section 9.2.2), the German SMEs expected 
more financial and managerial assistance from their potential Chinese partners than 
the UK SMEs did. Thus, the German SMEs were eventually more disappointed. 
As a trend, the smaller SMEs regard the JV strategy more as a strategy that eases the 
resource scarcities of SMEs than the larger ones. The smaller firms suggest that in 
terms of management and financial resource ease, the benefits from joint venturing are 
moderately, whereas the larger firms cannot see such an ease. Although with regard to 
information needs, the smaller firms appreciate the JV strategy more than the larger 
firms do. However, also they regard the provision of essential information by the JV 
strategy as moderately easing the scarce resource situation of SMEs. 
In conclusion, five of the nine UK SMEs would again engage in a JV, two suggested 
that it was too early to answer this question and one respondent was not sure. Of the 
German SMEs seven would again engage in a JV in China, one indicated that it did not 
know and four SMEs did not provide an answer to this question. There is no 
dissimilarity between the responses of the smaller and the larger SMEs. 
9.6 Conclusion 
The results of this study suggest that market seeker as well as resource seeker 
motivations are amongst the most important motivations of UK and German SMEs with 
a JV in China. However, the market seeker in the firm dominates the set of driving 
forces. It shows also that transaction related motivations such as transport costs, 
import duties, etc. are only of minor importance to the SMEs. Further, the main driving 
forces of the UK and German SMEs in this study are not different from the motivations 
that drive large MNEs to an FDi or JV activity, respectively. 
With regard to partner search, it has been found that SMEs employ strategies that are 
considerably resource saving. However, these 'shortcut' strategies are particularly 
dangerous since in many cases the evaluation of alternative partners falls short and 
also the evaluation of the easily found potential partners. When selecting a Chinese 
partner the SMEs paid attention to the Chinese enterprise's resource contributions. 
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This was expected and necessary, but being able to trust the later partner in a venture, 
its links to officials, product range etc. were perceived more important even by the 
SMEs. This confirms findings by Young et al. (1989) that considered the local partner's 
assets only marginally important, especially in LDCs, whereas the partner's knowledge 
of the local economy, of politics and culture are appreciated highly. 
The study found further that the negotiation contents and conflicting areas are not too 
different from what previous authors have suggested. The SMEs in this study had to 
make sure that their technology contribution was valued in a way that reflects the true 
value of their technology, since, in many cases technology is the main contribution of 
'cash-less' SMEs. On the other hand, the value of technology that is to be contributed 
to a JV must not exceed 50 per cent of the foreign partner's contribution or 20 per cent 
of the JV's total registered capital (Kay and Mann, 1995). For the reasons that were 
most important to the SMEs when choosing the location, availability of trained labour, 
infrastructure and proximity to target markets, the SMEs had to choose, in their 
majority, a location in the more developed areas of China, rather than in remote China. 
However, the SMEs' desire to also have access to cheap, apart from qualified labour, 
would suggest a remote area, rather than a coastal. Since the main motivation of the 
UK and German SMEs was, however, the development of the Chinese market and not 
solely cheap production in the country, the SMEs had to prefer the more developed 
coastal areas where they would be closer to their markets. 
Product and finance issues were amongst the most frequently negotiated issues of the 
UK and German SMEs in this study. However, the fact that issues were most 
frequently discussed does not necessarily mean that the discussion of these issues 
leads to successful negotiations. This study has shown this. 
By and large, the control distribution in the SME JVs corresponds with the findings by 
Dong et al. (1993). There, the foreign partners have much more control over areas 
such as product planning and quality control and a bit more over marketing, while the 
local partners have more control over labour policy. The findings are also in line with 
earlier observations by Kim (1996) who reveal that the internal variables are mostly 
controlled by the Chinese partner, except for production/operation and that labour 
management usually rests with the Chinese side. 
As factors of success the SMEs in this study confirm the findings of earlier studies on 
(New Zealand) SMEs as well as on large MNEs. The factors for JV success in China 
are similar for small and large MNEs; they revolve around company-inherent strengths. 
The provision of relevant information through the potential Chinese partner saved 
scarce managerial and financial resources. Apparently, this was welcomed by the 
SMEs that did not see the need to carry out, in addition, their own market research or 
commissioning studies to market research institutes. 
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Notes 
^ ECIP is the European Union's flagship investment financing programme. It has four facilities 
that offer organisations (facility one) and companies (primarily SMEs) (facilities two to four) 
financial assistance towards preparing and executing a direct investment project in an LDC. 
^ One partner sold its share to the other partners. 
^ The foreign equity stakes in Pan's (1997) research ranged from 10 to 99%. However, since the 
Chinese JV law of 1979 demands a foreign minimum equity share of 25%, this seems rather 
unlikely. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
10.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of this thesis summarises the key findings of the study and attempts 
to derive conclusions from those. The chapter presents implications for the underlying 
theory and for policy-making. It further offers a brief outlook into the future of FDI in 
China. Finally, the limitations of the study as well as the areas for further research are 
outlined. 
10.2 Summary of the results 
For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) alike, China Is a difficult terrain which is not for novices In International 
business (Teagarden and von Gllnow, 1990). However, successful market entry Is 
possible for SMEs, as the results of this study have shown. Although the SME 
interviewees were not able to present outstandingly positive financial results, none of 
them would not engage again in a joint venture (JV). After difficulties with getting their 
JVs off the ground, most of the managers of the UK and German SMEs predicted a 
promising future for their JVs In China. Accordingly, Kayser and Hauser (1993) argued 
that there is no single explanation of the correlation between profitability and firm size. 
Not only would the UK and German SMEs In this study again engage in a foreign direct 
investment (FDI) project In China. They would also again commit themselves to a JV 
with a Chinese partner. Although the SMEs experienced difficulties In their JV activity, 
in many cases a commitment without a local partner would not have been possible. In 
many cases, the attributes of the Chinese partner, not Its assets, were essential for the 
successful establishment and operation of a direct Investment project in the country. In 
this respect, the experiences of the SMEs are not too different from that of large MNEs 
that joint ventured in China. Also, the factors for being successful with an FDI project In 
China are similar for SMEs and large MNEs: they revolve around company-inherent 
strengths, rather than investment Incentives, provided by the home or host 
governments. 
The problems the UK and German SMEs faced when joint venturing in China include 
cultural misunderstandings, distrust, reporting problems, marketing difficulties, etc. 
Though essential, the assets and attributes of the Chinese partners were not always 
as resourceful as the SMEs had hoped prior to entering a JV. Although some sources 
praise the JV strategy for entering and developing the Chinese market (Delegation of 
Conclusions and recommendations 
German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1995), others report that the Chinese 
partner's access to potential customers and Its provision of marketing and distribution 
channels does often not exist to the extent the foreign partner had hoped It would 
(Vanhonacker, 1997). Further, Chinese partners were found unreliable and their 
contribution of local managerial talent was rather low. Having found that government 
networks are fine for taking orders but generally abysmal at actively selling products or 
meeting strict logistics standards, many foreign Investors are building their own sales 
force and distribution networks (Shaw and Meier, 1993). 
That expectations of foreign Investors are not met applies equally to large firms and 
SMEs as the literature shows (Shaw and Meier, 1993; Vanhonacker, 1997). 
Increasingly, thus, scholars articulate arguments that oppose the application of the JV 
as a market entry strategy, but favour the establishment of a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE) Instead. Whereas some authors critically shed light on the JV 
strategy (eg Kraus, 1989; Ding, 1993; Shaw and Meier, 1993; Weir, 1997), scholars 
also rigorously condemn the use of JVs (Glatter, 1996; Peerenboom, 1996; Economist, 
29.3.97, p.73; Nolting, 1997; Diem, 1997; Vanhonacker, 1997). The German periodical 
Manager Magazin (Nolting, 1997) regarded the decision to joint venture as a strategic 
failure even. 
According to the Manager Magazin, most of the new projects particularly from the 
'Mittelstand', are In the form of a WFOE. Also, the above-mentioned Fiducia study of 
98 European companies in China (chapter six, section 6.2.3) discovered that more 
than two thirds were choosing to Invest In a WFOE rather than a JV, If they had the 
chance again (FT, 16.2.98, p.2). Also, more than half of the German companies in the 
earlier Commerzbank study (1995) which had minority equity positions, would opt for a 
WFOE or at least a majority JV If they had the choice again to Invest In China. 
Apparently, the enthusiasm for SIno-foreIgn JVs has cooled down. 
Statements as the one by Beamish (1993, p.41) that "the overall use of equity JVs In 
China has been very high, particularly in relation to WFOEs," might soon be part of 
China's FDI history. Also Gledhill's (1994) finding from a study of 250 UK direct 
Investors, that investments through WFOEs are less common, will soon be dated. In 
fact, the past decade has seen an evolution In the thinking of the Chinese government 
from requiring JVs to permitting WFOEs, to encouraging such entities. At the end of 
1996, 76.1 per cent of all FDI projects were JVs, less compared with the figure at the 
end of 1994 (Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). For 1997, the Economist (29.3.97, p.73) 
suggests that "30 per cent of foreign-funded enterprises In China are wholly forelgn-
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owned" and Vanhonacker (1997, p.131) anticipates that "half of all foreign investments 
in China will be WFOEs by the year 2000." 
The motivations of the UK and German SMEs to engage in production in China are 
similar to those of large MNEs and of other SMEs in previous studies. The SMEs are, 
first and foremost, market seekers and, secondly, resource (cheap labour) seekers. 
Transaction-related motivations such as transportation costs, import duties, etc. are 
only of minor importance to these SMEs. 
The similarity of these findings with findings on large MNE investors in China and also 
other SME investors in previous studies confirms Grimm's (1997c) argument from his 
analysis of 35 German SMEs with a JV or a WFOE in China, respectively. He insists 
that SMEs and large MNEs are not different in their FDI activity in China. This is 
correct only partly, however. The data he had access to, was not comprehensive 
enough as to look deeper into the areas where SMEs could experience size-related 
problems and disadvantages. For instance, the planning process of an SME project is 
characterised by a lack of market research and a formalised planning procedure, a 
'gut'-approach and a high reliability on information provided by the Chinese partner. All 
these strategies save financial resources and managerial capacity and are thus 
employed by SMEs. Only GER-0 which is larger than the other enterprises in this study 
had carried out an extensive and professional planning process of its JV in China. 
There, the size-related difference between smaller and larger firms was clearly 
detected - in correspondence with the literature in chapter two of this thesis. 
The disadvantageous resource fitting of smaller firms manifests itself during the entire 
JV formation stage and becomes transparent also in the JV operation phase. 
Partner selection, when selecting a Chinese partner, many SMEs in this study did not 
evaluate other potential partners, but decided to joint venture with just the partner who 
they had made contact with in the first place. Moreover, several of the SMEs in this 
study have been approached by a Chinese company and would not have pro-actively 
explored the opportunities of investing in the country. This passive attitude of the 
SMEs with respect to finding a local partner helped the SMEs save resources. Thus, 
the initiatives of the Chinese companies were welcomed by the foreign firms. However, 
such shortcut strategies are particularly dangerous since in many cases not only the 
evaluation of alternative partners falls short, but also the assessment of the easily 
found potential partners. Buckley et al. (1988) highlight the danger of following the 
proposal of a foreign company or a customer, without being driven from inside the 
company and determined independently to engage in an investment project. 
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Negotiation: when negotiating their JVs, the SMEs revealed that they were In a 
disadvantageous position compared with larger enterprises. Often, the SMEs' 
bargaining power necessary to demand a certain equity share In a JV or to insist on a 
certain value of assets or attributes contributed, was not strong enough. For Instance, 
various SMEs In this study originally wanted a majority share In the JV, but could not 
realise this since the Chinese partner's opposition was too strong. Presumably, thus, 
the JV process of SMEs Is more often characterised by compromises than in the case 
of large MNEs. On the other hand, the ability and willingness to compromise can 
become an Important attribute in the subsequent JV operation. Large MNEs which can 
too easily play out their financial weight and, therefore, the equity share in a JV, might 
more often urge the Chinese partner to build up a hostile attitude against the foreign 
company. Too often, the equity majority Is emphasised, rather than an attempt 
undertaken to jointly find a solution to arising conflicts. SMEs, on the other hand, have 
to learn how to co-exist next to their Chinese JV partners at an early stage already. 
Contributions: the SMEs regarded it as necessary that their Chinese partners bring In 
asset-resources. However, being able to trust the partner, its links to officials, the 
compatibility of Its product range, etc. were perceived considerably more important by 
the UK and German SMEs than physical assets, such as cash and machinery. This 
confirms findings by Young et al. (1989) considering the local partner's assets only 
marginally important, especially in LDCs, whereas the partner's knowledge of the local 
economy, of politics and culture are appreciated highly by foreign companies. 
With respect to the evaluation of the foreign partner's contributions, especially SMEs 
have to rely too often on the 'gbodwiH' of the Chinese party. For SMEs, the contributed 
cash or machinery is relatively more valuable than for large MNEs. In many cases 
technology is the main contribution of 'cash-poor' SMEs. Thus, to get a good 
evaluation deal out of the negotiations, Is more Important for SMEs than for large 
MNEs. The SMEs In this study had to make sure their technology contribution was 
valued in a way that reflects the true value of their technology. 
Choice of location: the study also found that for the reasons that were most Important 
for the SMEs when choosing the location (le availability of trained labour, Infrastructure 
and proximity to target markets), the majority of UK and German firms had to choose a 
location In the more developed areas of China, rather than In remote China. However, 
the SMEs' desire to have access to cheap, apart from qualified labour, suggests a 
location in China's hinterland, rather than East coastal areas. Since the main 
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motivation of the UK and German SMEs was the development of the Chinese market, 
the choice had to be China's coastal areas. 
Ownership: size-related peculiarities of the UK and German SMEs' JVs in China 
became also evident in the operation phase. For instance, the majority of the SMEs in 
this study had only minority equity shareholdings. The empirical results clearly 
suggested that, with increasing firm size, the likelihood of having a majority stake 
increases, too. Had the UK and German companies been larger, they would have had 
a greater chance of getting a majority equity stake in their JVs, ceteris paribus. 
Control: nevertheless, the majority of the SMEs control the company functions that are 
controlled also by large MNEs in JVs in China. Independent of firm size, the SMEs 
insisted on the control of research and development, or production in many cases, and 
finance. On the other hand, they let the Chinese side control the marketing and human 
resources functions. The SMEs expected that there the Chinese partner would bring in 
its expertise. However, the results of this study show that, especially the marketing 
function is increasingly carried out by the foreign firm. This is because the Chinese 
partners performed not satisfactorily. 
Management with regard to the management of the JV, the size-related disadvantage 
of SMEs with respect to managerial capacity becomes very clear. Too often, the SMEs 
did not have sufficient financial and managerial resources to, for instance, expatriate a 
manager to the JV. Too often, the SMEs had to rely on the management input of their 
Chinese partners, which was, as in the areas of marketing and finance, not as 
satisfactory as the SMEs hoped. 
Overall, whereas differences with respect to nationality could not be explained in many 
cases, differences with respect to firm size were in most cases more obvious: the 
smaller SMEs had not sufficiently large finance and management resources necessary 
for the straightforward execution of an FDI project in China. 
10.3 Implications of the research 
The results of this study have implications for both, the theory and for practical policy-
making. For this, this study confirms the applicability of Dunning's eclectic theory of 
international production in the context of SME FDI in China. This is a novum in 
international market entry research which has, so far, predominantly dealt with 
Buckley's SME theories, rather than a holistic approach, such as Dunning's. The SMEs 
that go to China to form a JV have ownership-specific advantages (O) in the form of 
niche market production technology. China, on the other hand, offers the necessary 
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location-specific advantages (L) to attract foreign investors, Including a vast potential 
market and low wages, a relatively stable political climate, proximity to raw materials 
and preferential treatment of foreign investment (Chen, 1983). Not without a reason, 
Wu (1993) reported China's above-the-average rate of inward Investment. Still today, 
China receives about 50 per cent of all the FDI that flows to the developing world. 
The UK and German SMEs were. In the main, not attracted by the availability of raw 
materials or the prospect of preferential treatment or other Investment Incentives, such 
as tax and import duty reductions, or exemptions. Instead, the potential of the Chinese 
market and the availability of cheap labour were the outstanding motivations for FDI 
activity of the SMEs. The cheap labour and production cost argument also explains 
why UK and German firms sometimes shift their entire production lines to China. 
Companies locate overseas where they can manufacture more cost competitively than 
at their traditional locations. Germany's identity crisis as a manufacturing location Is 
known: wages and social costs are high and administrative barriers with respect to 
investment are restrictive. 
Without China's vast potential market, many of the companies would possibly have 
located In neighbouring countries of East and Southeast Asia that permit a more cost 
competitive production than China. Already In the late 1980s, Kraus (1989) suggested 
that China had lost Its comparative cost advantage. 
Finally, the (O) advantages of the SMEs are in many cases best exploited by the firms 
themselves, rather than by using the imperfect mechanism of the market (I). The case 
of GER-0 clearly shows this: after an initial licensing agreement with a Chinese 
customer for approximately ten years, the German SME decided to set up a 
manufacturing site, rather than further licensing Its technology to a Chinese enterprise 
which would then produce MECHANICAL COMPONENTS and perhaps service GER-
O's customer, KMP. In this particular case, transaction costs would have been too high 
for the German firm. UK-3 and UK-8 could have licensed their technologies to a 
Chinese company, too, without establishing a presence in the foreign market. 
However, again for reasons of high transaction costs (of making the deal through the 
market mechanism) the UK SMEs decided not to do this. UK-4 Is an exception: its JV 
is more of a hidden contract manufacturing deal, rather than a genuine JV. 
The valuation problem of foreign and Chinese contributions has been highlighted in 
this study. Thus, to agree a price that meets the expectations of both the Chinese and 
the UK or German sides, respectively, in the case of a technology licensing 
agreement, could become a difficult matter. In the case of niche product technologies 
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which often do not have a market price, this would have become even more 
complicated. Also, Chinese companies could copy the technology of the SMEs. The 
fear of the UK and German firms that their Chinese partners could do exactly this, has 
been revealed in this study. This fear is not misplaced since to date, there is no 
capable legal system in China that would prevent Chinese companies from copying 
foreign intellectual property (see Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997, chapter 14). 
With regard to the implications for practical policy-making, UNCTAD (1993) has 
suggested that SMEs will play an important role in the development and industrial 
upgrading of the (Chinese) economy. Certain manufacturing industries in developed 
countries are dominated by SMEs and it is, therefore, obvious that, if less developed 
countries (LDCs) are to obtain the needed resources to develop these industries, the 
only sources (at least at the firm-level) are SMEs.^ UNCTAD (1993) suggests that 
affiliates of SMEs seem to contribute to host economies by producing more value 
added per unit of input than affiliates of large firms and indigenous firms. They also 
make efforts to adapt their technologies to local conditions. At the national level, SMEs 
employ more labour per unit of capital than larger firms, undertake formal technical 
training (other than on-the-job training) more frequently than affiliates of large MNEs, 
and are more likely to export than those of large MNEs. Thus, SMEs are more likely to 
see China as export bases for their products than large firms. However, the empirical 
results in this study have emphasised the heavy domestic market orientation of the UK 
and German SMEs. Finally, host countries, such as China consider SMEs unlikely to 
become too powerful. 
Many specialist SMEs will independently service market niches whereas others will 
help develop a component industry that provides large MNE manufacturers with high 
quality and reliable supplies. This study has reviewed both types of SMEs. Whereas 
the majority of SMEs in this study entered the Chinese market independently, GER-0 
was pulled to China by existing opportunities, such as the move of one of its traditional 
customers to China. Following this strategy reduces the business risk since there 
would be a secure customer which would demand a certain share of GER-O-JV's 
output. Volkswagen of Germany and (ex-) Chrysler of the US have actively 
encouraged their traditional suppliers to form JVs with local Chinese companies and so 
supply the car manufacturers with reliable components for their vehicle production 
(Posth, 1987; Aiello, 1991). However, whereas some authors (eg Wu, 1993) believe in 
the rise of foreign (SME) investments in China with successful experiences, others (eg 
Mr. Yang of CBTG) predict that there will be no remarkable rise of (British) SME FDI in 
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China, due to Insufficient internal resources to support their China business In the long 
and medium-term (see also Anyansi-Archibong, 1989 and Duffy, 1995). 
As was outlined above, entering foreign markets Is a difficult task for SMEs since they 
lack financial, managerial and Information resources. On a general level, ambivalent 
opinions exist. Whereas Edmunds and Khoury (1986), Walker (1994), Dowson (1995)^ 
and DTI (1995) argue that government initiatives need to target SMEs more effectively, 
Berger and Uhlmann (1984) as well as Lloyd (1994) suggest that the existing 
government support mechanisms are sufficient to utilise the business potential for 
SME FDI. However, Berger and Uhlmann (1984) also content that governmental FDI 
support Is perceived more Important by SMEs than by large firms. Berger and 
Uhlmann's (1984) study Is based on the perceptions and experiences of managers 
Interviewed In 1983. Since then, however, market conditions have changed, 
competitive pressures have Increased and cost positions In Germany have weakened 
the competitive advantage of these firms. Thus, the attitudes of German investors 
might have changed since then.^ 
Some authors (Buckley, 1979; Dowson, 1995) point out that SMEs frequently display a 
disturbed relationship with government support mechanisms. In the simplest case, they 
are not aware of the efforts the government is undertaking (Dowson, 1995). More 
seriously, SMEs are suspicious of getting Involved with governments. Buckley (1979) 
suggests that this has often prevented SMEs from taking advantage of subsidies 
provided by governments. In detail, Buckley (1979) suggests that over a third of all UK 
outward Investors did not even investigate the Incentives provided. Also UNCTAD 
(1993) suggests that transnational SMEs seem to derive few advantages from 
government assistance. The findings of Kaiser and KIrby's (1996) study of SMEs In 
Northeast England confirm this. 
The UK and German SMEs In this study have, in the large, not used assistance 
provided by their respective governments. They have not exploited to a great extent 
the Information sources they would have needed when planning their JVs as well as for 
finding and assessing their potential partners. The SMEs have also not used finance 
schemes that would have helped them finance their operations in China. 
However, as the results of this study show, too, these means of assistance would have 
contributed positively to the joint venturing of the UK and German SMEs. Therefore, 
means of government assistance need to be directed to the following areas. 
Planning: the study has shown that the SMEs have frequently taken shortcuts when 
planning their JV project In China. This was to save limited resources. In cases the 
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necessary resources are not even available in the SMEs. In the initial phase of the JV 
activity, quick and unrestricted access to information is essential. Often, this is a major 
problem for SMEs that frequently have difficulties to get the whole process of collecting 
and sifting information started. SMEs need access to sources that offer information 
free of charge, access to databases with information on individual sectors and Chinese 
companies. Although this type of information will be, in most cases, very general, it can 
be a good starting point from where to formulate more specific queries. 
A good starting point are institutions in the home country, including the chambers of 
commerce. From those the SME can obtain free leaflets and ask for an initial 
discussion with a member of staff. As a result, a basic understanding of the alien 
market place China can be achieved. Further, financial institutions are able to provide 
Information on China, especially when they already have a branch or a representative 
office on-site. Also, so-called China-clubs or the like or universities from time to time 
organise China days where 'China hands' report their experiences with doing business 
with, and in, China. SMEs need access to all these sources of (free) information. 
In the UK, the department of trade and industry operates a so-called China desk from 
which basic information on the Chinese economy can be requested for study. An 
equivalent organisation in Germany is the government-funded BfAI. However, whereas 
DTI information is provided to interested parties free of charge, BfAI materials are for 
sale. An interesting and valuable address for SMEs in the UK is the China-Britain 
Trade Group, based in London, with an office in Glasgow and five offices in China. 
Finally, various Chinese organisations with offices in the UK and Germany provide 
initial information or even help find a partner for a co-operation project. 
In a further step, UK and German investors need to approach their embassies and 
consulates in China. They have, in their commercial sections, people working who can 
help with the provision of information or information in an interview, for instance. 
Further, the British Consulate General in Shanghai carries out databank searches 
(China-on-disk™) and is able to release the information requested within 24 hours -
for a fee. Once in China, the interested SME executive can carry out this computer 
search himself in the offices of the consulate, free of charge. Although the personal 
interview with staff from the embassies or consulates is valuable, own experience has 
shown that the printed material available at these institutions is not too valuable. For 
UK SMEs a further address are the offices of the British Chamber of Commerce, 
whereas German SMEs contact the Delegates of German Industry and Commerce in 
Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Finally, the offices of the China-Britain Trade Group 
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In China should be contacted and even membership with this organisation can prove 
beneficial since many services, such as the provision pf office space in China, are so 
available at more favourable conditions. 
If more specific information Is needed, the above listed Institutions can be asked to 
carry out database searches or to commission a market research project to a local, 
often a Chinese, market research agency. For this specific Information, the SMEs have 
to make funds available. Alternatively, the SME can directly ask a market research 
company or management consultancy either in the UK or Germany, respectively, or In 
China to collect and process market data or to prepare the entire market entry of the 
SME. Meanwhile many of the big consultancies and also smaller, less-known, 
consulting firms have offices In China, at least in the major cities, such as Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. In many cases, the legal advice of a law firm Is a 
worthwhile Investment. 
SMEs must be made aware of the financial support available to commission market 
research projects. The chambers of commerce can offer an overview of the financing 
schemes available to SMEs. After an evaluation, according to the special needs of the 
individual company, the SME can apply to the various schemes. In many cases, SMEs 
are not aware of these and if, often, they perceive them as bureaucratic or not suitable. 
The European ECIP support is one example. Although the scheme offers SMEs (and 
large firms) financial support for carrying out a market study, for Instance, Europe 
wants to see a lot of paper work. For many SMEs It Is, thus, not attractive. 
Partner selection: also with respect to partner selection, SMEs are well advised to 
consult the above sources. From databases with potential Chinese companies, the 
above Institutions can offer initial assistance to select a shortlist from a variety of 
potential partners for a JV, for Instance. Also, If one source does not produce a 
sufficiently large number of firms from which a smaller number of enterprises can be 
shortlisted, another source should be consulted. 
Negotiation: SMEs are advised to allow sufficient time, management resources and 
funds. This is to avoid to be forced to agree to a deal without proper evaluation or with 
which the SME Is not happy. Often, the Chinese party knows when a foreign investor Is 
under pressure (time and finance-wise). This makes it easier for the Chinese company 
to push through deals that are only sub-optimal for the foreign company. GER-O was 
prepared to withdraw completely from Its proposal to joint venture in case the Chinese 
party had not been prepared to agree to Its terms. For many SMEs, however, the 
ability to 'ignore' sunk costs Is a luxury which they cannot afford. 
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Further, the SMEs that face a size-related disadvantage with respect to bargaining 
power are advised to build up a sufficiently large amount of knowledge about the 
Chinese market, its economy and legal system prior to entering into negotiations. This 
helps avoid that the SME is being manoeuvred into a position where it is difficult to 
negotiate beneficial deals with respect to equity shares, JV durations, JV asset 
evaluations, etc. 
Host governments have to understand the importance of SME investment in their 
economies. Special tax treatments or special conditions when setting up an SME FDI 
project could ease the efforts of SMEs in engaging in FDI. So far, the Chinese 
government has not reacted to what researchers at MOFTEC have demanded 
recently, namely to offer SMEs such special treatment. Further, host governments, 
such as China, could help SMEs to a greater extent in finding a potential partner, 
though this strategy is dangerous (see chapter nine). 
10.4 An outlook into the future of FDI in China 
For a long period, academics and business people alike have debated on the future of 
FDI in China (Wu, 1982; Daniels et al., 1985; Simon, 1990; Aiello, 1991; Zander and 
Richter, 1992). It is not only what Grub and Lin (1991) pointed out, namely that 
investing in an LDC assumes a greater degree of country risk than investing in a 
developed country. It is also that China has its own tradition of not being a stable 
destination of FDI (Daniels et al., 1985). Political uncertainty has been a major concern 
of foreign investors in China. This has been shown by Davidson and McFetridge 
(1985), Frankenstein (1986), Tai (1988), Thiess (1994), Gledhill (1994) and 
Geissbauer(1994). 
Arguments can be found for both go-aheads of China's FDI policy. There are 
arguments which consider China's opening up as a strategy to obtain western 
technology. When this is achieved, China would retrieve to its ideological autarky with 
a 'socialist transformation' following, similar to what happened to Soviet investment 
projects in the 1950s (Klenner, 1986; Kraus, 1989). 
On the other hand, there is increasing evidence from the literature that China's 
transition from a planned to a 'market' economy also reflects prospects for a 
continuation of its new policies towards a China open to foreign trade and investment 
and for the stability of the country's leadership (Phillips, 1985). 90 per cent of the UK 
respondents in the study of Woodward and Liu (1993) believed in political stability or at 
least thought there is no instability. 90 per cent of the German investors in the study of 
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the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong (1995) regarded the 
Investment climate in China as favourable or very favourable, even. 
Since the death of Deng Xiaoping early In 1997, most of the doubts have been 
removed from the minds of foreign Investors and with Zhu Rongji becoming China's 
new prime minister, the country's position as a stable destination for FDI has been 
reinforced. Equally, president Jiang Zemin, the strong man of China's government, has 
repeatedly expressed his determination to a continuation of his reform course 
(Wascher, 1992; Shaw and Meier, 1993; SBFD, October 1995, p.69). This becomes 
evident In China's determination of joining WTO which requires the country to make 
concessions to foreign trade and FDI as part of the entry requirements. On the other 
hand, China's WTO entry also means an equal treatment of foreign and domestic 
companies and changes In tax and tariff Incentive will represent a big handicap to 
foreign investors (FT, 27.6.96, p.4). Copyright and patent Infringement remains an 
Issue of major concern of foreign investors in China and although China has declared 
its commitment to combat such (after the Immanent trade war between China and the 
US in 1995), It remains open to what extent this was Chinese lip service." 
10.5 Limitations of the study - areas for further research 
Though the study has documented the joint venturing of UK and German SMEs in 
China, It has limitations that need to be addressed in future research. Due to the lack 
of a comprehensive database containing Sino-foreign Investment projects undertaken 
by foreign SMEs, a systematic, cross-Industry sample building was not impossible. 
Instead, the sample In this research was rather a convenience sample. The number of 
research objectives was too small as to be choosy of which companies to include in 
the sample. The results presented in this study are not representative of the population 
of UK and German SMEs with an FDI project In China. Subsequent research needs to 
attempt to develop Industry and also regional patterns of SME FDI In China. 
Further, various JVs In this study were rather recent. This made an evaluation along 
the classical criteria difficult or impossible at all. Also, Including JVs of considerably 
different ages in a sample makes comparison difficult. In future research projects, JVs 
of about the same age should be examined, thus. Especially In China, so Is suggested, 
JV projects need a certain amount of time before they start generating financial results. 
A further methodological shortcoming of the study is that, although the UK SMEs were 
Interviewed after surveying them, the German SMEs were not (apart from GER-O). 
This was due to financial constraints the researcher was confronted with. This 
suggests that of the German SMEs which participated in this study, the amount of 
290 
Conclusions and recommendations 
information is not as rich as in the case of the UK SMEs. Future research projects 
should address this aspect, too. 
Finally, this research project has commenced in autumn 1994. The data used in the 
study were collected in the course of the year 1996. At the time of submission of this 
study, it is autumn 1998. This suggests that most of the data is dated already, 
especially since the pace of change in China is very fast. New regulations towards FDI 
have been put in place in the meantime and others will follow, induced by China's 
proposed entry to WTO, that demands an equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
companies. Thus, today's conclusions might be faced with challenge tomorrow. For 
this reason, this study can only pave the way for further research. 
Future research needs, in particular, address the questions of how attractive JVs 
remain over the next years and whether the WFOE as a market entry strategy is viable 
also for SMEs, as the recent literature speculates. 
Research also needs to be carried out into ways how home governments can assist 
their SMEs In establishing a market presence in China and to successfully defending it 
against increasing competition in the Chinese market place. There are initial efforts 
undertaken by UK and German bodies. However, they need to be concerted resulting 
in more focussed support. 
Important is also to address the issue of SME JV dissolution. Though this research has 
not addressed this issue, too, it can provide insight into the actual problems of SME 
joint venturing. It can also contribute to the avoidance of such problems in future 
projects to be undertaken by UK and German SMEs. 
Finally, and this is criticism directed towards the community of researchers and 
practitioners alike: sometimes, both species collaborate, in, perhaps, government-
funded projects, and can so learn from each other. In many other cases, however, the 
direct interface between researchers and entrepreneurs is only little. Researchers do 
not understand the problems of SMEs and, on the other hand, SME entrepreneurs do 
not have access to the knowledge base of researchers which could contribute to the 
success of an investment project in China. Researchers must no longer keep their 
writings to themselves. They must leave their ivory tower, at least for a while, and 
make their findings available to entrepreneurs. On the other hand, entrepreneurs must 
become more open towards the role which researchers can play in their own market 
entry process. The perception, at current, is rather opposite. This is the experience of 
the author of this study. In many cases, when a company agreed to participate in a 
research project, it was felt by the SME that it was doing the researcher a favour. An 
experience which the author of this study made was, thus, rather motivating: one of the 
SME entrepreneurs with whom the researcher had carried out various interviews, 
asked for a meeting and presented his ideas of forming a consultancy that would help 
SMEs successfully enter the Chinese market. 
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Notes 
^ In the general context, scholars have suggested various occasions where SMEs can benefit 
from their smallness, including the establishment of overseas market niches (Buckley 1979, 
1997; Porter, 1980; Berger and Uhlmann, 1984; Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Modiano and 
Ni-Chionna, 1986; Kerr, 1989; Simon, 1992, 1996; Schmidt et al., 1995; Eden et al., 1997; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Kohn, 1997). 
^ Dowes (1995), in an appendix of his MBA dissertation, provides a precious enumeration of 
support tools for trading abroad which is available to UK companies. 
^ A recent Lloyds Bank study (1996), carried out in November and December 1995, 
attempted to examine the role that the German government, banks and support agencies 
play in the development and growth of SMEs in order to see what can be best learnt and then 
applied in the UK. However, since the study was particularly concerned with start-ups on a 
national basis, rather than support mechanisms on an international scale, its empirical value 
for the current investigation is limited. Although there are over 800 support schemes available 
in Germany that are channelled through the KfW (Lloyds Bank, 1996) there are only few 
available to SMEs (see Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). 
" As a demonstration of good faith, China had closed seven pirate factories including the two 
most notorious plants - the Shenfei Laser and Optical System Co and Zhuhai Audio-video 
publishing house. China was also given credit for destroying some two million pirate items 
since early 1995 as part of its attempt to demonstrate a commitment to the enforcement of its 
own regulations against copyright violations (FT, 27.2.95, p.5). 
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Appendix I 
Defining SMEs 
The exercise of developing a concept of SMEs has proven anything but easy (Barrow, 
1993; DTI, 1995; Ali and Swiercz, 1991). Kimberley (1976) found that, as criteria, 
authors employ either the scale of operations or the scope of organisation and 
responsibi l i t ies. Also, both quantitative and qualitative definitions are employed, 
making compar ison difficult (Brooksbank, 1991).^ Even if, uniformly, quantitative 
criteria are used, some (eg Bhatty, 1981) applied two criteria, ie sales turnover and 
number of employees, whereas others (Piercy, 1983; Modiano and Ni-Chionna, 1986; 
Stanworth and Gray, 1991) employed only one criterion. Also, the application of a 
single quantitat ive criterion does not necessahly permit the comparison of different 
businesses since, frequently, margins between small , medium and large are drawn 
differently.^ Further, the criterion 'sales turnover' is subject to adjustment on a regular 
basis due to its exposure to inflation.^ And what about the criterion 'number of 
employees ' in an age of growing technologicalisation at work where a business with 
few employees can turn over as much as a large business in a different industry or 
some years ago? Also the qualitative concept is subject to change because the 
independent decis ion-making is modif ied, for instance, by the expansion of franchising 
as a new type of being self-employed (Kayser and Hauser, 1993). 
A graver problem is that the literature frequently uses the terms 'small business' and 
'SME ' interchangeably (eg Stratos, 1990; Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Lloyd, 1994) and 
Kaynak et al. (1987) insist even that it is possible to use one for a proxy of the other 
since smal l and medium firms are very similar in their export behaviour. Again others 
(Stanworth and Gray, 1991 ; Storey, 1994; Buckley, 1993) do not consider a clear 
terminology as important. Instead, they suggest that definitions are "not right or wrong, 
just more or less useful." This coincides with Brooksbank's (1991) observation that 
f igures are chosen on the basis of convenience, personal judgement or conventional 
wisdom. ' ' Gibb (1996) even used a rather philosophical approach in addressing the 
quest ion of what is "a small business?" He proposed that "small business is a way of 
life" and "for those who run small businesses it is an extension of themselves and of 
the family" ]...[ "it is a key determinant of social life to a degree that being an employee 
or manager of a large company rarely demands" ]...[ "it is a style of life, a form of 
en joyment , and occasionally of masochism." 
Appendix 1 
Whereas the majority of authors draw their line of demarcat ion at 500 employees, 
Samuels et al. (1992) introduced a 200 employee - margin, but did not provide further 
specif icat ions on that. Kumar and Neyer's (1992) definition of SME embraces 1,000 
employees even. Kohn (1997) in a recent study exploring the strategies of US SMEs 
with FDI def ines companies with ten to 499 employees as small and those with 500 to 
1,999 employees as medium-sized. 
Also, the institutional opinion about SME definitions is divided, including Bolton's 
(HMSO, 1971), Wi lson's (HMSO, 1979), Macmil lan's (HMSO, 1931) and that of the UK 
Company Act (Thomas, 1988).^ 
The German equivalent of the Anglo-Amer ican/Romanic area term 'SME' is 
'Mit telstand' company. Berger and Uhlmann (1984), the German Small Business 
Research Institute (Kayser and Hauser, 1993), Parnell (1993) and Smith (1997) 
specif ied companies with up to 499 employees® and 500 employees, ' respectively as 
SMEs. 'Mit telstand' actually refers to the concept of medium-sized, rather than small-
s ized. However, S imon (1996) insists that 'Mittelstand' encompasses all SMEs. 
Braun (1982, p.117) in his study of SME FDI in LDCs moves the upper margin of 
medium-s ized companies to 1,000 employees and refers to enterprises with 1,000 to 
5,000 employees as medium-large and to those with more than 5,000 employees as 
large companies. Equally, Simon (1992, 1996) employed a rather extraordinary 
definit ion of 'Mittelstand': he identified a representative German midsize company 
having a turnover of approximately DM525m and employing 2,900 staff. Simon's 
margins, however, far exceed the customary criteria for defining SMEs employed by 
the governments of, for instance, the UK and Germany. 
As is the case in the UK, the different institutional SME definitions in Germany vary, in 
places, considerably, with turnover margins ranging f rom DM 100m and D M I b n (KfW 
programme) to DM30m and DM300m ('Establishments and technology transfer by 
SMEs to LDCs' programme) to DM200m (R&D support programme).^ As is known from 
the UK S M E sector, the German definition of SME knows quantitative as well as 
quali tat ive criteria (Kayser and Hauser, 1993; German Federation of Small Business, 
no date given), making thus the definition flexible. Many of the German Mittelstand 
companies are in fact very large f irms (Mulhern, 1994). 
Mulhern (1994)^ highlighted the difficulty of deriving a commonly accepted, appropriate 
definit ion across borders.^" Al though the Commission of the European Communit ies 
(CEC) stated that "a general definition of SME is no t possible, because the term SME 
varies f rom sector to sector and country to country", the departments of the 
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commiss ion general ly use the definition of the f inancing instruments, ie every company 
with a workforce not exceeding 500 employees and f ixed assets up to Ecu75m and 
whose capital is owned by a larger company up to a max imum of one third is an SME 
(CEC, 26.8.86, p.15). 
EUROSTAT, the statistics department of the CEC, limits its approach to the workforce 
criterion and def ines companies with 10 to 500 employees as S M E s , " f rom its 
or ientat ion on the definit ions of the majority of member states. The major advantage of 
the CEC definit ion is that it uses the employment criterion and does not vary its 
definit ion according to the sector of the enterprise'^ (Storey, 1994) - unlike Bolton 
(HMSO, 1971) and the German Small Business Research Institute. However, Storey 
(1994) also admits that one of the key problems remains, namely that, for a number of 
countr ies, the CEC definit ion is too 'al l-embracing'. 
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' Brooksbank's survey covered a European cross section often empirical studies. 
^ Whereas the margins for the 'number of employees' revolve around the 500 mark (Stanworth 
and Gray, 1991^; Stratos, 1990^) the turnover margins differ considerably, from £ 10 m (Buckley 
et al., 1988) to between US$25m and USSIbn for American midsize high performing companies 
(Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985). 
^ For instance, analysis of the Bolton report (HMSO, 1971) as discussed by various authors 
(Buckley, 1993; Laughton, 1995) shows that the turnover figures provided differ due to 
inflationary tendencies. Equally, the turnover figures provided in the UK Company Act versions 
(Thomas, 1988) differ considerably. For instance, from 1981 to 1985, the turnover margin was 
increased, in average, by 4 1 % for small-sized and medium-sized enterprises and the balance 
sheet total was increased, on average, by 40% over a period of four years. 
" The case of the Small Business Administration (SBA) of the US should serve as an example: in 
1966, SBA classified American Motors as small in order to enable it to bid on certain government 
contracts and justified this by applying a not frequently used criterion of smallness, namely that a 
business qualifies as small if it does not dominate its industry (Barrow, 1993). 
^ The Bolton definition did not offer a commonly accepted definition of SME at all, since it 
considered different industrial sectors differently with regard to lower and upper limits of turnover 
and number of employees. Criticism of the Bolton report (HMSO, 1971) is widespread with 
Storey (1994) being one of the most prominent critics. Further, the literature shows some 
inconsistency with regard to the Bolton and Wilson reports (HMSO, 1971; HMSO, 1979), based 
on, as frequently observed, inaccurate researching. Finally, the UK Company Act (Thomas, 
1988) is frequently ignored when researchers discuss firm size in the UK. Buckley et al (1988), 
however, are an exception. For instance, Buckley (1993) refers to the Wilson report as Gmnd 
7503, whereas Barrow (1993) suggests Cmnd 7937. Whereas, according to Buckley (1993), the 
Wilson report dates 1978, Barrow (1993) suggests 1979. Laughton (1995) argues that the 
definition exposed in the Wilson report varied by industrial sector, since the committee 
recognised that, for example, the characteristics of a small firm in the retailing sector would be 
different from those in construcfion. This reveals some logic inconsistency: either, the Wilson 
. report replicated the arguments earlier made by the Bolton Committee, or Laughton (1995) is 
simply wrong, having mixed up the Bolton report of 1971 and the Wilson report of 1979. 
® The German Small Business Association employs as second criterion an upper turnover limit of 
DM 100m for medium-sized enterpnses. 
' The upper limit for small firms was 250 employees. 
^ For a comprehensive and detailed summary of this see the study of SME stafistics by Kayser 
and Hauser (1993). 
^ This author provides a range of European (Danish, French, German, Italian) definifional 
approaches. 
•'° A range of other definitions of the SME, such as in the US and the Netherlands, are presented 
in Buckley (1993, p.91). For further discussion of the French and Danish definition of the SME, 
see Barrow (1993, pp.5-6). For the case of Japan, Kayser and Hauser (1993, p.12) suggest that 
small trade- and industrial companies have less than 5 employees and those in other sectors of 
the economy have less than 20 employees. Certain SME support in Japan is also available for 
companies exceeding these limits. In the porcelain and ceramic industnes, SMEs can employ up 
to 900 staff and up to 600 staff when they are manufacturing coloured textile garments. 
" Companies with 1 to 9 employees are referred to as micro enterprises. 
Worthwhile to invesfigate would be whether Storey was involved in the creation of a European 
definition of the SME sector since he has no words of doubt about this approach. 
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Internationalisation strategies 
The range of market entry strategies 
A r m ' s - l e n g t h m a r k e t ent ry m o d e s 
The var ious forms of exporting are considered as arm's-lengtl i market servicing 
strategies. Export ing is the least risky method of internationalisation (Lopez-Gonzalez 
et al . , 1995) and as such it normally presents the "toe in the water" (Young et al., 1989, 
p. 11). Wi th export ing the value-adding part of the manufactur ing process is carried out 
in the home country without the need to establish an overseas production facility. 
Spare capacity within domest ic operations has been identified as the reason for the 
initial export decision (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Edmunds and Khoury, 1986). 
In practice, export ing appears as either indirect or direct export ing, according to how 
the export ing f irm carries out the transaction f low between itself and the importer or 
foreign buyer (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995).^ An enterprise is an indirect exporter 
when it sells its products into a foreign market without undertaking any special 
activit ies within the company. In other words, a firm is an indirect exporter when the 
export operat ions, including al! documentat ion, the physical movement of goods and 
channels of distr ibution for sale, are carried out by others, and indeed may take place 
wi thout the knowledge of the manufacturer himself. Indirect export ing may occur 
through an export house which buys directly from the firm on behalf of a foreign 
pr incipal , and then arranges for the export of the goods. Other forms of indirect 
export ing are the use of a trading company or piggy-backing, where the company sells 
its goods abroad through the overseas distribution facilities of another producer 
normal ly manufactur ing complementary, non-competit ive products. A more indirect 
form of export ing occurs when foreign buyers approach a firm to buy a product which 
they regard as suitable and desirable for their home markets abroad; or a buying 
house operat ing on behalf of clients undertakes the same activity (Young et al., 1989). 
In contrast, the direct exporter undertakes the export task himself and, therefore, has 
to build up contacts, carry out market research, handle documentat ion procedures and 
t ransportat ion, establ ish pricing policies, etc. The product is then sold by agents or 
distributors,^ through company technical specialist export salesmen, or through a sales 
subsidiary establ ished by the exporting f irm. Direct exporting facilitates greater control, 
informat ion feedback f rom the foreign market and the development of 'expertise',^ but 
is also more expensive alternative. Generally, the move to direct export ing, the setting 
up of a sales subsidiary, shows a genuine commitment to export ing, since it requires 
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direct investment in market ing institutions in the target country. In general , this genuine 
commi tment is absent when the indirect export route is used (Young et al., 1989). 
Tradit ionally, export ing has been highly attractive to small f irms due to its requirement 
of only l imited foreign capital investment and its perception of being less risky than FDI 
(Walker, 1994). However, once export ing activities are fully established, a re-
evaluat ion of international strategic options may favour the adoption of an alternative 
strategy for servicing foreign markets (Walker, 1994; Bilkey, 1978), especially since 
export ing faces more entry barriers than other strategies such as JVs, foreign 
l icensing, or FDI (Naumann and Lincoln, 1991). Piercy (1981) and Bilkey (1978) point 
out that SMEs usually take up the posit ion of the re-active exporter, at least in the early 
stages, and consider export ing as an option to increase turnover when the scope for 
domest ic market expansion is constrained. 
C o n t r a c t u a l m o d e s of m a r k e t s e r v i c i n g 
International l icensing is often used as a generic term to cover a wide variety of 
contractual arrangements between companies located in different countries for 
effect ing transfers of rights and resources (Young et al., 1989). For instance, Rugman 
et al. (1985) subsume management contracts, franchising and contract manufactur ing 
under the term licensing, whereas for Contractor (1984) and Young et al. (1989) 
l icensing is a contract in which a foreign licenser provides a local l icensee with access 
to one or a set of technologies or know-how or other f irm-specif ic advantages. 
Typically, with a l icensing agreement the exclusive rights are transferred to produce 
and market a product within an agreed area for an agreed period of t ime in exchange 
for f inancial compensat ion. 
A l icensing arrangement may be agreed, as suggested by Young et al. (1989), over 
contents such as pa ten t s , copy r i gh t s , ^ trademarks,^ trade secrets and know-how.^ 
Know-how is different f rom patents and trademarks in the sense that the latter enjoy 
addit ional legal protection. In l icensing arrangements, control over operations and 
strategies is granted to the l icensee in exchange for a lump-sum payment, a per-unit 
royalty fee, and a commitment to abide by any terms set out in the licensing contract 
(Hill et al., 1990). Generally, terms of payment in l icensing arrangements vary 
according to individual external and internal factors, such as political risk, market 
prospects, competi t ion in the market for l icensing arrangements, and the individual 
negotiat ing strength of the parties involved. License fees represent, according to 
Rugman et al. (1985), another means of repatriating profits JVs and W F O E s in the 
event of capital controls. The different external and internal inf luences are important 
326 
Appendix II 
e lements not only in sett ing direct payment terms, but also in determining equally 
signif icant contract components such as markets to be suppl ied, t ie-clauses, etc. 
The durat ion of the l icence varies, but typically might run for three to five years. 
However, a successful l icensing arrangement might be fairly automatically renewable 
in fact (Young et al. , 1989). 
Compared with export ing, production under licence takes place in the foreign market. 
This means that both manufactur ing and marketing lie in the responsibility of the 
l icensee. The l icenser avoids the capital investment required to establish production 
and distr ibution facil i t ies, and licensing permits entry to markets which may be closed 
to exports or other forms of market servicing (Young et al., 1989). Licensing is a 
market entry option that allows a company to spread the cost of its research and 
development and a company to harvest technology feedback (Robock and Simmonds, 
1989). This is, according to Rugman et al. (1985), the access to potential fall-outs of 
new technology that the l icensee creates on the basis of the l icensed knowledge. 
However, this has to be ensured contractually. 
Licensing is available to both large f irms and SMEs as an appropriate market servicing 
strategy (Robock and S immonds, 1989). It is not simply a matter of transferring a 
patent right or providing start-up training, but involves extended links between the two 
f irms and on-going interactions on technical or administrative issues (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). Licensing is the preferred mode if transaction costs are low. This is 
the case with mature technologies, globally f ragmented or mult i-domestic industries, 
technological ly sophist icated l icensees, technologies which are peripheral or involve 
only parts of the overall process (thereby advancing the competit ive position of 
l icensees only slightly) and extremely strong patent positions that can effectively 
protect t h e ' l i c e n s e d asset f rom unauthorised dissemination (Contractor, 1990). 
Licensing is especial ly attractive since it involves no investment risk and the volatility of 
cash f lows is lowest under this contractual mode (Contractor, 1990), 
Carstairs and Welch (1982) in their study of the circumstances under which licensing 
was employed in the international operations of 43 Austral ian SMEs and the role it 
wou ld play in the internationalisation process of SMEs, suggest that international 
l icensing is adopted as a secondary or residual strategy. However, the risk of know-
how disseminat ion born with l icensing, must not be overlooked (Brockmeyer, 1987). 
MNEs do not frequently we lcome licensing as a mode of servicing foreign markets, 
since they fear to lose their competit ive advantage when transferring technical and 
technological know-how to a foreign l icensee. Exporting, in several LDCs, faces major 
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restrict ions in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers. FDI, on the other hand, by 
internalising various aspects of a firm's market servicing operat ion may put a company 
in the advantageous position both to avoid transaction costs of using the market and to 
increase its market ing effectiveness through a greater control of key distribution and 
market ing funct ions (Buckley et al., 1991). Thus, FDI is increasingly preferred as a 
strategy of servicing foreign markets. 
However, f rom the perspective of the SME which often is faced with financial 
constraints, this might not be valid. When considering to service foreign markets, 
SMEs frequently have to neglect choices which are the best f rom the strategic point of 
v iew. They have, however, often to apply second best choices, since they are better 
meet ing their l imited financial opportunit ies. Thus, l icensing, is still favoured by SMEs. 
F r a n c h i s i n g is a special form of l icensing in which the franchiser grants the franchisee 
the right to do business in a prescribed manner. This right can take the form of selling 
the franchiser's products, using his name, production and market ing techniques, or 
general business approach. However, franchising is often thought of as a strategy to 
be used for foreign market entry only by large f irms. Yet franchising may be a viable 
alternative for SMEs, if limited to undeveloped market where the firm can establish its 
reputat ion relatively unopposed. 
Licensing is not without disadvantages. To a large degree, it may leave the 
international market ing function to the licensee. As a result, the l icensor may not gain 
suff icient international marketing expertise to ready itself for subsequent world market 
penetrat ion. "The initial toehold in the foreign market may not be a foot in the door" 
(Czinkota and Ronkainen, 1993). Moreover, in exchange for a fee or the royalty, the 
l icensor may create its own competitor not only in the markets for which the agreement 
was made, but also in third markets. 
Franchising is an evolving organisational form with broad implications for the way 
decis ions are made and implemented within a company (Dandridge and Falbe, 1994). 
It provides an inexpensive way to acquire capital and to introduce new products and 
services to other countries (Young et al., 1989; Falbe and Dandridge, 1992). It is a 
special form of company co-operation without capital investment (Braun, 1996), a 
part icular type of l icensing or technical assistance agreement (Young et al., 1989) and 
a market ing-or iented method of selling a business service (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 
1995). Normally, the franchisee operates under the name of the franchiser with the 
former providing the franchisee with a package including t rademarks and know-how, 
local exclusivity and management, financial assistance and joint advertising. 
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Fundamental ly , the franchisee runs a controlled business using the reputation and 
techniques of the franchiser. The business that is operated by the franchisee is viewed 
by the public as part of a country-wide chain rather than a single business enterprise. 
The success of this market entry mode is based on the fact that the individual 
f ranchisee gets, on a contractual basis, a comprehensive package of management 
know-how, both for establ ishing and operating the business (Braun, 1996). Payment 
will comprise an initial fee, royalties, and compliance with certain company regulations. 
Different franchising constel lat ions include manufacturer-retai ler systems, 
manufacturer-wholesaler, wholesaler-retai ler, trade mark l icenser-retailer and retailer-
retailer systems. Thus franchising can be used to segment the market spatially, with a 
full market coverage being achieved without internal competi t ion. On the other hand, 
host-country benefits f rom franchising are high because training and development of 
management skills are incorporated within the franchising deal. However, since the 
l icensee uses the MNE's brand name and international promotion, the licenser's 
reputat ion is particularty in acute risk with this type of contractual arrangement. 
A management contract is "an arrangement under which operational control of an 
enterpr ise (or one phase of an enterprise) is vested by contract in a separate 
enterpr ise which performs the necessary management funct ions in return for a fee" 
(Brooke, 1985). The management firm's duties are essential ly the same as the 
administrat ive and technical funct ions of an MNE in running a subsidiary (Young et al., 
1989). Services may include general management, f inancial and personnel 
administrat ion, product ion management and marketing. The services are generally 
l imited to ongoing operat ions and do not give the authority to the management 
contractor to make new capital investments, assume long-term debt or initiate basic 
management or policy changes. 
Management contracts are commonly found in conjunction with other forms of 
international market servicing - for example supplementing l icensing, JVs or turnkey 
projects, and facil itating management control which may be absent in the latter 
ar rangements per se (Young et al., 1989). Management contracts facilitate an MNE to 
better control the amount of knowledge that is divulged and through the MNE's 
inf luence on the foreign firm's management , the enterprise may obtain other benefits, 
such as becoming the supplier of factor inputs. Further, management contracts help 
ensure quality control and provide international experience for the firm's executives. 
Var ious formulae are used for the calculation of management fees. Most contracts 
include a basic fee along with an incentive fee, with special services including 
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market ing, pre-operat ions assistance, training and recruitment of personnel, etc. being 
remunerated separately. In many cases, the length of contract term is limited to the 
t ime necessary to complete a specific undertaking. 
A d isadvantage of management contracts is that it does not allow a firm to build up a 
permanent market posit ion, and difficulties have been experienced between 
management contractors and developing countries in recent years. The reasons are 
largely different objectives but also poorly specif ied contract terms, which have led on 
occasion to terminat ion or re-negotiation (Young et al., 1989). Management contracts 
are especial ly attractive to expanding f irms, since they involve no investment risk and 
have only little volatility of cash flows (Contractor, 1990). However, as discovered by 
Young et al. (1989), management contracts are concentrated in particular industries, 
wi th hotels and transportat ion being especially important, but also including industries, 
such as agriculture, public utilities, mining and minerals. 
Contract manufacturing, also known as international subcontract ing or offshore 
processing or assembly, is the reverse situation of a franchise, since the MNE pays the 
l icence fee (Rugman et al., 1985). It involves a principal company in one country 
placing an order, with specifications as to the condit ions of sale and the products 
required, with a f irm in another country (Young et al., 1989). Typically the contract 
wou ld be limited to production; marketing would be handled by the principal because 
sales often take place in the principal's home market. In order to ensure product 
standards, the provision of design and product specif ications and technical know-how 
and even the provision of physical equipment for the subcontractor may be part of the 
arrangement , the latter being formalised in separate licensing or technical assistance 
agreements between the two parties. Young et al. (1989) found considerable 
di f ferences in the nature of orders placed under contract, as between long-term, short-
term and single batch orders with no guarantee of renewal. 
Turnkey projects^ are package deals in which the MNE constructs a production 
facil ity and provides training for the personnel necessary to operate it (Rugman et al., 
1985). Young et al. (1989) suggest that, while differing from project to project, the 
contractor 's responsibil it ies generally include the basic design and engineering of a 
plant, the provision of technology and know-how, the supply of a complete plant and 
equipment , the design and construction of civil engineering works, the complete 
construct ion of a plant and installation of equipment, the commissioning of the total 
plant facil it ies up to the stage of the start-up, and the operation and maintenance by 
the contractor. The latter was added only in recent years to el iminate problems that 
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have arisen in this area (Young et al., 1989). Individual contractors are often 
engineer ing f irms which have had the ability to mobil ise personnel, equipment, 
technology, etc. and to co-ordinate the activities of subcontractors. Turnkey projects 
can be an alternative to export ing or to FDI when a host government has imposed 
restrictions on these. An MNE can benefit f rom turnkey projects in that it can become 
the supplier of factor inputs needed for future operations. In addit ion, the MNE can 
expect to l icense addit ional managerial or technological expertise to the nation that 
hosts the turnkey project (Rugman et al., 1985). There is no single term of payment in 
conjunct ion with turnkey projects. Payment may be in a variety of forms, including 
counter trading, where the supplier takes payment wholly or partly in the form of 
physical output f rom the completed plant (Young et al., 1989). 
F o r e i g n d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t 
The discussion of the organisat ional level of FDI is somehow hybrid in its character. 
Both subgroups of FDI, co-operat ive (equity JV, contractual JV) and hierarchical 
modes (WFOE) of market servicing are forms of FDI. FDI is considered the 
subsequent form of being internationally active (Rugman et al., 1985; Walker, 1994). 
FDI can be a means of making most efficient use of indigenous production resources 
within an overseas market, given the right balance of skill, flexibility and cheapness in 
the labour force, or the availability of cheap raw materials without the disadvantages of 
high transport costs. Wi th FDI, an MNE can circumvent tariff quota or exchange control 
restrictions by governments which might be a barrier to exporting (Laughton, 1995).^ 
Edmunds and Khoury (1986) found that getting behind the tariff walls has historically 
accounted for a large proport ion of FDI. FDI allows the fastest and most sensitive 
response to local demand (Laughton, 1995). 
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Author Dimension Market servicing enumeration 
Pavitt, 1969 Risk, resource commitment, 
financial return 
Licensing, exporting, FDI 
Root, 1987 Risk, control Direct exporting, licensing, 
exporting via agent, branch, JV, 
WFOE 
Rugman et al., 1985 Resource commitment Licensing, indirect exporting, 
direct exporting, local packaging, 
assembly, FDI 
Brockmeyer, 1987 No specification Direct exporting, licensing, JV, 
liaison office, branch, WFOE 
Young etal . , 1989 Risk, control Export, contractual modes, FDI 
Shenkar, 1990 Managerial commitment Import, export, countertrade, 
licensing, compensation trade, 
processing and assembling, 
contractual JV, equity JV 
Erramiili and Rao, 1990 Market involvement Franchising, licensing, indirect 
exporting, direct exporting, export 
subsidiary, minority JV, 50-50 JV, 
majority JV, acquired WFOE, 
green-field WFOE 
Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995 Risk Export, licensing, franchising, 
FDI, JV, strategic alliance 
Laughton, 1995 Experience, commitment Export, contractual modes, FDI 
Robock and Simmonds, 
1989 
Resource commitment Licensing, exporting, local 
warehousing with direct sales 
staff, local packaging, 
assembling, full-scale production 
and marketing operations 
Kaufmann etal . , 1990 Capital and management 
commitment in the host 
country and capital and 
management commitment in 
the home country 
Schmidt etal . , 1995 Capital and management 
commitment 
Indirect exports, direct exports, 
subcontracting, co-production, 
licensing, management contract, 
franchising, turnkey projects, 
representative office, equity JV, 
partnership, WFOE 
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Limited internationalisation resources 
Authors Mgmt Finance Info Know-how Ambition Competence Risk 
Donckels & Lambrecht 
Walker • • 
Cavusgil • 
Edmunds & Khoury • 
Buckley • • 
Buckley et al. • • • 
SBFD • • • • • 
Stanworth & Gray • 
Penrose • 
Schmidt et al. • • 
UNCTAD**" • • 
Peridis****** • • 
Oman • • 
Braun**"*** • • 
Eden et al. • • 
Note: + cited by JV entrepreneurs; ++ cited by the non-JV entrepreneurs as obstacles to 
establishing JVs; * insufficient know-how is regarded as a management weakness; ** 
internationalisation know-how; *** The small business research institute in Bonn study showed 
that planning was a barrier to internationalisation for 51.5% of the companies in the sample; **** 
Also a preference for short-term goals, limited transfer capabilities (which are, compared with the 
other problems, not as severe - UNCTAD, 1993); ***** international experience; ****** plus lack 
of knowledge protection; ******* plus problems with mobility of staff and problems when planning 
and establishing a project. 
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Notes 
^ For a classification of the various forms of (indirect and direct) exporting see Lopez-Gonzalez 
et al. (1995, pp.216-8) and Kerr (1989, pp.22-3). Wagner (1995) suggests a somewhat different 
distinction between direct and indirect exports. He defines exports as all sales in foreign 
countries directly exported by a firm, including sales via export agents. Indirect exports, on the 
other hand, are sales of intermediate goods that become part of finished goods that are 
exported. 
^ A major difference between agent and distributor is that the distributor actually takes title to the 
goods and represents the manufacturer in the sale and service of the product which he carries. 
^ The term has been used in seminars run by the Bank of Scotland (in Young et al., 1989). 
" Inventions are protected by patents and might be used until the period of expiration. 
^ They usually protect expressions as in book publishing, films and television, computer 
programs and other information transfer systems. 
^ They are words or symbols used to distinguish particular goods and services and to indicate 
their origin; as with patents, the duration is likely to vary between countries, although it is fairly 
easy to renew a trademark registration once it has expired. 
These are not generally available information which may be disclosed either by itself or as part 
of a patent or trademark license; the information may include product and process specifications, 
quality control procedures, factory layout drawings, instruction manuals, etc. 
^ Young et al. (1989) propose a variety of modified or turnkey-plus contracts: product-in-hand 
contracts, for instance, are turnkey operations in which the contractor's responsibilities end only 
when the installation is completely operafional with local personnel. Another form of modified 
turnkey contract is the market-in-hand agreement requiring the project contractor to give 
assistance in, or take responsibility for, the sale of at least part of the project's output. 
^ This needs some clarification: Laughton (1995) does not consider, as is shown below, JVs as 
being one form of FDI. Instead, he uses FDI and WFOE interchangeably. However, then it has 
to be added that also JVs can be seen as defensive modes of entering a foreign market in order 
to make sure that an MNE can maintain its market share in a specific host country! 
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Sources of Data Gathering 
UK sources 
Source approached Outcome Description 
North East Chamber 
of Commerce^ 
Negative Prime area of interest is Europe 
Government Office for 
the North East 
(GONE)^ 
Database with 
Northeast of 
England SMEs 
active in the Asia-
Pacific region 
No indication of the countries the enterprises were 
doing business with and of the types of market 
servicing strategies used. Database was used for 
carrying out a study on the attitudes of Northeast 
England SMEs towards Asia-Pacific. Findings were 
presented at the '96 Changzhou SME Convention' 
in October 1996 (see Kaiser and Kirby, 1996) 
Institute of Export 
( loE) ' 
Negative The loE expressed its interest in the research 
collaboration; the database promised never arrived 
Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI)" 
Negative 'DTI Export Promoter China' responded, that "there 
are many UK companies investing in China ]...[ ICI, 
Unilever, and Pilkington" 
China-Britain Trade 
Group (CBTG)^ and 
British Chamber of 
Commerce Shanghai 
(BCC)^ 
CBTG Shanghai 
and BCC pro-
vided five con-
tacts 
Three companies were located in Greater 
Shanghai and two in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. One 
of these JVs was known from previous research. 
The remaining four companies were approached 
and one company participated in the research. One 
was a UK WFOE and two did not respond to the 
researcher's request. The other CBTG offices in 
China were contacted, including the Guangzhou 
office. Four addresses were suggested which were 
followed up; One address was inaccurate, one 
company was a UK WFOE, one was a JV between 
a Chinese and a Hong Kong-based firm. The fourth 
UK investor was very large. The CBTG offices in 
Beijing, Wuhan and Chengdu did not respond 
British Embassy 
Beijing'" 
'JV list' (UK com-
panies with a JV 
in China) and 
'British Chamber 
of Commerce 
Shanghai mem-
bership list' 
No indication of firm size of the UK enterprise 
British Consulate 
General Shanghai^ 
Two contacts 
were provided 
Both JVs were contacted 
Northern Develop-
ment Company (NDC) 
Negative Although taking a trade mission to China in 1996, 
NDC expressed it would look more inward. This 
information seemed rather contradictory, since an 
MBA dissertation (Butler, 1993) established that 
the NDC's export promotion department holds data 
on regional firms by industry type and markets 
traded with. Further, the database was a major 
mechanism of recruiting for NDC trade missions 
TEC^ Negative 
German sources 
Appendix 
Source approached Outcome Description 
Delegation of German 
Industry and 
Commerce Shanghai 
Database with 
addresses of 
German WFOEs, 
JVs and repre-
sentative offices 
No specification of size of German companies 
German Embassy 
Beijing^" 
Negative Database of German companies present in China 
should be obtained from BfAI. Eventually, a copy of 
this directory was received from CICASME. The 
latest directory published in 1996 listed 314 entries. 
255 of them were labelled as Sino-German JVs, 58 
as WFOEs and one as a representafive office. As 
the directory serves as the basis of the further 
developed directory of the Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce Shanghai, the value-
added of the embassy directory was not great 
German Consulate 
General Shanghai 
Negative Does not have its own directory of German com-
panies present in China 
German Centre for 
Industry and Trade 
Shanghai" 
Negative Reference to Delegation of German Industry and 
Commerce Shanghai 
Chambers of 
Commerce (CoCs) in 
Germany^^ 
CoC in Nurem-
berg provided a 
list of 13 (alle-
ged) SMEs lo-
cated in Central 
Franconia 
Not all companies were SMEs and no specification 
of the type of business strategy employed by the 
companies 
German Asia-Pacific 
Business Association 
(OAV)^^ 
Directory of 
German firms 
with a WFOE, a 
JV or a represen-
tative office 
Informafion valid at the end of January 1994, sug-
gested a total of 380 German establishments in 
China. 115 of them were supposed to be JVs. 
However, neither the exact numbers of German 
WFOEs, nor German representative offices could 
be identified since the directory does not distin-
guish between them, not to mention that the direc-
tory has a section 'German representative offices in 
China and German-Chinese JVs' and another 
section 'German-Chinese JVs' which suggests an 
overlap and it cannot be specific whether the 
remaining 265 (380 - 115) entries were either 
WFOEs and representative offices or WFOEs, 
representative offices and JVs 
German Economics 
Research Institute 
(HWWA) ' ' 
Eight contacts 
provided 
The HWWA research proposal did not provide a 
reliable figure of German SMEs with investments in 
China, but suggested only ten German SMEs that 
were involved in a JV. For instance, one of the 'JV 
companies' that were visited was a JV between a 
German and a Taiwanese company and therefore 
not regarded as a JV in the Chinese understanding 
(see Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). An additional 
list was provided by HWWA, containing 17 comp-
anies where the HWWA did not know whether 
these companies had direct investments or 
representative offices only. This suggests that even 
prestigious research institutes did not have suffi-
cient information on German SMEs with China FDI 
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Source approached Outcome Descriptions 
Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic 
Cooperation 
(MOFTEC)^^ 
Negative MOFTEC data was considered as being compre-
hensive since all foreign companies establishing a 
presence in China have to register with the mini-
stry or its provincial or local authorities. A response 
to an enquiry never arrived 
Chinese International 
Association of Small 
and Medium Enter-
prises (CICASME)^^ 
Negative; copy of 
German Embas-
sy directory sent 
CICASME was thought to be a reliable source of 
information to learn about German and UK SME 
FDI projects in China 
Other Chinese sour-
ces (Guangzhou 
Investment Centre)^'^ 
Negative Request for Guangzhou/Guangdong investment 
brochure. The Chinese representative responded 
that it would not be possible to forward a copy and 
that it should be picked up in Guangzhou, instead 
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Notes 
^ In a letter of 10.6.1996 to Mr. Robin Mackay, the chamber of commerce was asked for the 
provision of addresses of Northeast England SMEs involved in business with the Asia-Pacific 
region in general and with China in particular. Further, collaboration in a planned study of the 
attitudes of Northeast England SMEs toward the Asia-Pacific region was offered. However, 
the chamber was not prepared to collaborate in the proposed study, nor to release any of its 
databases to support the research. 
^ Letterof 29.5.1996 to Mr. Mike Cairns. 
^ The loE was asked in a letter of 30.5.1996 to Mr. Ian Campbell to collaborate in the 
proposed study and to provide a database with relevant SME contacts. 
" In a letter of 4.2.1996 to Mr. A.G. Atkinson the DTI was asked for specific information on 
UK SME FDI in China. 
^ The CBTG provides services to all UK companies. Its core membership at the time of 
interviewing was approximately 250 companies. It has, apart from its head office in London 
and its Scotland office in Glasgow, five offices in China, including one each in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangzhou, Wuhan and Chengdu. CBTG offers a library in its London office and five 
days free use of office space for its member companies. For every day longer of use, 
member companies pay some £150 per day. Non-member companies have to pay from the 
very first day, a rate of £180 per day for office use. The membership fee is some £1,100 per 
year (minimum charge). If companies want to rent a desk and a telephone terminal, they 
have to pay another £5,000 per year. In Shanghai, six companies had rent seven desks (at 
the time of interviewing). CBTG carries out smaller market investigations and provides lists 
of potential partners or customers in China. Another part of its activities is the organisation of 
trade missions for mainly (80%) SMEs from the UK to China (these participating companies 
look basically for selling opportunities. However, frequently, these businesses' intentions 
change very rapidly, meaning that, often, companies come to China in search of a customer 
and then go home having found a partner for a joint project) (R. Yang interview, 21.10.1996). 
^ The chamber of commerce is organised like a club with approximately 150 corporate and 
individual members from all different areas of business. The chamber provides a forum for 
getting together on various aspects, also with guest speakers. Predominantly, the chamber 
of commerce provides services for companies that are already in China. It "puts everybody 
together." For this sen/ice, corporate members pay RMB1,500 (£125) per year (Lisa De 
Abreu interview, 21.10.1996). 
The British Embassy was approached in writing on 28.5.1996 to Mrs. Diane Ward with the 
request for information about UK SMEs with an FDI project in China. 
^ The Consulate in Shanghai promotes British exports, works with companies and ministries, 
finds out what projects are on offer, persuades Chinese companies to form JVs, consults on 
equity, participation and sales strategies, and offers databases and directories (China on-
line) to provide UK companies with information on, for instance, sources of supply (Paul 
Davies interview, 11.11.1996). 
® Training and Enterprise Councils in County Durham. Telephone conversation with Mr. Clive 
Smithers on 21.6.1996. 
The embassy was approached in a letter to Mr. Jens-Peter Voss, head of the trade 
promotion department of the Embassy. The database is organised along dimensions such as 
name of company in China, indication of whether the investment project is a JV, WFOE or a 
representative office, address, contact person, industry, and, in many cases, address and 
telephone number of the German parent company. 
The German Centre for Industry and Trade Shanghai is a limited liability company 
sponsored by the Bavarian ministry of economics, transport and technology and the 
Bavarian Regional Bank. Its aims are to provide German SMEs with information about the 
Chinese market, and thus ease their market entry and efforts to establish a presence in 
China. Its managing director Mr Michael Gotschlich was approached for information during a 
field visit to Shanghai in the winter of 1995/1996. He was contacted again with the request 
for data on German SME FDI in China in a letter of 3. June 1996. In his response of 4. June 
1996 he suggested that the German Centre would not have any of the requested data. 
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During a research placement with the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Shanghai in 1995, various chambers of commerce in Germany that were active with regard 
to the Chinese market and with whom the candidate had interacted, were identified: these 
included the chambers in Nuremberg and Regensburg. Both chambers were asked for 
relevant information in letters to Dr. Alfred Brunnbauer, head of the Chamber of Commerce 
Regensburg, and to Mr. Armin Siegert of the Chamber of Commerce in Nuremberg, 
respectively. The chamber in Regensburg did not respond. The chamber in Nuremberg 
provided a list of 13 companies that were involved in business with China. An examinafion of 
the list revealed that only one company qualified for participation in the survey (ie being an 
SME and having a JV in China). 
The directory is organised along dimensions, such as name of the company in China, 
address, telephone and fax numbers. 
'^^  In the spring of 1995, the HWWA forwarded a research proposal on German SME FDI in 
Asia to the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Shanghai, asking for logistic 
support when carrying out research in China. 
In a letter of 3. December 1996 to Professor Wang Zhile the ministry was asked for 
databases containing UK and German FDI projects in China, perhaps specified with regard 
to the size of the foreign parent company. The fact that contact had been made with a 
German businessman in Shanghai who had established links to Professor Wang Zhile at 
MOFTEC's Research Institute for International Economic Cooperation in Beijing, encouraged 
the candidate to approach MOFTEC. 
®^ Invitation by Lin Wenying of 17.4.1996 to Professor David Kirby to attend (supervisor of 
the researcher). Ms. Lin suggests that Taicang, a county nearby has set up eight JVs with 
German SMEs with the last three years. Follow-up fax of invitation of 3. May 1996 asking for 
contacts with the JVs. 
Telephoned in the first week in November 1996. 
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Durham University Business School 
UK SME joint ventures in China 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
This questionnaire survey is part of a PhD research project looking into the joint venturing of UK 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Please answer the following questions and 
return the completed quesfionnaire to me in the enclosed pre-paid, self-addressed envelope by date 
in hand, if possible. Many thanks for your time and effort. 
Stefan Kaiser 
I. B a s i c s a b o u t y o u r U K b u s i n e s s 
Q 1 : Please specifv the fol lowing basic characteristics of your business. 
Type of ownership (eg Ltd, subsidiary) 
Year of establishment " 
Industry/activity 
^ O m o v e r in the last financial year {VIT£)-; 
Number of employees in the UK 
Number of countrieSfaGtive,iri/; , f| 
Total number of foreign operations 
... of these wholly owned enterprises 
... of these joint ventures 
II. A b o u t y o u r j o i n t v e n t u r e In C h i n a 
Q2: Prior to your joint venture, did you do business with China and for how long? 
(Please specify) 
No 
Yes please specify 
Q3: How important were the fol lowing reasons for engaging in an investment 
project in China? (Please tick) 
Potential market for our product 
Faster entry into the market 
It is necessary to be there 
To overcome import duties 
Cheap labour 
Access to raw materials 
Strategic position in Asia-Pacific region 
We were approached in the first place 
Following customers/clients 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not really 
important 
not at all 
important 
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Q4: How important were the following reasons for establishing a joint venture instead of, 
for instance, a wholly owned operation? (Please tick) 
Local participation required by China 
. Overcoming nationalistic prejudice 
Political insurance 
Favourable government treatment. • • 
Less financial input 
Less management input 
Limitation of risk 
Partner's China business knowledge 
Partner's knowledge of customers 
Smoothing way through bureaucracy 
Sharing of distribution channels 
Access to other firm's technology 
Access to other firm's skills 
Accessito rawjiTiaterial v -
Strat. action to pre-empt competition 
Trade union relationship' ^ 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not really 
important 
not at ail 
important 
Q5: Compared with your operations in the UK, how well have you planned the joint 
venture in China? (Please tick) 
Much better 
Better 
The same way 
Nearly as good as usual 
Not at all as good as usual 
Q6: Please specify the following characteristics of your joint venture operation. 
Year of establishment 
Total investment (in £ or US$) 
Turnover (in 1995 and expected 1996 turnover) 
Number of employees 
Location 
Product range (compared with range in the UK) 
Greenfield or take-over plant 
Market target 
Market share in China (%) 
Number of partner(s) 
Industry of partner(s) 
Turnover of partner(s) compared with your firm 
Employees of partner(s) compared with your firm 
Partner's type of company 
Range of products/main product 
Location of partner(s) 
same - limited - different 
domestic market - export markets 
much larger - larger - similar 
smaller - much smaller 
much more - more - similar 
less - much less 
state-owned - township - private 
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Q7: Could you choose the location of your joint venture? (Please tick) 
Yes 
No 
Please go to Q8. 
Please go to Q9. 
Q8: How important were the following criteria for choosing the location of your joint 
venture? (Please tick) 
Location of partner 
Broximity ;^of target market 
Availability of trained labour 
Availability-of cheap labour 
Sources of raw material 
infrastructure 
Investment incentives 
Wewere^advised to go tfiere • 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not really 
important 
not at all 
important 
* • • • • ' 
Q9: How did you find your Chinese partner? (Please tick) 
Partner was our agent 
Partner met at a trade fair in China 
Partner met at a trade fair in the UK 
Chinese company approached us 
Chinese organisation helped to find 
partner 
UK organisation helped to find partner 
Other 
Q10: Were there alternative partners for choice? (Please tick) 
Yes 
No 
Please go to 011. 
Please go to 012. 
Q11: How important were the following criteria for choosing your partner? (Please tick) 
Size of partner 
Products of partner 
Location of partner 
Complementary resources 
Links to officials 
Financial fitting with local currency 
Trust between top management 
Reputation 
Access to technology 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not 
important 
not at all 
important 
342 
Appendix IV 
Q12: What were the contents of negotiations and did they create conflict? (Please tick) 
Equity shares 
Distribution of responsibilities 
Financing 
Royalties 
Training sessions of JV staff in UK 
Technologysseleetion/transfer ^ 
Intellectual property nghts 
Composition of the board of directors 
General manager appointment 
Staffing issues (number, salaries) 
Expatnate issues (number, salaries) 
Valuationiof assets 
Market prionties 
Other 
Contents Conflict 
Q13: Please tell me more about the negotiation process. 
Location(s) of negotiations 
Durationiof negotiations 
Language of negotiation 
Your negotiation team 
Use of interpreters 
Difficulties 
.longer than expected 
expected - as expected 
shorter than 
English - Chinese 
Number of negotiators 
negotiators . 
Positions of 
Yes - No 
Q14: How important do you consider the following factors for successful negotiations? 
(Please tick) 
Good personal relationship 
Knowledge of PRC business practices 
Partner's need for your product 
Uniqueness of your product 
Willingness to offer good financing 
Preparation of your team 
Patience of your team 
Your technical expertise 
Familiarity with social customs 
Past reputation in selling to China^ 
Knowing PRC polit. & social situation 
Your team's,sincerity 
Good interpreter on your side 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not really 
important 
not at all 
important 
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Q15: What is your contribution to the JV and what is its relative value? (Please tick) 
Value 
(%) 
jCash 
•Machinery 
Technology 
Patents 
Management expertise 
Technical training 
Access to world markets 
Other 
Q16: What is the Chinese partner's contribution to the joint venture and how important 
is it to you? (Please tick) 
Access to markets 
' ContactS'with customers 
Contacts with host government 
^Gash ^ T:"},, 
Land 
.Plant 
Machinery and facilities 
Local labour 
Materials 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not 
important 
not at all 
important 
Q17: What is your equity share in the joint venture? (Please specify where appropriate) 
specify % tick 
Majority stake 
Minority stake 
Equal stakes 
Q18: Please tell me about the management of the joint venture (Please specify). 
Number of members of the board of directors (BoD) 
Number of UK members in the BoD 
Number of Chinese members in the BoD 
Any other nationals in the BoD 
Which parent nominated the chairman of BoD 
Parent nominating the general manager 
Parent in charge of production 
Parent in charge of marketing 
Parent in charge of finance 
Parent in charge of personnel 
Parent in charge of R&D 
Does decision-making exist in the JV 
Is joint decision making a problem in the JV 
UK-China 
UK-China 
UK-China 
UK-China 
UK-China 
UK-China 
UK-China 
Yes - No 
Yes - No 
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Q19: About expatriates in the joint venture (Please specify) 
Number of expatriates sent to China 
How much does an expatriate cost you 
... remuneration 
... allowances 
... accommodation 
Who covers the cost of the expatriate SME-JV 
Q20: What would you consider as problem areas of operating a joint venture in China 
and how important are they for you? (Please tick) 
Recruiting personnel 
Technology transfer 
Loss of control 
iGreatingJa new^competitor -
Damaging reputation 
Low-labour productivity 
Local sourcing 
Bureaucracy 
Mismatch in management styles 
Ihsufficient; training of. Chinese 
managers 
Infrastructure 
Concept;of quality 
Personnel motivation 
Chinese commercial practices 
Communication with local staff 
Absence of detailed investment laws 
Repatriation of profits 
Transfer pricing 
Dividend policy 
Political risk 
Restriction on sales and import 
Corruption 
Foreign exchange restrictions 
Unfair competition 
Other 
very 
important 
important medium 
important 
not really 
important 
not at all 
important 
. • 
Q21; Overall, how satisfied are you with the performance of your JV? (Please tick) 
Very satisfied 
Satisfied 
Medium satisfied 
Not satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
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Q22: How satisfied are you with the following criteria of success? (Please tick) 
Return on investment 
Growth 
Compared with competitors 
Local market share ~ 
Export performance 
Royalty fees 
Supply fees 
Management fees 
Other 
Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied Medium 
satisfied 
Not 
satisfied 
Not at all 
satisfied 
Q23: How important are the following attributes for success in China? (Please tick) 
Good product 
Adapting to the Chinese market 
Sincerity 
Patience ^ t . 
Familiarity with PRC business practices 
Good business connections 
Relationship with Chinese officials 
Other ' ' 
Very 
important 
Important Medium 
important 
Not really 
important 
Not at all 
important 
<* • 
Q24: How did you finance your joint venture? 
With working capital 
With loan from UK bank 
Wth loan from Chinese bank 
With Grant from UK or European institution 
Other 
Q25: Does entering the Chinese market with a joint venture relieve your resources 
commitment in the following areas? (Please tick) 
Very big Big relief Medium Not a Not at all 
relief relief relief a relief 
Management resources 
Financial resources 
Information needs 
Other 
Q26: If you had the choice, would you again engage in a joint venture? (Please tick) 
Yes 
No 
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Defining FDI and JV 
Foreign direct investment 
"FDI is the transfer of capital and managerial and technical assets of a firm from one 
country to another by the same firm" (Grosse, 1981, p.1). The transfer can be direct, by 
payment of finance for assets in the host country, ie through acquisition of an existing 
firm or the creation of a new firm through transfer of physical and financial capital to the 
host country (Grosse, 1981). FDI means ownership of property abroad, usually in a 
company, for a return (Daniels and Radebaugh, 1992), It is a means of making most 
efficient use of indigenous production resources within an overseas market, given the 
right balance of skill, flexibility and cheapness in the labour force, or the availability of 
cheap raw materials without the disadvantages of high transport costs (Laugthon, 
1995). Control and managerial participation have been considered essential 
components of the definition (Kindleberger, 1979; Grosse, 1981; Robock and 
Simmonds, 1989; Daniels and Radebaugh, 1992; Office for National Statistics, 1996; 
UNCTAD, 1997), distinguishing it from portfolio investment that is undertaken with a 
rather short horizon for the purpose of obtaining investment income or capital gains 
rather than entrepreneurial income. 
However, authors have different opinions on the amount of equity a foreign investor 
has to hold in a project, ranging from 10% (US Department of Commerce) to 20% 
(Office for National Statistics, 1996), 25% (Hood and Young, 1979), or even variable 
stakes (Rugman et al., 1985). This makes it difficult to determine the dividing line 
between direct and portfolio investment (Robock and Simmonds, 1989). 
Joint ventures 
There is no precise (universal) definition of JV (Engelhardt and Seibert, 1981; Herzfeld, 
1983; Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993). In their pioneering study on JVs, Friedman 
and Kalmanoff (1961, p.6) adopted a very broad definition of JV as "any type of 
association which implies collaboration for more than a transitory period." Tomlinson 
(1970) added that the partners collaborating in that association are legally separate 
and collaborate for their mutual benefit. He also stressed the establishment of a new 
entity, as opposed to Friedman and Kalmanoff's (1961) eartier definition. Harrigan 
(1984, p.7, 1985, pp.2-3) considers the JV as a "partnership in which two or more firms 
create an entity to carry out a productive economic activity and take an active role in 
decision-making, if not also in operations." Harrigan (1984, 1985), Kogut (1988) and 
Hennart (1988), highlight the importance of management participation. Harrigan's 
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(1984, 1985) JV definition has enjoyed much popularity in the literature. A JV implies 
the sharing of assets, risks and profits (Oman, 1984; Hennart, 1988). 
Other works have specified Tomlinson's (1970) 'mutual benefit' criterion, suggesting 
"mutual improvement of their market growth potential" (Walmsley, 1982) and "agreed-
upon goals" (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 1995, p.218), whereas elsewhere (Beamish, 1987; 
Beamish and Banks, 1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1987), it is outlined that each party must 
hold at least 5% of the equity in a JV. Eariier, Drucker (1973, p.720) provided an 
assessment of the JV as "the most demanding and difficult of all tools of diversification 
- and the least understood." Hennart (1988) considers JVs as situations where a firm 
acquires partial ownership of another firm. 
Basically, there are two different forms of JV, the domestic and the international. 
Whereas in a domestic JV the participating companies are from the same country in 
which the JV is established, its international version brings together, according to 
Lichtenberger and Naulleau (1993), individuals who differ in national origin, cultural 
values, and social norms. There are also geographical, political, economic and legal 
system differences which are found not only in the beliefs and behaviour of individual 
employees, but also in the policies' of organisations (Albrecht et al., 1996). Authors, 
including Engelhardt and Seibert (1981), Shenkar and Zeira (1987) specify that at least 
one partner has its headquarters located outside the country of the JV's operation. 
Other sources have stressed the location where the economic activities of the JV are 
carried out: Geringer and Hebert (1989, 1991) regard a JV as international if it has a 
significant level of operation in more than one country, though the authors do not 
specify that level. International JVs in LDCs are, according to Oman (1984), those in 
which the LDC partner holds at least 50% of the equity. 
Various authors (Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 1984; Oman, 1984; Beamish and Banks, 
1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 
1989; Young et al., 1989; Lichtenberger and Naulleau, 1993; Laughton, 1995) consider 
the creation of a separate legal entity as essential for the definitional existence of a JV, 
though this is not essential for the existence of a JV. 
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Featuring EJV and CJV 
The EJV 
General information 
Earliest (1979) form of FDI in China. 
Legal form 
Limited liability company formed in accordance with China's law on Chinese-foreign 
EJVs. It is a joint-stock company that is not described in detail in the law. It requires 
stock holders to be liable only up to the amount of the registered capital (Duscha, 1987; 
Wascher, 1992). Despite the clear wording of the law, there had been tendencies since 
the early 1990s for the establishment of an EJV also as 'company limited by shares'. 
Officially, a 'company limited by shares' Is possible since 10. January 1995 (Kaiser and 
Grimm et al., 1997). 
Rights and liabilities 
Can acquire property, sue and be sued (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce 
Hong Kong, 1994). According to Laughton (1995), this is the essential characteristic of 
an EJV. Also a CJV can adopt a separate legal identity. 
Partners 
At least one Chinese and one foreign. 
Contribution 
Minimum foreign equity contribution to registered capital 25%, maximum 99%. The 
minimum foreign share is to ensure the bi-natlonality of the venture (Brown, 1985) and 
the foreign partner's effective management contribution (Duscha, 1987). Foreign equity 
can be contributed as cash, intellectual property, machinery and equipment, other 
tangible assets. The contribution of know-how Is only recognised by the approval 
authorities if It helps develop or manufacture new products, improve quality of existing 
products or save raw material (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong 
Kong, 1994). Value of know-how can neither exceed 20% of the registered capital of 
the JV nor 50% of the equity of the investor (ibid). Contribution of the Chinese partner 
is similar. In addition, he often provides the right to use the site on which the JV is 
located. To expect financial resources and know-how from the Chinese is not the norm 
(Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). 
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Management 
Usually managed by a BoD with at least three and a maximum of 13 members, 
appointed by the investors in proportion to their respective share of equity. According to 
Anglo-American practice, the BoD not only has management, but also supervisory 
functions. Its legal representative is the chairman. Only after the revision of the EJV law 
in 1990 was the BoD allowed to be chaired by the foreign partner. BoD meets once a 
year, more usually, two to four times (Campbell, 1989), either in China or abroad. At 
least two thirds of the BoD members have to be present, though representation by an 
'alternate director' is possible. 
Principally, decisions are made according to the principle of simple majority or two-
thirds majority rule. However, it can be agreed that at least one director of each party 
has to vote with majority (Duscha, 1987). Unanimous BoD decisions are necessary for 
modifications of the articles of association, transfer of equity, merger, termination and 
elimination of the JV (ibid). For the latter three, the approval of the authorities is 
necessary (Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). For the day-to-day matters, the JV has to 
establish an administration office which is headed by a general manager. Usually, the 
foreign partner appoints the general manager, whereas the Chinese side appoints the 
deputy (Kraus, 1989). 
Profits, r isks and l o s s e s 
Distribution in proportion of the partners' contribution. Deviations from this are possible 
only in proven cases. In principle, the net profit for the foreign partner can, after 
deduction of various reserves of up to 20% (10% into statutory reserves and 5% to 
10% into the legally laid down social welfare), be transferred through the Bank of China 
(Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). 
Duration 
Original version of the 1979 EJV law provided for contract duration of 10 to 30 years, in 
some cases 50 years, with the possibility of extension. For this, the unanimous 
decision of the BoD is necessary as well as approval by the authorities (Kaiser and 
Grimm et al., 1997). Article 12 of the revised EJV law of 1990 states, principally, no 
more limitations on the duration. In certain industries they still exist (Wascher, 1992). 
The duration of a JV reflects China's perception with regard to the process of technical 
adaptation and the developmental importance of the project (Duscha, 1987). The 
transfer of foreign funds prior to the venture's elimination is not possible (Thiess, 1994). 
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The CJV 
Genera l information 
Created in 1988, after continuous foreign criticism of the Inflexible EJV. Specific form of 
co-operation developed by the Chinese, through which, originally. Overseas Chinese 
investment should have been promoted (Wascher, 1992). It Is an especially attractive 
alternative to the EJV when bureaucratic delays hamper the approval process, but has 
since become less Important (Brown, 1985). It subsumes various arrangements 
whereby the partners co-operate In joint projects and business activities according to 
the terms and conditions stipulated In a venture agreement. CJVs, on the surface, have 
a clearer specification of responsibilities and perhaps a more focused task In 
comparison with EJVs (Laughton, 1995). A considerable difference between EJVs and 
CJVs is the clear regulation of the EJV through laws and implementation rules. 
Furthermore, for the CJV, there is no minimum amount of capital commitment provided 
for (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1994). CJVs are 
permitted in all industries. Experience has suggested that approval Is granted 
predominantly to those companies or associations that intend to plan and carry out 
construction and Infrastructure projects, or the development of raw materials and 
energy resources, or if they operate in technology-intensive industries or In the services 
sector In areas such as legal and corporate consulting and insurance (Brown, 1993). 
Foreign companies choose CJVs to bypass the minimum equity required for EJVs. 
Later, they apply to change in registration to an EJV (Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). 
The more Important the project the more difficult this is. 
Legal form 
Can take any form of agreement - from contractual co-operation with no own legal 
Identity to EJV (Plasschaert, 1993; Beamish and Spiess, 1993). Provides, thus, more 
flexibility in negotiation than the EJV. However, according to Grub and Lin (1991), the 
CJV is not as well protected by Chinese laws and regulations as is the EJV. If disputes 
arise, solutions may depend only on legal procedures and court settlement. The legal 
form of the CJV can be a limited liability company or a 'company limited by shares' and, 
as opposed to the EJV, the 'company limited by shares' has been a feasible option 
from the very beginning (Kaiser and Grimm et al., 1997). This contradicts the ideas of 
authors such as Young et al. (1989), Campbell (1989), Child (1994) and Laughton 
(1995) who argue that, with the CJV, the formation of a legal entity Is not possible at all. 
Partners 
At least one Chinese and one foreign. 
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Contribution 
With most contracts, the partners contribute capital in a variety of forms (cash, 
buildings, equipment and know-how, etc.) towards a project (Child, 1994). Since in its 
pure form, where 'pure' refers to cases where CJVs have no own legal Identity, such 
ventures do not have fixed equities and liability capital. As such there are no 
assessment problems. 
Management 
Partners manage the venture jointly (Pearson, 1991). However, there is no legally 
provided structure. Thus, Brown (1985) insists that CJVs normally have no shared 
management. Management can also be transferred to outsiders (Thiess, 1994). 
Wascher (1992) specifies the alternative structures as BoD or joint administration 
committee with at least three members. If the chairman of this committee Is appointed 
by the Chinese side, the foreign side appoints the deputy chairman, and vice versa. 
Daily management is executed by a general manager appointed by the committee. 
Profits, r isks and l o s s e s 
Regulations are formulated in a way that may lead to a high degree of freedom. The 
sharing of profits does not proceed according to fixed ratios, but is negotiable: the 
contract can provide either the splitting of profit and loss or the splitting of products 
(Delegation of German Industry and Commerce Hong Kong, 1994). Eariy transfer of 
the invested funds is possible, but has to be fixed in the contract and a unilateral, eariy 
termination of the contract Is possible (Thiess, 1994) - as opposed to the equity JV. 
Repatriation of foreign funds is undertaken through preferential treatment of the foreign 
partner when distributing profits (foreign partner receives repayment out of gross profit, 
Thoburn et al., 1990) or - similar to compensation trade - through transfer of products 
of the contractual JV to the foreign partner (Wascher, 1992). After expiration of the 
contract, the fixed assets become part of the Chinese partner (Brown, 1985) - only If 
the foreign partner has already repatriated his investment during the operation of the 
JV. If not, a liquidation process has to be gone through that distributes the CJV's 
property - In accordance with the contract - after deducting outstanding demands or 
discharging debts, respectively. 
Duration 
The CJV may be formed for a particular project of limited duration, or for a longer-term 
co-operative effort (Wright, 1981). Thus, the duration of the CJV needs to be fixed in 
the contract. Extension Is possible, but needs to be announced to officials at least six 
months prior to its expiration. 
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Case Studies 
Case One: GER-O-JV 
B a s i c facts about G E R - 0 
Established as a limited partnership (KG), GER-0 is located in South Germany. For 
more than 100 years the Mittelstand company has been manufacturing high tech 
mechanical components applied In Industries, including chemicals and petrochemicals, 
crude oil, machine building, coal refining, conventional and nuclear power generation, 
shipping and marine engineering, pulp and sugar production, etc. GER-O's products 
are suitable for uses in critical areas, where they are exposed to high pressures and 
high speed (GER-0 Company Catalogue, 1988). 
GER-0 considers Itself as the second most Important manufacturer of MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS wortdwide having a market share of 13% (GER-0 Annual Report '94, 
1994), second after its biggest competitor, UK-9, that holds 30% of the wortd market 
for MECHANICAL COMPONENTS. 
International b u s i n e s s activities 
International markets are very important for GER-0 as they are for the majority of 
German machine building companies. In the financial year 1995, GER-0 generated 
57% of its turnover overseas. At the time of the investigation, the company had been 
operating subsidiaries on all continents except Africa. In 1995, GER-0 established an 
operation In South America and its JV in China, In order to be able to establish a 
worldwide distribution system that gets the company closer to its customers (GER-0 
Newsletter, August 1996). In 1996, operations were established In the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia and Russia. 
Apart from Its effort to extend its wortdwide distribution network, GER-0 wants to widen 
Its network of manufacturing locations. In other words, GER-O's long term goal is to 
manufacture Increasingly for the local markets. Eventually, the German company's 
Asian production centres will be India and China (GER-O Newsletter, August 1996). 
The setting up of its JV In China was GER-O's first step of establishing itself as the 
leading supplier of high-quality MECHANICAL COMPONENTS in China (GER-0 
Annual Report '94, 1994). 
G E R - O ' s China experience 
GER-O's first commitment in China was a know-how transfer agreement made In 1982 
where the Chinese customer, a SOE based in CITY [Northeast China], for a lump sum 
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of DM 1.5m (£0.6m) received the right to produce three different types of 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS, together with training In the manufacture of the 
components. The agreement was due to expire In 1992. Initially, GER-0 was not very 
keen to continue engaging again In business in China, due to unsatisfactory living 
conditions In the country for German managers who had to go there for the delivery of 
training sessions, etc. However, especially in the eariy 1990s considerable 
improvements in this respect emerged with further improvements in sight, which 
eventually helped to change the company's mind. 
Joint venture formation 
Joint venture planning 
Since the know-how transfer agreement was financially successful and since China 
was perceived by the German company as offering a great potential market for Its 
products, GER-0 developed a vested interest In continuing its commitment In China "in 
one way or the other." Thus, In 1990, the company started actively seeking for 
opportunities of contracting with a Chinese partner. At approximately the same time, 
KMP, a German leading manufacturer of ENGINEERING PRODUCTS, was Involved In 
negotiations with ABC, a Chinese SOE located in CITY [East China] to establish a JV 
to manufacture ENGINEERING PRODUCTS. The Chinese SOE not only had 
manufactured ENGINEERING PRODUCTS, but also had a MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS division that had produced the MECHANICAL COMPONENTS that 
were needed by Its ENGINEERING PRODUCTS division. A high degree of vertical 
integration Is common for Chinese ENGINEERING PRODUCTS manufacturers and, to 
some extent, also for European. 
The German firm KMP which has been a long-known and very important customer of 
GER-0 In Germany had made clear that It was not Interested in acquiring the 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS division of ABC, but Instead laid out the situation to its 
German supplier GER-0 and presented the opportunities which the teaming up with 
the MECHANICAL COMPONENTS division of ABC would hold for GER-0. Basically, 
KMP proposed to split the Chinese enterprise ABC between itself and GER-0 and both 
German companies would join forces with one part each of ABC which then would 
cease to exist as a manufacturer of both ENGINEERING PRODUCTS and 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS. 
Since GER-0 was searching for collaboration opportunities In China anyway, KMP's 
proposal of 1993 "to invest in Asia" was very welcomed by GER-0. Also, the joint 
project would be located In CITY [East China], where GER-0 saw emerging the worid's 
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biggest region. GER-O's intensive research and KMP's initiative eventually led to first 
talks at GER-0 about committing funds to a JV In China. 
GER-O's director for overseas affairs produced a so-called 'JV assessment handbook' 
which he employs for the planning of foreign subsidiaries and JVs. During the planning 
process, GER-0 examined and determined market potentials in various relevant 
industries in China and the size of the overall Chinese market for MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS, the geographical distribution of these potentials, and the absolute and 
relative positions of Its competitors. The manager had further undertaken a growth 
prognosis of the Chinese market for MECHANICAL COMPONENTS and GER-O's 
potential market share. SEZs and other investment regions as well as on-going co-
operation projects between China and Germany were examined as were forms of co-
operations and investment, know-how transfer, financial assistance for Investment 
projects, assessment of existing Investment projects and their problems, special 
treatment, advantages and disadvantages of investing in China and a comparison of 
potential partners.^ GER-0 spent one month on the completion of this task and relied 
heavily on country-specific Information provided by BfAl, a German government-
funded body that provides information about market and Investment opportunities 
abroad. All the Information collected was used later for the preparation of a project 
feasibility study. 
GER-0 could obtain finance from the German Development Bank (KfW) at 2.5% 
interest rates. It also looked into financing through EClP. However, this was not 
considered appropriate for the company for no further reasons given. 
Motivations for production in Cfiina 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
The reasons of GER-0 to set up a plant In China were the potential of the Chinese 
market for the German company and GER-O's aforementioned strategy of developing 
its operations on a wortdwide scale. China would thus be used as a strategic position 
from where to develop and penetrate other markets. GER-O's goal has been to 
become not only the best, but also the biggest manufacturer of MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS In China (GER-0 Newsletter, January 1996). 
Motivations to form a joint venture 
For GER-0 the following-the-customer motivation was one of the main driving forces 
behind, and the initiator for, its decision to establish a JV with a local Chinese company 
instead of a WFOE. GER-0 followed one of its biggest customers In Germany, KMP, to 
China. In fact, KMP had initiated talks between GER-0 and the Chinese SOE ABC with 
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which KMP was negotiating the possibility of establishing a JV to manufacture 
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS. In Its newsletter (GER-0 Newsletter, January 1996), 
GER-0 emphasises the Importance of following its International customers. In this 
case, the market potential of GER-0 would be created. Initially at least, by KMP. This 
was a high business security factor for GER-0. Secured volumes would be sought by 
KMP and would help GER-O-JV to facilitate the cost-effective production of high quality 
components to develop further segments of the Chinese market. 
Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
Although GER-0 examined other, alternative, Chinese companies, its way of finding Its 
Chinese partner was somewhat pre-determined by KMP's strategic move to joint 
venture with the Chinese SOE ABC. 
Partner selection criteria 
Despite the above mentioned pre-determlnation of GER-O's Chinese partner company, 
the German firm applied thoroughly a set of criteria when comparing ABC with other, 
alternative, Chinese enterprises. This set of criteria had been successfully applied for 
the establishment of all of GER-O's operations before. Selection criteria Included the 
partners' turnover (total and MECHANICAL COMPONENTS), market shares, number 
of employees, turnover per capita, industrial focus, location, range of MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS, licences for ENGINEERING PRODUCTS and MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS, sales and distribution networks, production, technical know-how and 
management. GER-O Investigated further the potential partners' five-year profitabilities 
and their cash flows. Eventually, GER-0 had to choose between an ENGINEERING 
PRODUCTS manufacturer based In a provincial capital in North-China and the SOE 
ABC that was said to have a good reputation In and out of CITY [East China]. 
Partner characteristics 
GER-0 teamed up with one Chinese partner in its JV. Prior to committing itself to the 
JV with the German enterprises KMP and GER-0, the Chinese company ABC had a 
workforce in excess of 2,000 employees with 200 working in its MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS division. The remaining employees worked In its ENGINEERING 
PRODUCTS division and supporting departments, typical for Chinese SOEs. 
After GER-0 had taken over ABC's MECHANICAL COMPONENTS division and KMP 
ABC's ENGINEERING PRODUCTS division, ABC ceased to exist as an 
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS and MECHANICAL COMPONENTS manufacturer. 
However, in September 1996, the municipal government of CITY [East China] had 
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decided to revive ABC to new corporate life and in October 1996, ABC had sold its 
shares in both the KMP JV and GER-O-JV to CGMG Corp., a holding closely linked to 
the municipal government of CITY [East China]. Simultaneously, ABC terminated its 
partnership with GER-0 and KMP. The new co-owner of GER-O-JV is a conglomerate 
of three dozen firms, both Chinese and Sino-foreign (including eight ENGINEERING 
PRODUCTS manufacturers), employing some 60,000 staff. 
The transfer of the equity has brought at least one major change to GER-0. CGMG 
Corp. has international links, as opposed to ABC and it was hoped that the member 
companies in the group will be potential partners or customers of GER-O-JV. For 
instance, it is hoped within GER-0 that being part of this 'union' would help meet GER-
O-JV meet its set export share of total production. By the time of the investigation, 
GER-0 had supported GER-O-JV's exports with DM100,000 (£42,553.2) and the JV's 
own export topped some US$30,000 (£12,766.0), equalling a total of RMB745,703. 
However, according to plan, GER-O-JV should have exported goods worth some 
US$0.28m (£0.18m; RMB2.4m). This suggests a gap of approximately US$0.19m 
(£0.12m; RMB1.6m). 
According to an official document about the change of ownership, GER-0 agreed to the 
proposed acquisition since CGMG Corp. could help GER-O-JV with providing access to 
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS manufacturers. As a matter of fact, GER-O had no 
choice, but to agree ]...[ and it was annoyed since it was informed about the transfer of 
shares only when it already was completed. 
Although ABC was re-established, it had been, contractually, not allowed to 
manufacture or sell neither ENGINEERING PRODUCTS nor MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS. Instead, it had turned into a service provider, catering for the KMP 
JV's and GER-O-JV's workforces and operating a huge fleet of buses which transport 
workers to and from the factories. In addition to its catering and transportation 
services, ABC created an operative division that takes on contract manufacturing 
orders. For instance, if manufacturing capacity at GER-O-JV becomes a temporary 
bottleneck, it subcontracts work to ABC. This move helped ABC find alternative 
employment for some of its staff not taken over by either KMP or GER-O-JV. 
Joint venture negotiation process 
Negotiation contents and conflict 
The main content of the negotiations was the product programme that would be 
manufactured by the JV. GER-0 offered approximately 65% of its entire MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS programme and the potential Chinese partner selected what should 
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be manufactured in the JV. Eventually, GER-0 did not accept the entire shopping list of 
its Chinese partner, since some where perceived to be too state-of-the-art, for 
instance. Of the accepted MECHANICAL COMPONENTS types, the entire technology 
was transferred to the JV. 
Contents of the negotiations were further the planning of operations in subsequent 
years, the contents of the feasibility study, the distribution of equity shares, and 
particularly the valuation of both partners' contributions, such as drawings (German 
contribution) and machinery (Chinese contribution). Initially, this was a major problem 
for both parties. Eventually, however, the companies could agree upon their 
contributions' values. For instance, the valuation of contributed assets or attributes was 
a major problem of the negotiations between the Chinese SOE ABC and UK-9 that 
was, for three years prior to GER-0, involved in JV negotiations with ABC. In this 
particular case, both parties had already signed the 'letter of intent'. However, the 
inability of both partners to compromise, together with the fact that ABC considered 
GER-0 as technologically more advanced, eventually terminated the plans to establish 
the mutually intended JV between ABC and UK-9. 
GER-O's director for overseas affairs had his clear idea of what would be acceptable 
and what not as the outcome of negotiations. He "was prepared to withdraw from our 
proposal if I had not felt comfortable with an issue." For instance, GER-0, out of 
principle, demands 5 1 % equity ownership in JVs. If ABC had not accepted this, GER-0 
would have withdrawn from its proposal to JV with the Chinese enterprise. Eventually, 
ABC offered GER-0 a 60% equity share even. Would the total investment in the project 
have been larger, ABC's opinion of the foreign equity share and that of the municipal 
government would have been different, though and it would likely not have accepted a 
foreign majority stake. 
The duration of the JV was agreed at 50 years with an option of extension. Usually, 
GER-0 commits itself to project durations of ten to 15 years. However, since the 
Chinese party "liked such long durations very much," GER-0 agreed to it. A further 
aspect of JV negotiations was GER-O-JV's market target. Although GER-0 had made 
clear that it came to China "in order to serve the Chinese market," it had to agree to 
purchase a certain quantity of the JV's output for export markets: by the end of the fifth 
year of operation, the venture has to export 30% of its annual production. 
SME negotiation team, location, duration, language of negotiations, interpreters 
Things happened very quickly with the establishment of GER-0-JV. On 14. July 1994 a 
Chinese delegation came to Germany for talks. This was followed by a visit to China by 
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managers of the overseas business division of GER-0 from 25. to 29. July 1994 when 
the 'letter of intent' between the parties was signed. In August 1994, GER-O's director 
of overseas affairs went to China to sign the contract whose content was based on 
GER-O's business plan. The JV was approved, due to the relatively small investment in 
the venture, by the municipal government of CITY [East China]. Chinese law stipulates 
that MOFTEC must examine and approve the establishment of JVs in China, and issue 
a 'Certificate of Approval'. MOFTEC is authorised to delegate such examination and 
approval authority to its provincial and municipal counterparts (Randt, 1995). 
Eventually, the operation of GER-O-JV started on 2. January 1995, after only about six 
months of preparations and negotiations. This was due to GER-O's determined 
approach towards the undertaking and its professional proceeding. Further, the 
Chinese side could manage to get the JV approved by the municipal government so 
quickly for two main reasons: first, ABC had close links with the municipal government 
of CITY [East China] and secondly, the Chinese partner wanted the deal. ABC 
certainly refrained from delaying or even jeopardising its deal with GER-0 since this 
could have affected its main deal with KMP to form the proposed KMP-JV to produce 
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS. This certainly saved GER-0 substantial funds, otherwise 
necessary for extended negotiations, travel to China, etc. 
Partner contributions 
SME's contribution 
GER-0 contributed to its JV assets and attributes worth a total of approximately 
DM3.32m (£1.41m) in the form of cash, know-how and drawings. Its cash contribution 
accounted for some DM1.7m (£0.7m) and the remaining DM1.62m (£0.69m) were in 
the form of some 6,000 drawings of sizes A4 to AO.^ These were the drawings and part 
lists which formed the basis of the JVs production in China. 
Chinese partner's contribution 
GER-O's partner. ABC, had conthbuted its own MECHANICAL COMPONENTS 
programme, machinery, land, warehouse facilities, and it was responsible also for the 
staffing of the JV. GER-0 had not expected a cash contribution from its Chinese 
partner, according to the JV's German production and quality assurance manager, 
though his assistant insisted that the Chinese side also contributed local currency. The 
production and quality assurance manager of the JV considers land to be the most 
important contribution of the Chinese partner since, "as a foreigner you never have the 
right to acquire land." Instead, China knows the system of land leasing of up to 99 
years. Subsequently, the land and buildings on it fall back to the Chinese People. 
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A problem that relates to the Chinese partner's conthbution of land is that, frequently, 
foreign direct investors failed to reassure themselves when establishing a JV: the 
Chinese partners bring into the JV land and later, a third party starts claiming money 
due to its right which it holds in the land. "And of course, when they know they can get 
money off you, they try to squeeze you," suggested the production and quality 
assurance manager. This problem was confirmed by Mr. Gotschlich of the German 
Centre for Industry and Commerce in Shanghai (interview on 5.11.96). This is not the 
case in GER-O-JV - at least it had not been detected at the time of the investigation. 
Joint venture operation 
Joint venture background information 
Joint venture establishment, total investment and workforce 
GER-O-JV is an equity JV and was established as a limited liability company, according 
to Chinese law. The total investment in the JV accounts for DM6.5m (£2.8m). At the 
time of the investigation, GER-O-JV employed 95 staff. 
Joint venture location 
GER-O-JV is located in an economic and technological development zone in CITY 
[East China]. It is located in the neighbourhood of the Sino-German KMP JV, on the 
site that originally belonged to the Chinese parent company ABC. Not only can GER-O-
JV find many of its clients in immediate reach in CITY [East China], but CITY [East 
China] had always had the reputation of being superior, suggesting that products 
manufactured there would be appreciated by customers all over the country - a good 
marketing argument. It is relevant, however, for Chinese, rather than for Sino-foreign 
customers. For those, the reputation of the German partner weighs more than the fact 
of producing in CITY [East China]. 
Choice of location 
Although GER-0 had two other, alternative, locations for establishing a JV, one in 
North China and another one in China's remote area, the question always was very 
dichotomous: CITY [East China] or not. Only if CITY [East China] as location for an 
investment had been rejected, the other locations would have been thoroughly 
investigated. A GER-0 research team was sent to CITY [East China] and after the 
presentation of their location assessment report, CITY [East China] was chosen. 
Proximity to GER-O-JV's markets was a main factor determining the choice of location. 
Important for the director for overseas affairs of GER-O was also that the location was 
in a "civilised area, otherwise you will find nobody to send there." From the very 
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beginning of its JV planning process, GER-0 had the intention to expatriate a German 
manager who would look after the interests of GER-0 on the spot. 
The economic and technological development zone offers the usual tax concessions: 
there are no taxes to be paid in the first two years and from year three to five the JV 
pays only 50% income tax. After that, the JV pays the full rate of 33%. 
Production site 
From January 1995 to July 1996, GER-O-JV had operated in an old building that 
belonged to the Chinese parent and which was rent out to the JV. However, from the 
very beginning the erection of a new building was planned since the old one would be 
needed eventually by the KMP JV and it further was not big enough for the needs of 
GER-O-JV. Thus, from October 1995 to June 1996, a new, purpose-built workshop and 
office building was established on the land that was contributed to the JV by the 
Chinese parent company. The new company building on a total site of 5,000 square 
metres, was officially opened in June 1996. Most of GER-O's DM1.7m (£0.7m) cash 
contribution was used for the erection of the new production site. Being located in the 
immediate neighbourhood of GER-O's customer KMP saves time and money for 
transportation and makes thus GER-O-JV's products attractive to KMP-JV. 
Product range 
According to the contract between GER-0 and ABC, the JV has the right to 
manufacture MECHANICAL COMPONENTS and MECHANICAL COMPONENT 
SYSTEMS, predominantly for the power and chemical industries. Compared with the 
range of MECHANICAL COMPONENTS and other products that are manufactured at 
the SME's German plant, the JV's production programme is only a small fraction. 
Target market 
The JV contract provides that the vast majority of the JV's output should be sold into 
the Chinese market. However, from the first to the fifth year of operation (= 1999), the 
share of output sold into the Chinese market must be reduced gradually from 95 to 
70%. To export as much as 30% of its entire output is considered a lot by GER-0. 
Whereas the German production and quality assurance manager believes the 30% 
share to be difficult to achieve - in fact, according to the director for overseas affairs at 
GER-0, these targets have never been met - both the assistant sales and assistant 
production and quality assurance managers are confident to meet this target. The 
latter based his confidentiality on a section in the JV contract that requires GER-0 to 
purchase up to 20% of the JV's output. 
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GER-0 had recently arranged an order for the JV from a customer in Mexico about 
300,000 minor MECHANICAL COMPONENTS. Although GER-O-JV could not make 
any money with this deal, it primarily supported its Mexican partner company that was 
looking for cheap products to get a foot into the Mexican market. Further, with the 
overseas sales the JV could contribute to its set export volume. Apart from Mexico, the 
JV had also been exporting to subsidiaries of GER-0 in Australia and South Africa. 
China-based customers of GER-O-JV are existing Chinese as well as other Sino-
foreign JVs or WFOEs. In its newsletter (GER-0 Newsletter, January 1996) GER-0 
emphasises the importance of some of its international customers having already, or 
are about to establish JVs. This would help GER-0 to get established in the Chinese 
market. GER-O-JV had been further targeting customers that were being served by its 
domestic and overseas competitors. Another aspect of the JV's market potential is the 
future development of the power generation, chemical and infrastructure construction 
tools industries. However, new factory building in China is difficult to predict. "The 
government plans a certain number of factories, but at the end of the day might build 
only half of them, because of financial restrictions," commented the Chinese assistant 
production and quality assurance manager. 
GER-O-JV's domestic customers are spread all over the country. However, the area 
around CITY [East China] is one of the bigger concentrations of its customers. Clients 
are also in North China and the JV was, at the time of the investigation, attempting to 
develop business in South China, too. 
Apart from Chinese and Sino-foreign ventures, GER-O-JV has another group of 
domestic customers: only recently was the JV selected as one of the main suppliers of 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS to the Chinese aerospace industry. The number of 
suppliers was fixed by the central government and GER-O-JV had inherited this 
privilege from ABC. 
Market share in China 
At the end of 1995, GER-O-JV had a share of 3 to 5% of the Chinese market for 
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS. The reason for this small share is that the Chinese 
parent, ABC, prior to entering into GER-O-JV, had manufactured MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS only for its own ENGINEERING PRODUCTS division, but not for other 
customers. This suggests that the market had been open for GER-O-JV only since 
early 1995 when it started to serve other companies also. The assistant sales 
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manager's guess for the JV's market share in its fifth year of operation (= 1999) is at 
approximately 10 to 15%. 
Joint venture ownership 
GER-0 holds a majority share of 5 1 % in its JV. This is what the German company 
wanted. Although the Chinese side had offered a 60% share, GER-0 refused to accept 
this since it wanted a strong partner in the JV. GER-O's strategy was to combine a risk 
position as small as possible with a control position as big as necessary to avoid 
dissipation of its technology. On the other hand, GER-0 wanted an active partner in the 
JV, rather than one who regarded the JV as a portfolio investment. 
Joint venture control 
GER-O-JV's board of directors (BoD) has four members, two Germans and two 
Chinese. On the foreign side, these are the director for overseas affairs of GER-0 who 
is also the superior of the expatriate production and quality assurance manager of 
GER-O-JV. On the Chinese side were, originally, one director of ABC and the Chinese 
general manager of GER-O-JV. However, since ABC had sold its share in GER-O-JV to 
CGMG Corp., ABC's appointment of one director to the JV's board became invalid and 
a new member of the BoD had to be appointed. The director for overseas affairs of 
GER-0 is also chairman of the JV's BoD. The vice-chairmanship is held by CGMG 
Corp. That one side holds the chairmanship and the other the vice-chairmanship is 
common in Sino-foreign JVs with equal ownership distribution or slight diversions from 
that. Apart from the four directors of GER-O-JV, all other managers attend board 
meetings. This was agreed between the parties as it allows the sharing of information 
and the obtaining of input for the general manager's decision-making. 
Although GER-0 holds 5 1 % and, thus, the majority stake in GER-O-JV it insisted that 
the general manager of the JV should be a Chinese and not a foreigner. A foreign 
general manager, so considered the production and quality assurance manager, would 
only be a marionette. Certainly, its majority stake gave GER-0 this confidence in 
appointing a Chinese general manager. If there are arguments within the company, the 
German enterprise can easily play out its 5 1 % . Prior to his appointment as general 
manager, the 50 year old Chinese was vice-managing director of ABC. 
Originally, sales was given into the hands of the general manager, though gradually, 
the German expatriate manager has taken on responsibility of this. 
Board meetings take place once every six months in China and last for one to two 
days. Additional meetings can be arranged if and when necessary ]...[ or "if somebody 
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is just on his way through CITY [East China]." In the meetings, everything is discussed 
openly. Contents such as the policy of the company for the next six months are 
debated and agreed, problems are discussed, etc. For instance, a, at the time of the 
investigation, recent major decision was the implementation of a computer network at 
the cost of about US$80,000 (£51,282). In principle, every major investment has to be 
discussed by the BoD. Discussed by the BoD are also decisions of appointing 
additional foreign staff to the JV or senior Chinese personnel in strategic positions, 
including sales. 
Day-to-day decisions in the JV are made by the individual line managers whereas 
major decisions are made only with the approval of the chairman of the BoD. 
Although GER-0 holds a majority stake in the JV, consensus decisions are sought and 
usually found. "Up to now, we did not have a major crisis in decision-making," said the 
production and quality assurance manager. 
Joint venture management 
Every Monday morning, all department managers and, additionally, the managers in 
the general manager office discuss the most important problems the JV is confronted 
with. In addition to this, the individual departments meet separately to debate 
department-specific issues. 
Since the general manager does not speak English, "though he was supposed to learn 
it," the contact person for the chairman of the BoD is the expatriate production and 
quality assurance manager, who functions as an intermediary between the director for 
overseas affairs of GER-0 and the general manager of the JV. In this function, he can 
propose to the general manager what the chairman would like to happen with the JV. 
As a 'level two' manager, the then production and quality assurance manager of the JV 
had no decision-making power with regard to the overall business of GER-O-JV or 
matters in other departments. Functionally, the German expatriate is in equal terms 
with the sales and engineering managers, for instance. He has no authority to issue 
directives, can only propose to the general manager who then takes action or not. "The 
general manager decides nearly always the way, I want it," said the German manager. 
This way of management had been considered as a problem by the German side and 
thus the BoD decided to create a new position for the expatriate: early in 1997 he 
became assistant general manager. Only then would it be possible to issue directives 
for other managers, "and they can accept it without losing face." 
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At the time of the investigation, GER-0 had expatriated only one German manager, an 
engineer. Whereas initially he was production and quality assurance manager, later he 
was promoted assistant general manager. The German expatriate costs some 
DM400,000 (£179,213) per year. This includes the RMB450,000 (£33,383) to 
RMB500,000 (£37,092) for accommodation, catering and telephone born by the JV. 
Joint venture problems 
The problems GER-0 was facing at the time of the investigation were various. 
Production 
The quality problem with sourcing subsequently affects the ability of the JV to meet its 
export targets since only high quality exports can be sold into international export 
markets. Further, MECHANICAL COMPONENTS of only low quality produced by the 
JV could harm the high quality reputation of the German parent company. For retaining 
the quality standard of MECHANICAL COMPONENTS produced in the JV, the 
production and quality assurance manager highlighted the importance of the transfer of 
know-how. "The transfer of machines is only the last step in the process of 
transforming quality," he said. However, customers often think that quality depends on 
the use of high quality machinery, exclusively. Although the JV was working with 
Chinese machines, it was able to manufacture German quality, according to the 
production and quality assurance manager. 
At the time of the investigation, GER-O-JV was working on getting its operation ISO 
approved. ISO 9002 had been implemented as far as 70% and completion was 
expected by the autumn of 1996. Certification according to ISO 9001 was expected for 
the end of June 1997. 
Local sourcing 
Local sourcing has been a distinct problem for GER-O-JV. Although GER-O-JV 
sourced, at the time of the investigation, approximately 90% of its supplies locally (at a 
lower cost), gualitatively sufficiently good components still had to be purchased in 
Germany, imposed with an import duty of between 25 to 27%. "It is impossible to get 
them in China," the production and quality assurance manager said. Whereas the JV 
can easily source, for instance, carbon ceramic, silicon carbide of good quality would 
be difficult to get in China. Also, special measuring tools are purchased in Germany 
since the quality of these types of tools in China is not sufficient. Apart from a low and 
sometimes not even sufficient quality of local supplies, a sourcing problem has been 
also the lack of reliability of Chinese suppliers. The production and quality assurance 
manager assumes that "what complicates the quality problem even more is the fact 
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that Chinese staff that have worked for years with certain materials have difficulties in 
understanding that these materials are all over sudden not good enough any more." 
This rests on a different understanding of quality between the German expatriate and 
Chinese workers. "The Chinese adopt new things very quickly, but they also stick to 
old norms," he pointed out. 
Another barrier to local sourcing is the fact that all materials are labelled according to 
the American system (ASI) whereas all the drawings and blueprints used by the JV are 
based on the German industry norm (DIN). 
Know-how dissemination 
Further, the German expatriate worried about know-how dissemination in "the biggest 
copy country." Once, various GER-O-JV blueprints appeared at the German 
headquarters, though they were not supposed to. As a consequence, draconic 
protection means had to be implemented and now all blueprints are locked in a room 
and even the German production and quality assurance manager has to ask for the 
key if he wants blueprints. 
Productivity 
Both the director for overseas affairs of GER-0 and the assistant general manager 
criticised the lower productivity of personnel in the JV, compared with personnel in its 
plants in Germany. On average, a German production worker costs GER-0 
approximately DM75,000^ (£31,915), whereas in China, costs are at DM11,700 
(£4,979) per year. Productivity of Chinese workers would be "somewhere around 30% 
of ours," said the director for overseas affairs. "In our JV, some 100 employees 
turnover DM2.7m (£1.1m), whereas in Germany one employee turns over DM200,000 
(£85,106)." 
There is a big gap between what Chinese workers earn and what they actually cost a 
foreign investor, though this is frequently overlooked by foreign investors. The case of 
GER-O-JV demonstrated this. For instance, at the time of the investigation, GER-O-JV 
employees were paid the following basic monthly salaries. 
To derive at the actual labour costs in GER-O-JV, the personnel manager has to 
calculate with an add-on-top factor of 1.48." This changes the basic salaries paid to the 
employees tremendously. For instance, taken a middle manager (level 2) at GER-O-
JV: instead of RMB4,500 (£333.8) per month, he costs the company RMB6,660 
(£489.6). Equally, production workers do not cost the basic salary of RMB850 (£63.1) 
but RMB1,258 (£93.3). 
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Monthly basic salaries paid to employees in GER-O-JV. 
Position in the JV Remuneration in RMB (£ equivalent) 
Workshop staff RMB 850 (£63.1) 
Office staff RMB 900 - 1,000 (£66.8 - £74.2) 
Managerial staff level 3 (e.g. HR manager) RMB 2,500 (£185.5) 
Managerial staff level 2 (e.g. sales manager) RMB 4,500 (£333.8) 
Note: Salaries paid in 1996. 
Foreign exchange 
Foreign exchange had been a problem for GER-O-JV. By the end of the second year of 
operation (= 1996) the company should have generated a foreign exchange surplus of 
some US$200,000 (£128,205). The assistant production and quality assurance 
manager believed that the "headquarters will take care of this, otherwise the foreign 
exchange issue will be a big problem for the JV." With 'taking care' he means the 
headquarters would help the JV to export. The JV needs foreign exchange to purchase 
quality components from overseas. 
Collision of interests 
A major problem area had been the collision of interests of the German parent 
company and GER-O-JV. For instance, the production of special MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS was originally not included in the contract. However, GER-O-JV was 
approached by a Chinese customer to produce such a component. Subsequently, 
GER-O-JV had ordered the drawings from Germany and they were transmitted to the 
factory in China. The special component was produced and offered to the Chinese 
customer at only 60% of the price GER-0 charged for the same product in Germany. 
Thus, GER-O-JV was blamed by its German parent that had to justify its higher 
German price to the allegedly Chinese customer that turned out to be a German-
funded venture (the German company is a client of GER-0). 
Obviously, there was a lack of communication and co-ordination between the German 
parent company and GER-O-JV. A possible reason is that there are only two persons 
in the JV who can speak English and are familiar with the MECHANICAL 
COMPONENTS business. The rest does either not speak English or does not know 
the business. 
In fact, the director for overseas affairs at GER-0 considered communication a major 
problem of the German company's JV operation - however, between the JV and the 
German parent, rather than within the JV. To overcome this problem, GER-0 intended 
to recruit a Chinese who had studied in Germany. This proves a good strategy to 
overcome the potential and existing lack of communication between the parent 
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company and its operation in China. This strategy works out beneficially and is also 
economically justifiable if the Chinese employee is capable of doing a job a German 
national does. In such cases, the Chinese national has a clear competitive advantage. 
Sales and marketing 
The Chinese managers in GER-O-JV considered the most important factor for 
successful sales the existence of 'guanxi'. "We ask our friends to help us making the 
contact. If friends can help us, it's easier," both the assistant production and quality 
assurance and the assistant sales managers pointed out. However, this has been 
perceived as a problem by the German production and quality assurance manager. 
"Aggressive customer acquisition as we know it in Germany is not commonplace in 
China and even disliked," he suggested. However, slowly this changes and sometimes 
the Chinese sales staff pro-actively make the effort to telephone potential clients. In the 
past, sales staff relied too much, as perceived by the expatriate manager, on people 
they knew somewhere in companies and refused to approach a potential client if they 
did not know people there. Thus, the transfer of sales know-how has been considered 
extremely necessary within the JV. 
Price 
The price of its MECHANICAL COMPONENTS is a major obstacle for GER-O-JV. The 
higher price, compared with that of competitors, is partly caused by higher wages that 
have to be paid in CITY [East China], compared with elsewhere. Further, GER-O-JV is 
controlled by its headquarters and cannot go too low with its prices. However, the first 
thought in China is price. Thus, GER-O-JV will eventually have to compensate its 
disadvantages from being expensive by offering the highest quality available in China, 
accompanied by reliability, customer service, etc. 
In conclusion, the director for overseas affairs of GER-0 would anticipate many more 
problems without having a majority equity share. "But now, with the majority stake, I 
determine what is happening." 
Joint venture evaluation 
Joint venture performance 
According to GER-0, so far the JV could realise everything that was planned. "It is a 
good success," according to the director for overseas affairs of GER-0. He had 
planned two loss-making years and profits from the third year on. The second year 
loss had fallen even below the planned. GER-O-JV's loss in 1995 was minus RMBLOm 
368 
Appendix VII 
(£0.074m) and for 1996 GER-0 expected a loss of RMB600,000 (£44,510) which was 
actually only RMB300,000 (£22,255). 
Sales volume by the end of August 1996 accounted for some RMB8.02m (£0.59m) 
which is an increase of 39.2% over the same period of 1995 and also 25% more than 
was planned for the year. 
Case Two: UK-3-JV 
B a s i c facts about UK-3 
Established as a limited liability company, UK-3 is based in the English midlands. It is 
one of the world's leading manufacturers of INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS with 
installations at airports, docks and harbours, railway marshalling yards and station 
platforms, sports stadiums, industrial areas, motonways, expressway interchanges, etc. 
(UK-3 Company Catalogue, 1995). UK-3 has an international reputation for its 
commitment to high engineering standards and quality production with consideration to 
low or maintenance-free equipment. At the time of the investigation, UK-3 employed 
210 staff at its corporate headquarters and its maintenance depot in London. 
International b u s i n e s s activities 
UK-3 has been conducting business virtually all over the world, though this information 
is not specific. Business activities limit themselves to exporting and the installation of 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. The JV in China is the SME's only investment project. 
UK-3 's Ch ina experience 
Approximately 15 years ago, UK-3 had first developed business in the Far East, 
particularly in Hong Kong. Later, in about 1985, UK-3 started seeking export 
opportunities also to China, since the Chinese market was perceived as having a big 
potential for the SME's infrastructure products. 
Joint venture formation 
Joint venture planning 
Rather than scientific, UK-3's approach towards establishing an FDI project in China 
was rather shallow and hskful, ie setting up a company first and looking how the 
market works. The approach was a so-called 'gut-approach', lacking a sound definition 
and assessment of evaluation criteria. 
Motivations for production in China 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
China is set to spend astronomic amounts of money (RMB1,000bn) over the next ten 
or so years on infrastructure projects all over the country. For UK-3, this might be a 
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huge potential market for its products. The expatriate general manager of UK-3-JV 
believes that the Asian market "could bring us more than enough work to occupy our 
capacity" and the managing director of UK-3 estimated the demand for its products in 
China "ten times bigger than in the UK." Exporting back of products to the UK could 
possibly not even be realised by the JV, though it was considered. On the other hand, 
the general manager also contended that there is "perhaps not enough money to be 
spent." UK-3's 'potential market' argument lacks substantiation. A precise assessment 
of this 'potential' demand for infrastructure products in the form of a market study, for 
instance, had never been undertaken, sound figures never been established. 
Servicing the huge potential Chinese market with exports from the UK was considered 
difficult by UK-3. Access to the market through exporting exclusively would be limited 
since reaction to changes in demand would be rather sluggish. Further, UK-3 had 
realised that the supply of goods from England to China cost-competitively would 
become increasingly difficult since transportation and import duties lift prices 
considerably. In addition, competitors in China and Vietnam, both local and foreign, 
that can utilise low cost production were considered being at an advantage in servicing 
their own as well as neighbouring markets. In summary, apart from the potential 
market argument, UK-3 also hoped to utilise low production costs to become more cost 
competitive. Steel, the main material used for production, for instance, was regarded 
being cheaply available in China, and so was labour. Without the ability to purchase 
large volumes of steel of a certain quality and at a low price, UK-3 would not have 
started production in China. UK-3's further salient reasons for its FDI commitment were 
the 'necessity to be there' and the 'establishment of a strategic position in Asia-Pacific'. 
Motivations to form a joint venture 
Establishing a manufacturing base, UK-3 had two options, to engage in a JV or to set 
up a WFOE. Since UK-3 does not operate in one of China's restricted industries, both 
opportunities were open to the company. Eventually, UK-3 opted for a JV since it 
assumed having a Chinese partner was essential for setting up the venture and for 
developing business. In fact, the contacts of the partner in the Chinese market, its links 
to officials and its knowledge of potential Chinese customers were regarded as the 
most important attribute of the Chinese partner. Subsequently, it had taken UK-3 
another five years before it started looking for a partner in a potential JV. 
Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
After UK-3 had decided to set up a business in China and that this business would be 
a JV, the SME, in subsequent years, approached various potential partners in North, 
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South and East China. Eventually, in East China, the managing director of UK-3 met 
with the Chinese partner company, an Independent port authority under the Chinese 
Ministry of Communications, that would become its later partner. 
Partner selection criteria 
With its later partner, UK-3 obtained its desired 'Chinese element', the 'guanxi', and it 
secured a partner that had a large share of the market. Further, when approached, the 
East Chinese port authority showed interest in the proposed collaboration. These were 
the criteria that were important for UK-3 for partner selection. Of considerable interest 
in this particular case was the fact also that the potential Chinese partner company 
"had no idea about the product." UK-3 hoped that its Chinese counterpart would be a 
silent partner, not participating in the management of the JV. UK-3 needed its Chinese 
partner exclusively for getting business in the Chinese market. "Unless you have 
guanxi you do not get business," the managing director of UK-3 said. Without the 
necessity of finding a way to acquire the 'guanxi' and since it was believed that a JV is 
the best way to do so, UK-3 would have possibly decided to set up a WFOE. 
Partner characteristics 
UK-3 joined forces with one Chinese partner company. This was the local port 
authority of CITY [East China] under the Chinese Ministry of Communications with a 
workforce in excess of 3,000 employees. The managing director of UK-3 insists that 
the Chinese company is not a SOE, though there was no indication in the interviews on 
the spot that it was not. 
Joint venture negotiation process 
Negotiation contents and conflict 
For its operation UK-3-JV needs a lot of steel. Thus, the UK SME had to ensure that 
logistics and material supply were adequate throughout the course of the project. "We 
did not want to sign a contract to find out later that we could not get steel in China," 
said the managing director of UK-3. With great difficulties the company negotiated that 
the JV could import steel if there were quality and delivery problems with international 
projects. This agreement allowed for the importation of as much as 200 tonnes of steel 
per year at a maximum duty of 15%. However, whereas the importation of raw 
materials is accepted in cases where raw matehals of comparable quality and price 
cannot be purchased in China at comparable conditions (see JV law implementation 
rules), the contractual agreement of a fixed import duty of 15% seems rather 
surprising: the determination of set import duties rests upon tax authorities. 
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With regard to the duration of the JV, UK-3 opted for 30 years. This, however, was 
initially rejected by the Chinese side that wanted 15 years, instead. Since 15 years 
were considered not long enough as duration of the venture, UK-3 insisted on its 
original proposal and eventually, the parties agreed 30 years as duration of the JV with 
the possibility of extension. 
Another issue of dispute during negotiations of UK-3-JV was the JV's market focus. 
The Chinese side wanted the JV to export as much as 50%, whereas it has been the 
objective of UK-3 to develop a new, ie the Chinese, market. In other words, UK-3 
wanted to get additional business, but not to substitute for its exports to world markets 
from the UK. It was the intention of UK-3 that its JV should not have too much market 
impact on "our product and production here [UK and Europe]." The plant in China 
should sell its products only to the Chinese and neighbouring Asian markets. This was 
the idea of UK-3's managing director. The UK SME wanted to avoid so-called market 
cannibalism, where subsidiary (JV) sales substitute export sales originating from the 
foreign parent company. Subsequently, exporting certain fractions of the output back to 
the UK would be considered. Eventually, however, UK-3 agreed to a 50% export share 
with the Chinese side. The Chinese party's bargaining position was too strong for the 
UK SME to withhold. 
Whereas the managing director of UK-3 was rather reluctant in talking about problems 
that occurred during the establishment or operation phases, the expatriate general 
manager of UK-3-JV was rather frank. He suggested that the valuation of the 
machinery contributed by UK-3 was "absolutely horrendous." The assets bureau in 
CITY [East China] simply ignored all the invoices he had provided and eventually, the 
Chinese side valued the assets brought in by UK-3 at some US$100,000 (£64,102) 
less "than they were worth. This was to get an extra US$100,000 (£64,102)," he said. 
Although it was very annoying for the general manager, UK-3 had to give in, since 
without the UK SME accepting it, the joint business would not have been approved by 
the Chinese authorities. He remembers with reference to his small black book where 
he pencils down all major or minor issues of conflict that "the Chinese said: if you do 
not accept this you will never get the business licence." 
A further issue of conflict was the distribution of the equity shares in the JV. Whereas 
UK-3 was very keen in holding the majority stake in the enterprise, the Chinese partner 
insisted on evenly shared equity. UK-3 accepted, but insisted on, and was granted, the 
right to appoint the general manager. 
SME negotiation team, location, duration, lanquaqe of negotiations, interpreters 
Negotiations were held in China exclusively. The Chinese side prepared two sets of 
documents and everything was discussed "point by point". The managing director of 
UK-3 initiated and spent considerable amounts of time preparing and carrying out the 
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negot iat ions. Only towards the end of {he process was the expertise of Price 
Waterhouse 's local off ice in CITY [East China] consulted that jointly with UK-3 worked 
out the f inal documents needed for the establ ishment of the JV. The entire negotiation 
process required eight meetings (including the final signing of the documents) and had 
lasted for 18 months. Eventually, the JV contract was signed in September 1995 and 
the JV approved by the municipal government of CITY [East China]. 
Partner contributions 
SME's contr ibut ion 
UK-3 commit ted capital, machinery and technical know-how. UK-3 had the right (see 
PRC Company Law; see also Kay and Mann, 1995) to contribute a maximum of 2 0 % 
of the JV's total registered capital (or 5 0 % of its total contribution to the registered 
capital) in the form of technical know-how. This would have saved cash. However, UK-
3 gave away this right in return for extra work paid for by the Chinese partner in the 
form of electrical installations that needed to be carried out in the factory. Eventually, of 
its contr ibut ion of slightly more than US$1.6m (£1.0), approximately US$0.6m (£0.4) 
were contr ibuted in the form of machinery and the balance in cash. UK-3 had the 
obl igat ion to pay in its total cash contribution within two years. Kaiser and Gr imm et al. 
(1997) suggest that 90 days after the JV was approved, 15% of the nominal capital 
ought to be contr ibuted, and for the remaining 8 5 % the period stipulated varies 
between 12 and 33 months, according to the location of the JV. This suggests that the 
S M E had to have the necessary resources f rom the beginning, instead of raising more 
funds over the coming five or so years. 
Chinese partner's contribution 
UK-3's Chinese partner contributed land and the building in which the JV operates. 
There was no Chinese cash contribution. Important is, however, that the Chinese 
partner 's contr ibut ion of 'guanxi ' was regarded as very important by the UK SME. 
Joint venture operation 
Joint venture background information 
Joint venture establ ishment, total investment and workforce 
UK-3-JV is an equity JV and was establ ished as a limited liability company. It became 
operat ional on 18. May 1996. The total investment volume of UK-3-JV is US$3.26m 
(£2.09m). At the t ime of the interview, the JV's workforce was 25, with ten working in 
administrat ion and 15 on the shop floor. There is no definite figure planned of what the 
number of employees should look like in one, two or more years. An increase of the 
workforce depends, so suggested the general manager of UK-3-JV, entirely on the 
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order book of the company. If the company continues working with one shift only, then 
the workforce in the JV would not exceed 30. "If we had enough work for two or even 
three shifts then this place could really make a lot of money." This would imply an 
increase of the number of employees. 
Joint venture location 
UK-3-JV is located in CITY [East China], in one of the city's economic and 
technological development zones. The company's production site has access to the 
harbour of CITY [East China] and a major road link into the city. 
Choice of location 
UK-3 examined a variety of locations that were close to the RIVER and finally 
est imated that there were approximately 200 to 300 ports along the river that would be 
potential customers of the JV. Eventually, however, UK-3 considered CITY [East 
China] and the RIVER delta as the fastest expanding region in China and thus a good 
location for its product ion. According to the general manager of UK-3-JV, for the choice 
of location the fol lowing criteria were relevant: 
• availability of a factory building of the size and shape ideal for the purposes of 
UK-3, 
• availability of skilled labour, 
• availability of cheap material (steel), 
• access to river and sea shipping (some electrical fitting components were 
imported f rom the UK), and 
• proximity and access to the potential market. 
However, the general manager of UK-3-JV stressed that the latter argument was not 
the main criterion since UK-3 had intended, from the very beginning, to develop a 
sales network that would cover all of China, together with a UK infrastructure 
component manufacturer, that had establ ished a sales network across China and had 
of fered to sell the products of UK-3-JV. However, the proposed alliance between UK-3 
and the infrastructure component manufacturer never substantiated. "It would not have 
happened quickly enough," said the manager, indicating that these were problems 
between the two potential partners with regard to adjusting their strategies, etc. 
Product ion site 
UK-3-JV is a take-over operat ion, manufactur ing on the site of the Chinese partner 
company. The factory building was erected in 1990. An office complex is attached to 
the factory located in the second floor of part of the building. Prior to the JV 
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establ ishment, the Chinese partner used the factory building for repairing buses. A 
product ion assembly line with sawing and welding facilities was installed that takes 
about half of the total plant space. The rest is occupied by, predominantly, machinery 
for dril l ing or bending, and a warehouse with installation materials and 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. On the general manager 's request, in April 1996 UK-
3 had sent a mechanical engineer for six weeks to help with the installation of the 
machinery equipment that was shipped over from the UK. 
W h e n the general manager first came to CITY [East China] in September 1995 for a 
factory inspect ion, "the place was empty, dusty and disgusting," he remembered. 
"There was only one socket in each office in the building." Eventually, the entire factory 
had to be rewired over a period of three months. The information that the researcher 
obtained about this particular issue is controversial. Whereas the managing director of 
UK-3 insisted that the Chinese partner paid for the refurbishment of parts of the 
factory, the general manager of UK-3-JV suggested that the costs were covered by the 
JV. "This was not wri t ten into the contract and we used our working capital for this 
more than I wou ld have liked it," he remarked. The fact is, however, that UK-3 and its 
Chinese partner agreed that UK-3 would not make use of its right to bring in 2 0 % of its 
contr ibut ion as intellectual know-how, but as cash. The Chinese partner, in return, 
would then cover the cost of the refurbishment. 
The problem roots deeper than can be seen at first glance: the building was never 
properly appraised on its state and usefulness. Naively, the UK SME relied on 
information f rom its Chinese partner without undertaking a thorough look at the 
building itself. Instead, "it was assumed that the building would do what it should do." 
This was a big mistake. The concepts of quality of Chinese and UK (or German) 
managers are different. Especially the concept of quality is very subjective and there is 
no standard measure that would facilitate comparison. 
Product range 
UK-3-JV produces the full range of standard INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS that are 
manufactured by UK-3 in England, though compared with the full range of products 
manufactured by the SME in the UK, the JV's product range represents only a fraction. 
The analysis of UK-3's product catalogue of 1995/96 (UK-3 Company Catalogue, 
1995) suggests that the two product groups that are manufactured in China cover only 
35 pages of a total of 176, or approximately 20% in the catalogue. 
In December 1996 UK-3 also introduced its 'f lagship' product of INFRASTRUCTURE 
S Y S T E M S to the JV's range of products. At the t ime of the investigation, the 
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components of this product were shipped to China from the UK and assembled locally 
by the JV. At the end of February 1997, so predicted the plans of the managing 
director of UK-3, a UK-3 shopfloor worker would be sent to China to train the workforce 
of the JV in assembl ing this particular product. Eventually, when the JV can afford its 
own press at a cost of approximately RMB5.0m (£0.37m), this type of product can be 
manufactured locally in China. 
UK-3's product strategy had been to build up the product range of the JV gradually and 
progressively. By mid 1997, so hoped the managing director of UK-3, also 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS components would be produced in the China venture. 
Target market 
Accord ing to the JV contract, UK-3-JV should export 50% of its output. However, this 
general statement in the agreement "is not particularly binding," said the general 
manager. "We export as much as we can. How can they control it? If we can achieve 
this, I do not know. W e have to try it." In its exporting efforts, UK-3-JV is supported by 
UK-3 whose export sales manager handles the JV's exports. This is not contractually 
f ixed, but is another effort of UK-3 to help establish the JV. 
At the t ime of interviewing, UK-3-JV has had two big orders from abroad, one from a 
customer in Hong Kong and one from a client in the Middle East. At the t ime of the visit 
to the JV, UK-3-JV was processing an order from UK-3 which was fol lowed by an order 
f rom Hong Kong. Also, at the first day of the researcher's visit to UK-3-JV, the general 
manager was involved in discussions with a potential client f rom Singapore who has 
known UK-3 for many years and at the t ime of the investigation started to examine the 
possibil ity of directly buying high quality products, which UK-3 is known for, f rom the JV 
in China at a lower price. 
UK-3's original strategy provided that, initially, the domestic Chinese market would be 
developed through a collaboration with the UK-based INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
components manufacturer, ISC. This company had established a sales network across 
China and proposed to sell the products of UK-3-JV. In a second phase, the JV would 
establ ish its own sales network covering all China. It was further intended that the 
company ISC would become a third partner in the venture that would produce electric 
components for infrastructure systems. However, eventually, the all iance between UK-
3 and ISC did not substantiate. As a consequence, UK-3-JV had to deal with domestic 
market development itself. 
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In particular, this meant for the general manager of UK-3-JV to build up its own sales 
team and, more importantly, its own network of contacts. "China is not an easy place. 
You have to have lots of contacts. You have to have lots of agreements. You have to 
know whose fr iend you are," the general manager pointed out. He also stressed the 
fact that "in China you do not necessari ly have to offer the best product at the best 
price, but, instead, having the right contacts is more important." This supports UK-3's 
original desire to partner with a Chinese organisation to be able to reap the benefits of 
having the 'guanxi ' essential in the Chinese market. 
UK-3-JV's market development strategy had been to contact infrastructure design 
institutes. A l though the JV has its own sales force, "at the moment I am helping out 
where I can," remarked the general manager. "Chinese customers want to meet the 
European general manager." According to the general manager, the JV could also 
serve customers in the UK that want to purchase from the cheaper JV since "there is a 
pot big enough for all", though this seems rather unlikely and does not reflect a 
possible UK SME's global strategy. In fact, the managing director of UK-3 attempted to 
avoid so-cal led cannibal ism effects initiated by the JV. 
Export ing to the UK and to wor ld markets means that UK-3-JV must meet certain 
quality standards that have been applied successfully by UK-3. Since UK-3 is very 
strong on quality and customer service, the general manager of UK-3-JV insisted that 
"I will not compromise on quality." At the t ime of the interview, UK-3-JV was preparing 
its ISO 9002 certif ication which was planned for July 1997. As a matter of fact, the 
strategy apparent ly worked: prior to the investigation, the JV had exported a batch of 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS to Hong Kong and, shortly after that, received a call 
f rom the customer who expressed great satisfaction with product quality. 
Market share in China 
Neither the general manager of UK-3-JV, nor the managing director of UK-3 could, at 
the t ime of the investigation, specify the market share of their operation in China. 
Joint venture ownership 
The JV is owned equally by UK-3 and the Chinese partner company. UK-3 originally 
did not want a 50-50 equity distr ibution. However, the Chinese side insisted on evenly 
shared equity. Originally, the Chinese side intended to establish a US$10.0m (£6.4m) 
JV, However, the value of the Chinese contribution in the form of land and building 
eventual ly determined the actual volume of the JV. UK-3 was will ing to contribute more 
capital . The Chinese, however, insisted on their 50% share of equity. "At the end of the 
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day," said the managing director of UK-3, "it was a matter of trust and you have got to 
have faith ]...[ and we get on alright." 
As a matter of fact, however, UK-3's wil l ingness to agree to the equal equity venture 
was not so much a matter of trust, rather than the fact that the Chinese partner had no 
idea of the industry in which the JV would be operating. Eventually, there might be an 
opportuni ty for UK-3 to get its majority stake in the venture: UK-3 has the contractually 
f ixed opt ion to increase its investment in the form of a further machinery contribution. 
Doing this, the company could lift its stake in the venture beyond 5 0 % ]...[ "unless they 
bring in more capital as wel l ." The value of the next batch of machinery of 
approximately US$624,000 (£400,000) to US$780,000 (£500,000) has already been 
verbal ly agreed and will be purchased if the JV has the orders to justify this. 
Joint venture control 
The BoD of UK-3-JV has six members. Chairman of the board is a Chinese who had 
formerly been general manager of the Chinese partner company and who had, in the 
meant ime, been promoted a director of the CITY [East China] port authority. The UK 
side on the board is represented by the managing director of UK-3 and two other UK-3 
directors. The managing director of UK-3 is also vice-chairman of the BoD. After three 
years, a UK director will become chairman of the JV and the Chinese side would be 
granted the vice-chairmanship. This revolving system is common in Sino-foreign JVs. 
Responsibi l i t ies are not distributed according to a fixed structure, though, according to 
the managing director of UK-3, the Chinese side is in charge of selling to the Chinese 
market and the 'Chinese relations', whereas UK-3 would help the JV in selling and 
market ing in China. The UK side is additionally responsible for manufacturing, 
technology, sales and marketing outside China. 
Board meet ings are scheduled twice a year or "as and when necessary," and take 
place in England or China. The meetings last for half a day and issues debated include 
staff issues, market ing, selling, production, f inancing, accounting and further capital 
investment. By the t ime of the investigation, the BoD had met only two t imes, in May 
1996 and again in October 1995 when the 'valuation of UK assets'-problem was 
d iscussed and sett led. 
The fact that UK-3's Chinese partner is not familiar with the INFRASTRUCTURE 
S Y S T E M S business manoeuvres the UK SME into a position where it is able to control 
the venture, though the equity share would not suggest so. "We have control, because 
wi thout us they cannot do it," the managing director of UK-3 said. Part of UK-3's 
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control strategy was also that it negotiated and contractually f ixed the right to nominate 
the general manager of the JV. The Chinese side agreed to that and there were no 
lengthy negotiat ions about this. "Otherwise, we would not have discussed it any 
longer." As a consequence, the Chinese could nominate the vice-general manager. 
A l though both the general manager and the vice-general manager of UK-3-JV are not 
members of the BoD, they attend board meetings in order to support decision-making. 
The managing director of UK-3 insists that everything (all major decisions) is agreed 
between the JV and the UK headquarters. This supports again the assumption that the 
UK S M E uses the JV in China as a tool in its global strategic operations. 
Joint venture management 
The equal equity distribution in the JV would suggest that control and management are 
shared between the partners. The general manager seemed to be the decision-maker 
in 'his' JV. The Chinese side seemed passive in taking an active interest in the JV and 
"they are destructive in what they do," suggested the general manager. "I have offered 
them to take an active role in the business, to meet weekly, but they did not want it." 
The JV is character ised by its lean hierarchy. It does not have departments. "In 
departments the managers are too busy looking after their own power." Everybody in 
the company reports to the general manager directly. Once a week, the general 
manager calls for a meeting with the entire workforce where achievements, problems 
and further directions of the company are discussed. 
The general manager empowers his staff to make decisions. However, at the t ime of 
the visit to the JV, the business was not quite there. "We are getting there," contended 
the general manager. He recognised that active decision-making is in conflict with the 
Chinese authoritarian philosophy, though increasingly staff make decisions, such as 
work ing to their own schedules. Increasingly, but slowly, the JV's personnel also dares 
to disagree with the general manager in one or the other matter or to ask questions 
when issues are not clear and need to be discussed further. 
At the t ime of the visit to UK-3-JV, the Sino-UK JV worked with one expatriate 
manager f rom the UK-3 headquarters. The 44 year old Briton was holding the position 
of general manager of the JV. Formerly manufacturing manager with UK-3 where he 
had been working for ten years, he was asked in 1995 to represent UK-3's interests in 
its newly formed JV. "I am a country boy. This was a big decision for me," he said. The 
'expatr iate to be' had discussed this for a long t ime (with his family) and finally decided 
that this was too good an opportunity to miss. Since February 1996, he had been living 
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in the outskirts of CITY [East China], together with his family. The general manager's 
contract was due to expire in February 1998. 
A l though especial ly the first months or so were hard for the expatriate and his family, 
due to missing the UK and being exposed to an alien environment, at the t ime of the 
invest igat ion, the expatr iate was keen to renew his contract and do another two years 
since "two years are not enough to build up a company and definitely not in China." 
At the t ime of the visit of the JV, the expatriate was teaching himself Mandarin, every 
day f rom seven to eight in the morning. Before leaving the UK, he received a several 
week lasting language preparatory training at a university near by the UK-3. However, 
the training was not offered by UK-3, but the expatriate had to insist on it. 
Originally, the British manager had to look after all aspects of the JV, but in the 
meant ime, could pass on the manufactur ing supervision to his vice-general manager. 
This gives him more t ime to concentrate on the sales side of UK-3-JV. 
The expatr iate general manager costs approximately US$187,200 (£120,000) to 
US$234,000 (£150,000) per year. UK-3 covers the manager 's salary. The costs of 
living (accommodat ion, electricity, telephone, son's education) are covered by the JV. 
Joint venture problems 
Production 
High quality is one of the marketing features UK-3 had been applying successfully 
throughout the past years. Also, if quality of the INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
components is not good enough, the JV cannot export parts of its output back to 
Europe, for instance. UK-3 had been granted the ISO 9001 certif icate. It has also been 
the intention of UK-3 to introduce the high quality standard to the JV in China. At the 
t ime of the visit, the JV had started to qualify for ISO 9002 with the general manager 
producing the manual . UK-3 sent to China an ISO 9001 manual and, additionally, the 
JV was work ing with a consultant "who comes into the company twice a month to 
assess the progress that's being made in terms of ISO 9002." The general manager 
p lanned that the JV would be suitably certified by July 1997, "or so." "I will not 
compromise on quality. With our ISO 9002 certification we try to give the customer 
conf idence in what w e are doing and what he is buying." 
In fact, the managing director of UK-3 was "quite surprised with the standard of quality 
amongst the workers which "is as good as here." The workers employed by the JV 
were already qualif ied welders. This meant that UK-3-JV did not have to train the 
workers in welding, but only how to weld the specific products manufactured in the JV. 
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For that purpose, UK-3 had sent a welding engineer to China for six weeks to train the 
weld ing staff of the young JV. UK-3 had sent to the JV also sophist icated welding 
equipment. Controversial ly, the general manager of UK-3-JV reported that he bought, 
at the beginning of the operat ions, ten tonnes of steel for training purposes. "We totally 
destroyed this." Wou ld this have been necessary if the JV's welders were already 
qualif ied welders as the managing director of UK-3 suggested? Nonetheless, after 
several months of training and practice, the welders in UK-3-JV had reached a quality 
s tandard that "is as good as, or even better than, that in our UK operation and 1 am 
very proud of that," said the general manager. 
However, some potential Chinese customers of UK-3-JV are still of the opinion that 
"everything f rom China is rubbish and that everything that comes on the ship is of 
higher quality." This means, UK-3 still has to export products that its JV in China could 
produce. UK-3-JV also imports the C O M P O N E N T S that it fits onto its 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. The JV sources C O M P O N E N T S from a European 
manufacturer wi th a JV in CITY [East China] and f rom overseas. For imported 
C O M P O N E N T S the JV pays some 4 0 % import duties. Thus, the general manager of 
UK-3-JV considered it as good if the JV could get the same quality of lighting for less a 
price locally. 
On average, it takes the company about 15 minutes to manufacture an 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS product in the UK. The average duration to 
manufacture a similar product in the JV was, at the t ime of the visit, almost 
comparable. "I am very impressed," said the general manager. 
For its planned assembly and later complete production of special INFRASTRUCTURE 
S Y S T E M S in China, UK-3-JV intended to send two engineering staff for training to the 
UK. The JV contract does not require UK-3 to bring Chinese for training to the UK. 
However, "we intend to do that since it is essential. W e bring both over eventually 
somet ime next year (= 1997)," said the managing director of UK-3. In addition, the 
general manager intended to send his senior engineer on an MBA course, either in 
Europe or in China. Apart f rom that, he expects a welding engineer from UK-3 to come 
and supervise the production process of the INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. 
Local sourcing 
Offer ing the highest quality of products suggest not only having a quality-conscious 
workforce, but also high quality components and matehals. The local sourcing of high 
quality products is not always possible in China, however, though it is desirable since it 
al lows to keep costs down and to save foreign exchange that otherwise is needed for 
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the purchase of high quality components abroad. At the t ime of the investigation, UK-3-
JV was sourcing almost 100% of its material locally. The ability to produce cost-
competi t ively in China due to cheap labour and cheap material purchases was one of 
the pr ime reasons of UK-3 to invest in China and establish a plant to manufacture 
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E SYSTEMS. Material costs account for approximately 85% of the 
total costs of one unit of INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS manufactured. Thus, savings 
wi th the sourcing of supplies could eventually contribute to substantial savings of the 
company. The quality of the steel f rom China was sufficient for the purposes of the 
S M E . Problems with the local sourcing of materials are thus negligible in this case. 
Productivity 
With regard to productivity, UK-3-JV still has a long way to go, though in terms of 
quali ty achievements, both the managing director of UK-3 and the general manager of 
UK-3-JV are content. The two managers have recognised that, in terms of productivity, 
"the level needs to go up. It is good, but it is not good enough." Interestingly, during the 
first interview session, the general manager of UK-3-JV insisted that his Chinese staff's 
productivity level would be as good as in the UK. The JV also faces problems with the 
eff ic iency of its administrat ion. "Although they work hard, they have to improve their 
organis ing efforts," he crit icised. An example should illustrate this: recently (at the t ime 
of the investigation) the general manager had asked one of his engineers to find a 
Chinese suppl ier of high quality and cheap steel. Eventually, this employee of the JV 
travel led there - taking three other staff with him. After returning f rom the business trip, 
the general manager quest ioned all of the 'travellers' about the necessity of going in a 
four persons large delegation only to find out that actually only one or two people were 
essent ial for the complet ion of the mission. "Chinese just do not understand this. This 
takes some t ime," he reckoned. However, the general manager had already achieved, 
at the t ime of the investigation, that one person was doing one person's job. This was 
dif ferent when the JV first started its operation. 
Aga in , productivity of Chinese staff in the JV has to be v iewed somewhat cautiously 
and compar ison with productivity of workers in western factories is difficult since the 
salary levels are rather different. For instance, at the t ime of the investigation, 
product ion workers ' salary in UK-3-JV was approximately RMB1,400 (£103.9) per 
month . Accord ing to the JV's general manager and based on the researcher's own 
exper ience with foreign investors in China and particularly in CITY [East China], these 
are compet i t ive salaries for locations, such as CITY. Paying competit ive salaries keeps 
personnel loyal to the company. "Labour turnover is a waste of t ime and money." UK-3 
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has done research on that and its consultant. Price Waterhouse, worked out labour 
contracts that were not violating Chinese laws. Noteworthy is that the JV operates a 
f lexible remunerat ion system where workers earn between RMB1,200 (£89.0) and 
RMB1,700 (£126.1), depending on their skills and motivation. All office staff were at 
the same level with only the vice-general manager being higher than the others. 
On top of the basic salaries there are various add-ons to be paid. For instance, the 
basic monthly salary of the general manager 's secretary is RMB2,000 (£148.4). This is 
topped by a factor of 1.79. At the end of the month, the secretary costs the JV 
RMB3,580 (£265.6). This does not apply for the welders, however, who are from 
outside of CITY [East China] and do not get paid these social and welfare benefits. On 
the other hand, UK-3-JV had recruited all its welders through an employment agency 
which charges the JV RMB300 (£22.3) per person per month. In any case, however, 
the maximal cost for a welder does not exceed RMB2,000 (£148.4) per month. 
Foreign exchange 
Since UK-3-JV sources predominantly locally and sells its products also mainly in 
China, but also to overseas markets where customers pay US dollars, foreign 
exchange is not really a problem in the JV. 
Collision of interests 
The collision of interest between UK-3 and UK-3-JV is a latent problem. UK-3 does not 
want the JV to cannibal ise its own export sales. UK-3-JV, on the other hand, attempts 
to serve also tradit ional customers of UK-3 with cheaper products, since "there is 
enough for all of us." In the long-term this attitude of both parties could create a major 
confl ict in the inter-relationship between the UK SME and its ambitious JV. 
Sales and marketing 
UK-3's original turnover forecast was "ten t imes of the UK turnover." However, UK-3 
recognised early that it has to work hard to achieve this. "We realised that we have to 
do a lot of work to get there, we have to build connections up, etc.," suggested the 
managing director of UK-3. UK-3 also faces a lot of competi t ion, international as well 
as Chinese, including an Amer ican company and a UK enterphse (UK-7). The 
managing director of UK-3 considers the Chinese competi t ion as threatening since "it 
is rather who you know than what you know," he said. In terms of quality, the general 
manager of UK-3-JV does not consider Chinese companies as a competit ive threat. 
Price 
Compared with competi tors - both Chinese and foreign - UK-3-JV can offer its products 
at the lowest price. The general manager suggested that the Chinese would not be 
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famil iar wi th the concept of marginal costs and, thus, would be too expensive. Also, 
compared with the prices UK-3 asks for, UK-3-JV is much cheaper. In its China 
venture, however, UK-3 can manufacture its products at approximately two thirds of 
the cost for products manufactured in England and transport is not too expensive. 
Communication 
In UK-3-JV internal communicat ion is a major problem that stems not only from the 
potential mutual misunderstanding between two different cultures (the lack of 
awareness of cultural diversity), but also from inherent and developed distrust. 
"Col laborat ion is absolutely dreadful," said the general manager, "and my vice-general 
manager is obstruct ive." At various occasions the Chinese manager had provided 
inaccurate information to influence the general manager 's decision-making. The 
general manager 's (authoritative) management style and the perception of what the 
JV's management should look like are different. "I offered them to take an active role in 
the business, to meet weekly, for instance, but they did not want it," the British 
manager remembered. Already earlier in the JV process, UK-3 had experienced 
considerable problems with its Chinese partner, including the valuation of 
contr ibut ions. 
The general manager il lustrated this with an example noted in his little black book 
(where he jots down every minor or major dispute between himself and the Chinese 
manager ia l staff): when he was looking for welders for the workshop, he asked the 
personnel manager of the Chinese partner company and his vice-general manager for 
a meet ing to discuss ways of recruiting such staff and how to remunerate them. The 
Chinese part icipants in the meeting suggested that RMB3,000 (£222:6) per month 
would be commonplace as salary for welders in CITY [East China]. 
However, later, at a social event in CITY [East China] the general manager discussed 
this with a German businessman based in CITY [East China]. The German told his 
British fr iend that, for about RMB2,000 (£148.4) per months he could get a good 
mechanica l engineering graduate. Since mechanical engineers are being paid higher 
salaries than welders, the general manager could not trust the figure any longer that 
was establ ished earl ier as salary for welders. "I thought RMB3,000 (£222.6) for a 
welder cannot be right." 
Subsequent ly , the British general manager discussed this with his previous Chinese 
advisers who then sized the figure down to "perhaps RMB1,000 (£74.2)." Eventually, 
the general manager decided to pay the welders a wage high enough to keep them 
loyal to the company. He was prepared to pay a minimum wage of RMB1,200 (£89.0) 
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and a max imum of RMB1,700 (£126.1) per month (including benefits). Finally, he 
d iscovered conf irmation of the above range when asking the director of a Belgian 
company who paid his welding staff some RMB1,200 (£89.0) per month. 
Later, at the first board meeting in May 1996, the topic was raised and the general 
manager found that the Chinese directors of the Chinese company and the vice-
general manager of UK-3-JV wanted to determine their salaries on the basis of the 
salaries that are being paid to welders. "We think that RMB1,200 (£89.0) is not 
enough." if the JV pays some RMB1,200 (£89.0) to welders then the Chinese partner 
company would pay its welders RMB2,000 (£148.4). "The vice-general manager was 
trying to talk his wages up," said the general manager. 
The general manager illustrates his distrust of the Chinese vice-general manager with 
another example: he wanted to have a sign next to the road that displays the name of 
UK-3-JV in English and Chinese, telephone numbers, etc. and an arrow so that visitors 
wou ld find the company easily. The sign should have been in the corporate colours of 
UK-3, red and white. He was told by his vice-general manager that just these colours 
would be illegal in China and, therefore, could not be used by the JV. Doubting this, the 
general manager, on a tour through CITY [East China], inspected many signs of other 
companies and found, amongst them, several signs in red and white. Only later, the 
general d iscovered that the vice-general manager wanted to have the colour of the 
Chinese parent company which is blue. 
The general manager of UK-3-JV was not short of further anecdotes. One more should 
be i l lustrated here: once the vice-general manager bought steel for much too high a 
price and since he delivered the cheque for payment himself, the general manager 
suspected that he (the vice-general manager) had received money from the selling 
company. From that t ime on the vice-general manager was no longer al lowed to buy or 
sell anything for, or of, the JV. "I gave him a last opportunity and he blew it." 
Subsequent ly , the British general manager made the vice-general manager who 
speaks English "better than he admits" in charge of manufactur ing, after he was 
originally responsible for the workshop, for buying steel, computer-aided-design 
drawing, production planning and repairing machines. However, this was not to 
promote him by adding responsibility to the Chinese manager 's range of 
responsibi l i t ies. Rather, it was a tactically clever move by the British general manager 
to place his vice-general manager somewhere where he can recognise immediately "if 
anything is only slightly out of balance." 
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Joint venture evaluation 
Joint venture performance 
The managing director of UK-3 had est imated that within five years, "if everything goes 
wel l ," the UK SME would make more profit in China than in the UK. However, at the 
t ime of the investigation, none of the interviewees could specify the success of the JV, 
though there were orders in the pipeline. 
The JV was establ ished only in May 1996 and the interviews were carried out in 
November and December 1996. In other words, the JV had had less than six months 
to produce results which the managing director of UK-3 and the general manager of 
UK-3-JV could assess against their expectat ions with respect to JV performance. 
However, both the general manager of UK-3-JV and the managing director of UK-3 
had other criteria against which to assess the Sino-UK JV's performance. For instance, 
a l though relat ionship business is very important in China, the general manager 
admit ted that the JV had not done its homework sufficiently. "Building relationships 
takes a long t ime. Currently, our orders from China are far f rom good." Although UK-3-
JV is the cheapest and the quality of its products is very high, the venture still lacks of 
essent ial contacts and the expatriate manager starts realising this (ie the importance of 
contacts) only now. 
The managing director considers the venture successful if "we can do what our product 
says it can do." UK-3 products have a reputation of good quality and a high reliability. 
The certif ication of the JV according to ISO 9002 that was planned for the summer of 
1997 was thus one criterion of success. 
Overal l , the general manager of UK-3-JV suggested that "what we have achieved in 
the first months looks quite good, though the order book could be fuller. If I look back I 
am quite happy." The general manager admits that f inancial planning is difficult. "We 
are a baby and babies spill food," he said. In other words, making mistakes is rather 
c o m m o n for a young company like UK-3-JV. "It is alright as long as you learn from 
this," he said. Adopt ing this attitude, the general manager of UK-3-JV replicates 
Confucius 's phi losophy who states that "if you make a mistake and do not correct it, 
this is cal led a mistake." 
Factors for joint venture success 
The general manager of UK-3-JV believes in people. He did not consider it sufficient 
having the best machines in the JV, but no people who do want to make the venture a 
success. Instead, the British manager insisted, the crucial element for a venture's 
success is whether its human resource wants to succeed or not. One way of creating 
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personnel that want to succeed is to create a corporate philosophy of success. This is 
the management 's job. Accordingly, the general manager believed that people who are 
wel l managed are good players. However, according to the expatriate manager, "the 
Chinese will never understand the importance of the contribution of people." 
C a s e Three: UK-4-JV 
B a s i c facts about UK-4 
UK-4 was establ ished as a limited liability company in the Northeast of England. It is an 
innovative enterprise operating in the ELECTRONIC DEVICES industry. At the t ime of 
the interview, UK-4 had ten employees. Four of them were working in production and 
the rest in research and development, sales and administrat ion. The annual output of 
UK-4 is 50,000 units of its ELECTRONIC DEVICES. Since 1986, UK-4 had been 
manufactur ing and distributing its products and selling it to, exclusively, corporate 
customers, mainly security companies. UK-4 is jointly owned by two directors: the 
managing director holds 86% of the equity and the sales director 14%. 
International bus iness activities 
UK-4 exports its products to more than 60 countries throughout the world (UK-4 
Company Catalogue, 1996) and had been carrying out development work in Germany, 
Canada and Austral ia. Al though the managing director of UK-4 does not know the 
market shares of the individual ELECTRONIC DEVICES, he est imated them as "fairly 
h igh" since the products of UK-4 are niche market products. Competi t ion, in particular 
f rom international companies, had been increasingly setting UK-4 under cost pressure. 
At the t ime of the investigation, UK-4 was not active in the US market. The managing 
director reckoned that, although business would be good, "you need to be there." A 
presence of UK-4 in the US market, however, is restricted by the company's under-
capital isation - a problem that is inherent in many SMEs. 
UK-4's China experience 
Prior to its JV establishment, UK-4 had no expehence with or in the Chinese market. 
Neither China nor neighbouring countries in the Far East had been the target of the 
company 's market development and penetration efforts. 
Joint venture formation 
Joint venture planning 
Due to competit ive pressure from particularly international f irms that were competing 
with the UK SME in its traditional markets in mainly Europe, UK-4 had two alternative 
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go-aheads for survival: first, to invest substantially in production capital and to go for 
large product ion vo lumes or secondly, to produce labour-intensively. These were the 
opt ions in UK-4's specif ic industry. Due to its chronic capital shortage, UK-4 decided to 
shift product ion out of the country to a low-cost location. "If we had millions of output, 
we could have stayed here," said the managing director of UK-4. Subsequently, he 
invest igated various potential countries for production. 
Initially, the managing director enquired the possibilities of shifting production to either 
Korea, the Phil ippines, India, Thai land, Hong Kong, Taiwan or China. He had 
approached the British embassies in these countries and had asked for details about 
local companies that could manufacture a selection of UK-4's products. The embassies 
had sent lists of potential companies that could take on production on behalf of UK-4. 
A longer period of faxing and lettering with these companies on the lists provided 
resulted, eventual ly, in the shortl isting of two potential companies for collaboration in 
the Phil ippines and in China. 
Subsequent ly, the managing director of UK-4 visited the two companies that had 
responded to his enquir ies and with whom he had made contact and the Chinese 
company turned out to be the one that would be most suitable, based on quality-of-
labour considerat ions. In the end, UK-4 shifted production to China, though China was 
not its first choice. The managing director had rather col laborated with a firm in Korea. 
Motivations for production in China 
Motivat ions to engage in an FDI project 
UK-4 shifted a part of its production of ELECTRONIC DEVICES to China, "not because 
it was cheap, but because it was cheap and had skilled labour that was available." As 
outl ined in the section above, the managing director of UK-4 was much keener to 
produce in Korea than in China, since the quality of labour was perceived to be better 
in Korea. This was one of the reasons also why he decided not to shift to production of 
the ELECTRONIC DEVICES to the Philippines. For demonstrat ion, of the selling price, 
material accounts for approximately 3 0 % and labour for 5% in the UK. When produced 
in the JV in China, material costs account for about 2 5 % and labour for around 1 % of 
the sell ing price. 
Motivat ions to form a joint venture 
UK-4 had never considered the possibility of going it alone in China. Up to the t ime of 
the investigation, UK-4 had no intention even of serving the domest ic Chinese market, 
nor of establ ishing a JV. UK-4's predominant interest had been to manufacture high 
quality ELECTRONIC DEVICES at a low cost which could have been done in the form 
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of contract manufacturing. UK-4's interest in China had been purely from the point of 
view of a resource seeker. However, UK-4's Chinese negotiation partner was 
exclusively interested in establishing a JV and eventually, the managing director of UK-
4 agreed, because he wanted to manufacture in China. 
The Chinese company had a variety of reasons for engaging in, and insisting on, a JV 
with UK-4, instead of contract manufacturing on behalf of UK-4. From a JV with UK-4 
the Chinese company expected to receive technology in order to develop its own 
production. The directors of the Chinese family-owned private enterprise were sure 
that UK-4 would eventually agree to establish a JV. As the main advantages of their 
company for a collaboration with a foreign enterprise they considered to be able to 
offer cheap labour and the government's favourable policy towards peasant 
enterprises, including a direct export/import right, the ability to import (machinery) free 
of duty and the ability to go through formalities quicker than other Chinese companies 
could do. However, the Chinese government has, at the end of 1996, ended this 
favourable import duty treatment of JVs that were to import capital equipment for their 
production in China. Only after long and substantial protest of foreign investors in 
China was this privilege being re-introduced, though modified. 
To obtain advanced technology and also contacts in other parts of the world was very 
important for the Chinese enterprise. This drive and desire was articulated in huge 
Chinese characters across the hall in the company's administration building. Self 
explanatory, the characters read "Creating a world famous brand - striving for a first-
class enterprise." Interestingly, throughout the discussions with the researcher, the 
Chinese directors had repeatedly expressed their interest in establishing additional JVs 
with UK companies. At the time of the investigation, the Chinese enterprise had in 
operation two further JVs, one with another UK company (producing barrings) and one 
with an enterprise from Thailand (producing knitting clothes). 
Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
UK-4's process of finding a partner for its JV was inevitably linked with the entire 
planning process of shifting its production of ELECTRONIC DEVICES to a low 
production cost location. Apart from approaching the British embassies in the various 
countries (eg the British Embassy in Beijing), UK-4 had not undertaken any other 
efforts to discover potential Chinese companies that would have been prepared to 
accept UK-4's initial proposal of collaborating in the form of contract manufacturing. 
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Although the Chinese company did not agree to contract manufacturing and insisted 
on a JV, instead, UK-4 did not continue its search process. Further research could 
have resulted in finding another company that would have been prepared to contract 
manufacture on behalf of UK-4. However, due to limited time and finance, and certainly 
due to only limited knowledge of the means available to search for partners, UK-4 
ended up being restricted in its choice of its partner company in CITY [East China]. On 
the other hand, the Chinese company's proposal to joint venture was not totally 
unacceptable for UK-4 and perhaps a strategy the managing director of UK-4 had not 
considered before, because he was not familiar with it. 
Partner selection criteria 
UK-4 did not have the choice of selecting its Chinese partner from a pool of potential 
partner companies. It only had found one Chinese company that could produce its 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES. 
Partner characteristics 
The Chinese partner of UK-4, based in East China, is privately owned by a Chinese 
family. The group comprises five companies of which three are JVs with foreign 
partners, two with partners from the UK and one with a Thailand-based enterprise. The 
Chinese group's second JV with a UK-based company had been manufacturing 
barrings and the JV with the Thai firm, knitting clothes. At the time of the investigation, 
the Chinese parent company had been existing for some 30 years, but had moved its 
operation into its present site in 1980 and also had changed its name. Thus, 
production buildings on the site are built from 1980 onwards and had a maximum age 
of around 15 to 16 years. 
The Chinese parent company had been operating in a variety of industries, including 
knitting, yarn-feeding and textile appliances. It is the largest producer of Yarn feeders 
for knitting machines in Asia. 
The total workforce of the Chinese company had been in excess of 500 staff. This, 
however, includes the workforce of its JVs. In 1995, the Chinese parent company had 
turned over in excess of RMB40.0m (£3.0m) of which more than 90% was generated 
in the Chinese market. The remaining 10% were earned through exports to markets in 
Europe, America and neighbouring Asian countries. 
Joint venture negotiation process 
Neqotiation contents and conflict 
UK-4's agreement was a pure manufacturing agreement in which the JV produces 
according to orders from the UK SME. All the important issues such as marketing and 
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personnel, for instance, or the expatriation of UK-4 employees to the JV, etc. were not 
really relevant in this case and did not have to be negotiated in lengthy debates. UK-4 
clearly laid out what kind of products it wanted at which price and when this was 
negotiated, the JV was sorted out. 
The duration of the JV was negotiated and contractually fixed at 20 years and there 
was no conflict between the partners on that, though UK-4 was also prepared to agree 
to a shorter duration. 
SME negotiation team, location, duration, lanquaqe of negotiations, interpreters 
Most of the negotiations and contract formalities were carried out by the chairman of 
the Chinese partner company and by the managing director of UK-4 plus an interpreter 
who was provided by the Chinese side (the Chinese company's own interpreter). 
"Without formalising it too much we got it right," said the managing director of UK-4. 
Additionally, the managing director of UK-4 consulted a Hong Kong-based solicitor firm 
to look after the legal aspects and the special features of the Chinese law, since his 
understanding of the legal issues and the content of the JV contract were only limited. 
The entire process of negotiating the potential JV was carried out in China. First 
discussions between UK-4 and the Chinese enterprise commenced in 1992. The 
actual sorting out of details had taken approximately six months and most of the 
negotiating was done during a ten day visit of the managing director of UK-4 to China, 
shortly before the contract was signed. 
Eventually, the JV was approved by the municipal government of CITY [East China] 
and its operation started - simultaneously - in March 1994. The managing director of 
UK-4, however, was not aware of who approved the JV. This shows clearly the strong 
influence of the Chinese partner in the entire JV establishment process which was 
more than welcomed by UK-4, whose main interest was the manufacture of 
qualitatively good products at a low cost. Other issues revolving around the JV 
management were only of marginal interest to UK-4. The managing director of UK-4 
insisted that the signing of the JV contract and the operation of the business had 
started simultaneously. This seems rather impossible, however. 
UK-4's Chinese partner's influence on the approval process by the municipal 
government of CITY [East China] was considerable. After only about six months the 
business was negotiated and approved in March 1994, though first discussions 
between UK-4 and the Chinese company commenced in 1992. 
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Partner contributions 
SME's contribution 
The original cash contribution to the JV by UK-4 was a mere US$58,000 (£37,179), a 
third of what the Chinese side poured into the JV. From the interviews with both UK-4 
and the Chinese company it became apparent that the know-how of UK-4 had not 
been valued and accepted as a contribution to the JV. The Chinese company itself is a 
high-tech component manufacturer and was, according to the managing director of 
UK-4 not interested in the acquisition of technology. However, the interviews with the 
Chinese side suggested the opposite and it would support the common wisdom that 
Chinese JV partners attempt to upgrade their operations with western technology. 
Further, it could also be that, after the contract between the Chinese and UK partners 
expires, and since the Chinese company has ambitious plans to develop also the 
Chinese and other markets in Asia, the Chinese company exploits the technology 
transferred to the JV. 
Chinese partner's contribution 
The Chinese enterprise contributed approximately US$116,000 (£74,359) to the JV. A 
major contribution of UK-4's partner to the JV was the Chinese firm's municipal 
government connections. One of the directors of the Chinese partner company is a 
friend of the mayor of CITY [East China]. This good relationship to the municipal 
government of CITY allows the Chinese partner company to pledge that "we complete 
all the formalities and after five days, the JV can be set up." However, the Chinese 
directors have no relationship with the government at the provincial or national levels. 
"We know them from TV," the interviewees replied to the researcher and smiled ]...[ as 
had they expected the question that is a must on the interview outline of every foreign 
researcher who had studied the importance of relationships in the Chinese society. 
The original cash contribution of both partners was used by the JV for the purchase of 
machinery needed for the subsequent manufacture of UK-4-JV's products. Since the 
Chinese company had not operated in the ELECTRONIC DEVICES business before 
and since UK-4 did not have second-hand machinery which it could have shipped to 
China, the JV had to purchase a complete set of new machines. Also, the Chinese 
side was not very keen on getting second-hand equipment anyway. Subsequently, 
both parties in the JV had poured in more funds and also the profits of the JV were 
being re-invested. 
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Joint venture operation 
Joint venture bacliground information 
Joint venture establishment, total investment and workforce 
The JV between UK-4 and its Chinese partner company is an equity JV, established as 
a limited liability company according to Chinese law. The total investment in the joint 
business accounts for some US$170,000 (£108,974). At the time of the visit to the JV 
in China, the JV had employed some 20 staff. 
Joint venture location 
UK-4-JV is located in CITY [East China] at China's east coast, which is a modern 
medium-sized city with a population of approximately 990,000 (The People's 
Government of CITY, 1996). According to the CITY [East China] government, the 
county has key industries, such as machine building, electrical appliances, light and 
textile, vehicle, electronics and communication, chemicals and metallurgical industry 
and further has trade relationships with more than 80 countries and regions. During the 
eighth five year plan period (1991-1995) the CITY government had invested about 
RMBI.Obn (£0.074bn) in water conservancy, transportation, telecommunication and 
municipal administration (The People's Government of CITY, 1996). 
CITY [East China] economic and technological development zone, where UK-4-JV is 
located is a provincial zone, combining industry, science and technology, construction 
and trade (The People's Government of CITY, 1996). The city comprises more than 
20,000 enterprises. Further, by 1996 the county had attracted more than 330 foreign-
funded enterprises (ibid). The JV had been receiving preferential income tax treatment. 
For the first two years, the JV was exempt from income tax and from the third year on 
it had been paying only half the income tax of 33% for another three years. However, 
this is rather common in China's special economic zones or open cities. 
An asset the government of CITY [East China] emphasises in its investment promotion 
brochure are its 'super-kids', known in the world for their "superb mental arithmetic 
skills based on using the abacus" (ibid). 
Choice of location 
UK-4-JV exports its entire production to the UK and imports various special parts and 
components from abroad. Thus, it needs the proximity to an international port - sea or 
air. CITY [East China] is about 60 kilometres away from China's largest port and a two 
hours highway dnve from the next international airport. Further, at the time of the 
investigation, a highway was under construction that links CITY with a major economic 
metropolis of the country. Proximity to harbours and airports is essential for UK-4 that 
393 
Appendix VII 
relies on flexible planning. The main argument in the case of UK-4, however, was that 
because UK-4-JV should commence in the existing buildings of the Chinese partner, 
UK-4's location choice followed the 'location of the Chinese partner'. 
Production site 
To erect a new building was never the intention of either the Chinese or the UK side. 
Instead, the JV should rent the production space of the Chinese parent company. The 
eight year old building where JV production had been located has an area of 
approximately 400 square metres. One of the Chinese directors repeatedly symbolised 
that this would be only a very small workshop. Previously, the premise was used by 
the Chinese parent company's textile appliance business. The workshop building had 
been located on the site of the Chinese company, next to the accommodation blocs, 
the canteen and other production workshops. The entire site of the Chinese group 
covers some 20,000 square metres. 
The workshop has different lines of assembly for the manufacture of the different 
series of ELECTRONIC DEVICES. Staff in the workshop have to wear white coats and 
the workshop is air conditioned, dust-free and the noise level is low. This was one of 
the requirements of the UK SME since otherwise the high quality of the ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES could not have been maintained. The administration of UK-4-JV is located in 
the main building of the Chinese parent company where the JV's accountant, 
interpreter, quality inspector and office manager work. 
Product range 
UK-4-JV manufactures five types of ELECTRONIC DEVICES (COMPONENT ONE) 
and three types of ELECTRONIC DEVICES (COMPONENT TWO). This adds up to 
approximately 50,000 product units per year. The volumes are produced according to 
the orders placed by UK-4. Compared with UK-4's product range in the UK, this 
represents only a small fraction, "only the specials," according to the managing director 
of UK-4. An expansion of the current product lines was planned, however, though 
there was no set time scale for this. 
Production 
To make sure the workforce of the JV manufactures the ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
according to the requirements of UK-4, the company had sent an engineer to CITY 
[East China] for three or four times. He had trained the workforce and only then gave 
the JV management a letter of approval to be able to manufacture ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES as required by UK-4. 
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Further to ensure product quality, UK-4-JV employs a total quality control system that 
is headed by the Chinese general manager of the JV. In practice this suggests a very 
strict quality control of all the outgoing products that are to be shipped to the UK. Each 
manufactured good goes through three function tests. At UK-4 incoming products are 
further quality controlled. UK-4 had supplied the tools necessary for testing and the 
JV's staff uses them to test products according to UK-4's testing programme. 
Manufacturing of the security items takes approximately the same time as in UK-4's 
operation in Northeast England. The managing director of UK-4 is satisfied with the 
quality standard of the products manufactured by UK-4-JV. "There are no problems 
with quality," he said. 
Production forecasts are planned in advance for UK-4-JV. This is the job of the 
managing director of UK-4. Since products on stock are dead capital, he considers the 
issuing of orders as an issue to be done very carefully. If major discrepancies with the 
forecast appear, production planning can be changed rather easily. 
For labour, UK-4-JV has to pay approximately RMB1,000 (£74.2) per month plus 
another RMB1,000 (£74.2) per year for welfare. This remuneration package follows, 
according to the interviewees at the Chinese parent company, a fixed bonus system as 
provided for in the Sino-foreign JV law (implementation rules). The salaries that are 
paid to the workers in the JV are equal to those being paid to the workers in the 
Chinese parent company. This seems rather unusual since Chinese legislation 
suggests that JVs have to pay salaries that are 120 to 150% higher than those paid in 
Chinese enterprises. However, by paying equal salaries to the workforce in both the 
Chinese company and the JV, the Chinese parent company wants to avoid any 
discrimination of, and social unrest amongst, the workers. Equally, this example shows 
that the JV was clearly established as a product of the interests of the Chinese side. 
Othenwise the salaries paid in the JV would certainly be 120 to 150% higher than those 
paid in the Chinese company. 
The remuneration of some administration staff appears rather interesting. For instance, 
the general manager of UK-4-JV is paid by the JV. The interpreter of the JV who also 
works for the Chinese parent company is paid by the Chinese company which charges 
approximately 50% of the costs to the JV. Personnel is somehow interwoven between 
the JV operation and the Chinese parent. Some work for both organisations and 
perhaps also for the other JVs where the Chinese company holds shares in. 
Sourcing 
At the time of the investigation, UK-4-JV had been sourcing about 30% of its parts in 
China. These components are, in particular, printed circuit boards and plastic 
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materials. The vast majority of components, mostly resistors and capacitors, had been 
sourced in Thailand and Japan - directly or from these suppliers' sales offices in China. 
The suppliers were appointed by UK-4. In cases where the JV had difficulties with 
supplies, UK-4 would help out and purchase them in the UK. In particular, these are 
special electronic components, including circuits. Their share of value accounts for 
approximately 15%. Since the JV exports its entire production output, it does not have 
to pay import duties for components purchased abroad. This would change when UK-
4-JV starts targeting the Chinese domestic market. All components used by the JV are 
quality controlled. 
In the future, the JV intends to increase its share of locally sourced components, with 
the permission of UK-4. However, there is no certain set value that has to be reached 
over the next years. The general manager of UK-4-JV reckoned that local sourcing 
would cut costs and transportation would be more convenient. The general manager of 
UK-4-JV believes that the JV could purchase from other Sino-foreign JVs in China. For 
instance, the Japanese enterprise TDK had set up a JV in Xiamen in South China in 
1995. At the time of the investigation, UK-4-JV purchased resistors and capacitors 
from TDK in Japan. However, if the TDK JV's products are as good as those of TDK in 
Japan, "then we will purchase from them" for less a price. This would improve the 
company's cost position. 
The managing director of UK-4 pointed out that "somewhere in the contract" there is 
the value of the local content set and he reckoned that it could become an issue of 
dispute in the future. He believed that "there will always be these 15% of supplies that 
need to be sourced in Europe (Belgium) because some of these 15% cannot be made 
in China." The non-availability of certain supplies in China is a rather common problem. 
At the time of the investigation and, perhaps, some time later, from a balance-of-
foreign exchange point of view, the local sourcing of components is not essential for 
the JV since UK-4-JV's entire output is exported for hard currency that can be used to 
purchase components overseas. However, with regard to the JV's ambition to also 
develop the Chinese and neighbouring Asian markets, this might become an issue in 
the future. 
Tarqet market 
Due to the original intention of the managing director of UK-4 to engage in a contract 
manufacturing agreement, UK-4-JV had not been targeting the Chinese market so far. 
In other words, the entire output of the JV had been shipped over to the UK. The 
contractual agreement provides for UK-4 to buy the entire output from the JV. 
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Recently, however, UK-4 and its JV managers have been undertaking efforts to also 
look into the development of the Chinese market and other markets in East and 
Southeast Asia. For that. Hong Kong, where the Chinese partner company has an 
office, would be used as a marketing and distribution basis. The Chinese partner would 
be in charge of marketing and selling into China and neighbouring markets. The 
proposed and planned expansion into the markets of Southeast Asia was hoped to 
double the JV's production. 
Joint venture ownership 
The UK and Chinese side agreed that it would need about US$170,000 (£108,974) to 
keep the business going. Further, the parties were very clear about the distribution of 
equity: the Chinese wanted to have the majority stake in the business and UK-4 was 
happy with a minority position. Eventually, the JV's equity was split two thirds - one 
third. Since UK-4 had no intention of opting for a JV in the first place, its minority 
position was welcomed. The explanation of the Chinese parent company for having the 
majority stake in the JV was "because Mr. NAME is the chairman." The Chinese 
interviewees had not been prepared to reveal neither the total investment in the 
business, nor the distribution of the equity. Contractually, UK-4 could increase its share 
in the JV. However, "if the English party wants to have more shares, it has to send a 
person to China." This, however, seems very unlikely, for the reasons outlined above. 
Joint venture control 
In the case of UK-4-JV, the equity distribution clearly reflects on who has control of the 
JV. The BoD has five members. Three are from the Chinese partner company and two 
are from UK-4, ie the managing and sales directors of UK-4. The Chinese side had 
appointed the chairman of the JV. In personal union, he is also the chairman of the 
Chinese partner company. The Chinese side is in charge of production, management 
of the entire company and of technology. The managing director of UK-4 is responsible 
for the marketing of the JV's products and for new product development. 
The BoD of UK-4-JV meets once a year for about two days either in the UK or in 
China. Both parties in the JV have contractually agreed that, for major decisions to be 
made regarding the JV's investment or management appointments, etc., the managing 
director of UK-4 has to agree. To ensure effective communication between the parties 
in the JV, UK-4 and its Chinese counterpart have established a system of telefax 
communication in the English language. Once a year, the managing director of UK-4 
receives the JV's income statement, sales figures, balance sheet as well as profit and 
loss account. According to the managing director of UK-4, the Chinese directors are . 
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familiar with western accounting practices. "They have to be," he said. However, the 
fact that Chinese managers "have to be" familiar with western accounting practices 
does not necessarily mean that they are, as is the case in many Sino-foreign JVs. The 
managing director's over-confident statement appears thus rather naive. Initially, 
however, the JV had sent an account report to the UK monthly. Since the companies 
did not have any problems with the reporting procedure, the frequency of sending the 
accounts was reduced. The accounts are set up by the venture's accountant and are 
checked once a year by the 'Accountant Commission CITY [East China]'. 
"Mr. NAME and I get on well, we know our business very well. We are in business for a 
lot of years now. We agree on numbers, exchange faxes and try very hard to have an 
idea what business will be like," the managing director of UK-4 pointed out. To ensure 
unproblematic communication, the JV pays for the services of the Chinese partner 
company's interpreter, since the UK manager does not speak Chinese. 
Joint venture management 
The general manager of the JV was appointed by the Chinese side and so was the 
vice-general manager. The general manager's job is the daily work of the JV such as 
the import/export of components, the management of the workshop and the quality 
assurance of the ELECTRONIC DEVICES. The general manager of UK-4-JV is an 
engineering graduate from a Chinese university and he had been working with the 
Chinese parent company for six years. Prior to his general manager appointment he 
was equipment manager in one of the group's companies. Since UK-4 did not intend to 
send a manager to China for the reasons outlined above, the appointment of the 
Chinese general manager was not objected by UK-4, but welcomed. 
At the time of the investigation, UK-4 had not expatriated personnel to its JV in China 
and there were no plans for doing so in the future. The Chinese side would require UK-
4 to send a manager from the UK if it was to increase its share in the JV. This, 
however, is very unlikely since the UK SME sought its JV with the local Chinese 
company solely to manufacture cheaply and thus cost-competitively to withhold the 
increasing competitive pressure in its niche. 
Joint venture problems 
At the time of the investigation, Uk-4 had no serious problems with its JV in China that 
the managing director of UK-4 considered worthwhile talking about. To a very large 
degree, this is due to the entire constellation of the partners and their interests in the 
JV. UK-4 sought a cheap way of producing its ELECTRONIC DEVICES and found this 
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in its JV partner. The managing director is required only once per year to go to China 
or even less if the Chinese side comes to the UK for the board meeting. Inter-personal 
problems did not exist at the time of the investigation. Moreover, between the partners 
there existed also a private relationship beyond the pure business ties. All this 
contributed to the fact that the JV was exposed to only little potential of collision, etc. 
Joint venture evaluation 
Joint venture performance 
The interviewees, both the Chinese directors and the managing director of UK-4, did 
not release information on the JV's turnover in the financial year 1995. However, it was 
indicated that orders had grown approximately 10% in 1996 compared with 1995. Both 
parties showed satisfaction with their JV, though they did not quantify this. The 
Chinese partner repeatedly expressed its satisfaction with the performance of the JV, 
referring to UK-4-JV's profitability. The Chinese directors added another criteria for 
their assessment of the venture's performance. "We made a lot of friends and 
friendship between two countries." 
Case Four: U K - 8 - J V 
Basic facts about UK-8 
UK-8 was established as a limited liability company. It is based in Northeast England. It 
had been engaged in the manufacture and installation of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS since its establishment in the early 1980s. In the UK, the SME holds 
about 80% of the market for ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. At the time of 
the investigation, UK-8 employed 90 staff in its operation in the UK. 
International business activities 
Apart from its activities in China, at the time of the investigation, UK-8 was involved in 
business in Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region where it exports ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS and later supervises 
their installation by local labour. In the past, the company had successfully completed 
projects in Hong Kong, the United Emirates and Pakistan. As much as 5% of its 1995 
turnover was generated abroad and for 1996 the figure was similar, whereas for 1997 
and 1998 both the managing and technical directors of UK-8 expected an overseas 
turnover share of 10 and 20%, respectively. Apart from its JV in China, UK-8 has only 
recently bought a 50% share in a Singaporean enterprise. In addition, UK-8 has two 
agents in Hong Kong and one in Dubai acquiring business on behalf of the UK SME. 
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UK-8's China experience 
Prior to its commitment in the JV in China, UK-8 was not involved in any kind of 
business with, or in, China. In 1992 the Chinese were searching the world markets for 
suitable ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS "since there is a phenomenal 
amount of work in terms of infrastructure to be carried out in China." Without the 
approach by a Chinese delegation in the first place, the UK SME would not have been 
targeting the Chinese market at all. 
Joint venture formation 
Joint venture planning 
The SME considered the Chinese government's infrastructure modernisation plans as 
a huge potential for its products and services. UK-8 had all this information about the 
potential market for its ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS obtained from its later 
partner. The company did not carry out any form of research into market opportunities 
in China itself. Instead, it relied entirely on the input from the Chinese partner 
company, though the managing director of UK-8 insisted that he had made enquiries 
into the potential of the market and its competitive situation when UK-8 was separately 
involved with a potential Chinese client to export and install ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. 
Motivations for production in Ctiina 
Motivations to engage in an FDI project 
UK-8 saw great potential for its ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS in the 
Chinese market. The UK SME had estimated approximately 100,000 kilometres of 
roads and bridges that are to be built in China over the next years. (As a matter of fact, 
by the year 2000 China plans to build another 110,000 kilometres of roads, 6,000 
kilometres of which will be expressways, while 60% of the roads will be in the centre 
and west of the country (FT, 23.9.97, p.6). The unique characteristic of UK-8's ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS is their ability to absorb the shock from traffic and 
guarantee a smooth running surface to accommodate thermo-movements. However, 
once they are broken, they need to be replaced in order to prolong the life of a bridge. 
In this respect, UK-8 was aiming both at the market for new ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS as well as the market for their replacement. At 
present, there are several hundred kilometres of bridges in China and over the next ten 
years or so they all need to replace their broken ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS. Apart from this, the ambitious efforts of the Chinese government to 
modernise the country's infrastructure are seen as being a huge potential for UK-8-JV. 
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The practice in China had been that, if repair works were carried out, bridges were 
closed and since the operator of a bridge charges customers for using it, this meant a 
loss of income for a considerable period of time. The installation of UK-8 expansion 
joints, however, would allow an operator to keep the bridge open while replacing the 
broken ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. This was also the reason for the 
Chinese company to seek collaboration with the UK SME. 
The Chinese company that was to become UK-8's partner argued that the Chinese 
market needs the more sophisticated ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS for the 
reasons above. However, importing the products was regarded as being too expensive 
and making the product thus not competitive. 
The Chinese company that was to become UK-8's later partner in the JV, had 
approached the UK department of trade and industry (DTI) to find out which 
companies would produce ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS that could be used 
as replacements in existing bridges (a German company offers ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS that are used for bridges under construction and 
there are about 12 companies worldwide that are considerably active in the specific 
industry). Eventually, the DTI identified UK-8 as matching the Chinese company's 
desired profile. 
Subsequently, the Chinese company sent a delegation to the UK after approaching it in 
the first place. The Chinese delegation spent three days with UK-8 and visited various 
sites where UK-8 had previously installed its joints systems. Subsequently, UK-8 went 
on a trade mission to Hong Kong and from there to Beijing to progress discussions. 
UK-8 accepted the approach by the Chinese to engage in an FDI project in the 
country. This was mainly due to reasons of low labour costs that would be 
advantageous for the company and so help develop the Chinese market. 
Motivations to form a joint venture 
UK-8 did not further pursue the idea of setting up a local manufacturing facility on its 
own without the participation of a local partner since "it would be simply impossible to 
do this alone." As reasons, both the managing and technical directors of UK-8 
suggested the language problem and the different business environment in China. "We 
had no idea of how to conduct business in the construction industry in China." UK-8's 
Chinese partner was already established as one of the biggest companies in China 
specialising in road furniture. Further, UK-8 did not have the necessary resources, 
financial and managerial, to pursue the idea of going it alone. 
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All of UK-8-JV's potential business goes through the authorities of the Chinese Ministry 
of Transport. The responsibility for the construction of road infrastructure rests within 
so-called 'express way companies' at the level of provincial, municipal and 
independent regions. 'Express way companies' place orders with the construction 
companies that build the express ways. From the Chinese national planning bureau 
UK-8-JV obtains information about the express ways to be constructed, including the 
total value of the projects, the constructor and calculated period of construction. 
Subsequently UK-8-JV acquires details about the designer and builder of an express 
way. From the design company UK-8-JV obtains detailed information about the project; 
for instance, the type and size of the ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS that 
should be used and the volume of a potential order. Eventually, UK-8-JV introduces its 
product to the design company and tries to convince the designer to base further 
drawings, etc. on the specifications of UK-8-JV's systems. 
From this, it becomes clear that UK-8 needed the Chinese element in its operation in 
the new market which can facilitate contacts to, and relationships with, Chinese 
authorities and potential customers. 
Partner selection 
Finding the partner 
In the case of UK-8 it was the initiative of a Chinese enterprise to find a western 
partner company to team up with in a JV. Would have the Chinese company not 
approached UK-8, a JV would not have been established and also the entering of the 
Chinese market would not have happened. Thus, the choice of the later partner was 
somewhat pre-determined in this case. 
From the very beginning of its JV operation UK-8 was certain that having a suitable 
partner was 'very important'. When attempting to identify alternative partners, the UK 
SME faced considerable obstacles. It simply did not know where to look at and whom 
to approach. 
Partner selection criteria 
UK-8 insisted that the Chinese company that had approached the UK SME initially met 
approximately 80% of UK-8's partner requirements. One of those was certainly the 
Chinese partner's reputation as a manufacturer of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS and the fact that it would have contacts and credibility in the market and 
amongst customers since these criteria were considered important for UK-8-JV to 
further develop the Chinese market for ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. 
402 
Appendix VII 
Eventually, the UK SME decided to join forces with this particular Chinese enterprise. 
However, it is not clear whether the decision resulted from the difficulties experienced 
when searching for alternative partners or the actual assessment of the Chinese 
partner company. Instead, this remains subject to speculation. 
Partner characteristics 
The Chinese partner company in UK-8-JV is a SOE, based near a provincial capital in 
China's remote area. The SOE was established in the early 1960s and is directly 
controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Communication. The Chinese company 
manufactures machinery for the road and bridge construction industry. According to 
the managing director of UK-8, its Chinese partner "basically builds bridges and 
manufactures bridge furniture." The managing director of UK-8 suggested further that 
the Chinese partner would be a 'very large' SOE with in excess of 1,000 employees. 
As a matter of fact, the Chinese enterprise had a workforce of 1,200 employees, as 
discussions with the Chinese general manager of UK-8-JV revealed. 
The managing director of UK-8 had obtained most of the information about the SOE 
from the company itself. However, some details about the Chinese partner were 
obtained also from another European company that had done business with this 
particular Chinese company before. Information on the actual turnover volume of the 
Chinese partner was not released by the Chinese side and not known by the UK SME. 
Joint venture negotiation process 
Neqotiation contents and conflict 
Part of the deal between UK-8 and the Chinese partner enterprise was to manufacture 
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS in the JV in China. All components but one 
should be purchased and produced locally. The one, chemical, component of the 
system, however, should be delivered by UK-8. This chemical component absorbs the 
shock of the traffic when it hits the ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS and was 
considered an essential one for the uniqueness of the whole product. The formulation 
of this component was regarded as a secret by UK-8 and the SME was not prepared to 
release its formulation know-how since "the Chinese are notorious for copying." 
Although this fact was discussed by the partners in the negotiations, the exclusion of 
this special component from the production programme was not so much of a problem 
for the Chinese. "They accepted it," said the managing director of UK-8. 
UK-8 and its Chinese partner also negotiated issues such as cost implementation and 
the business plan for the JV. UK-8 further insisted on the importation of equipment for 
the manufacturing and installation of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS since 
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the efficiency and quality of such machines were higher. The Chinese agreed to that 
although UK-imported equipment would cost about five times that of comparable 
equipment made in China. About 95% of the machines and equipment were new when 
they were bought. The UK SME apparently had a strong bargaining position. Due to its 
firm-specific advantage of being able to replace ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS without closing the individual bridge, UK-8's collaboration was strongly 
desired by the Chinese company. Of approximately a dozen international firms that 
operate in this industry, the Chinese chose to invite UK-8 to joint venture. Apparently, 
the Chinese partner company recognised the importance for the JV to operate with 
sophisticated equipment and thus agreed to import the more expensive UK equipment. 
Not giving the knowledge about the formulation of the special component away was 
very important for UK-8 since, without the knowledge about this certain component, the 
current Chinese partner could not really become a potential competitor of UK-8. 
The partners agreed to a JV contract duration of 12 years with the possibility of an 
extension, subject to the mutual agreement of both parties with application to MOFTEC 
six months prior to its expiration. 
SME neqotiation team, location, duration, language of negotiations, interpreters 
Negotiations were carried out, basically, between three parties both in China and in the 
UK; UK-8, the Chinese partner company and a Chinese commercial organisation 
based in Beijing (China Guangda Foreign Trade Company). UK-8-JV was negotiated, 
initially, by the managing director of UK-8 and later, "once we knew which route to 
take," he delegated this job to the technical director who went to China to get ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS installed on-site. The Chinese side had sent four 
members, including the director of the company, its vice-director, the chief engineer 
and the sales manager. The composition on the Chinese side changed throughout the 
negotiation process. Whereas the sessions in England were attended by the director, 
the chief engineer and the deputy-chief engineer and the sessions in China by the 
deputy chief engineer and the sales manager, the director and the vice-director since 
the chief engineer had retired in the meantime. Of China Guangda Foreign Trade 
Company, one manager attended the meetings; he also took over the role as 
interpreter. Negotiations were held in English and it was interpreted for the Chinese 
directors who did not speak English. 
Negotiations required four meetings between the partners with each session lasting for 
about three to four days. Initially, the managing director of UK-8 was involved in 
negotiations and later, "once we knew which route to take," the technical director of 
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UK-8 went to China to get ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS installed on the 
spot. Then negotiations progressed. The Chinese side prepared the business plan and 
all the financial issues and UK-8 reviewed it. Since UK-8 had been separately involved 
in acquiring ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS business in China (this was a 
110 kilometres road project of which 40% were bridges), the company had a basic 
understanding of the issues the Chinese partner put in the business plan. For instance, 
this gave UK-8 insight in the potential of the market so that it had not to rely entirely on 
the information input from the Chinese side. 
Subsequently, the contract was signed In the UK and approved on 22. January 1995 
by MOFTEC and the business licence was issued by the Administrative Bureau for 
Industry and Commerce In Beijing - after approximately two years of preparations and 
negotiations, whereas nine months were planned. 
The negotiation of the JV was difficult, very time consuming and expensive for UK-8. 
The SME first had to install successfully one of its ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTS in China and had to get this approved by the Ministry of Transport. 
"Regardless in which country, the equivalent of the UK department of transport has to 
approve our product before it can be used," the managing director of UK-8 made clear. 
Only then could the JV be approved by the authorities. In March 1994 the Chinese 
partner came to the UK and the JV was agreed in principle. From then, discussions 
were carried out in China. Eventually, the JV was established in March 1995. 
The managing director of UK-8 considered the negotiation process of the JV as very 
long. For the SME the language barrier was a grave problem. "Everything had to be 
discussed through interpreters. Thus, everything took so much longer to negotiate." 
This was regarded as very difficult by the managing director of UK-8. It meant a 
considerable financial and managerial burden for the UK SME when, for instance, the 
technical director had to go over to China to carry out this task. 
Factors for successful negotiations 
The managing director of UK-8 considered as factors for successful negotiations to 
build up trust between the parties. "Otherwise there will never be a deal to sort things 
out." He stressed that "there is no use in establishing a JV without trusting the partner." 
For UK-8 trust played an important role since "the Chinese would control the JV," in 
which UK-8 was the junior partner. 
Partner contributions 
SME's contribution 
To the total investment in the JV of some RMBIO.Sm (£0.77m) UK-8 contributed cash, 
the product and technology to produce and install ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
SYSTEMS, its contribution was worth RMB5.15m (£0.38m). 
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Chinese partner's contribution 
The Chinese contribution was in the form of cash and knowledge of the local business 
community, contacts, etc. Also, the Chinese partner was responsible for staffing the 
JV. The Chinese partner's knowledge of the business environment, contacts and links 
to officials was very important for the UK SME. The evaluation of the partners' 
contributions was not a problem for either side. "The Chinese established the figures 
and we were happy with this," the managing director of UK-8 said. 
Joint venture operation 
Joint venture background information 
Joint venture establishment, total investment and workforce 
UK-8-JV was established as an equity JV in the form of a limited liability company, 
according to Chinese law, on 2. March 1995. The total investment in the JV accounts 
for US$1.2m (£0.77m). At the time of the investigation, UK-8-JV employed 54 staff. 
Joint venture location 
Basically, UK-8-JV operates at two different locations: it is headquartered in the centre 
of CITY, a provincial capital in South China. There, UK-8-JV has rented office space in 
the sixth floor of a Chinese state-owned hotel. Accommodating offices in hotels had 
been rather common in China since demand for office space exceeded supply in the 
early 1990s. The three-room office is used, mainly as headquarters and as the basis of 
the marketing and sales department. The production facility of UK-8-JV is located in a 
village about 40 kilometres off central CITY [South China]. By car it takes about 40 
minutes to get there from central CITY [South China]. 
Choice of location 
UK-8 had chosen CITY [South China] as the location for its JV for several reasons, 
including 
• the potential market of the developing city and province, 
• its proximity to a major port of the country which makes the supply of the special 
chemical component convenient, fast and cheap, 
• its lower production costs, 
• its availability of trained labour, though at the time of the investigation, the 
majority of UK-8-JV's staff was seconded to it from the Chinese parent 
company,^ and finally 
• that it was easier to get the licence for the JV there since CITY [South China] 
itself is located in one of China's five special economic zones. According to the 
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general manager of UK-8-JV, there was no special treatment in terms of taxes, 
compared with other economic development areas, though it was especially tax 
concessions that were a reason for choosing CITY as the location for the JV, 
according to the managing director of UK-8. However, the tax treatment in 
special economic zones is no different from the tax treatment in other 
development zones in the case of an enterprise, such as UK-8-JV. If the 
managing director of UK-8 had thoroughly investigated different locations, he 
would have known of the similarity of tax concessions in the various 
development zones all over China. 
Production site 
The factory in the village near CITY [South China] is a typical green field site 
establishment. The construction of the factory commenced approximately at the end of 
1994 and it was completed at the end of 1995. The entire site comprises, in principle, 
three major buildings: the workshop, an office and accommodation as well as a 
warehouse building. The accommodation building had to be erected since the 
workforce of UK-8-JV came from the remote province where the Chinese parent 
company is located. 
The production site was built by the Chinese partner company. UK-8-JV only rents 
parts of the factory complex from its Chinese parent company, whereas the other parts 
of the factory are used by the Chinese company itself. The Chinese parent gets 
monthly reimbursement. 
Product range 
At the time of the investigation, UK-8-JV manufactured only one type of ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS, though in the future another type would be 
introduced that is to be produced in UK-8's (new) Singaporean plant. 
Production 
For the manufacture of the ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS the JV needs, 
basically, two types of components which are both manufactured from steel in the JV's 
workshop. Afterwards, the two components are welded together, sprayed and stored in 
the factory. The finished ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS are then transported 
to the road building site where they are used for installation. At the time of the 
investigation, UK-8's expatriate manager supervised the installation process which was 
carried out by local Chinese workers. 
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At the time of the investigation UK-8-JV did not have an ISO certificate. However, there 
is a Ministry of Communication standard which has to be met, "in order to be able to 
sell our product." In the UK, the equivalent is the Ministry of Transport. Though UK-8 
holds the ISO certificate, in China, the implementation of ISO had, at the time of the 
investigation, just started to be talked about. 
Sourcinq 
Overall, UK-8-JV uses a variety of components for both the manufacturing and the 
subsequent installation of the joints. As outlined above, UK-8-JV sources, apart from a 
special, chemical, component all Its supplies locally in China. According to the 
business plan of UK-8-JV, 15% of the costs for one unit (= one metre) of finished 
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS is labour content and as much as 85% is 
material content. Thus, the local sourcing of components and materials in China is 
economically advantageous and thus pursued by the business. 
Originally, in terms of value, the share of imported supplies, at the time of the 
investigation, accounted for some 70% with the remaining 30% being locally sourced. 
25% thereof (= certain steel components) are purchased from the Chinese partner 
company, as it was contractually fixed. The remaining 5% (= very simple components 
and materials) were sourced from a local Chinese supplier based in CITY [South 
China]. In the meantime, the JV has also started purchasing rubber components in 
China (from its Chinese parent), instead of importing them from the UK for a higher 
price. In the future, the share of components (by value) shipped over from the UK will 
be reduced to 50% even. Then, 45% will be sourced from the Chinese partner and 5% 
from another local supplier. Recently, the price of the special, chemical, component 
that is sourced in the UK, was reduced in an attempt to help the JV operate more cost 
competitive. Equally, this reduced the share of value of goods imported to the JV. 
Problems with local sourcing had, by the time of the investigation, not occurred. 
Although the quality of Chinese steel is lower than that of foreign, for example 
Japanese, steel, it is sufficient for road steel and can thus be used without a limitation. 
Target market 
With its ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS, UK-8-JV targets the Chinese market 
exclusively. This was fixed in the JV contract. However, subsequently, other markets in 
the region will be serviced and even the exporting back to the UK of certain 
components will be considered. This is especially finished steel components that the 
JV wanted to export back to the UK starting in 1997. There is no definite export ratio 
fixed in the JV contract. Instead, UK-8 managed to satisfy the Chinese authorities with 
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a "we will try" phrase that will not result in financial 'punishment' in case a certain ratio 
cannot be met in an individual year. 
The Chinese Ministry of Communications is in charge of all planning and management 
of China's transportation infrastructure. In China's provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipal cities, express way companies are responsible for the construction of road 
infrastructure. The express way companies give orders to construction companies that 
subsequently build the express ways. 
The general manager of UK-8-JV explains how the acquisition of orders works - in the 
case of the province, where CITY [South China] is the capital of: the JV gets 
information about the express way to be constructed from the Chinese national 
planning bureau. This is information about the total value of the project, about who is 
going to construct it and how long the project would take. In a next step UK-8-JV finds 
out who is in charge of designing and building the project. From the design company, 
UK-8-JV gets more information about the project, for instance, what types of ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTRE PRODUCTS will be used, the size of such products and the volume 
of the potential order. 
With this information in hand, UK-8-JV introduces its product to the design company 
and tries to convince the designer to base further drawings, etc. on UK-8-JV's ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. "If they are interested in our products then they will 
recommend our joints to the construction contractor, who builds the bridge," the 
marketing manager of UK-8-JV suggested. The JV further needs to make suggestions 
to the construction company that builds the express way, because the builders care 
about price of the product and its longevity. Eventually, it is the building company and 
the designer that make a final decision. 
As means of promoting its products, the JV applies symposiums where existing as well 
as potential customers (people in charge of the construction of . express ways) are 
invited. Very important for the JV to get orders is also the word-of-mouth 
recommendation to potential clients by satisfied customers. Although UK-8-JV had 
been, at the time of the investigation, operating in China for only about two years, and 
the ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS are a new type of product in China, the 
company had already several successful reference projects in the country. This makes 
it easier for potential customers to accept the JV's product. The majority of these 
reference projects were installed in the 'home' province of the JV in South China. The 
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first type of reference project for the North of China was, at the time of the 
investigation, being installed and a lot of attention was being paid to it. 
If UK-8-JV's first project in the North of China worth some RMB400,000 (£29,674), 
could be successfully installed to the entire satisfaction of the client, a construction 
company based in North China, the project would eventually open this northern market 
for UK-8-JV since most of the construction companies are in contact with each other. 
On the other hand, if UK-8-JV could not satisfy its client, it might be difficult the next 
time to get another order. 
Market share in China 
The majority of projects UK-8-JV had installed by the time of the investigation, are 
located in CITY [South China]. There, the company has a market share of about 20%. 
"For other markets it is difficult to say," the marketing manager pointed out. 
Joint venture ownership 
Of the total investment in UK-8-JV of RMB10.5m (£0.78m), UK-8 holds a 49% equity 
share. Initially, UK-8 wanted to obtain the majority share in the venture, but the 
Chinese side objected to the UK SME's desire for the majority and even for an equal 
equity share in the JV. UK-8's bargaining position was not strong enough to push this 
through. Eventually, UK-8 accepted the minority share. "We are happy with 49%," said 
the managing director of UK-8. 
Joint venture control 
The BoD of UK-8-JV has five members and the number of seats in the BoD is 
distributed according to the equity distribution: the Chinese side holds three seats, the 
UK side two. On the Chinese side, BoD positions are held by the Chinese general 
manager of UK-8-JV as well as by the managing director and deputy managing 
director of the Chinese parent company. On the UK side, positions are held by the 
managing director and the joint managing director of UK-8. 
In the JV the Chinese side is in charge of administration and the commercial issues, 
whereas UK-8 oversees the technical side and, thus, expatriated one of its employees 
to look at the technical side and supervise the installation of ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. 
The BoD of UK-8-JV meets once a year. Board meetings are held alternately in CITY 
[East China], in the UK and in CITY [remote China] where the Chinese parent 
company is located. In total, UK-8 managers go out to China three or four times a 
year. Very important decisions are made by the board members, including which 
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components are to be sourced where. By the time of the investigation, UK-8 had not 
experienced problems with joint decision-making. 
Joint venture management 
The Chinese side had appointed the general manager of UK-8-JV. This was not an 
issue of conflict between the two parties in the JV. The general manager is responsible 
for the day to day operations of the JV. Prior to his commitment in the JV, the Chinese 
manager was assistant director with the Chinese partner company, in charge of 
worldwide sales. The general manager's permanent office location is in central CITY 
[South China]. Three times a week he visits the workshop to supervise production. 
Since the entire management of the JV is in Chinese hands, there is no conflict in 
decision-making styles, etc. that would be worth investigating for the purpose of this 
study. Also, the weight of the expatriate installation supervisor is rather weak and he 
has to report to the general manager. 
At the time of the investigation, UK-8-JV employed one expatriate. He was sent over 
from the UK parent company for a duration of three years. The British citizen who had 
been working with UK-8 for the past 15 years, supervises the installation process of 
the bridge expansion joint systems on the spot. However, his contract is to expire after 
three years and UK-8's expatriate replacement, an engineer, is to work alongside the 
JV's management and to help boost domestic sales also. The Chinese side agreed 
that the JV would need more help to increase domestic business. 
Currently, UK-8-JV covers approximately 60 to 70% of the costs of the expatriate, the 
rest is paid for by the UK SME. Although it is important for UK-8 to retain an expatriate 
in the JV since "otherwise we could lose it altogether," costs of one expatriate are 
about 40 times that of a local employee. The expatriation of UK personnel is thought 
about very carefully since it is an imposition of a high financial burden for the SME. 
Joint venture problems 
Production 
The managing director of UK-8 considered the quality aspect of the JV's ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS as potentially problematic for the future. If the quality 
of the products is not up to standard, this could damage the reputation of the company. 
"Everyone gets a first order. But if the customer is not satisfied with the quality, you will 
not get another one." 
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Only if the quality of the work completed is recognised as such, UK-8-JV's ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS would be specified for more projects by the 
respective Chinese ministry. Thus, UK-8-JV planned to get its operation ISO approved. 
Local sourcing 
The known problems of local sourcing, including insufficient quality of supplies, 
unreliable suppliers and limited supplies had not been experienced by UK-8-JV. 
Sales and marketinq 
According to the managing director of UK-8, the JV has various problems with respect 
to marketing and sales. "Their method of marketing pisses us off." In the UK, UK-8's 
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS system has approximately 70 to 80% of the 
market and in China the company is still struggling to develop market share. "We 
expected more, a bigger share of the market. This is bad salesmanship." It is important 
for the JV to have reference projects in various places of the market. Only so can 
potential customers inspect the quality of UK-8-JV's products and be convinced to 
place an order with the JV. 
Though the managing director recognised the importance that price plays in the 
business in China, "we do not see that the market is all about price." He criticised the 
passive approach of the JV's management towards the acquisition of new business in 
the Chinese market. "They do not really look for the repair market to solve an 
engineer's problem. They cannot go to prospective clients. They have not got the 
expertise, the knowledge." 
Price 
The ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS of UK-8-JV do not only have a life 
expectation of some 15 years, which is at least three times higher than that of common 
Chinese products, and the quality of the products is the best, according to the 
marketing manager of the JV, the price of the JV's products had been nearly twice as 
much as that of its main competitors - a private Chinese and a US company. Only 
recently could the JV reduce the cost of the product (the special component supplies 
were made cheaper) and now the price is 1.5 times higher. However, since the 
Chinese government is short of money, price is a major issue when negotiating the 
sale of the JV's products. At the time of the investigation, only the province where the 
JV is based, and the province in North China could, or wanted to, afford these 
expensive ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS. 
Communication 
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Originally, UK-8 had faced some communication problems with the JV's management. 
The UK SME wanted to receive monthly reports to better be able to monitor the 
progress of the JV. However, the JV management did not provide reports on a monthly 
basis. It was prepared only, or could manage, to send them every three months. 
The new expatriate manager who UK-8 is about to send to China to replace its 
installation supervisor, will work, together with the JV management, on establishing an 
accounting system. Perhaps then will the JV send its monthly reports. 
Joint venture evaluation 
Joint venture performance 
Neither the general manager of the JV nor the managing director of UK-8 were 
satisfied with the JV's performance in 1995. "It could be better. It was not as laid out in 
the business plan." A reason was certainly that building works in the factory had just 
finished and the JV could only then start properly to conduct business. 
In 1995, instead of 5,000 metres of ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTS, only 
1,941 metres were produced and installed. According to the general manager of UK-8-
JV, the reason for this considerable discrepancy was that both partners' pledged 
contributions arrived too late at the JV which meant, for the JV, that it could not carry 
out all the necessary preparations, ie going through all procedures, including the 
collection of relevant stamps for getting the business approved. 
The managing director of UK-8 was convinced that the JV would "run a lot better from 
now on." For 1996, he expected a turnover of some RMB16.0m (£1.2m), RMB27.0m 
(£2.0m) in 1997 and RMB40.4m (£3.0m) in 1998. Later projections by the managing 
director of UK-8 suggested a turnover in 1997 of US$7.Om (£4.5m) even that would be 
very likely to be achieved. 
The supply of components to the UK-8-JV, at the time of the investigation, contributed 
some 5% to UK-8's overall earnings and in 1998, the UK SME will ship some 100 
tonnes of the chemical component to the JV, similar to the amount that is used by UK-
8 at home. 
The high price of the JV's products compared with those of competitors' is the main 
obstacle, according to the general manager of UK-8-JV, for achieving high sales 
volumes, despite all its advantages (easy installation, longevity, etc.) - apart from the 
economic situation in China, of a China that does not spend enough money on 
infrastructure projects. "At the beginning we had a lot of difficulties to market our 
products. After a lot of hard work, sales have increased steadily." 
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Notes 
^ Market potential [chemical industry: £6.09m; shipping: £3.66m; power generation: £1.23m; 
textiles: £1.83m; pulp: £2.43m; aviation: £2.43m; agriculture: £4.85m; automotive: £3.02m; 
pharmaceutical: £1.83m; mining: £2.43m; petrochemical: £12.77m]; Location of potentials 
[Northeast China: 20%; East China: 25%; North China: 10%; Northwest China: 10%; Central 
China: 10%; Southwest China: 15%; South China: 10%. 
• ^ This is in contradiction with information in GER-O's newsletter (GER-0 Newsletter, January 
1996) which suggests that GER-0 had prepared nearly 3,000 transparent and 1,400 paper 
copies. 
^ Note: this includes the entire overhead. 
Add-on: insurance: .12; housing fund: .20; health care: .07; welfare: .07; labour union fee: 
.02). For details on add-ons see Kaiser and Grimm et al. (1997). Further: at the beginning of 
the Winter, GER-O-JV buys hand cream for staff or drinks in the summer; or sends wives of 
employees to the hospital for preventive surgery. GER-O-JV provides also apples or peaches 
according to what is currently harvested. Additionally, one or two times per year, GER-O-JV 
covers the cost of the hairdresser or provides the company car when staff gets married and 
buys presents or lets staff take two days off if they move houses. Further, when family 
members of employees are ill, employees are allowed to stay at home to look after them. 
^ Perhaps the availability of trained labour is important for the future development of the 
workforce. 
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